TWO CCJ's from Parrell Parking Limited - late application for set aside

Coupon-mad

ieshagayle25 said:

 Hi all,

I checked my credit report on the 2nd of February 2025 and was shocked to find that there were two CCJs issued against me, both dated 8th March 2022. These were from Parallel Parking Limited, and related to parking tickets. I hadn't received any correspondence from either Parallel Parking or Gladstones Solicitors (who were acting on their behalf).

I panicked and called Gladstones that same day (2nd Feb), only to find out that the CCJs had been served to my old address, which I moved out of in April 2019. They told me they’d done an Experian trace and had sent letters to my current address on the  27th July 2021—but I never received them.

I asked them to send the letters via email instead, which they did. The start of the letter stated:

“We wrote to you on 20 July 2021 at an alternate address. We have since carried out an Experian trace, which has produced a new address for you.”

They claimed that because I didn’t respond to that letter, they proceeded to serve the judgment at what they considered my "last known address"—which turned out to be the old one I hadn’t lived at for years.

Castle said:

OP

Have you contacted Experian to confirm this? (Because, why do a trace less than 7 days after sending the first letter unless the first letter was returned to sender!)

Gladstones:
"Our Client has followed the correct process and your address came from the DVLA. If this was incorrect at the time the charges were incurred, then it is your obligation to ensure your details are correct and kept up to date". 

Shot themselves in the foot.

VCS v Carr is binding and it has confirmed that a DVLA address is only a 'starting point'.

And if it's true that they did a trace in 2021, then the 'new' address that the trace gave them, then became 'the last known address'. Not the DVLA car address from years before!

And why didn't they do another 29 pence (cheap as chips in bulk) address trace immediately before litigation in 2022?

And why did they split the claims into two, which doubled the costs & court time/burden?

And why did they add 10.25% interest? Maximum is 8%.

Nothing has been answered by Gladstones.

They're clearly hoping you don't know that you can clobber them at a hearing re all of the above conduct.

asevabab

VCS v Carr is binding and it has confirmed that a DVLA address is only a 'starting point'.

Thought the same, especially as some of the witness statements I’ve read make similar points.

And if it's true that they did a trace in 2021, then the 'new' address that the trace gave them, then became 'the last known address'. Not the DVLA car address from years before!

I’m also thinking that if a tracing agent could find me in 2021, the claimant could’ve done the same. I’d already updated my address back in 2019 on things like utility bills, car insurance, and my bank account – all of which show on my credit file. I can provide proof of this.

Part of me wants to email them a quick summary of what I know, to see if they’ll back down. But from what I’ve read, that’s probably a waste of time. What do you think?

Also, should I reply to their email to formally decline their offer and say I’ll be submitting the N244 application? Or just ignore it?

I think the penny’s finally dropping now, lol – am I right in thinking the witness statement should focus on the key points above and be backed up with procedures, legislation, codes of practice, and any relevant case law?

Coupon-mad

Yes that's right.

And ignore Gs now. Waste of space! 

asevabab

Here's an updated draft of WS. I've reorganised it to improve the flow. Are there any sections you think would work better in a different place? 

Could you also check my section about promptness—do you think the reason I gave is strong enough? 

I'm wondering if I should move it up, maybe just before the sequence of events, since it's right where I mention the claimant's lack of promptness.

-----------------------------------------------------------

WITNESS STATEMENT

I, [MY NAME], of [MY ADDRESS], will say as follows:

1.     I make this statement in support of my application to set aside the default judgment entered against me. The judgment was obtained without proper service of the claim form, and I had no knowledge of the proceedings until after the judgment was entered. I respectfully request the Court set aside the judgment under CPR 13.2 and/or CPR 13.3.

2.     I believe I have a strong and legitimate defence to the claim. In the event that the claim is not dismissed, I respectfully request the opportunity to defend it fully and fairly, in accordance with CPR 13.3, which provides for the setting aside of a default judgment where the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim.

3.     I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me on 08/03/2022. I am aware that PARALLEL PARKING LTD is the Claimant, and the claim appears to relate to an unpaid Parking Charge Notice.

 

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

 

4.     The address listed on the claim form is ADDRESS A. I moved from this address to my current residence at ADDRESS B in April 2019 [see Exhibit A].

 

5.     I was unaware of the claim made against me until I obtained a credit report from Equifax on 13/02/2025. I was at this point that I discovered a Country Court Judgment had been entered against me.

6.     I contacted the Claimant and was told that following an Experian soft trace, a letter was sent to my current address on 27 July 2021. However, I did not receive any correspondence or notice regarding this matter until I requested the Claimant re-send them to me by email [see Exhibit B and C].

 

7.     One such letter stated: “We wrote to you on 20 July 2021 at an alternate address. We have since carried out an Experian trace, which has produced a new address for you.”

 

8.     This shows that the Claimant was aware their original address was incorrect, and had successfully traced and identified my correct address as of July 2021.


9.Despite having the correct address from July 2021, the Claimant issued proceedings in 2022 using an outdated address—believed to be the vehicle’s registered keeper address held by the DVLA, which was no longer valid [see Exhibit D].

10.  In VCS v Carr [2024], it was held that reliance on a DVLA address alone does not amount to proper service if the claimant is aware of a more up-to-date address [see Exhibit E]. The court confirmed that the last known address under CPR 6.9(2) must reflect what the claimant actually knows, and a trace resulting in a new address obligates the claimant to use that address for service.

 

11.  The Claimant's continued use of the DVLA address—despite holding a more current address since July 2021—renders service of the claim form invalid. The default judgment was consequently entered without proper notice, denying me the opportunity to respond or defend the claim.

 

12.  Furthermore, once the trace returned a new address, that address became the “last known address” for service under CPR 6.9(3). Thus, the Claimant has failed to comply with CPR 6.9(3), as they were aware that I no longer lived at [ADDRESS A] but continued to serve the claim form there, resulting in an unjust judgment against me.

 

13.  I have attached an extract from my Equifax credit file [see Exhibit F] which shows that I had active accounts at my current address from 2019.

 

14.  This failure to take proper steps is not an isolated case. Many individuals across the country have been similarly affected by the parking industry's failure to confirm accurate addresses, resulting in undue stress and legal burdens.

15.  DVLA data is provided for a limited purpose: to enable parking operators to contact the registered keeper shortly after a parking event. It is not intended for litigation or legal service purposes.

16.  The KADOE (Keeper at Date of Event) system offers only a snapshot of where a vehicle was registered at a particular time, not a reliable service address for court claims.

17.  Operators are permitted to query the DVLA only once. Therefore, the IPC Code mandates that reasonable steps be taken to confirm the defendant’s current address prior to issuing a claim.

18.  The use of an outdated DVLA address, without soft trace checks (which are inexpensive and readily available), breaches the IPC Code of Practice, the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, and CPR requirements to take reasonable steps to ensure proper service.

19.  In “Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan” (2018), the court held that sending court documents to a previous address when a more recent one is known is not proper service [see Exhibit G]. Also, in CS v Carr [2022] EW Misc 13 (CC), the court confirmed that the DVLA address is only a starting point and not sufficient where other steps could be taken [see Exhibit H].

ABUSE OF PROCESS / CAUSE OF ACTION ESTOPPEL

20.  I respectfully draw the Court's attention to the fact that the Claimant has issued multiple claims arising from related matters, rather than consolidating them into a single action. This approach unnecessarily increases costs and burdens on the court, contrary to the overriding objectives of CPR Part 3 and the principles established in Henderson v Henderson [1843], which discourage re-litigation of matters that could and should have been addressed together. [see Exhibit I]

 

21.  Likewise, in Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 3 All ER 41 the court noted that cause of action estoppel “…applies where a cause of action in a second action is identical to a cause of action in the first, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject matter.” [see Exhibit J]

 

22.  The Claimant, who is legally represented, either knows or ought to know that fragmenting alleged debts into separate claims - each relying on substantially the same particulars and factual background - constitutes an abuse of the civil litigation process.

 

23.  Specifically, the Claimant has brought two separate claims that are nearly identical in substance, differing only in the date of the Parking Charge Notices (PCNs):

 

24.  Claim 1 [Claim Number: xxxxxx] concerns PCNs issued on 06/05/2021.

 

25.  Claim 2 [Claim Number: yyyyyy] concerns a PCN issued on 20/05/2021.

 

26.  Both claims rely on the same narrative of events and location, with no material difference other than the PCN date.

 

27.  The Claimant, having issued the first claim without advancing the entirety of their case, is now barred from bringing further claims based on the same or similar facts. Any further cause of action arising from those circumstances is extinguished under the principle of cause of action estoppel. Where the facts and legal basis are substantially the same, the Court may prevent additional claims from proceeding.

 

28.  I respectfully invite the Court to strike out the second claim on these grounds. In the alternative, I ask the Court to consolidate the claims for determination together and to consider applying appropriate sanctions against the Claimant for this misuse of process.

CLAIM SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT

29.  I respectfully bring to the Court’s attention that I was never served with the Particulars of Claim. As a result, I have been denied a fair opportunity to understand or respond to the allegations made.

 

30.  Despite my request on 13/02/2025 for the Claimant to provide a copy of the Particulars, no response has been received [see Exhibit K]. This failure—together with the fact that the Claimant sent correspondence to an outdated address, despite later confirming that an Experian trace had identified a more current one—demonstrates that the claim was neither properly served nor sufficiently pleaded.

 

31.  The Claimant’s failure to serve the claim to my correct address, coupled with their decision to issue multiple separate claims, is contrary to CPR 1.1 – The Overriding Objective. This rule requires the court to deal with cases justly and proportionately, ensuring both parties are on an equal footing, avoiding unnecessary expense and delay, and making effective use of court resources.

 

32.  Under CPR 3.4(2), the Court may strike out a statement of case if it: (a) discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim; or (b) constitutes an abuse of the Court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. This claim satisfies both of these grounds.

 

33.  In Venulum Property Investments Ltd v Space Architecture & Others [2013] EWHC 1242 (TCC), the Court held that a failure to serve claim forms properly, combined with deliberate procedural delays, amounted to an abuse of process and warranted the claim being struck out under CPR 3.4 [see Exhibit L].

 

34.  Similarly, in Nugent v Nugent [2019] EWHC 1151 (Ch), the Court struck out proceedings on the basis that the claim had not been properly served and the claimant had failed to adhere to principles of procedural fairness  [see Exhibit M].

 

35.  These authorities reinforce the proposition that where a party fails to comply with fundamental service requirements and undermines the fair progression of proceedings, striking out the claim is not only justified but necessary to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.

 

THE CLAIM IS EXPIRED UNSERVED

36.  It is a core procedural requirement under CPR 7.5 that a claim form must be served within four months of the date of issue. Where this does not occur, the claim expires and cannot be continued or revived without a formal application and good reason. In this case, more than four months have elapsed since issue, and no valid service was ever affected. As such, continuation of this claim is contrary to the CPRs and established legal practice.

37.  The Claimant bears sole responsibility for failing to ensure proper service within the required timeframe. The consequence is that this claim is now expired and unserved, and it is not open to the Claimant to proceed with it in its current form.

 

38.  The Claimant should not be permitted to waste further Court time or resources, particularly where they have failed to comply with key procedural obligations, including the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the IPC Code of Practice, and CPR 6.9, which obliges a claimant to take ‘reasonable steps’ to verify a defendant’s current address prior to service. The failure to do so is particularly egregious given the Claimant had access to an Experian trace identifying the correct address, yet chose to ignore it.

39.  If the Claimant believes they still have a cause of action, the correct course is to commence proceedings afresh—this time complying with all relevant procedural requirements. This includes sending a proper Letter Before Claim to the correct address, as required by the Pre-Action Protocol. To date, I have received no claim form or Particulars of Claim at my current address, and therefore have had no opportunity to understand or respond to the case.

40.  For these reasons, I respectfully request that the Court strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b). The claim is procedurally defective, time-barred under CPR 7.5, and was never validly served.

CONSIDERATION OF PROMPTNESS

41.  I acknowledge that I did not act as promptly as ideally required in addressing this matter. However, the delay was not intentional, nor was it due to any disregard for the Court’s process. I suffer from ADHD, which significantly effects my executive functioning and impacts my ability to manage complex administrative tasks, particularly without external prompts or structured support [See Exhibit O and Exhibit P] . This neurological condition has directly contributed to the delay in my response.

42.  I respectfully request that the Court take this into account when considering the issue of promptness under CPR 13.3(2). Once I became aware of the judgment and was able to understand the situation fully, I acted as swiftly as I reasonably could in making this application.

CONCLUSION

43.  In light of the above, I was unable to file a defence or properly respond to the claim. I therefore submit that the Default Judgment was entered incorrectly and respectfully request that it be set aside.

 

44.  I also respectfully request that the Court consider ordering the Claimant to reimburse the £313 court fee I was required to pay in order to apply for this set-aside, as well as my reasonable costs for attending any hearing.

45.  Due to my diagnosis of ADHD, I face significant challenges with concentration, focus, and organisation. These difficulties substantially increase the amount of time it takes me to complete administrative and legal tasks compared to the average individual.

46.  In accordance with CPR 46.5, I respectfully request that the Court allow a reasonable amount of preparation time at the Litigant in Person rate of £19 per hour. I estimate that I have spent approximately 15 hours preparing this application, which amounts to a total of £285. I submit that this is a fair and proportionate amount in the circumstances and ask the Court to include this in any costs award.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH:

47.  I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

Signed:
Date:

Coupon-mad

Change it from:

41.  I acknowledge that I did not act as promptly as ideally required in addressing this matter. However, the delay was not intentional, nor was it due to any disregard for the Court’s process. I suffer from ADHD, which significantly effects my executive functioning...

to this

41.  I acted promptly, given a reasonable adjustment of time because I have 'protected characteristics' under the Equality Act 2010. I suffer from ADHD, which significantly effects my executive functioning... 

1505grandad

Para 19. -  VCS v Carr

Coupon-mad

Another good spot as usual!

asevabab

Thank you, @Coupon-mad and @1505grandad — really appreciate your help.

I’ve updated the WS draft with your suggested corrections.

Now that it’s done, shall I go ahead and send it?