Clarification on Newbie instructions - VCS Bristol Airport fee

Le_Kirk

I would follow @Coupon-mad's advice but it cannot be your major defence point as it occurred after the alleged event and didn't cause you to stop, the traffic lights did.  Search the forum, there are a number of (successful if I remember) defences about this airport and your exact circumstances.

cutlero

Coupon-mad said:

Why do you rely so heavily on the POFA? Because you weren't driving? If you were the driver, the POFA/not relevant land argument is pretty much redundant.

They haven't identified the driver, and I never said I was the driver.

I've written these points to add to the defence template, to be inserted before the Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government section, and in addition to the rest of the template. I'm aware it is long, but I am not sure if it is unnecessarily long, or whether including more detail just gives DCBL more things to try and counter me on. Any feedback much appreciated.

Q. Am I still expected to do the acknowledgement of service, even after the CCJ? Might be a stupid question because obviously I'm aware I've been served, but this whole process is full of strange loopholes.

Q. You mentioned a counter claim. Is that something that is done at the same time, or where I would need to raise a new claim after this one is complete?


POC:
1. The Defendant (D) is indebted to the Claimant for a Parking Charge issued to vehicle YS13XDD at Bristol airport, Bristol, BS48 3DY.
2. The PCN(s) were issued on 16/05/24
3. The Defendant is pursued as the driver of the vehicle for breach of terms on the signs (the contract). Reason: 104) Stopping TO Pick UP/Drop Off In A Restricted Zone
4. In the alternative the defendent is pursued as the keeper pursuant to POFA 2012, Schedule 4.
AND THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS
1 £170 being the total of the PCN(s) and damages.
2. Interest at a rate of 8% per annum pursuant to s.69 of the County Courts Act 1984 from the date hereof at a daily rate of £.03 until judgement or sooner payment.
3. Costs and court fees.

DRAFT DEFENCE (sorry the numbers are messed up this is a copy and paste issue)

1. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised, and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper.

2. Referring to the POC: paragraph 1 is denied. The Defendant is not indebted to the Claimant.

3. Paragraph 2 is denied. No PCN was "issued on 16/05/2024" (the date of the alleged incident).  The Claimant is put to strict proof that a Parking Charge Notice was issued on 16/05/2024, and of its contents and service.

4. Paragraph 3 is denied. The Defendant is the registered keeper of the vehicle and makes no admission as to the identity of the driver. There is no presumption in English law that the registered keeper was the driver. This principle was confirmed in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Mr A. Edward (Sheffield County Court, 2013). The Claimant is put to strict proof of their allegations.

5. Paragraphs 4 is denied. Under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, there can be no keeper liability where the land in question is not ‘relevant land’. Bristol Airport is governed by byelaws, and is therefore excluded from POFA. The Claimant cannot rely on POFA to pursue the keeper of the vehicle. This position was confirmed in the County Court case of Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Christopher Mackie (C8DP37F1, 2017), where the claim was dismissed on this basis. 

6. The Defendant is not liable and has seen no evidence of a breach of prominent terms.  The quantum is hugely exaggerated (no PCN or CN can be £170 on private land) and there were no damages incurred whatsoever. The Claimant is put to strict proof of all of their allegations.

7. The claimant is pursuing the keeper of the vehicle for an alleged breach of contract, with the reason in the POC being “Reason: 104) Stopping TO Pick UP/Drop Of In A Restricted Zone”. However, the Defendant notes inconsistencies across the Claimant’s correspondence, making it unclear what the alleged contravention is:

1. On 22 May 2024, a Charge Notice (CN) Notice to Keeper (NTK) was issued to the keeper stating “Reason: 104) Stopping TO Pick UP/Drop Off In A Restricted Zone”.

2. A ‘Notice of Debt Recovery’ letter dated 11 July 2024, states “You have an unpaid parking charge and Direct Collection Bailiffs Ltd (DCBL) have been instructed to collect the outstanding balance… The parking charge was issued because the vehicle was parked in contravention of the terms and conditions outlined on the signage as agreed to by the driver when the vehicle entered and parked on private land”.

3. On 7 August 2024, a Letter of Claim was issued which stated “We… write in respect of an unpaid parking charge notice (PCN)” and “The vehicle… was parked on private land managed by our client”.

These inconsistent terms not only refer to the actions of the driver, who has not been identified, but also cast doubt on the nature of the alleged contravention and the Claimant’s legal standing to enforce charges relating to a purported “stopping” incident.

1. The alleged breach is further denied on the basis that stopping — particularly in compliance with traffic signals, does not amount to “parking,” either under statute or any reasonable contractual interpretation, and cannot be subject to a penalty on that basis. In Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (B9GF0A9E, 2016), HHJ Glen confirmed that a brief stop for operational reasons does not constitute parking. That reasoning applies equally to a vehicle stationary at a red light or a vehicle briefly allowing a passenger to alight or board.

2. If the Claimant is pursuing the Defendant for an alleged “stopping” incident, it is denied that the reason for the alleged stop could have been as the Claimant describes. The Claimant's own photographic evidence shows the vehicle stationary at a red traffic light at a pedestrian crossing, with pedestrians visibly walking in front of the vehicle. 

3. Stopping at a red light is a legal requirement under Section 36 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Rule 109 of the Highway Code. It is not a voluntary act and cannot constitute acceptance of contractual terms. It is submitted that attempting to penalise lawful compliance with traffic signals is inappropriate and potentially hazardous.

4. The Claimant is put to strict proof that the alleged stop was made for the purpose of and intent "TO pick up and drop off in a restricted zone", rather than a mandatory response to traffic signals.

5. The Defendant further denies that any signage was capable of forming a binding contract with the keeper or any passenger. There is no legal basis to hold a registered keeper liable for the independent action of a passenger. A passenger entering or exiting a vehicle is not a breach of airport byelaws and does not give rise to contractual liability.

6. In email correspondence dated 4 September 2024, the Claimant’s legal representative stated: “The signage clearly stipulates No Pick Up or Drop Off at any time regardless of whether you had to stop at the traffic lights or not.”

The Claimant is put to strict proof that such signage existed at the material time and location, and that it was visible and legible on the stretch of road where the alleged incident occurred.

1. The same correspondence included a photograph purporting to show signage at Bristol Airport, dated November 2019, approximately five years before the alleged incident. The image appears to show a different road layout, which to the best of the Defendant’s knowledge, has since changed due to roadworks.

2. Furthermore, the signage is affixed parallel to the direction of travel, mounted lower than a vehicle’s wing mirror. It would not be visible through the windscreen or driver-side window. Even if visible through a passenger window, which is disputed, it is unrealistic and unsafe to expect a motorist to read and comprehend small print while moving through a traffic-controlled area.

3. The Claimant is put to strict proof that the signage was present, adequately illuminated, legible, prominently displayed, and visible to motorists in real traffic conditions. 

4. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

1. a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

2.  'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

5. The Defendant denies (i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'), which is fully distinguished.

6. The Defendant submits that the Claimant and their legal representatives have acted unreasonably in the conduct of this claim. Notably:

1. The Claimant has continued to pursue the Defendant as registered keeper under POFA 2012 for 12 months ongoing, despite being aware that Bristol Airport is governed by byelaws and not classified as 'relevant land' under Schedule 4, a position upheld in previous county court decisions and raised by the Defendant in correspondence dated September 2024.

2. In the same correspondence with DCBL, the Defendant stated that issuing a claim regarding the alleged incident would be “an abuse of the court’s process” for the reasons stated in this defence and “I will defend any such claim vigorously and seek costs in relation to your client’s unreasonable conduct”.

3. No further correspondence followed from DCB Legal after 4th September 2024, until five months later, the Claimant issued proceedings in February 2025 without warning. The claim was served while the Defendant was out of the country for 30 days, leading to default judgment, despite the Claimant knowing that the Defendant intended to fully defend the matter.

4. On 2nd April 2025, the Defendant contacted the Claimant’s legal representatives to request that they agree to set it aside by consent.

5. The Claimant did not respond substantively until 2 May 2025, a month later, via an email which the Defendant did not receive at the time. By 2nd May the Defendant had already had to incur the cost of the £303 N244 application for the default CCJ due on 17 April 2025, due to the lack of a timely response.

6. A follow-up email from the Claimant’s legal representatives was received by the Defendant on 13 May 2025, three days before the scheduled hearing. In it, the Claimant indicated they would consent to the judgment being set aside, on the condition that the Defendant did not seek costs.

7. As a litigant in person with no legal training, and acting in good faith, the Defendant proceeded to attend the hearing to ensure the matter was properly addressed and their position protected.

8. Had the Claimant responded to the original request within a reasonable time, or avoided pursuing the Defendant without a legitimate basis to do so, these costs could have been avoided.

Coupon-mad

No AOS in this situation.

There are no grounds to counterclaim.

The judge could easily decide to ask if you were driving and as the POFA is not your strongest suit, I would drop it.

My advice (and I've never lost a case before a judge): You should admit to driving if you were, drop the POFA argument, defend as the driver and concentrate on:

- covert camera surveillance is illegal under the DPA 2018 and UKGDPR. It also breaches the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice from the Information Commissioner's Office. There was no way for the D to know that they were being filmed by a third party ex-clamper firm at a traffic light for the sole purpose - not of road safety, but - to issue a 'parking charge', which is an absurd situation with no legitimate purpose;   

- the reason for stopping was to comply with road traffic enactments;

- airport roads are publicly accessible and are thus covered by road traffic enactments and are not private land. Use all this argument (below) gleaned from the thread by @Milliered which you should read (this link is just the wording, not the thread by that poster, which you need to also read):

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/81100527/#Comment_81100527

That approach makes for a solid defence and means you can openly speak as the wronged driver at the final hearing.

cutlero

Coupon-mad

Thanks so much for your feedback. I'll update the defence 👍🏽

cutlero

Updated defence

Coupon-mad said:

My advice (and I've never lost a case before a judge): You should admit to driving if you were, drop the POFA argument, defend as the driver and concentrate on:

I have re-written the defence, which again is super long. I don't know if it's a problem with the way I write, or if I'm adding way more detail than is required. I've attached only the parts that I've added to the template defence. I thank anyone who reads this and provides feedback in advance! So much appreciated!

1. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised, and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver.

2. Referring to the POC: paragraph 1 is denied. The Defendant is not indebted to the Claimant. Paragraph 2 is denied. No PCN was "issued on 16/05/2024" (the date of the alleged visit).  Whilst the Defendant is the registered keeper and driver, paragraphs 3 and 4 are denied. The Defendant is not liable and has seen no evidence of a breach of prominent terms.  The quantum is hugely exaggerated (no PCN/CN can be £170 on private land) and there were no damages incurred whatsoever. The Claimant is put to strict proof of all of their allegations.

Stopping is not parking

1. The Claimant is pursuing the Defendant for an alleged breach of contract, citing in the Particulars of Claim: “Reason: 104) Stopping to Pick Up/Drop Off in a Restricted Zone.” The alleged is denied on the basis that stopping, particularly in compliance with traffic signals, does not amount to “parking,” either under statute or any reasonable contractual interpretation, and cannot be subject to a penalty on that basis. 

2. In Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (B9GF0A9E, 2016), HHJ Glen confirmed that a brief stop for operational reasons does not constitute parking. That reasoning applies equally to a vehicle stationary at a red light or a vehicle briefly allowing a passenger to alight or board.

3. However, the Claimant’s own correspondence contains significant inconsistencies that cast doubt on the legal basis of the claim and the nature of the alleged breach:

1. The Charge Notice (CN) Notice to Keeper (NTK) issued on 22 May 2024 states “Reason: 104) Stopping to Pick Up/Drop Off in a Restricted Zone”

2. The Notice of Debt Recovery letter issued on 11 July 2024 states “You have an unpaid parking charge… The parking charge was issued because the vehicle was parked in contravention of the terms and conditions outlined on the signage as agreed to by the driver when the vehicle entered and parked on private land”.

3. The Letter of Claim issued on 7 August 2024 states “We… write in respect of an unpaid parking charge notice (PCN)... The vehicle was parked on private land managed by our client”.

4. These shifting and contradictory descriptions between stopping and parking suggest that the Claimant either does not understand the nature of the alleged contravention or is seeking to retroactively construct a claim around conduct that does not amount to a breach of any contractual or legal obligation. Such inconsistency casts significant doubt on the enforceability of the charge.

5. If the Claimant is pursuing the Defendant for an alleged “stopping” incident, then any reference in their correspondence to a “parking charge notice” or “parking offence” is inaccurate and misleading, and calls into question the coherence and legal foundation of the claim.

6. If the Claimant is pursuing the Defendant for an alleged “stopping” incident “TO Pick Up/Drop Off In A Restricted Zone” it is denied that the reason for the alleged stop is as the Claimant describes. 

7. The Claimant’s own photographic evidence shows the vehicle is stationary at a red light at a pedestrian crossing, with pedestrians visibly walking in front of the vehicle.

8. Stopping at a red light is a legal requirement under Section 36 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and Rule 109 of the Highway Code. It is not a voluntary act and cannot constitute acceptance of contractual terms. It is submitted that attempting to penalise lawful compliance with traffic signals is inappropriate and potentially hazardous.

9. The Claimant is put to strict proof that the alleged stop was for the purpose of picking up or dropping off a passenger, which is denied, rather than a mandatory response to traffic signals.

10. There is no legal basis to hold a driver liable for the independent and unexpected actions of a passenger. The Defendant is put to strict proof of any ability to form a binding, enforceable, contract with a pedestrian or passenger of a vehicle at the location of the alleged contravention.

Public access at Bristol Airport

1. The Claimant has previously been caught being dishonest by stating that the airport byelaws were obsolete at Bristol Airport. When John Penrose MP queried this with the management company of Bristol Airport, they confirmed this was false. 

2. As byelaws do apply at Bristol Airport, these override any supposed contractual enforcement on the Airport roads. This allows, and even enforces certain conduct, such as stopping at red lights, and a passenger either entering or exiting a vehicle is not a breach of these byelaws.

3. The Claimant is put to strict proof that their supposed contract aligns with the byelaws, which clearly take precedence, and to prove the circumstances that caused a ‘parking charge’ or ‘CN’ to arise. For the avoidance of doubt, the byelaws are statutory, not advisory.

4. In a similar case - but re East Midlands Airport - heard at Leicester County Court on 07/01/2022, Deputy District Judge Wigham held that the byelaws prevail and asked VCS' solicitor if they were aware of the statutory bylaws in force.  VCS' legal representative's reply was, "I am instructed that the byelaws are advisory".  The learned Judge disagreed, pointing out that Airport Byelaws carry statutory weight and remain in force by order of the Secretary of State, reportedly telling VCS' solicitor: "these Byelaws are there to protect the public from firms like you".  She dismissed the case and permission to appeal was refused.

5. Further and by way of alternative defence: Airport approach roads are subject to road traffic enactments (public highway).  Even if the Claimant is able to overcome the difficulties they face in showing that:

1. they have locus to sue in their own name regarding this location, and that

2. the Defendant was afforded the opportunity to accept contractual terms which could somehow override the natural and ordinary meaning of a red traffic light, and that

3. these terms were prominently displayed, well lit, fair and unambiguous (per the Consumer Right Act 2015) and capable of being offered at a set of red traffic lights which convey a completely different message, and that

4. this charge can override statutory Byelaws and/or the Road Traffic Act 1988 and/or the Airport Act 1986, and that

5. This third party (notorious ex-clamper) firm has sufficient contractual, commercial and 'legitimate interest' to save this punitive charge from falling foul of the penalty rule, and that

6. The traffic lights with a camera deliberately trained on it was set up by the Airport for a legitimate reason and not set up by VCS as a 'hidden pitfall or trap' (ParkingEye v Beavis phrase from the Supreme Court) to catch drivers out as a money-making cash cow area.

6. The Claimant has stated that the driver was “parked on private land” multiple times during communications. The Claimant is put to strict proof that this access road is not part of the public highway. A 'public highway' is defined online as 'any road maintained by public expense where the public would normally have a right to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle'. It is averred that the Airport approach road is 'public highway' and the Claimant is put to strict proof to the contrary.

7. The approach road comes off a roundabout and is not demarcated as 'private land', nor is it a private car park and thus, any parking/traffic contraventions on this roadway would be a matter for the local authority.

8. Such roads are subject to the rules of the Road Traffic Act and statutory instrument and any 'PCN' must be a proper penalty charge notice issued under the Traffic Management Act 2004. As such, the claimant is put to strict proof that this approach road is a part of the Airport 'where road traffic enactments do not apply' (in which case the roadway then falls under the Airport byelaws, as stated above).

9. The Defendant avers - and asks the court to determine - that the road is likely subject to road traffic enactments rather than airport byelaws, as per the Airport Act 1986:

''65 Control of road traffic at designated airports - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the road traffic enactments shall apply in relation to roads which are within a designated airport but to which the public does not have access as they apply in relation to roads to which the public has access.''

1. Both the Airport Act 1986 and the airport byelaws state that byelaws only apply to roads to which road traffic enactments do not apply. This location is indisputably 'publicly accessible' and therefore the Road Traffic Act applies.

Use of Surveillance and Compliance with Data Protection Law

1. The Claimant’s own evidence shows that they are relying on covert surveillance footage aimed directly at the pedestrian crossing to support their claim. Targeting a location where drivers are required to stop by law in order to issue 'PCN' or 'CN's supports that revenue generation, rather than public safety or traffic management, is the purpose of the surveillance.

2. Covert camera surveillance is illegal under the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR. It also breached the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice from the Information Commissioner’s Office. According to these regulations, a third party collecting footage including personal data (licence plate numbers) needs to have a lawful basis for collecting the data, use it transparently where people are made aware they are being recorded, and for a legitimate purpose outside of revenue generation, and follow the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice.

3. There was no way for the defendant to know that they were being filmed by a third party ex-clamper firm at a traffic light for the sole purpose, not of road safety, but to issue a ‘parking charge’, which does not constitute a legitimate purpose. 

4. There was no way for the claimant to know who was operating these cameras and where and for what purpose the data was being collected.

5. The Defendant submits that the Claimant’s collection and use of this footage was unlawful and in breach of the UK GDPR and DPA 2018, and invites the Court to give no weight to this evidence on the grounds that it was obtained through non-compliant and disproportionate data processing.

Coupon-mad

Yep that's fine, although the paragraph numbers are wrong from the start as the template para 1 goes first, then your paras, then the usual para 4 onwards, re-numbered but do not show us all that! 

cutlero

Coupon-mad said:

Yep that's fine, although the paragraph numbers are wrong from the start as the template para 1 goes first, then your paras, then the usual para 4 onwards, re-numbered but do not show us all that! 

Thank you so much for your quick responses and help. I have submitted my defence by email to CNBC and emailed a copy to DCBLegal as advised by the default CCJ judge. Now I just wait for the DQ from CNBC I assume.

Coupon-mad

cutlero said:

Coupon-mad said:

Yep that's fine, although the paragraph numbers are wrong from the start as the template para 1 goes first, then your paras, then the usual para 4 onwards, re-numbered but do not show us all that! 

Thank you so much for your quick responses and help. I have submitted my defence by email to CNBC and emailed a copy to DCBLegal as advised by the default CCJ judge.

But you will be in default of the local court Judge's order by doing that.
Nothing was to go to the CNBC in this case because you aren't dealing with Northampton admin centre any more and haven't been for months.

I just wait for the DQ from CNBC I assume.

No. The CNBC should not have been copied in. Your order to file & serve a defence came from your local court.

cutlero

Coupon-mad said:

No. The CNBC should not have been copied in. Your order to file & serve a defence came from your local court.

Thanks for the update. This whole process is confusing as hell. The CCJ judge says the entire process now 'starts again' and we have to file a defence to the original claim. That claim was with CNBC, so I assumed that's where to file it as per the instructions on the thread too. 

I'll send it to the local court today. Hopefully, that's not a problem

Coupon-mad

Yep I get you! Courts don't make it clear.