Claim Form Gladstone's solicitors Filing defence

Plonker25

Hello,

I have been directed to this website to help with a claim form I have received from Gladstones solicitors representing Parking Control Management.

They are alleging a breach of parking from back in 2020.  

I genuinely cannot recall parking at the place that they are saying my vehicle was parked or who was driving a the time.  My brother's use my car and so does my father who are all on the insurance policy.

After doing a bit of reading on this website and familiarising myself with the different stages of the procedure I have to file my defence.  My claim form is dated 19th January 24, I already acknowledged service within the 14 days.

POC:

The driver of the vehicle with registration ********* ('the vehicle') parked in breach of the terms of parking stipulated on the signage (the 'contract') at Saw mill way - Ash Elder and Davis court, on 19/03/2020 thus incurring the parking charge (the 'PCN').  The PCN was not paid within the 28 days of issue.  The Claimant claims the unpaid PCN from the Defendant as the driver/keeper of the Vehicle.  Despite demands being made, the defendant has failed to settle their outstanding liability.  THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS £100 for the PCN, £70.00 contractual costs pursuant to the contract and PCN terms and conditions, together with statutory interest of £51.03 pursuant to s69 of the county court acts 1984 at 8.00% per annum continuing at £0.04 per day.

My defence:

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  *******

Between

Parking Control Management (UK) limited

- and -  

Mrs **************

_________________

DEFENCE

 

1.  The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term.  Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the boilerplate text in the Particulars of Claim ('the POC').

 

The facts known to the Defendant:

2. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper but cannot confirm who was driving at the time.

3. The alleged breach dated 19/03/2020 was nearly 4 years ago, the defendant cannot recall as to why the vehicle was parked at this location and who was driving at the time of the alleged incident.

 

4. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(Ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

5. The Defendant denies (i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'), which is fully distinguished.


Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

6. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred.

7. This claim is unfair and inflated and it is denied that any sum is due in debt or damages. This Claimant routinely pursues an unconscionable fixed sum added per PCN, despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban it.

8. This is a classic example where adding exaggerated fees funds bulk litigation of weak and/or archive parking cases. No checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit or a cause of action (given away by the woefully inadequate POC).

9. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('the DLUHC') published a statutory Parking Code of Practice in February 2022: 

removed link to post

The Ministerial Foreword is damning: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

10. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code (temporarily withdrawn) it is now 'live' after a draft Impact Assessment (IA) was published on 30th July 2023. The Government's analysis is found here: 

removed link to post

11. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 state that the parking industry has shown the DLUHC that the true minor cost of pre-action stage totals a mere £8.42 per case (not per PCN).

12. This claim has been enhanced by a disproportionate sum, believed to enrich the litigating legal team. It appears to be double recovery, duplicating the intended 'legal fees' cap set by small claims track rules.

13. The draft IA shows that the intimidating letter-chains endured by Defendants cost 'eight times less' than the  fixed +£70 per PCN. This causes immense consumer harm in the form of some half a million wrongly-enhanced CCJs each year, that Judges are powerless to prevent.  MoJ statistics reveal several hundred thousand parking claims per annum, with c90% causing default CCJs totalling hundreds of millions of pounds. The false fee was enabled by the self-serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies who aligned in 2021 to allow +£70, each led by a Board comprising the parking and debt firms who stood to gain from it. 

14. It is denied that the added damages/fee sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs' inflating a PCN to £135 exaggerated the cost of template letters and 'would appear to be penal'.

15. This Claimant has not incurred costs. A PCN model already includes what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' and it generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 pre-action letters/reminders and £85 was held to more than cover the minor costs of the operation (NB: debt collectors charge nothing in failed collection cases).

16. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, all non-monetary clauses went unchallenged. It will replace the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes, which are not regulation and carry limited weight.  It is surely a clear steer for the Courts that the DLUHC said in 2023 that it is addressing 'market failure'.

17. At last, the DLUHC's analysis overrides plainly wrong findings by Circuit Judges steered by Counsel in weak appeal cases that the parking industry steamrollered through. In Vehicle Control Services v Percy, HHJ Saffman took a diametrically opposed position to that taken by DJ Hickinbottom, DJ Jackson (as Her Honour Judge Jackson then was), and other District Judges on the North Eastern Circuit, including DJ Skalskyj-Reynolds and DJ Wright (Skipton) all of whom have consistently dismissed extortionate added 'fees/damages'. District Judges deal with private parking claims on a daily basis, whereas cases of this nature come before Circuit Judges infrequently. The Judgments of HHJ Parkes in Britannia v Semark-Jullien, and HHJ Simpkiss in One Parking Solution v Wilshaw were flawed. These supposedly persuasive judgments included a universal failure to consider the court's duty under s71 of the CRA 2015 and factual errors. In Wilshaw: a badly outdated reliance on 'ticket cases' which allowed poor signage to escape fair scrutiny and a wrong presumption that landowner authority 'is not required' (DVLA rules make it mandatory). In Percy, HHJ Saffman made an incorrect assumption about pre-action costs and even sought out the wrong Code of Practice of his own volition after the hearing, and used it to inform his judgment.

18. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper. The Claimant is put to strict proof of POFA compliance if seeking 'keeper liability'.

19. The Defendant avers that there was no agreement to pay a parking charge or added 'damages' which were not even incurred, let alone quantified in bold, prominent text. This Claimant's lack of large, readable signs are nothing like the yellow & black warnings seen in Beavis, nor do they meet the signage requirements in the DLUHC Code which reflects the already statutory requirement for 'prominence' (Consumer Rights Act 2015 - the 'CRA').

CRA breaches

20. Section 71 CRA creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the test of fairness whether a party raises it or not. Further, claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3):

removed link to post

21. The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both terms and 'consumer notices'.  In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of 'signs & lines' and all communications (written or otherwise). Signs must be prominent (lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

22.  The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the duties of fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).  

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

23.  Unlike in Beavis, the penalty rule remains engaged. The CRA covers disproportionate sums, which are not exempt from being assessed for fairness because a 'fee' is not the core price term and neither was it prominently proclaimed on the signs.  

24. The Supreme Court held that deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms or cumbersome obligations ('concealed pitfalls or traps').  This Claimant has failed those tests, with small signs, hidden terms and minuscule small print that is incapable of binding a driver. Court of Appeal authorities about a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (Lord Denning's ‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space''. 

25.  Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the DLUHC Code and these clauses are supported by the BPA & IPC. In the official publication 'Parking Review' the IPC's CEO observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t." 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

26. DVLA data is only supplied if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules). It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority to form contracts at this site in their name. The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to litigate.

27. The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The DLUHC Code shows that genuine disputes such as this should see PCNs cancelled, had a fair ADR existed. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject most disputes: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (ref: Annual Report).  This consumer blame culture and reliance upon their own 'appeals service' (described by MPs as a kangaroo court and about to be replaced by the Government) should satisfy Judges that a fair appeal was never on offer.

Conclusion

28. There is now evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims that are causing consumer harm.  The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis shows that the usual letter-chain costs eight times less than the sum claimed for it.  The claim is entirely without merit and the POC embarrassing.  The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that poorly pleaded claims like this should be struck out.

29. In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

(a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

30.  Attention is drawn to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signature:

Date:

Am I ok to file this as my defence, anything I'm missing?

Coupon-mad

Please don't show us the whole Template.  

You should be using the linked hharry100  version of defence.

Plonker25

oops sorry about that.

Ill amend using hharry100's version and repost, without the whole template!

KeithP

Plonker25 said:

My claim form is dated 19th January 24, I already acknowledged service within the 14 days.

With a Claim Issue Date of 19th January, and having filed an Acknowledgment of Service in a timely manner, you have until 4pm on Wednesday 21st February 2024 to file your Defence.

That's just two days away but plenty of time to produce a Defence.

To create a Defence, and then file a Defence by email, look at the second post in the NEWBIES thread.

Don't miss the deadline for filing a Defence.

Do not try and file a Defence via the MoneyClaimOnline website. Once an Acknowledgment of Service has been filed, the MCOL website should be treated as 'read only'.

Plonker25

I am going to file this defence today before 4pm, I have amended using hharry100's template.

Am I ok to file this defence, it seems a bit vague, however, we genuine cannot recall who was driving at the time.

Thanking you in advance 

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  xxxxxx

Between

Full name of parking firm Ltd, not the solicitor!

(Claimant) 

- and -  

Defendant named on claim (can’t be changed to driver now)                        

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE

_________________

1.  The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term.  Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the boilerplate text in the Particulars of Claim ('the POC').

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

2. The Defendant draws to the attention of the allocating Judge that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on appeal).  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

3. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment (transcript below) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. 

images of chan case

The facts known to the Defendant:

4. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper, however, it is unknown who the driver was due to length of time since the PCN was issued.  The vehicle has more than one user.

 

5. The Defendant does not remember on the day in question who was driving the vehicle so cannot state the reason for the vehicle being parked in this location and as to why a PCN was issued.  The defendant does not recall receiving a PCN on the windscreen nor do they recall receiving any correspondence with regards to this PCN.  This PCN was issued nearly 4 years ago.

remainder of template point 6 onwards

Coupon-mad

I think you should add a bit more; maybe:

6.  The Defendant denies liability for the entirety of the sum claimed and, save as expressly stated, makes no admissions except that the Defendant was the registered keeper.

7.  In an effort to look at the supposed 'contract' (not supplied in any pre-action correspondence) the Defendant used the only factual hint in the POC and Googled 'Elder Court Saw Mill Way'. Street view images show a residential estate with a complete lack of entrance signage or signs adjacent to the various parking bays.  An already faded pale green/white 'PCM' sign was found in the image (from 8 years ago) on a wall next to a far more prominent red prohibition 'No Parking' sign but this is alongside a roadway kerb.  There is no evidence from the Claimant as to where the vehicle stopped, how long for (could have been unloading, or picking up a passenger, not parking) nor even what the terms on their sign said and if that could be seen/read from a driver's seat. 

8.  Given the prohibitive nature of most PCM signage seen in their other Gladstones !roboclaim' cases and the images seen on Google Streetview, the Defendant takes the point that the wording of the Claimant's signs typically forbids parking. As such, there is no offer to park and therefore no contract.  Accordingly, the Defendant denies that the vehicle was parked in breach of any term (whatever that term might have been) and denies that a contract with PCM to pay £100/£160 (or any sum) would have been agreed.

9.  Assuming the Defendant's 'detective work' is right in locating the land to shed some light on the case, they will rely on decisions in similar residential estate parking cases including these involving the same Claimant: B4GF26K6 PCM (UK) v Mr B (£914.67 claimed) B4GF27K3 PCM (UK) v Mr W (£1559.82) and B4GF26K2 PCM (UK) v Ms L (£1067.15) which were all heard together at High Wycombe in 2016 and PCM's claims were dismissed due to specifically inadequate signage. Other similar facts residential parking cases include PACE Recovery and Storage Ltd v Lengyel. C7GF6E3R (Manchester Court, 2017) and Jopson v Homeguard [2016] B9GF0A9E which was heard on appeal at Oxford Court and thus it is a persuasive decision.

10.  In the seemingly unlikely event that this cut-and-paste roboclaim progresses past allocation stage, the Claimant is put to strict proof of all allegations including but not limited to keeper liability, landowner authority, maps and proof of adequate signage capable of forming a contract on the material date and their evidence of a parking period which allegedly breached a 'relevant contract or obligation'.

Coupon-mad

For info, NOT for defence stage:

http://parking-prankster.blogspot.com/2016/04/pcm-uk-signage-does-not-create-contract.html?m=1

Plonker25

Thank you Coupon-mad.

Shall I add your points including my paragraph 6 or replace it with your paragraph 6 that you have suggested.  

Also do I need to add the remainder of the template after your paragraph 10 and re-number?

Plonker25

Im thinking after more of a read through that I need to replace my paragraph 6 and add new paragraphs in as suggested, I've then continued the template paragraphs and renumbered. 

1.  The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conductby the driver was in breach of any term.  Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the boilerplate text in the Particulars of Claim ('the POC').

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

2. The Defendant draws to the attention of the allocating Judge that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on appeal).  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

3. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment (transcript below) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. 

Chan images  

The facts known to the Defendant:

4. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper, however, it is unknown who the driver was due to length of time since the PCN was issued.  The vehicle has more than one user.

5.  The Defendant denies liability for the entirety of the sum claimed and, save as expressly stated, makes no admissions except that the Defendant was the registered keeper.

6.  The Defendant denies liability for the entirety of the sum claimed and, save as expressly stated, makes no admissions except that the Defendant was the registered keeper.

7.  In an effort to look at the supposed 'contract' (not supplied in any pre-action correspondence) the Defendant used the only factual hint in the POC and Googled 'Elder Court Saw Mill Way'. Street view images show a residential estate with a complete lack of entrance signage or signs adjacent to the various parking bays.  An already faded pale green/white 'PCM' sign was found in the image (from 8 years ago) on a wall next to a far more prominent red prohibition 'No Parking' sign but this is alongside a roadway kerb.  There is no evidence from the Claimant as to where the vehicle stopped, how long for (could have been unloading, or picking up a passenger, not parking) nor even what the terms on their sign said and if that could be seen/read from a driver's seat. 

8.  Given the prohibitive nature of most PCM signage seen in their other Gladstones roboclaim cases and the images seen on Google Streetview, the Defendant takes the point that the wording of the Claimant's signs typically forbids parking. As such, there is no offer to park and therefore no contract.  Accordingly, the Defendant denies that the vehicle was parked in breach of any term (whatever that term might have been) and denies that a contract with PCM to pay £100/£160 (or any sum) would have been agreed.

9.  Assuming the Defendant's 'detective work' is right in locating the land to shed some light on the case, they will rely on decisions in similar residential estate parking cases including these involving the same Claimant: B4GF26K6 PCM (UK) v Mr B (£914.67 claimed) B4GF27K3 PCM (UK) v Mr W (£1559.82) and B4GF26K2 PCM (UK) v Ms L (£1067.15) which were all heard together at High Wycombe in 2016 and PCM's claims were dismissed due to specifically inadequate signage. Other similar facts residential parking cases include PACE Recovery and Storage Ltd v Lengyel. C7GF6E3R (Manchester Court, 2017) and Jopson v Homeguard [2016] B9GF0A9E which was heard on appeal at Oxford Court and thus it is a persuasive decision.

10.  In the seemingly unlikely event that this cut-and-paste roboclaim progresses past allocation stage, the Claimant is put to strict proof of all allegations including but not limited to keeper liability, landowner authority, maps and proof of adequate signage capable of forming a contract on the material date and their evidence of a parking period which allegedly breached a 'relevant contract or obligation'.

11.  In an effort to look at the supposed 'contract' (not supplied in any pre-action correspondence) the Defendant used the only factual hint in the POC and Googled 'Elder Court Saw Mill Way'. Street view images show a residential estate with a complete lack of entrance signage or signs adjacent to the various parking bays.  An already faded pale green/white 'PCM' sign was found in the image (from 8 years ago) on a wall next to a far more prominent red prohibition 'No Parking' sign but this is alongside a roadway kerb.  There is no evidence from the Claimant as to where the vehicle stopped, how long for (could have been unloading, or picking up a passenger, not parking) nor even what the terms on their sign said and if that could be seen/read from a driver's seat. 

12.  Given the prohibitive nature of most PCM signage seen in their other Gladstones roboclaim cases and the images seen on Google Streetview, the Defendant takes the point that the wording of the Claimant's signs typically forbids parking. As such, there is no offer to park and therefore no contract.  Accordingly, the Defendant denies that the vehicle was parked in breach of any term (whatever that term might have been) and denies that a contract with PCM to pay £100/£160 (or any sum) would have been agreed.

13.  Assuming the Defendant's 'detective work' is right in locating the land to shed some light on the case, they will rely on decisions in similar residential estate parking cases including these involving the same Claimant: B4GF26K6 PCM (UK) v Mr B (£914.67 claimed) B4GF27K3 PCM (UK) v Mr W (£1559.82) and B4GF26K2 PCM (UK) v Ms L (£1067.15) which were all heard together at High Wycombe in 2016 and PCM's claims were dismissed due to specifically inadequate signage. Other similar facts residential parking cases include PACE Recovery and Storage Ltd v Lengyel. C7GF6E3R (Manchester Court, 2017) and Jopson v Homeguard [2016] B9GF0A9E which was heard on appeal at Oxford Court and thus it is a persuasive decision.

14.  In the seemingly unlikely event that this cut-and-paste roboclaim progresses past allocation stage, the Claimant is put to strict proof of all allegations including but not limited to keeper liability, landowner authority, maps and proof of adequate signage capable of forming a contract on the material date and their evidence of a parking period which allegedly breached a 'relevant contract or obligation'.

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

15. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred............

template points continued............ until paragraph 39

Plonker25

just realised paragraphs 5 and 6 have been duplicated 

Plonker25

Sorry for the above posts, a bit confusing!

so, this is my final edited version......

1.  The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term.  Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the boilerplate text in the Particulars of Claim ('the POC').

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

2. The Defendant draws to the attention of the allocating Judge that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on appeal).  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

3. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment (transcript below) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. 

Chan Case images

The facts known to the Defendant:

4. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper, however, it is unknown who the driver was due to length of time since the PCN was issued.  The vehicle has more than one user.

5. The Defendant does not remember on the day in question who was driving the vehicle so cannot state the reason for the vehicle being parked in this location and as to why a PCN was issued.  The defendant does not recall receiving a PCN on the windscreen nor do they recall receiving any correspondence with regards to this PCN.  This PCN was issued nearly 4 years ago.

6.  The Defendant denies liability for the entirety of the sum claimed and, save as expressly stated, makes no admissions except that the Defendant was the registered keeper.

7.  In an effort to look at the supposed 'contract' (not supplied in any pre-action correspondence) the Defendant used the only factual hint in the POC and Googled 'Elder Court Saw Mill Way'. Street view images show a residential estate with a complete lack of entrance signage or signs adjacent to the various parking bays.  An already faded pale green/white 'PCM' sign was found in the image (from 8 years ago) on a wall next to a far more prominent red prohibition 'No Parking' sign but this is alongside a roadway kerb.  There is no evidence from the Claimant as to where the vehicle stopped, how long for (could have been unloading, or picking up a passenger, not parking) nor even what the terms on their sign said and if that could be seen/read from a driver's seat. 

8.  Given the prohibitive nature of most PCM signage seen in their other Gladstones roboclaim cases and the images seen on Google Streetview, the Defendant takes the point that the wording of the Claimant's signs typically forbids parking. As such, there is no offer to park and therefore no contract.  Accordingly, the Defendant denies that the vehicle was parked in breach of any term (whatever that term might have been) and denies that a contract with PCM to pay £100/£160 (or any sum) would have been agreed.

9.  Assuming the Defendant's 'detective work' is right in locating the land to shed some light on the case, they will rely on decisions in similar residential estate parking cases including these involving the same Claimant: B4GF26K6 PCM (UK) v Mr B (£914.67 claimed) B4GF27K3 PCM (UK) v Mr W (£1559.82) and B4GF26K2 PCM (UK) v Ms L (£1067.15) which were all heard together at High Wycombe in 2016 and PCM's claims were dismissed due to specifically inadequate signage. Other similar facts residential parking cases include PACE Recovery and Storage Ltd v Lengyel. C7GF6E3R (Manchester Court, 2017) and Jopson v Homeguard [2016] B9GF0A9E which was heard on appeal at Oxford Court and thus it is a persuasive decision.

10.  In the seemingly unlikely event that this cut-and-paste roboclaim progresses past allocation stage, the Claimant is put to strict proof of all allegations including but not limited to keeper liability, landowner authority, maps and proof of adequate signage capable of forming a contract on the material date and their evidence of a parking period which allegedly breached a 'relevant contract or obligation'.

11. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(Ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

12. The Defendant denies (i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'), which is fully distinguished.


Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government................

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