CCJ set aside of CEL claim

Sumsum12

But what about the email they sent today? Should I ignore that as well?

Grizebeck

Yes you should ignore it

Sumsum12

OK. Thank you. 

Coupon-mad

Sumsum12 said:

Hi again, I can’t send a screenshot of it because I’m a newbie, but I’ll try to find a way to do so. However,I have just received a response from DCBL regarding the letter I sent yesterday about my pending application. What should I do next?


*********

Thank you for your email.

As you are aware, DCBL are instructed by our Client Civil Enforcement Ltd to recover the outstanding balance of £297.23 in relation to the unpaid County Court Judgment (CCJ) issued to you, reference number xxxx

Please be advised, this matter is not the subject of any high court or bailiff action.

The courts have already passed judgment and you have been deemed liable therefore a CCJ has been issued against you and whilst instruction remains from our Client, DCBL will continue to issue notices of debt recovery in relation to this matter.

You can pay easily by using Scan to Pay, simply scan the QR code located on our letters with your phone and pay by card. You can also pay by card on the secure payment page on the website 24 hours a day www.dcbltd.com/pay-online/.

Alternatively, use our 24/7 Payment line: 01302 897022— Office number: 01606 539 169 Office opening hours: Monday—Friday 8am—8pm.

I'd reply (without the word 'Dear':


DCB Ltd,

Wind your necks in. I've filed an application and the claim will be set aside.  The Court will serve a copy of my N244 and witness statement to Civil Enforcement Ltd in the usual way and they'll no doubt be ordered to pay my £303 fee and their claim will be struck out in due course.

Move onto a weaker victim.

yours faithfully

YOU

Coupon-mad

This bit was a wrong move: wrong forms, wrong place to send it to, and not a Penalty Charge) but that's in the past. No harm done:

"1.6.4 On October 10, 2024, I submitted forms TE9 and TE7 to the Traffic Enforcement Centre to formally request the cancellation of Penalty Charge No. Xxx, linked to Claim No. Xxxx."

You'll now need a Skeleton Argument with the legal arguments and case law I mentioned earlier (and excerpt from the BPA CoP about checking details before litigation) but wait till you are 4 months past the date of the actual claim form.

Can you now edit your thread title to something more relevant:

CCJ set aside of CEL claim

Sumsum12

Thank you for your help Coupon- Mad.
I have been trying for several days to draft my amended witness statement but must admit that I’ve struggled. As a result, I began copying and pasting content from the threads you recommended (apologies to Zbubuman and Brightonrock123 for borrowing your information) while doing my best to make it suitable. I would appreciate your feedback or any advice to help improve it. To be honest, there’s a lot of information and numerous rules, which makes it challenging to determine which ones are most relevant to my case. Additionally, I’d like to know if I need to include copies of judgments such as CEL v Chan, VCSL v Carr, Akande, or any others.

Sumsum12

Hier is My amendment Witnesses statement as well a request to the court for approval of my amended statement.

 

**To the Court: **  

 

 I write to inform you of my intention to amend my witness statement submitted on [21/10]. The amendment is necessary to correct inaccuracies.  

I have made the amendments clearly identifiable in the revised statement, which I am ready to submit if the court permits

 

 

WITNESS STATEMENT

 

 

1.1. I was the registered keeper of the vehicle at the time of the alleged offence and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgment (CCJ) entered against me on XX/XX/XXXX, in default due to a defective service of Claim.  

 

1.2. I have not received any claim form or detailed particulars of the claim regarding this matter until I became aware via letter from Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd on 2nd of October 2024. This is when I found out the Claimant had obtained a default CCJ against me.  

 

1.3. The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the IPC Code of Practice 22.1 and CPR 6.9, as more than 12 months have passed since the PCN on XX/XX/XXXX and the CCJ on XX/XX/XXXX.  

 

1.4. Whilst I am unsure which date the claim was issued, it has been more than four months since the CCJ was issued, during which time I have not been aware of the claim or the CCJ. As per CPR 7.5, the claim should now be dismissed.

"" "

 [I am not sure if I can include this in my case. Dcbl sent the letter on October the second, but it was dated September 25th, informing me about a CCJ issued against me on the July 4th, even though TransUnion shows it was issued on June28th, which means it has been four months since the claim was issued and I knew about it on 2nd of October which is only 3 months after that] "

1.5. In addition to the above, it should be highlighted that my integrity and law-abiding intention should be taken into consideration on the basis that;

 

1.6. Upon receiving the DCBL letter on October 2, 2024, I contacted them that same day, as well as on October 8, 2024, to request relevant information regarding the default judgment. However, the request was denied, and no information about the Claimant or the Claim was provided.

 

1.7. The initial event leading to the judgment and the steps taken to challenge and overturn it can be outlined as follows:

 

• 25/02/2022 - Moved into temporary address  xxxx
• 04/2022 - Registered my current address xxxx with
• O5/2022 - Registered my current address With Utilities as well driving licence

• 04/01/2023  -    Parking Charging Fine
• 02/02/2023  -    Payment due
• 04/07/2024  -    Judgment

 

No correspondence regarding this matter was received from any party during the above - mentioned dates.

 

• 25/09/2024 -  DCBL letter issued 
• 02/10/2024 -  DCBL letter received 
• 02 & 03/10/2024 - Emails sent to DCBL and Court (CNBC) seeking information
• 03/10/2024 -I discovered that a CCJ had been recorded on my credit file.
• 08/10/2024 - I made calls to DCBL and the Court to obtain information about the Claimant and the claim, as well my decision to request the judgment be set aside.
• 09/10/2024 - DCBL confirms that their claimant, even after being notified that the PCN was sent to the wrong address, still insists that I pay the outstanding balance.
• 10/10/2024 - Informed DCBL and the Claimant that I am applying to set aside the judgment 
• 17/10/2024 - DCBL confirms that it will keep pursuing the outstanding balance unless an official set-aside judgment is issued. 
• 18/10/2024 - set aside sought 
• 21/10/24 - The witness statement was updated to include new evidence: an image of an out-of-order parking machine, clearly showing the date and time.
• 23/10/2024 an email was sent to DCBL along with an official letter to the claimant, notifying them that I have submitted my set –aside application to the court for consideration
• 5/11/2024 – DCBL  sent an email demanding payment , stating that their client does not wish to halt enforcement action
• 07/ 11/2024 – I contacted CNBC, who confirmed that no warrant has been issued against me. They advised me to send the court confirmation email, and noted there is a blockage in addressing the claims and my application is still pending.
• 8 & 26/11/2024 – an email sent to DCBL informing them that no warrant has been issued and therefore they have no legal authority to proceed with enforcement action
• 13 & 27/11/2024 I received a letter and an email from DCBL regarding a Notice of intended enforcement Action, stating that DCBL has advised their client to proceed with enforcement if I fail to pay the charge and I remain liable for the debt even if I have submitted an application to set aside the claim.
• /12/2024 the witness statement was amended to correct inaccuracies

 

1.8.  I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and should it not be dismissed despite the wealth of case law below that supports the claim being dismissed at the set aside hearing, I should (at the very least) have the opportunity to defend it properly. My application relies upon the 'mandatory set aside' rule in CPR 13.2 (in the alternative, 13.3). In addition, I further rely upon CPR 16.4(1)(e) and 16PD3 and 16PD7, because I say that the expired POC fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". More detail follows below

 

1.9.     I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order.  

 

 

 

THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM  

 

 

2.0. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgement against me as the Defendant on 04th/July/ 2024. I am aware that the Claimant is Civil Enforcement It'd, and that the assumed claim is in respect of unpaid Parking Charge Notice on 4th of January 2023, at my then temporary residence xxxxx. I contest this charge for the reasons outlined below.

 

2.1. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until I received notice of a Debt Recovery from DCBL on 2nd of October 2024. This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgment was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).

 

2.2. The address on the claim is XXX.

My current address at xxxxx has been correctly registered with xxx since April/2022 and my Driving Licence, Utilities since May,2022. In support of this I can provide documentation showing my updates address including, Council tax, Utility bills and my Driving licence. All Court documents should have been sent to my current address as the Court claim was issued after I moved into current address. 

"" "

(I will not disclose the date I moved into my current house because the claimant might use this to claim they served me the PCN, even though I never received it. From the start I tried to avoid postal issues by providing my current address instead of the rent. My V5C was always renewed by my brother, so I am unsure which address was on it. He doesn’t remember either, and the DVLA will only provide the information if I submit v888 form.)"" 

 

2.3. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."  As I have not had any correspondence in relation to this matter, other than the brief case details emailed to me on 08/10/2024 from the courts, I am unsure of the specific dates that the claim was made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Claimant, having obtained a previous address from the DVLA and having received no response, did not perform the requisite "reasonable diligence" required to find my current residence to serve the claim form in, despite having months to establish a valid address. (XXXX due to the fact that utility bills and Council tax had been updated to this address for many months) (see utility bill dated XXX, submitted as evidence).This has led to the claim being incorrectly served to an old address and an irregular judgment.

 

2.4. The fact that there was no response from a series of letters sent to my previous address should have alerted the Claimant to the possibility that I was not residing there. Silence after sending a Notice to Keeper, a reminder and then a Letter before Claim is a clear indicator that the Registered Keeper may not live there. It appears that the claimant continued to issue correspondence to the incorrect address intentionally, in line with the concerns raised by the government regarding this abhorrent industry.

 

2.5. International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice which requires a soft trace to be undertaken was not followed. The IPC Code of Practice 2019 - Version 7, November 2019, clause 22.1 states;  

Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings”  

 

 

DVLA ADDRESS DATA MAY NOT BE RELIABLE  

 

 

2.6. DVLA address data may not be accurate. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the keeper to name the driver or to pay, or to inform the keeper they will be liable if not, and about their right to appeal.

 

2.7. The system is called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event) because it is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updated a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA failed to note a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out.

 

2.8. There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was 'kept').  

 

2.9. A claim sent to an old DVLA registered keeper address with no soft trace checks (costing as little as 29 pence and offered free by debt collectors connected to the parking industry) fails to meet the IPC Code of Practice, fails to satisfy the specific 'pre-action Protocol for debt claims', and is in breach of the CPRs about the obligation to take 'reasonable steps' to check a Defendant's address so that service is effective. Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim.

 

3.0. There is a wealth of case law making reference to the failures of parking companies to correctly ascertain the addresses of defendants. Of note:  

 

3.1. In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said  

  

3.2. "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? … As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble and expense of making applications to set aside default judgments."  

 

3.3. The same sentiment was echoed by:  

  

3.4. HHJ Hacon in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)  

  

3.5. HHJ Behrens in Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012)  

  

3.6. In Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) it would appear that obtaining the information from a source that an individual is required by law to keep updated is adequate knowledge. However, i would submit that it is incumbent to have recent knowledge and not outdated knowledge as HHJ Hacon put it in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)   

 

3.7. According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses of results is an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country.  

 

3.8. As it was put in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016) by LJ McCombe  

  

3.9. “If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgment. He is simply not in default at all."  

 

 

 

Sumsum12

Please ignore sections 3.8 and 3.9 above as they are duplicates.

****Default Judgment

 

3.8.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in August 2024 due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. These results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, and then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016):

 

3.9. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a).

 

4.0. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable.

 

4.1. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case,

cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.”

 

 

 

**** [I’m unsure if I should include these arguments (3.6-3.9) in my case ]

 

 

 

Sumsum12

CLAIM SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT   

 

 

4.2. In the alternative: the claim should be struck out regardless of the above other abusive conduct, because the POC fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice

Direction Part 16.7.5.

 

 

4.3. In view of this woeful POC (EXHIBIT XX-) I am confident in relying upon two recent persuasive appeal judgments as authority to support striking out the claim Dismissing this claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.

 

4.4. In Car Park Management Service LTD v Akande heard on 10th May 2024 before her

Honour Judge Evans, the following has been stated:

 

4.5. "The district judge said paragraph 5 of her judgment that she did not accept there was sufficient set out in the claim form to enable the court and in particular the Defendant to understand the nature of the breach alleged. She identified at paragraph 9 that an allegation of breach and the nature of the breach rather than a simple assertion of breach of terms and

conditions is fundamental to a claim of this nature.

 

4.6. "She identified that there are a number of different ways in which a defendant might breach the terms and conditions in a car park: for example, not displaying a ticket, overstaying, not parking within the correct area for parking. She noted that these Particulars of Claim do not specify which of those, if any, or which other breach was said to have been committed by this Defendant."

 

4.7. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious DCB Legal with their well-documented connections to the IPC Trade Body) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their

claims based in the following authority:

 

4.8. In Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) heard on 15th August 2023 and which was also about a N244 'parking CCJ' set aside application (wrong refused at the first hearing), HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon

which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'.

The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

 

4.9. Similarly, at the Wakefield County Court on 8th September 2023, District Judge Robinson considered mirror image POC in claim K3GF9183 (Parallel Parking v anon) and struck the Claim out without a hearing.

 

5.0. Likewise, in January 2023 (also without a hearing) District Judge Sprague, sitting at the County Court at Luton, struck out a similarly badly-pleaded parking claim with a full explanation of his reasoning. (See Exhibit xx-04)  

 5.1. Furthermore, at Manchester District Judge McMurtrie and District Judge Ranson also struck out a claim (again without a hearing) on the grounds of POC’s lacking clarity, detail, and precision. As stated in the final image below, the Claimant’s solicitors confirmed they would not file an amended POC, demonstrating again the reliance of a number of firms on robo-letters and illegitimate practices

 

5.2. In Vehicle Control Services Limited v Carr (Ref. CA-2024-001179) heard on 7th May 2024 the following has been noted (EXHIBIT XX-03 – VCSL v CARR (Ref. CA-2024-001179) :

5.3. Avoiding Injustice: "However, the purpose of the power under CPR 13.3 is to avoid injustice, and although a lack of “promptness” in applying to set aside is a mandatory consideration, the rule makes it clear that the overriding objective is paramount. It is far from clear that the Circuit Judge approached the matter from that perspective. I find it telling that

there is no mention in her of the overriding objective nor of what the justice of the case

required."

5.4. Assessing a Judgment in Default (Denton): "Even in a case of relief from sanctions where the delay is lengthy and there is no excuse for it, the court is required to consider all the circumstances of the case, in order to deal justly with the matter: Denton v White. This court has confirmed that the approach in Denton applies in the context of setting aside a judgment in default: FXF v English Karate Federation [2023] EWCA Civ 891"

 

5.5. No opportunity to defend: "There also appears to have been no specific consideration at the third stage of the fact that in practical terms this defendant has never had an opportunity to advance his valid defence irrespective of whether service was property effected at his former address. That is related to but different from the point that he cannot be blamed for failure to respond to the claim form because he never received it."

 

5.6. No Opportunity to contest: "Standing back and looking at the bigger picture, if the defendant has a viable defence, then by reason of a judgment to which it was not entitled, and which he had no opportunity to contest before it was entered, the claimant will be unjustly enriched at his expense.

The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment and dozens of similar

decisions both at hearings and at allocation stage (SEE EXHIBIT XX- – CEL V CHAN, CPMS LTD v Akande and other judgments) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

Sumsum12

Pay and Display machine was out of order

 

5.7. I deny that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

 

5.8. The Particulars of Claim on the N1 Claim Form mention 'Parking Charge(s)' incurred on January 4, 2023, but fail to specify the grounds for any alleged liability. They do not outline the parking terms that are allegedly violated when the machine is not functioning.

 

5.9. I deny liability that any contravention or breach of clearly signed/lined terms occurred. 

 

6.0. I wish to highlight that the only Pay & Display machine located in the area mentioned in the Particulars was none operational On January 4, 2023. In support of this I included a picture of the screen, which clearly displayed the date and time, as evidence that I was unable to process the payment. No clear instruction was affixed to the machine with direction to me. 

 

6.1. I deny a breach of contract as the primary source of payment was none operational. The Claimant failed to ensure their terms of the service agreement to which they are claiming a contravention of, has occurred. The Pay & Display machine, the on-site available source of payment, to the knowledge of the Defendant, was owned and operated by the Claimant.

 

6.2. Even though I did not consider the alternative payment method to be secure, I made numerous attempts to pay by the app, which took a long time. However, the system kept rejecting my card details, and the payment was unsuccessful.

 

6.3. I was unaware there was an issue with the payment machine; otherwise, I would have moved my car and not parked there. However, my child had a dentist appointment that had been scheduled for two months, requiring a specialist available only on that specific day and time, so missing it was not an option. After the appointment, I hoped the machine issue had been resolved, but it was still not working, and I had to quickly return my child to school.

Fees charged are significantly inflated 

 

6.4. The Claimant, or their legal representatives, has added an additional sum of £70 to the original £100 parking charge, for which no explanation or justification has been provided. Schedule 4 of the Protection Of Freedoms Act, at 4(5), states that the maximum sum which can be recovered is that specified in the Notice to Keeper, which is £100 in this instance. It is submitted that this is an attempt at double recovery by the Claimant, which the Court should not uphold, even in the event that Judgment for Claimant is awarded.

 

6.5. For all or any of the reasons stated above, the Court is invited to dismiss the Claim in its entirety, and to award the Defendant such costs as are allowable on the small claims track, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 27.14. Given that the claim is based on an alleged contractual parking charge of £100 - already significantly inflated and mostly representing profit, as was found in Beavis - but the amount claimed on the claim form is inexplicably £170 per PCN plus interest, the Defendant avers that this inflation of the considered amount is a gross abuse of process.

 

6.6. In conclusion, the Defendant believes the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs.  The specifics of this case lack clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached. This lack of specificity places me, the Defendant, at a distinct disadvantage, as I find myself in the position of having to mount a defence without a clear understanding of the precise nature of the alleged violation. As such, I request the Court to dismiss the claim on its own accord, using its case management authority under CPR 3.4. as I believe that the Default Judgement against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside. 

 

6.7. In order to make informed decisions and statements in my defence as a former keeper of the vehicle I will require copies of all paperwork and pictures of all signs at the time the PCNs were issued from the claimant.

 

Statement of Truth:

 

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.