PARKING EYE - court claim 2025

Gr1pr

Please answer the question I asked earlier 

I assume that the claimant is Parking Eye,  top left of the claim form,  but is it  Parking Eye themselves or DCB Legal listed in the second box down on the left   ?

Please edit your out of date thread title in post 1 to something more suitable like 

Parking Eye court claim 2025

GinaGrey

Gr1pr said:

Please answer the question I asked earlier 

I assume that the claimant is Parking Eye,  top left of the claim form,  but is it  Parking Eye themselves or DCB Legal listed in the second box down on the left   ?

Please edit your out of date thread title in post 1 to something more suitable like 

Parking Eye court claim 2025

title amended. 

yes it is ParkingEye LTD themselves @Gr1pr

Coupon-mad

Have they added £25 to the PCN or have they added £30? Look at the columns on the right. 

Show us the bottom half of the claim form but COVER the MCOL password bottom right and your VRM in the particulars on the left. We need to see the ''particulars'.

Was this a hospital? Or where?

Change this as shown:

The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen - over and above the £1.40 they their own system failed to take - and that...

And remove the template paragraphs 9-11 about the DLUHC as that's old news that I will remove this week from the template.

Replace the template 9-11 with this - WITH the italics shown - because they accused the driver of failing to pay a tariff:


9. The breach complained of is that the driver (not the Defendant) allegedly failed to pay the parking tariff specified in the Claimant’s onsite notices. The Supreme Court considered the application of the rule against penalties in precisely this situation in the leading case of  ParkingEye Limited v Beavis ([2015] UKSC67):

The true test [of whether a term is a penalty] is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation (per Lords Neuberger and Sumption at paragraph 32).

10. The term at issue in this case is the one imposing a secondary obligation to pay £100 for breach of the primary obligation to pay the tariff. The Supreme Court held that the £85 parking charge in Beavis was a secondary obligation that engaged the penalty rule but was saved by the special circumstance of the parking arrangements in that case.

[T]he £85 charge had two main objects. One was to manage the efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of those outlets who wish to find spaces in which to park their cars. This was to be achieved by deterring commuters or other long-stay motorists from occupying parking spaces for long periods or engaging in other inconsiderate parking practices, thereby reducing the space available to other members of the public, in particular the customers of the retail outlets. The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable Parking Eye to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services, without which those services would not be available. (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption at paragraph 98).

In our opinion, while the penalty rule is plainly engaged, the £85 charge is not a penalty. The reason is that although ParkingEye was not liable to suffer loss as a result of overstaying motorists, it had a legitimate interest in charging them which extended beyond the recovery of any loss.

The scheme in operation here (and in many similar car parks) is that the landowner authorises ParkingEye to control access to the car park and to impose the agreed charges, with a view to managing the car park in the interests of the retail outlets, their customers and the public at large. That is an interest of the landowners because (i) they receive a fee from ParkingEye for the right to operate the scheme, and (ii) they lease sites on the retail park to various retailers, for whom the availability of customer parking was a valuable facility. It is an interest of ParkingEye, because it sells its services as the managers of such schemes and meets the costs of doing so from charges for breach of the terms (and if the scheme was run directly by the landowners, the analysis would be no different). As we have pointed out, deterrence is not penal if there is a legitimate interest in influencing the conduct of the contracting party which is not satisfied by the mere right to recover damages for breach of contract. (ibid at paragraph 99)

11. Those purposes are not served by the secondary term in this case. The Claimant charges motorists for parking at this car park, from which it receives an income stream. There is no purpose of deterring motorists from occupying parking spaces for long periods.  On the contrary, the legitimate commercial interests of the operator are served by encouraging motorists to stay, and pay, for long periods. In short, the Beavis exception cannot apply to failure to pay the tariff in a pay-to-park car park and the secondary obligation in the present case is, therefore, a penalty and unenforceable.

GinaGrey

Thanks @Coupon-mad - the amount claimed is £125 so it looks like they've added £25

No this wasn't a hospital, just a regular car park in the town centre, that wasn't even busy at the time we stayed there for 35 minutes only. During our POPLA appeal they provided a list of other cars using the car park at the same time, and there were literally 7 cars on that list, so not busy at all.

Here's the screenshot: 

Coupon-mad

OK so replace this para 2

2. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and
honest belief. Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste
incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in
breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts
necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action".
The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with
certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being
pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is
recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered
keeper and the driver on the date in question.

with this instead:

2. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief. The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper and the driver on the date in question. It is denied that any parking charge on a ParkingEye sign could have been £125. The British Parking Association applies a mandatory cap and the maximum is £100. This Claimant now routinely pursues an unconscionable fixed sum added at the eleventh hour to each PCN, despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban add-ons and despite binding case law against them (on this very point) in ParkingEye v Somerfield. In a tactic only seen from this bulk Claimant in recent months, the sum claimed under purported 'contract' has been suddenly and disproportionately exaggerated by £25 immediately prior to proceedings. This is double recovery because the capped legal fees are also being claimed, at £50. The Defendant takes the point that enhancing their claim with a disproportionate and impermissible sum, is reason enough to disallow the claim. The signage could not have formed a contract for a £125 parking charge. The Defendant denies knowing about, let alone 'agreeing' to any contract to pay £100, let alone the inflated sum of £125 and the Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof of all their allegations.

GinaGrey

That's amazing, thanks for all your help @Coupon-mad xx