McDonalds Gatwick

morlox

Hello,

I received a fine for overstaying at the McDonalds in Gatwick. I stayed for 74 minutes when the permitted stay was 60 minutes. I wasn't aware at all of any time restrictions when I parked there and trying to feed two hungry kids while the service is completely slow within an hour is near impossible!

 I called McDonalds and found a very unhelpful manager. I emailed McDonalds and found them equally unhelpful. I have lodged my appeal and been given a POPLA number. I haven't at any stage admitted I was a driver.

I'm looking through the NEWBIE post but getting slightly confused at to what I need to include.

Would someone mind looking at the fine to tell me if it is a MET Golden ticket? And if so, which template I should adapt in my circumstances? 

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o-hX-X_c6wxo40gQo9QptN8Cf0ceY8-p/view?usp=sharing

Thanks in advance.

sully62

You've left the PCN number bottom right. You need to obliterate it there, too.

Gr1pr

Read the advice below 

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6524058/mcdonalds-gatwick-met-parking-charge-am-i-doing-this-right-please-guys-and-girls/p1

Coupon-mad

I do hope you didn't say who was driving?

nopcns

morlox said:

Would someone mind looking at the fine to tell me if it is a MET Golden ticket? And if so, which template I should adapt in my circumstances? 

It's only a "golden ticket" as long as you have not revealed the drivers identity. As long as that is the case, just respond with a POPLA appeal using this as your main point when appealing as keeper only:

MET Parking cannot hold a registered keeper liable for any alleged contravention on land that is under statutory control. As a matter of fact and law, MET Parking will be well aware that they cannot use the PoFA provisions to hold the keeper liable because Gatwick Airport is not 'relevant land'.

If Gatwick Airport wanted to hold owners or keepers liable under Airport Byelaws, that would be within the landowner's gift and another matter entirely. However, not only is that not pleaded, it is also not legally possible because MET Parking is not the Airport owner and the 'parking charge' is not and never attempts to be a penalty. It is created for MET Parking's own profit (as opposed to a byelaws penalty that goes to the public purse) and MET Parking has relied on contract law allegations of breach against the driver only.

The registered keeper cannot be presumed or inferred to have been the driver, nor pursued under some twisted interpretation of the law of agency. The NtK can only hold the driver liable.

morlox

Thanks for getting back to me. No, I've never revealed the driver.

I saw that other post that was quoted but just to be clear, is that all the argument I need to put in the reasons? It doesn't require a much longer POPLA letter like the other templates? Or is that argument just one part of a bigger letter?

nopcns

Use the a full POPLA appeal but you need to lead on this point. You are appealing as the keeper and because they cannot rely on PoFA, they cannot transfer liability to you. They are not allowed to "presume" or "infer" that you were the driver. Unless they can provide proof that you were the driver (they cannot unless you admitted to them to being the driver) then they cannot go any further with this and POPLA must accept the appeal.

Just find some other POPLA examples (recent ones) and use all the points about signs, contract with landowner etc.

Umkomaas

The NEWBIES FAQ Announcement, third post, will help with near-oven-ready appeal points. You need to consider including the following, as often posted by forum stalwart @Fruitcake.  Key points to include in any POPLA appeal:

1) Non-PoFA compliant NTK/NTH (if appropriate)
2) Not the driver/not the person who may be liable for the charge (if non-PoFA)
3) Not the landowner/ No landowner contract
4) No standing to issue charges in their own name
5) Inadequate signage
6) BPA CoP failures (if appropriate)

morlox

Thanks for all your help. It's quite a lot to get my head around! But would a letter like this be likely to win a POPLA appeal?

Appeal re POPLA Code: [XXX] v MET Parking Services

Vehicle Registration: [XXX]

POPLA ref: [XXX]

I, the registered keeper of this vehicle, received a letter dated [XXX] acting as a notice to the registered keeper. My appeal to the operator – MET Parking Services – was submitted and acknowledged on [XXX] but subsequently rejected by a letter dated [XXX]. I contend that I, as the keeper, am not liable for the alleged parking charge and wish to appeal against it on the following grounds:

 

1. A compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply
2. Appellant not being the individual liable.

3. Insufficient evidence of the alleged contravention
4. Lack of standing / authority from landowner
5. Non-Compliant Signage

 

1.      No keeper liability

I appeal as keeper.  I am not obliged to identify the driver and I decline to do so. Even if (which is not the case) the driver is liable, the operator can only transfer the driver’s liability to the keeper by complying with the strict requirements set out in Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (‘POFA’).

As recognised in the BPA Code of Practice, strict compliance with POFA is required in order to pursue a keeper. Assumption, or partial or even substantial compliance is not sufficient even for the BPA, as the CoP states:

"21.2 As long as the strict conditions of Schedule 4 are met, you may claim payment from the keeper or the hirer of the vehicle rather than from the driver. To do this you need to follow the procedures set out in the Schedule…"

POFA paragraph 9. (2) (f) states that a notice to keeper "must ...: warn the keeper that if, at the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice to keeper is given—

(i) the amount of the unpaid parking charges … has not been paid in full, and

(ii) the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver, the creditor will (if all the applicable conditions under this Schedule are met) have the right to recover from the keeper so much of that amount as remains unpaid."

The PCN does not comply with POFA. That's fatal to their case. Game over.

2.  The operator has failed to demonstrate that its signage was adequate to give rise to a contract with the driver to pay the parking charge.  

3.  The operator has not proved that it owns the land in question or was authorised at the relevant time by the landowner to issue and enforce parking charges.

I reserve the right to expand on these points in light of any arguments or evidence put forward by the operator in response to this appeal. 

 

 

2) The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who may have been potentially liable for the charge

MET has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who was liable for the charge. (ref POPLA case Carly Law 6061796103). In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever.

In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.

In this case, no other party apart from an evidenced driver can be told to pay. As there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made and regardless of whether a purported 'NTK' was served or not, because the fact remains I am only appealing as the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability
'There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no 'reasonable presumption' in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.'

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator cannot transfer the liability for the charge using the POFA.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:
''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.''

morlox

3) Insufficient evidence of the alleged contravention

The evidence provided by MET Parking Services for the alleged breach of terms and conditions stated are still photos. There is also no evidence that the supposed boundaries are shown on any signs or on a prominent map that individuals can see while on site in order for them to make a reasonable decision as to what then might be considered 'off site'.
Even if a sign says a charge can be issued for 'leaving the site', this means nothing if 'the site' is not defined. This could include any number of shops, a cash point, toilets, cafe, drop-off areas, delivery area, the car park itself, rest area/benches and any other section of a retail park.

4) No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice.

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights, and of course all enforcement dates/times/days, and the boundary of the site - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do, and when/where. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is authorised on the material date, to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only). Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement. Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic but crucial information such as the site boundary and any bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the only restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge, as well as the date that the parking contract began, and when it runs to, or whether it runs in perpetuity, and of course, who the signatories are: name/job title/employer company, and whether they are authorised by the landowner to sign a binding legal agreement.

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

Section 7.1 states:

“If you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you the authority to carry out all the aspects of car park management for the site that you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges.”

Section 7.2 states:

“If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.”

Section 7.3 states:

“The written authorisation must also set out:

a.             the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined.

b.             any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation.

c.             any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement.

d.             who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs.

e.             the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement”.

 I do not believe that MET’s mere site agreement as a contractor issuing PCNs and letters 'on behalf of' the landowner gives the parking firm any rights to sue in their own name. This is insufficient to comply with the BPA Code of Practice and not enough to hold me liable in law to pay MET (not that a keeper can be liable anyway on non-relevant land and MET cannot enforce byelaws themselves). MET have no title in this land and therefore have no standing to enforce 'parking charges' or penalties of any description in any court. No evidence has been supplied lawfully showing that MET are entitled to pursue these charges in their own right.

In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, a non-landowner private parking company must have a specifically worded contract with the landowner - not merely an 'agreement' with a non-landholder managing agent - otherwise there is no authority. I put MET to strict proof of compliance with all of the above requirements.

5) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself

I note that within the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 it discusses the clarity that needs to be provided to make a motorist aware of the parking charge. Specifically, it requires that the driver is given 'adequate notice' of the charge. POFA 2012 defines 'adequate notice' as follows:

''(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) 'adequate notice' means notice given by: (a) the display of one or more notices in accordance with any applicable requirements prescribed in regulations under paragraph 12 for, or for purposes including, the purposes of sub-paragraph (2); or (b) where no such requirements apply, the display of one or more notices which: (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and (ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land''.

Even in circumstances where POFA 2012 does not apply, I believe this to be a reasonable standard to use when making my own assessment, as appellant, of the signage in place at the location. Having considered the signage in place at this particular site against the requirements of Section 18 of the BPA Code of Practice and POFA 2012, I am of the view that the signage at the site - given the minuscule font size of the £sum, which is illegible in most photographs and does not appear at all at the entrance - is NOT sufficient to bring the parking charge (i.e. the sum itself) to the attention of the motorist.

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

http://imgur.com/a/AkMCN

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-eYdphoIIDgE/VpbCpfSTaiI/AAAAAAAAE10/5uFjL528DgU/s640/Parking+sign_001.jpg

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

http://www-archive.mozilla.org/newlayout/testcases/css/sec526pt2.htm

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

http://www.signazon.com/help-center/sign-letter-height-visibility-chart.aspx

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2' letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3' or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

http://www.ebay.co.uk/gds/Outdoor-Dimensional-Sign-Letter-Best-Viewing-Distance-/10000000175068392/g.html

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this. 

 

Taking all the above into account, I therefore respectfully request that my appeal is upheld, and the charge is dismissed.

Yours faithfully,

KeithP

Check all the links do what you expect them to do.
Hint: they don't.