Not the Keeper nor the Driver

Pullmyfinger88

Ok, thanks @Coupon-mad. I’ve a bit of rework to do before I send it. As you say, no rush, I’ve 2 weeks before I need to submit it. I’ll check with the court to see if they have discontinued when I speak to them next. (They can do that when I have a live counterclaim?)

Coupon-mad

Yes they can discontinue and I fully expect them to.  In fact I reckon they already have. What's the hearing fee deadline?

Pullmyfinger88

🤣🤣🤣🤣 The hearing fee deadline is 5th July 2024 and the deadline for witness statements for both of us is 22nd May 2024.

Coupon-mad

Ah OK, an odd way round!  But no pressure yet for you to end up paying that hearing fee then.

Pullmyfinger88

Good morning everyone, thanks a million to all of you for your help so far. I’ve made the changes that you’ve all suggested and I think it’s pretty much done. Sorry it’s another war and peace. I will go over it with a fine tooth comb for spelling and grammar before sending it. EDIT: I see a few paragraph numbers missing also 🙈

Please can I have your input?

2. The facts and matters referred to in my witness statement are within my own knowledge, except where I have stated otherwise. Where the facts are within my knowledge, they are true. Where they are not within my own knowledge, they are true to the best of the information, resources, and belief to be correct.

3. Whilst parts of this Witness Statement may be familiar to the claimant, as a litigant-in-person it would not be right to be criticised for using all relevant resources and advice that has been available to me. This statement was prepared by me specifically for this matter and unlike the claimant’s case, it deals properly and individually with the facts.

4. Exhibited to this witness statement are the following attached documents which I will rely on to support the facts and arguments contained in this statement:

a) All correspondence received from and made to I Park Services Ltd.

b) All correspondence received from and made to DBCL.

c) Screenshots of my work schedule for 21/04/23 & 23/04/23 

d) V5 for my vehicle

5. As DCB Legal’s data protection officer admitted that “This in your case has produced a mistrace in error” (See attachment XXXXXX) then their claim against me is totally baseless. The only matter to be determined is the quantum of my counterclaim.

6. For the avoidance of any doubt however, I make the following statements and provide the following proof so that my innocence may be established beyond any doubt.

7. I am not the owner or registered keeper of the vehicle mentioned by the claimant. I never have been and neither have I leased or hired the vehicle.

8. My vehicle’s registration from my V5 (Attachment XXXXX) is completely different, it’s a different make, model and colour from the vehicle pictured in the the junk mail I received. I own no other cars. 

9. Note that ????? is the name on my V5 (Attachment XXXXX) and is the name I use for official purposes. The data obtained by the claimant refers to a “???!”, a name I only use with friends. This is red flag on its own.

10. On the date of the alleged contravention (22/4/23), I was in Azerbaijan. I landed there the day before, spent the 22nd there and left for Frankfurt the day after. I have included screenshots of my work schedule showing my arrival and departure flights. (Attachments XXXXX)

AND THE DEFENDANT COUNTERCLAIMS:- 

11. My counterclaim is that I Park Services Ltd and their agent’s course of conduct amounts to unlawful harassment pursuant under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.  

12. Also, numerous counts of data protection breaches, pursuant under the respective Data Protection Act 2018 and GDPR. They unlawfully obtained, processed and passed on my data to a notoriously aggressive third party debt recovery agency and violated almost every one of the data protection principles. They then placed unreasonable obstacles in my way and initially refused my right of access, right to rectification and most importantly, my right to erasure. The information they did finally provide was incomplete, with a nonsensical reason for the missing information given.

13. I am a victim of appalling abuse of process and vexatious use of the court system in a blatant attempt to bully me and enrich themselves without any lawful entitlement whatsoever. It is submitted that the principal object of my counterclaim is to hold I park Services Ltd and DCBL to account. Even knowing that this matter was absolutely nothing to do with me, they pursued me all the way into court, and then attempted to blame me for proceedings being instigated by “failing to mitigate” (Not entirely true, point 38 below)

14. I am seeking remedy for £900 for distress, anxiety and alarm caused by the actions of the claimant and their agent pursuant to points 11 & 12 above.

15. As mentioned in my defence, the figure of £900 was arrived at with reference to the Vento Bands for 2021. I did not realise until later in my research that there was a revision for 2023/24 which increased the bottom of the lower band to £1,100. Still, even though it is now below the bottom of the lower band, I believe £900 reflects the less serious nature of the case. I have not attempted to be greedy, the claim is extremely modest and is a balance between the distress, anxiety and alarm caused and the counterclaim fee.

Pullmyfinger88

16. Under the protection from Harassment act 1997, section 7(2) ‘References to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress’

17. I concede that receiving their ‘junk’ mail once a month, over the course of almost a year, causes minimal alarm and distress. Even the ever increasing bloated fees and threats held little jeopardy as it did not pertain to me in any shape, way or form. Similar to the correspondence I receive from Elon Musk regarding Bitcoin & the messages threatening to expose my browsing history unless I pay a ransom, I deemed this letter inconsequential, junk, a scam and binned it. 

18. The same can not be said for receiving a claim form from the county court. It is nothing short of horrific to endure for a litigant-in-person and the shock of a court claim cannot be underestimated. The claimant may be used to boilerplate litigation, taking it in their stride, but I am not. I have never been involved with the courts, for any reason, and have zero experience of the process. Of course, they know this and use it with devastating effect to bully money out of people. 

19. I work abroad and so received the claim form on my arrival home. It led to sleepless nights and distraction during my valuable vacation time, which I would prefer to spend with my young daughter than researching what kind of trouble I’m in and how to get out of it.

20. The fact that I am often away for more than a month is particularly alarming as if my arrival home was not as luckily timed as it was, I would have had a default judgement entered against my perfect record when I am in fact, totally innocent. 

21. I researched what to do next and sought advice. The advice I received was to email both data protection officers (Attachment XXXXX and XXXXX dated 19/2/24), as no single point of contact was given, and advise them that they have the wrong person and request they erase the erroneous data they held on me. I requested a SAR and gave them seven days to confirm a discontinuance.

22. I immediately received an automated reply from DCBL with their telephone payment line and bank details on.

23. I received replies from I Park services on XXXXX (Attachment XXXXX) and DCBL on XXXXX (Attachment XXXXX) and it’s from here that my stress, anxiety and alarm increased greatly. Data protection principles are dismissed out of hand and the line is clearly crossed as both pursue a course of conduct which is encapsulated by the protection against Harassment act 1997 section 1(1) ‘a course of conduct which amounts to harassment, and which the defendant (the claimant and their agents in my case) knows or ought to know amounts to harassment’.

24. My first real reply was from the claimant’s data protection officer (Attachment XXXXX) on 22/2/24, 5 days after my email. It was, as expected, obstructive and violates almost every one of the data protection principles. It stated that they can “only provide data to either the registered keeper if the driver has not been identified”. This violates my right under the data protection act 2018 ‘to find out what information other organisations store about you’

25. Keeping in mind that I told them that they have the wrong person and to erase the erroneous data they held on me, they also violated my rights to have ‘incorrect data updated’ and to have ‘data erased’. Data protection principles state that they must make sure that the information is “used fairly, lawfully and transparently” and “accurate and where necessary, kept up to date”. I also argue that knowing that I’m the incorrect data subject, they are in violation of the principle ‘used in a way that is adequate, relevant and limited to only what is necessary’

26. The I Park Services data protection officer insisted on seeing my driving licence, which I know from ICO guidance is not mandatory. I am uncomfortable providing these predators with any personal information, and no way would I send my licence, especially when they’re so irresponsible with that data. I did reply and send their original paperwork with a redacted utility bill to prove my identity and therefore move forward. (Attachment XXXXX dated 23/02/24)

27. Later on 22/02/24, I received a copy and paste reply from DCBL. It requested even more, different information, which I refused to part with (Attachment XXXXX dated 23/02/2024). Especially when I had already parted with more than I wanted to to the claimant.

28. In both replies I reiterated that they had the wrong person. I requested they erase the erroneous data and issue a discontinuance in the next 7 days.

29. Looking back now, I regret the disrespectful tone I used but it clearly highlights the distress being caused by their obstructive approach to my situation and the frustration being caused by the threat of impending court action. I am not unreasonable but the feeling is that they don’t want to know, they just want you to pay. 

30. This would have been the perfect opportunity to look at their evidence, realise they had the wrong person, issue the discontinuance and erase the spurious data they held on me as I had asked. It would have put an end to my distress and ended the waste of their, my and ultimately the court’s time.

31. I park services’ data protection officer replied (Attachment XXXXX dated 27/02/24) and made it quite clear that they were not going to cooperate, the tone extremely bellicose in nature. This is a continuation of the harassment I was feeling, causing me more alarm, distress, anger and sleepless nights.

32. The email states clearly in no uncertain terms, in all 3 of the first paragraphs that they will not provide me with any of the information I requested. Under the Data Protection Act 2018 I have the right ‘to find out what information other organisations store about you’. This is a clear violation of my rights.

33. The DPO then goes on to say that they obtained my name and address from the DVLA which is a downright lie. It is absolutely impossible. Per section 1(2) of the protection against harassment act 1997, this moved them clearly into territory which, ‘the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to [or involves] harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other’. A reasonable person who saw the DVLA information would see instantly that it is not my address and even if they weren’t big enough to apologise, would end it there, issue the discontinuance I requested and delete the spurious data they held on me.

34. The same day, I get the same cut and paste reply from Mr. Hinton of DCBL (Attachment XXXXX) requesting the same personal information he requested a week earlier, which I had already refused to part with.

35. Due to my frustration and anxiety triggered when dealing with these firms, I did not contact either any further. My thoughts were “what’s the point?” . Payment is the only course of action made easy and readily available , anything else is purposefully made to be cumbersome, obstructive, obfuscated and frustrating. Despite the extra stress & loss of extremely limited and precious time that I’d prefer to spend with my daughter, I began research and sought advice on how to file a counterclaim. I felt it was my only chance of a discontinuance and protection of my personal data. I was sure that this is the only form of communication these people will take any notice of, and I was proven correct very quickly, within days of my counterclaim in fact.

36. Within 4 days of filing my counterclaim, DCBL completely changed tack. The counterclaim was the catalyst needed to finally make the claimant take the matter seriously. All they needed was a counterclaim filing against them.

37. Later, on 19/03/24 I received an email from DCBL’s data protection officer (Attachment XXXXX) This email was totally unsolicited and arrived without me providing any of the identification or information requested by Mr. Hinton previously. It asked for another month to provide the SAR, on top of the month it had taken for them to reply. It appears that they didn’t need more information to honour my request after all, again, they just needed a counterclaim filing against them.

38. My SAR finally arrived on 8/4/24 from DCBL’s data protection officer(Attachment XXXXX). As you can see, it is total nonsense. It has the wrong name, an address that it claims was “provided by trace”, and the same VRN at the bottom with no information attached to it, the VRN I have maintained all along is nothing to do with me. There was no mention of the DVLA and the reason is because the DVLA cannot have returned my address. It was a clear attempt to placate me and a rushed, half cocked attempt to prevent me from claiming that they refused to provide me with the SAR I requested.

39. I replied quickly (Attachment XXXX) and informed Ms Stokes that the trace cannot be from the DVLA, enquiring what trace returned my address?

40. An exchange then followed between Ms Stokes and I where I felt she continued to attempt to obsfucate the details I sought and palm me off with the DCBL privacy policy on their website. Because of this, I continued to press her (Attachment XXXXX)

41. Her reply (Attachment XXXXX) is where she admitted that “A trace actioned by DCB Legal has given a secondary address for the name on file. This in your case has produced a mistrace in error.”

42. That alone rendered their case against me over. It also confirms the fact that the I Park Services’ data protection officer lied regarding my details coming from the DVLA. It also proves that, given even the smallest investigation, they would have realised that they had the wrong data subject which would have put a stop to all of this before we got anywhere near this point.

43. Still Ms. Stokes hadn’t answered my question so I replied again (Attachment XXXXX), seeking further clarification of the source of my home address. Her reply (Attachment XXXXX) informed me that under the exemption rule, ‘management forecasting and planning’ she is exempted from providing the information I requested on the basis that it would be likely to prejudice the conduct of their business activities.

44. Researching that exemption, I read that it relates to sales projections, staffing plans and and financial forecasts. I fail to see how it bears any relevance to my request to disclose the source of the trace that erroneously returned my home address. 

It rendered my SAR incomplete and therefore totally useless, as the critical information regarding where my postal address was obtained from is still unknown. We can safely say, even before Ms Stokes admission in Attachment XXXX, that it did not come from the DVLA. It is yet another clear violation of the data protection principle, “used fairly, lawfully and transparently”. Not to mention it’s lack of accuracy

45. It took 7 exchanges to arrive to that point and still the information I requested had not been provided. Every exchange is designed to cause maximum distress and results in very little progress. I suspect the reason is because it would prove that this whole thing is what I said it was in point 13 above, “appalling abuse of process and vexatious use of the court system in a blatant attempt to bully and enrich themselves without any lawful entitlement whatsoever”, “Even knowing that this matter was absolutely nothing to do with me, they pursued me all the way into court”. Yet more fuel for the harassment fire.

Pullmyfinger88

DEFENCE TO MY COUNTERCLAIM AND CONTINUED HARASSMENT 

46. Finally, I’d like to highlight the lies, half truths, misconceptions and what is a clear continuation of harassment that is Mr Hinton’s shameful defence to my counterclaim. (Attachment XXXXX). At this point, the game is up and they know I’m not the person they’re looking for, yet they persist.

47. At 6 (i) the claimant says I failed to mitigate in the circumstances. As I said in point 17 above, there was nothing about their letters that pertained to me. I deemed this letter inconsequential, junk, a scam and binned it. I am not obliged and don’t have the time to respond to junk mail, especially junk mail saying I owe money. 

48. In actual fact, I did call DCBL early on in the proceedings. After several letters, I did call them despite knowing their modus operandi and being fully aware it would be a waste of time. I withheld my number and after an age on hold was connected with a dismissive, arrogant and belligerent operative that repeatedly informed me that as the registered keeper, I was liable for the debt. I restated that I was not the registered keeper but was told my details had been obtained from the DVLA, which I knew was impossible. This lead to an increasingly frustrated and heated discussion, the operative eventually hanging up on me. 

49. Same paragraph, “if the defendant genuinely believes that they have been mistraced”. It’s not what I believe, it’s what I know, and what DCBL’s own data protection officer admitted, so they knew it too.

50. Same paragraph, “due to the correspondent refusing to confirm their details in accordance with DCB Legal’s data protection procedures”. I did confirm my details to I Park Services’ data protection officer (Point 26 above) and it was a waste of time. Why would I bother providing more, different information to DCBL? Having said that, as soon as my counterclaim was filed, DCBL’s data protection procedures went out the window (point 37 above). Either they’ve willingly broke their own procedures or the procedures were there as a roadblock and to aggravate me in the first place. 

Same Paragraph. To call me obstructive and unreasonable is rich and is totally unnecessary from a professional. I have an emotional involvement in this matter, he should not, it’s his job. Yet more unreasonable behaviour causing distress and alarm.

51. 6(v) the claimant states, “if the Defendant has been caused “distress and anxiety” then it is only because of their decision not to pay the charges”. Why would I pay charges for something that is nothing to do with me? How is this not a perfect example of ‘if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other’?. I’m innocent, I was minding my own business when these predators attacked me, why would I pay? Why would Mr. Hinton even write this? Surely anyone wrongly accused would defend themselves and not just pay up. If I wrote to DCBL and said they owed me £500 would they pay? No way! It would be an exercise in futility.

52. 6(vi). Lies, on an official court document. They knew my details hadn’t come from the DVLA. This point is completely moot.

53. 6(vii) My witness statement highlights the harassment I have suffered. I am innocent. This whole thing has been unwelcome in my life and I shouldn’t be dealing with any of it. In reference to 6(iv.b) my distress and anxiety is directly a result of the claimant. If they had their facts straight and desisted when they realised they were in error , I wouldn’t have experienced any distress or anxiety. If they’re not to blame, who is? (point 64 below)

54. Same paragraph, charges may have been issued correctly but they were to the wrong person, an innocent person. Why continue the charade? They know I’m innocent. The debt may be legally owed but it’s not owed by me. I am innocent. Again, another moot point and an attempt to obfuscate the matter at hand.

55. 6(viii) I Park Services and DCBL issued court proceedings against me, not the other way round. I say again, was minding my own business going about my life. I am not the aggressor here. I told them they had the wrong person, twice, and gave them 7 days to stop it proceeding further, twice, but as I mentioned above, they only paid attention once I was left with no alternative but to file a counterclaim. How dare they blame me for court proceedings being issued? 

56. 7 This is most certainly not a counterclaim that can be categorised as baseless because the remedy I seek is not a remedy unknown to the law. I include the relevant case law below. 

AUTHORITIES: 

(Tort of harassment giving rise to damages):

57. Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd  [2009] EWCA Civ 46, [2009] All ER (D) 80 (Feb)

https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/46.html

 The only real difference between the crime (s 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997) and the tort (s 3) is standard of proof: to prove the civil wrong of harassment it is necessary to prove the case on a balance of probabilities. Ms Ferguson endured debt demands for monies she did not owe. 

[52] ''...For my part I would draw attention to the fact [...] that harassment is a crime as well as a tort. Contrary to what was more than once suggested, this does not modify in any way the constituents of the wrong. 

[53] Parliament's intention in passing the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was to criminalise the kind of serious and persistent unwarranted threat which is alleged here, giving a right of civil action as a fallback. In this situation it ought not to be left to hardy individuals to put their savings and homes at risk by suing. The primary responsibility should rest upon local public authorities which possess the means and the statutory powers to bring alleged harassers, however impersonal and powerful, before the local justices.'' 

58. Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 333.

(DPA 2018 breach / misuse of data giving rise to a remedy in cases where distress is caused)

The claimant was awarded £750 following the wrongful disclosure of information to a credit reference agency. Although the impact of the breach was minor, the Court of Appeal decided that a modest damages award was justified to mark the “frustration” it had caused. 

59. Vidal-Hall v Google [2015] EWCA Civ 311.

The principle that damages were available for distress alone under the DPA 1998.

The Court held that there is now no need to establish pecuniary damage to bring a claim under the DPA and that distress alone is sufficient. The Court of Appeal held that Article 23 of Directive 95/46/EC should be given its natural and wide meaning so as to include both material and non-material damage. As the aim of the Directive was to protect privacy rather than economic rights, and to ensure that data-processing systems protect individuals' fundamental rights and freedoms, it would be "strange" if the Directive could not compensate those whose data privacy had been invaded by a data controller so as to cause them emotional distress (but not pecuniary damage).

60. Simon Clay v Civil Enforcement Limited 2018 (Case No. D9QZ9E8Q)

Judge Jones awarded Mr Clay £200 stating, “30. I think that the fact that there has been a breach must cause some inconvenience and that has to be reflected, not only in my finding of breach but also in some award for Mr Clay in respect of the consequences of him being pursued in the way that he was”

61. Vehicle control services Ltd v Robert Ferguson (Case No. G2Z60G1)

Is almost a carbon copy of my situation. Mr Ferguson was an incorrect data subject but was harassed by Vehicle Control Services and the victim of numerous data breaches. Despite his continued clarification that he knew nothing about it.

It is interesting to read in 12 that “under the act, there will be a liability to pay compensation if the claimant ought to have known that the information that they were relying on was incorrect, and I have absolutely no hesitation in concluding based on the facts of this case, and the evidence before me that the claimant ought to have known”

Judgement was in favour of Mr Ferguson in the sum of £1,500, which Judge Hayward said he considered entirely reasonable, again reflecting the modesty of my claim.

TO CONCLUDE

62. I have satisfied that in the balance of probabilities that the claimant knew or ought to have known that this claim had no merit and I was not liable in law. I have further strengthened my position that the claimant was negligent and lazy and their sole aim was to bully me for money which they had no lawful entitlement to.

In 2016, came the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which replaced the1995 Data Protection Directive. The provisions of the EU GDPR have been incorporated directly into UK law as the UK GDPR. UK organisations that process personal data must now comply with: The DPA (Data Protection Act) 2018 and UK GDPR, which this claimant most certainly did not. At all material times the claimants were data controllers, and I was the data subject, within the meaning of the DPA. The claimants were thereby under a statutory duty to process the Defendant’s data only in strict accordance with the DPA 2018 and the GDPR.

63. I have satisfied the balance of probabilities that the claimant has committed numerous counts of Data Protection material breaches by unlawfully obtaining and misusing my details, by refusing me complete access to that data, and for failing to erase the erroneous data they held about me. 

64. Furthermore the harassment for monies that was never due by me was unwarranted. It is to be noted that the protection from Harassment Act 1987 does not provide any defence for “accidental” harassment. Confirmed by Lord Justice Jacob in the case between Lisa Ferguson vs British Gas Trading Limited [2009] EWCA civ 46. Nor there is any policy reason why big corporations such as the claimant and their agents, who are among the biggest players in the parking and debt recovery Industry, should be exonerated for conduct which, if carried out by an individual, would amount to harassment.

65. I have provided sufficient evidence and information to show that the claimant and their agent knew the conduct amounted to harassment, or that it ought to have so known it was and their course of action is capable of causing alarm and distress. In accordance with what I understand in the Laws of Agency - the claimant is ultimately responsible for the third parties conduct and actions. I did everything that was reasonably expected as a vulnerable appellant in a territory virtually unknown to me at the time.

66. The 'thin skull' rules applies in that the claimant must take its victim as they find them. It has taken, and continues to take, a monumental effort to withstand the pressure of a series of aggressive letters. I have suffered substantial distress which has impacted upon my peace of mind for many months, during which there has been no prospect of stopping this claimant until the matters reached litigation.  

67. This case highlights the dangers of companies “Robo Claim“ business model, impersonal approach , spewing out robotic responses, and making no attempt to pay attention to or care about anything presented to them.

68. DCB Legal’s data protection officer admitted that they made a mistake still they have not apologised, discontinued or offered an amicable settlement. They continue to waste the courts, my and their own time, money and resources.

69.  As such, it is without a doubt they are engaging in unreasonable conduct in litigation and still continue with the same pattern of behaviour that constitutes a course of conduct amounting to harassment and intimidation. This case, without a doubt, falls comfortably within those types of cases in which the Court should exercise its powers under CPR 27.14(2)(g) and give out the strongest sanctions allowable .

70.  Lord Denning MR’s aptly described the concept of abuse of process in a dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal case, namely Goldsmith v Sperrings and others [1977] 1WLR 478. He said at p.489:  “In a civilised society, legal process is the machinery for keeping and doing justice. It can be used properly, or it can be abused. It is used properly when it is invoked for the vindication of a man’s rights or the enforcement of just claims. It is abused when it is diverted from its true course so as to serve extortion or oppression: or to exert pressure so as to achieve an improper end.  When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. The judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay the legal process, if they can, before any harm is done. If they cannot stop it in time, and harm is done, they will give damages against the wrongdoer. Sometimes abuse can be shown by the very steps being taken in the courts. At other times the abuse can only be shown by extrinsic evidence that the legal process is being used for an improper purpose. On the face of it, in any particular case, the legal process may appear to be entirely proper and correct. What may make it wrongful is the purpose for which it is used. If it is done in order to exert pressure so as to achieve an end which is improper in itself, then it is a wrong known to the law. This appears distinctly from the case which founded this tort. It is Granger V Hill 1838 4 Bing (NC) 212 which arose out of the old process of Capias. The plaintiff recovered damages for abuse of the process. It had been abused because it had had because it had been taken as Tindal CJ said at page 221, "to effect an object not within the scope of the process unquote": and as Bosanquet J said at page 224: the process was enforced for an ulterior purpose. ... I know that the remedy by staying the process is a strong remedy, and only to be exercised in exceptional cases. But there are cases in which justice may require it to be done. And then it should be done if the evidence is sufficient for the purpose."

71. The ideas inherent in this reasoning have flowed through case law right up to recent times some 45 years on. For example, reviewing the authorities, especially the judgment of Lord Clarke in Fairclough Homes Limited v Summers [2012] UKSC 26, it seems to me clear that the chief purpose of abuse of process lies more in achieving procedural fairness before trial, than it does in featuring in the disposal of a claim after trial. This is not to say that the Court can never resort to it after a trial, but this would be rare. Lord Clarke said “The test in every case must be what is just and proportionate. It seems to us that it will only be in the very exceptional case that it will be just and proportionate for the court to strike out an action after a trial.” [Para 61 of Fairclough]. 65. Rule 3.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules which enables the Court “to strike out the whole or part of a statement of case which discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending a claim” (CPR 3.4(2)(a)), or which is “an abuse of the process of the court or otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings” (CPR 3.4(2)(b)).''

72.  Accordingly, it should not preclude the Court from concluding that the claimant’s behaviour was altogether unreasonable. They started this action and pursued it without a sight of discontinuance or even a hint of remorse or apology, and this must fall into the category of unreasonable conduct attracting the costs sanction of CPR 27.14(2)(g) in favour of the Defendant.

73. The claimant - who has no prospect of success and has acted vexatiously and in breach of its DPA statutory duties throughout - is urged to discontinue now and settle this Part 20 Counterclaim. 

STATEMENT OF TRUTH:

Coupon-mad

Yes looks good.

Did you find wording from other threads about Vidal-Hall and the other case (Halliday) by doing the search I suggested?

Did you search & find the transcript of VCS v Ferguson?

On reflection, I wouldn't bother with Simon Clay because he only got £200.  Whereas I am remembering VCS v Ferguson as a mirror image to your case.

Pullmyfinger88

Coupon-mad said:

Yes looks good.

Did you find wording from other threads about Vidal-Hall and the other case (Halliday) by doing the search I suggested?

@Coupon-mad

Yes, thank-you. I got them from the search and saw you’d wrote a bespoke defence. I stole some of it! 🙈 and those 2 are at 58 and 59. 

VCS v Ferguson is at 61. That was perfect, thank-you. Can I quote from it like I have? Is it correct?

Very good, I agree with you about Clay 👍 I’ll remove it.

Thanks for all your help so far.

Coupon-mad

Just checking you have the actual VCS v Ferguson transcript because it's an unreported case.  The Judge can't just find that one.

Not the same as Ferguson v British Gas of course!