Court Claim Help - Another One Bites the Dust

Coupon-mad · 4 October 2024 at 5:19PM

What exhibits to include are already in a bespoke section of the NEWBIES PLEASE READ THESE FAQS FIRST thread, about WS stage advice, with an a-f list of suggested exhibits that no poster seems to go & read.

As for a recent WS example? Read some on the forum by browsing or searching.

You put in a short defence with no defence points?

FraggleRoxy · 6 October 2024 at 4:31PM

Below is my full defence. It is what I used to start creating my notes (in my previous post) of what to include in my paperwork for the court date at the end of the month.

However, I became snowed under by the references to other cases/documents, and I don’t know if I am supposed to include the whole documents, or just the listed paragraphs. And where cases are mentioned, what would I need to include there?

If I’m honest, I do not understand much of what was in paragraphs 5-28, particularly where references are made between cases/documents. I added these in because, in my understanding, that is the advice given to people in my situation on here.

I have Chronic Fatigue (CFS for those who love acronyms 😉). I struggle to concentrate and absorb information, so dealing with this is especially difficult, stressful and time consuming for me. I used to think I was fairly intelligent, but these days I feel useless, and so I’m asking for your help to get me through this - hopefully with a positive outcome.

I’d really appreciate your help and support. Thanks

DEFENCE

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief ni the sum claimed, or at all. It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term. Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the boilerplate text ni the Particulars of Claim (the POC).

Preliminary Matter. The claim should be struck out

2. The Claim should be struck out on the basis that it contravenes Schedule 4, Paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). PoFA clearly stipulates that a creditor may not make a claim against the keeper of a vehicle for more than the amount of the unpaid parking charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued. The original Parking Charge Notice (PCN) issued by the claimant was for £100.

The claimant's current claim is for £170, which exceeds the amount of the unpaid parking charges as stated in the original notice. The claimant's attempt to claim an unlawful amount constitutes an abuse of process and should not be allowed to

proceed. Irespectfully request the allocating judge to dismiss the claim on the basis of the claimant's contravention of Schedule 4, Paragraph 4(5) of PoFA and thereby CPR

1.1, CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b) and CPR 27.14 and to award costs to the defendant for having to defend against this improper claim.

The facts known to the Defendant

3. The facts ni this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief. Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be ni breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state al facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper, but they were not the driver.

4. The Defendant and the other occupant of the vehicle both have mobility issues that are protected characteristics under the Equality Act and were at the location as patrons of the local businesses. The Defendant is being penalised because of their disability and the Claimant has no cause of action. The claim is vexatious and the Claimant has knowingly discriminated against the Defendant and the other occupant of the vehicle.

5. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen an in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

i). a strong legitimate interest extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). 'adequate notice of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

6. The Defendant denies i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 (the Beavis case), which is fully distinguished.

Exaggerated Claim and market failure currently being addressed by UK Government

7. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap). It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred.

8. This claim is unfair and inflated and ti is denied that any sum is due in debt or damages. This Claimant routinely pursues an unconscionable fixed sum added per PCN, despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban it.

9. This is a classic example where adding exaggerated fees funds bulk litigation of weak and/or archive parking cases. No checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit or a cause of action (given away by the woefully inadequate POC).

10. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('the DLUHC) published a statutory Parking Code of Practice in February

2022: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice. The Ministerial Foreword is damning: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to

extort money from motorists."

1. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code (temporarily withdrawn) it is now 'live' after a draft Impact Assessment (IA) was published on 30th July 2023. The Government's analysis is found here:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

12. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 state that the parking industry has shown the DLUHC that the true minor cost of pre-action stage totals a mere £8.42 per case (not per PCN).

13. This claim has been enhanced by a disproportionate sum, believed to enrich the litigating legal team. It appears to be double recovery, duplicating the intended legal fees' cap set by small claims track rules.

14. The draft AI shows that the intimidating letter-chains endured by Defendants cost 'eight times less' than the fixed +£70 per PCN. This causes immense consumer harm in the form of some half a million wrongly-enhanced CCJs each year, that Judges are powerless to prevent. MoJ statistics reveal several hundred thousand parking claims per annum, with c90% causing default CCJs totalling hundreds of millions of pounds. The false fee was enabled by the self-serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies who aligned in 2021 to allow +£70, each led by a Board comprising the parking and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

15. It is denied that the added damages/fee sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis. Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD |2011| EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs' inflating a PCN to £135 exaggerated the cost of template letters and 'would appear to be penal'.

16. This Claimant has not incurred costs. APCN model already includes what the Supreme Court called an automated letter-chain and it generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 pre-action letters/reminders and £85 was held to more than cover the minor costs of the operation (NB: debt collectors charge nothing in failed collection cases).

17. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, all non-monetary clauses went unchallenged. It will replace the self-serving BPA &IPC Codes, which are not regulation and carry limited weight. It is surely a clear steer for the Courts that the DLUHC said in 2023 that it is addressing 'market failure'.

18. At last, the DLUHC's analysis overrides plainly wrong findings by Circuit Judges steered by Counsel in weak appeal cases that the parking industry steamrollered through. In Vehicle Control Services v Percy, HHJ Saffman took a diametrically opposed position to that taken by DJ Hickinbottom, DJ Jackson (as Her Honour Judge Jackson then was), and other District Judges on the North Eastern Circuit, including DJ Skalskyj- Reynolds and DJ Wright (Skipton) all of whom have consistently dismissed extortionate added 'fees/damages'. District Judges deal with private parking claims on a daily basis, whereas cases of this nature come before Circuit Judges infrequently. The Judgments of HHJ Parkes in Britannia v Semark-Jullien, and HHJ Simpkiss in One Parking Solution v Wilshaw were flawed. These supposedly persuasive judgments included a universal failure to consider the court's duty under s71 of the CRA 2015 and factual errors.

In Wilshaw: a badly outdated reliance on 'ticket cases' which allowed poor signage to escape fair scrutiny and a wrong presumption that landowner authority 'is not required' (DVLA rules make it mandatory). In Percy, HHJ Saffman made an incorrect assumption about pre-action costs and even sought out the wrong Code of Practice of his own volition after the hearing, and used it to inform his judgment.

19. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (the POFA) the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper. The Claimant is put to strict proof of POFA compliance if seeking keeper liability.

20. The Defendant avers that there was no agreement to pay a parking charge or added 'damages' which were not even incurred, let alone quantified in bold, prominent text.

This Claimant's lack of large, readable signs are nothing like the yellow &black warnings seen in Beavis, nor do they meet the signage requirements in the DLUHC Code which reflects the statutory requirement for 'prominence' (Consumer Rights Act 2015 - C' RA)'.

CRA breaches

21. Section 71 CRA creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the test of fairness whether a party raises it or not. Further, claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3):

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf

22. The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both terms and 'consumer notices'. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of 'signs &lines' and all communications (written or otherwise). Signs must be prominent (lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

23. The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the duties of fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

24. Unlike in Beavis, the penalty rule remains engaged. The CRA covers disproportionate sums, which are not exempt from being assessed for fairness because a 'fee' is not the core price term and neither was it prominently proclaimed on the signs.

25. The Supreme Court held that deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms or cumbersome obligations (concealed pitfalls or traps). This Claimant has failed those tests, with small signs, hidden terms and minuscule small print that is incapable of binding a driver. Court of Appeal authorities about a lack of 'adequate notice of a parking charge include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (Lord Denning's 'red hand rule) and

ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd |1970) EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space".

26. Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the DLUHC Code and these clauses are supported by the BPA &IPC. In the official publication Parking Review' the IPC's CEO observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn't. If it's clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of al parties involved —it's either fair or it isn't."

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

27. DVLA data is only supplied fi there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules). It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority to form contracts at this site in their name. The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to litigate.

28. The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The DLUHC Code shows that genuine disputes such as this should see PCNs cancelled, had a fair ADR existed. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject most disputes: e.g. the lAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (ref: Annual Report). This consumer blame culture and reliance upon their own 'appeals service' (described by MPs as a kangaroo court and about to be replaced by the Government) should satisfy Judges that a fair appeal was never on offer.

Conclusion

29. There is now evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims that are causing consumer harm. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis shows that the usual letter-chain costs eight times less than the sum claimed for it. The claim is entirely without merit and the POC embarrassing.

The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that poorly pleaded claims like this should be struck out.

30. In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and
a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

31. Attention is drawn to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r. 38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg)."

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

LDast · 6 October 2024 at 8:08PM

Coupon-mad said:

You put in a short defence with no defence points?

No, because short defence never gets to WS stage as they are either discontinued or struck-out at allocation stage or when the claimant fails to comply with the draft order.

Here is a suggested framework for your WS. Not sure if you've received the claimants WS and whether they are representing themselves or by a solicitor:

1. My name is [Your Full Name], and I reside at [Address]. I am the Defendant in these proceedings and this Witness Statement is made from my own knowledge and research. I confirm that the facts stated within it are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

PRELIMINARY MATTER - The Claim should be struck out

2. I respectfully submit that before proceeding with the hearing, the Court should consider a Preliminary Matter: striking out the claim due to the Claimant's and/or their solicitor’s failure to comply with CPR 16.4, which requires a concise statement of the facts. It is embarrassing that the Claimant’s solicitor, a firm widely recognised for its bulk litigation process of issuing thousands of poorly pleaded claims each month, has once again provided inadequate Particulars of Claim (PoC). In this case, the PoC are so deficient that I, as the Defendant, was expected to prepare a defence without a proper understanding of the facts and allegations against me.

3. Dismissing the claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious Gladstones with their well-documented connections to the IPC Trade Body) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, they should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based on the following persuasive authorities:

4. In Car Park Management Services Ltd v Akande 2024 [K0DP5J30], HHJ Evans held that “It cannot be right that the fundamental basic rule that Particulars of Claim must set out the case which a defendant has to meet can somehow be swept away by the character limit imposed by the MCOL system. It does not take many characters to say ‘did not buy a ticket’ or ‘did not display permit.’”

(See exhibit XX-01 CPMS v Akande judgment)

5. In Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan 2023 [E7GM9W44], HHJ Murch held that “the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract.”

(See exhibit XX-02 CEL v Chan judgment)

6. There are many other examples of similarly poorly pleaded claims that have been struck out, both at allocation stage and at hearings. (See exhibit XX-03 Other CPR 16.4 judgments)

7. The PoC provided to me by the Claimant states:

“THE CLAIM IS FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR BREACHING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET ON PRIVATE LAND. THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE, [XXXXXX], WAS IDENTIFIED IN [XXXXXX] ON THE [XX]/08/2023 IN BREACH OF THE ADVERTISED TERMS AND CONDITIONS; NAMELY PARKED FOR LONGER THAN THE MAXIMUM PERIOD PERMITTED. AT ALL MATERIAL TIMES THE DEFENDANT WAS THE REGISTERED KEEPER AND/OR DRIVER. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS UPON ENTERING PRIVATE LAND WERE CLEARLY DISPLAYED AT THE ENTRANCE AND IN PROMINENT LOCATIONS. THE SIGN WAS THE OFFER AND THE ACT OF ENTERING PRIVATE LAND WAS THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER HEREBY ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT BY CONDUCT. THE SIGNS SPECIFICALLY DETAIL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COMPLY, NAMELY A PARKING CHARGE NOTICE WILL BE ISSUED, AND THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SETTLE THE OUTSTANDING LIABILITY. THE CLAIMANT SEEKS THE RECOVERY OF THE PARKING CHARGE NOTICE, CONTRACTUAL COSTS AND INTEREST.”

8. As evidenced, there is a lack of precise detail in the PoC in respect of the factual and legal allegations made against me such that the particulars of claim do not comply with CPR 16.4. The allegation contains no mention of the contractual term breached, and no detail is shown as required by CPR PD 16.7.5.

9. The PoC does not state the exact wording of the clause (or clauses) of the terms and conditions of the contract (or contracts) which is/are relied on.

(i) The PoC does not state with sufficient particularity the exact time when the breach occurred and how long it is alleged that the vehicle was parked before the parking charge was allegedly incurred.

(ii) The PoC does not state exactly how the claim for statutory interest is calculated.

(iii) The PoC does not state what proportion of the claim is the parking charge and what proportion is damages.

(iv) The PoC states that the Claimant is suing the defendant as the driver or the keeper. The claimant obviously knows whether the defendant is being sued as the driver or the keeper and should not be permitted to plead alternative causes of action.

(v) There is no factual or legal basis for the claim. It is not shown how the claim has been calculated.

10. Should the court not agree that the claim should be struck out, I respectfully request that the Claimant be ordered to provide further particulars that, for the avoidance of doubt, must:

(a) refer to and have attached to them (clearly marked "A") a copy of the contract (or contracts) between the claimant and defendant relied on.

(b) set out the exact wording of the clause (or clauses) of the terms and conditions of the contract (or contracts) which is (or are) relied on.

(c) have attached to them a copy of each of the Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) which forms the basis of this claim.

(d) must state by what method each of the PCNs was first brought to the attention of the defendant. For example, attaching it to the defendant's vehicle or sending by post.

(e) in respect of each alleged breach of contract, set out the reason (or reasons) why the claimant asserts that the defendant was in breach of contract.

(f) in respect of each alleged breach of contract, set out (i) the full postal address of where the breach took place and (ii) the precise date and time of the alleged breach and (iii) exactly how long it is alleged that the vehicle was parked before the parking charge was incurred.

(g) state, in respect of each PCN sued on, whether the claim is (or is not) brought under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

(h) in respect of each alleged breach of contract, must state whether the defendant is sued as the driver of the vehicle or the keeper of the vehicle.

(i) not state that the defendant is sued in the alternative as the driver of the vehicle or as the keeper of the vehicle.

(j) state what amount of the claim is the claim for non-payment of the PCNs and what amount of the claim is not for non-payment of the PCNs.

(k) must explain the factual or legal (or both) basis of the claim for any amount claimed which is not for non-payment of the PCNs.

(l) set out a precise calculation of the claim for statutory interest up to the date of issue to include the date interest started running.

11. Should the Claimant fully comply with the order and the claim is not struck out, I should be allowed to provide an amended defence based on all the facts provided by the order.

THE BASIS OF THE DEFENCE

EQUALITY ACT 2010 – DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION

12. Whilst I am the keeper of the vehicle, I was not the driver on the date of the alleged contravention. However, the driver also had a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010 due to their disability. The driver, like myself, has mobility issues and cognitive impairments. Therefore, both the driver and I were entitled to reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act.

13. Under the Equality Act 2010, businesses have a legal duty to make reasonable adjustments to ensure that disabled individuals are not disadvantaged. On the date in question, the driver needed more time to carry out tasks at the site due to their disability, but the Claimant failed to provide reasonable adjustments such as an extension of the grace period, effectively penalising the driver due to their disability.

14. The alleged overstay was only minor and should have been considered within a reasonable extension to the grace period, especially in light of the driver's and my disabilities. The Claimant’s failure to accommodate this constitutes unlawful discrimination.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE

15. The Claimants' witness is a legal assistant employed by the Claimant’s solicitors and has no direct knowledge of the actual events that form the basis of the claim. Any evidence provided by this individual is second-hand, supposedly relying entirely on information supplied by the claimant, and thus cannot carry the same weight as testimony from someone who witnessed or was directly involved in the incident.

16. While the Civil Evidence Act 1995 allows hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, it is required to be given less weight, especially when it comes from someone with no firsthand knowledge. Furthermore, under CPR 32.2, the court has the discretion to exclude hearsay evidence when it is of limited probative value.

17. The claimant's WS fails to comply with CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.2, as it does not clearly distinguish between what the witness knows firsthand and what has been provided to them by others. As a result, this statement amounts to hearsay, which weakens its credibility.

UNENFORCEABLE ADDITIONAL COSTS

18. The Claimant has added £70, claiming this as "contractual costs." However, these costs are not mentioned on the signage or in any terms. This violates the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which requires clarity and transparency in contract terms.

19. The additional costs are arbitrary, penal in nature, and not commercially justified under the principles of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.

PENALTY CHARGE, NOT GENUINE PRE-ESTIMATE OF LOSS

20. The £70 additional costs appear to be arbitrary and penal in nature. Under established law principles, such as ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67, parking charges must either be a genuine pre-estimate of loss or commercially justified. In this case, the additional £70 is neither justified nor explained.

21. The claimant has provided no breakdown or explanation of how this amount was calculated or why it is appropriate. It can only be viewed as a punitive charge designed to penalise me, which is contrary to established legal principles that prohibit excessive and unfair contractual penalties.

CONCLUSION - CLAIMANT'S FAILURE TO SATISFY THE BURDEN OF PROOF

22. The claimant, in their Witness Statement, has failed to satisfy the fundamental burden of proof in this matter. Despite making various assertions about the alleged contraventions and my supposed liability, the claimant has not provided adequate evidence to support their claim. Specifically:

23. Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4: As detailed earlier, the claimant’s Particulars of Claim (PoC) are woefully deficient and do not comply with the requirements of CPR 16.4. The PoC fails to provide sufficient detail about the alleged contravention, preventing me from fully understanding the case against me. Recent persuasive cases, such as CPMS v Akande [2024] and CEL v Chan [2023], demonstrate that such failures warrant the striking out of the claim.

24. I respectfully request that the court dismisses the claimant’s claim in its entirety due to the claimant’s failure to meet the burden of proof and their failure to comply with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules. The court should also consider the claimant’s unreasonable conduct throughout these proceedings when making any assessment of costs.

25. In the matter of costs, I ask:

(a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

26. Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)), this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed:

Date:

This is just a framework and some of it may not be relevant, such as the "Hearsay Evidence" bit, if they are pursuing this in-house. Also, you will need to add reference to this comparison of the sign to the Beavis sign to show breaches of the IPC CoP and the CRA how the charge is most definitely not brought to the drivers attention:

Image: https://us-noi.v-cdn.net/6031891/uploads/editor/n2/rexp90yb30b9.jpeg

FraggleRoxy · 6 October 2024 at 10:02PM

Wow! DLast thank you. 🙏 You’re a star. My head is still spinning, but I feel so much better for having that framework.

In January this year, VCS informed me that the case will now be handled by their in house legal department.

Point 9 is a great one, since the ‘terms and conditions apply’ sign, makes 7 further references to terms and conditions’ and yet fails to list anything relevant, and doesn’t even say specifically where the terms and conditions are to be found.

I realise I’ll have to include the case judgments/transcripts referred to in the WS, but do I need to include the CPR, POFA, CEA and Equality Act paragraphs? Or should the judge be expected to know them?

I had initially planned to include the driver as a witness, but to do that, I would have to confirm their details to VCS, and I worry that they would then try to pursue them for the charge. What do you think?

do I need to/should I provide:
-proof of purchase from the Retail park?
-blue badge
-proof of medical conditions?
-photo of mobility equipment in the car
-my photocard drivers license - not valid for the date in question
-forum screenshot suggesting the PCN arrived 16 days after the date in question
I have all of the above.

Costs assessment. Not so important, but …I don’t work since I’m disabled, so I don’t need to take time off work, however, my time is still precious to me. Especially as I need to spend the day before court making sure I will have the energy to get through the court day, and the day after recovering, even if the court proceedings are done in under an hour. I’ve spent many days already trying to understand and respond to the PCN, and many more nights worrying about it, and days recovering from the stress caused. I firmly believe that my time is just as valuable as a working person, and VCS’s behaviour has already cost me dearly.

What can I actually claim for?

By the way, should I have received a DQ copy from VCS, as well as expecting to receive a WS copy?

Thanks folks

Gr1pr · 6 October 2024 at 10:28PM

Your court order gave both you and VCS or their lawyers the same deadline, typically 2 weeks before the hearing, so both of you have that same deadline date to submit the bundles to each other and to your local civil court

If that date has passed then yes is the answer to your question, if its still in the future then the answer is NO

FraggleRoxy · 8 October 2024 at 4:39PM

The reason I asked about the DQ is that I know I had to send a copy of my completed DQ to VCS, so I want to know if they too should have completed a DQ and sent a copy to me. I certainly didn’t receive one.

Coupon-mad · 8 October 2024 at 6:39PM

Yes but it doesn't matter. Unimportant.

FraggleRoxy · 11 October 2024 at 5:58PM

Hi, these are the current signs on site, is there anything more I should note about them?

https://ibb.co/MCgN5sX

https://ibb.co/jJj1f0Y

FraggleRoxy · 11 October 2024 at 7:47PM

Here is my draft WS. I would appreciate any feedback, additions or corrections that may need adding/changing.

Please ignore the formatting and paragraph numbering etc, as I will sort these out once the wording is pinned down.

=================================

1. My name is XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, and I reside at XXXXXXXXXXXXXX. I am the Defendant in these proceedings and this Defence Statement is made from my own knowledge and research. I confirm that the facts stated within it are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

PRELIMINARY MATTER - The Claim should be struck out

2. I respectfully submit that before proceeding with the hearing, the Court should consider a Preliminary Matter: striking out the claim due to the Claimant's and/or their solicitor’s failure to comply with CPR 16.4, which requires a concise statement of the facts. It is embarrassing that the Claimant’s, a firm widely recognised for issuing thousands of poorly pleaded claims each month, has once again provided inadequate Particulars of Claim (PoC). In this case, the PoC are so deficient that I, as the Defendant, was expected to prepare a defence without a proper understanding of the facts and allegations against me.

3. Dismissing the claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators, like the Claimant’s legal department should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, they should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based on the following persuasive authorities:

4. In Car Park Management Services Ltd v Akande 2024 [K0DP5J30], HHJ Evans held that “It cannot be right that the fundamental basic rule that Particulars of Claim must set out the case which a defendant has to meet can somehow be swept away by the character limit imposed by the MCOL system. It does not take many characters to say ‘did not buy a ticket’ or ‘did not display permit.’”

(See exhibit XX-01 CPMS v Akande judgment)

5. In Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan 2023 [E7GM9W44], HHJ Murch held that “the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract.”

(See exhibit XX-02 CEL v Chan judgment)

7. The PoC provided to me by the Claimant states:

“THE CLAIM IS FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR BREACHING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET ON PRIVATE LAND. THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE, XXXXXXXXXX WAS IDENTIFIED IN XXXXXXXXXXXXX RETAIL PARK ON THE XX/08/2023 IN BREACH OF THE ADVERTISED TERMS AND CONDITIONS; NAMELY PARKED FOR LONGER THAN THE MAXIMUM PERIOD PERMITTED. AT ALL MATERIAL TIMES THE DEFENDANT WAS THE REGISTERED KEEPER AND/OR DRIVER. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS UPON ENTERING PRIVATE LAND WERE CLEARLY DISPLAYED AT THE ENTRANCE AND IN PROMINENT LOCATIONS. THE SIGN WAS THE OFFER AND THE ACT OF ENTERING PRIVATE LAND WAS THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER HEREBY ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT BY CONDUCT. THE SIGNS SPECIFICALLY DETAIL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COMPLY, NAMELY A PARKING CHARGE NOTICE WILL BE ISSUED, AND THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SETTLE THE OUTSTANDING LIABILITY. THE CLAIMANT SEEKS THE RECOVERY OF THE PARKING CHARGE NOTICE, CONTRACTUAL COSTS AND INTEREST.”