Stansted McDonalds Starbucks Southgate County Court Claim

HHGGG

Coupon-mad said:

HHGGG said:

Coupon-mad said:

That's good. Nearly done.

You need to embed the image of the Chan judgment like everyone else is doing in all the defence threads you click on.

And I'd remove this phrase from 10

"requires further and better particulars, and"

Thank you! I've searched through the forum and can't yet find any images yet, could you point me in the direction to find it?

10 now reads:

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

10. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred by this Claimant, who is put to strict proof of:

(i). the alleged breach, which is not pleaded in the POC and

(ii). a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced sum in the POC, including how interest was calculated, which looks to be improperly applied on the entire inflated sum, as if that was all overdue on the day of the alleged event

You can't find the Chan case despite the fact every defence thread shows it and so does the Template Defence thread?

No I can't unfortunately, I can find references such as [Embed images of the transcript here].

If anyone can point me in the right direction that will be massively appreciated. This is not something i've done before and find quite difficult. 

Many thanks

KeithP

HHGGG said:

Coupon-mad said:

HHGGG said:

Coupon-mad said:

That's good. Nearly done.

You need to embed the image of the Chan judgment like everyone else is doing in all the defence threads you click on.

And I'd remove this phrase from 10

"requires further and better particulars, and"

Thank you! I've searched through the forum and can't yet find any images yet, could you point me in the direction to find it?

10 now reads:

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

10. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred by this Claimant, who is put to strict proof of:

(i). the alleged breach, which is not pleaded in the POC and

(ii). a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced sum in the POC, including how interest was calculated, which looks to be improperly applied on the entire inflated sum, as if that was all overdue on the day of the alleged event

You can't find the Chan case despite the fact every defence thread shows it and so does the Template Defence thread?

No I can't unfortunately, I can find references such as [Embed images of the transcript here].

If anyone can point me in the right direction that will be massively appreciated. This is not something i've done before and find quite difficult. 

Many thanks

So you didn't see this in the second post of the Template Defence thread?...

UncleThomasCobley

HHGGG said:

UncleThomasCobley said:

Paras #3 and #4 should be #2 and #3 plus the embedded CEL v Chan transcript.

Apologies, I'm not sure I quite follow. The original paragraph 2 should potentially be removed?

I didn't say remove anything. Your paras #2 and #3 should be the preliminary matter about the CEL v Chan case. Then, everything else should be renumbered sequentially after.

HHGGG

KeithP said:

HHGGG said:

Coupon-mad said:

HHGGG said:

Coupon-mad said:

That's good. Nearly done.

You need to embed the image of the Chan judgment like everyone else is doing in all the defence threads you click on.

And I'd remove this phrase from 10

"requires further and better particulars, and"

Thank you! I've searched through the forum and can't yet find any images yet, could you point me in the direction to find it?

10 now reads:

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

10. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred by this Claimant, who is put to strict proof of:

(i). the alleged breach, which is not pleaded in the POC and

(ii). a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced sum in the POC, including how interest was calculated, which looks to be improperly applied on the entire inflated sum, as if that was all overdue on the day of the alleged event

You can't find the Chan case despite the fact every defence thread shows it and so does the Template Defence thread?

No I can't unfortunately, I can find references such as [Embed images of the transcript here].

If anyone can point me in the right direction that will be massively appreciated. This is not something i've done before and find quite difficult. 

Many thanks

So you didn't see this in the second post of the Template Defence thread?...

Thank you, brilliant, all included now.

HHGGG

Updated draft below:

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  xxxxxx

Between

MET Parking Services Ltd

(Claimant) 

- and -  

Defendant named on claim (can’t be changed to driver now)                        

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE 

1.  The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term.  Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the boilerplate text in the Particulars of Claim ('the POC').

2. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely. the Defendant observes after researching other parking claims with the same POC that this claim sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent statement of case.  The POC is sparse on facts and specific breach allegation, making it very difficult to respond. However, it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle.

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

3. The Defendant draws to the attention of the allocating Judge that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on Appeal).  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

4. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 and Practice Direction Part 16. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4

The facts known to the Defendant:

5. The Defendant is disabled and has not kept or found a copy of the dispute or reply, this was over five years ago. The hazy recollection is that the car was at all material times properly parked and authorised and who were genuine patrons of McDonalds and/or Starbucks. The Defendant cannot tell from the POC whether the allegation they have to answer is an alleged overstay, or something else.  Any contractual breach is denied. The site is notorious for spurious PCNs for 'parking on the wrong side' and this scam has even featured on national television and national press.

6. This site is also Airport land, which is not 'relevant land' as it is already covered by statutory bylaws and so is specifically excluded from 'keeper liability' under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. As the registered keeper, the Defendant is not legally liable as this Act does not apply on this land. The Operator is put to strict proof otherwise if they disagree with this point and would be required to show evidence including documentary proof from the Airport Authority that this land is not already covered by bylaws.

7. Subsequent research by the defendant shows that the parking signage at the site in question and the boundary delineation between purported areas was wholly inadequate, misleading and confusing, and therefore cannot reasonably be construed as having created a contractual relationship between the Claimant and the driver(s). The Claimant is put to strict proof that, at the time of the parking event, the signs and lines were prominent and clearly visible on the site in question and that this incident was a single 'period of parking', and not two visits.  As well as images of the actual signs and delineation of the boundaries, ANPR raw data is required, showing every capture of the vehicle that day as it traversed and returned/left the site, or an area within the site.

8. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

9. The Defendant denies (i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'), which is fully distinguished.

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

10. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred by this Claimant, who is put to strict proof of:

(i). the alleged breach, which is not pleaded in the POC and

(ii). a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced sum in the POC, including how interest was calculated, which looks to be improperly applied on the entire inflated sum, as if that was all overdue on the day of the alleged event.

11. The Defendant avers that this claim is unfair and inflated and it is denied that any sum is due, whether in debt or damages. This Claimant routinely pursues an unconscionable fixed sum added per PCN, despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban it.

12. This case is a classic example where adding exaggerated fees funds the 'numbers game' of bulk litigation of weak and/or archive parking cases.  MoJ statistics of bulk litigators reveal that there are several hundred thousand parking claims per annum, with some 90% causing default CCJs totalling hundreds of millions of pounds.  No checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit or a proper cause of action (given away by the woefully inadequate POC).

13. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('the DLUHC') published a statutory Parking Code of Practice in February 2022, here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

The Ministerial Foreword is damning: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

 

14. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code - marked as temporarily withdrawn - it is thankfully 'live' after a draft Impact Assessment (IA) was published on 30th July 2023. The Government's analysis exposes what they say are industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'fees'. The analysis is found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

 

15. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 state that the parking industry has shown the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the former calls debt recovery or 'enforcement' (= pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per case (not per PCN).

16. With that in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an extreme sum, believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team, not the Claimant.  In this Claim it is additional to the intended 'legal representatives fees' cap set within small claims track rules.  This conduct has been examined and found - including in a detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute 'double recovery'. The Defendant takes that position.

17. The draft IA shows that the intimidating letter-chains actually cost 'eight times less' than the seemingly 'price-fixed' +£70 per PCN. This causes consumer harm in the form of almost half a million wrongly-enhanced CCJs each year, that District Judges are powerless to prevent.  This false fee was enabled by the self-serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies who suddenly aligned in 2021 re allowing +£70, each led by a Board of the very parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it. 

18. It is denied that the purported damages/fee sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs' inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of template letters and 'would appear to be penal'.

19. This Claimant has not incurred costs. A parking charge model already includes what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' and it is a model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 pre-action letters/reminders and the £85 'PCN' was held to more than cover the minor costs of the operation.  The DLUHC's IA confirms that the parking charge more than covers the minor costs of the letters (NB: the debt collectors do not charge anything in failed collection cases).

20. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, all non-monetary clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry. The 2022 DLUHC Code will replace the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes, which are not regulation and carry limited weight.  In a clear steer for the Courts and for the avoidance of doubt: the DLUHC say they are addressing 'market failure'.

21. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper.  Further, the Claimant is put to strict proof of POFA compliance.

22. The Defendant avers that the DLUHC's analysis now overrides plainly wrong assumptions made by Circuit Judges steered by Counsel in astonishingly weak appeal cases that the parking industry engineered their way: Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy. Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals cherry-picked litigant-in-person consumers without the wherewithal to appeal. Incorrect presumptions were made in every case; and there were major evidence discrepancies (e.g. in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority). One Judge inexplicably sought out for himself and quoted from the wrong Code of Practice (Percy). In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was wrongly aligned with the agreed contract in Beavis.

23. The Defendant avers that there was no agreement to pay a parking charge or added 'damages' which were not even incurred, let alone quantified in bold, prominent text. This Claimant failed to erect well-placed, large and readable signs on a par with the yellow & black warnings seen in Beavis, and unlike the signage requirements set out in the DLUHC Code which reflects the already statutory requirement for 'prominence' (Consumer Rights Act 2015 - the 'CRA').

CRA breaches

24. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the CRA which introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

25. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well-placed (and lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

26. The CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

HHGGG

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

27.  Unlike in Beavis, the penalty rule remains engaged, not least due to the unconscionable added 'Fee'.  The CRA covers disproportionate sums, which are not exempt from being assessed for fairness because a 'fee' is not the core price term and neither was it prominently proclaimed on the signs.  

28. The Supreme Court held that deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms or cumbersome obligations ('concealed pitfalls or traps').  In the present case, the Claimant has failed those tests, with small signs, hidden terms and minuscule small print that is incapable of binding a driver.  Court of Appeal authorities about a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (Lord Denning's ‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space''. 

29.  Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the DLUHC Code and these clauses are supported by the BPA & IPC. In Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t." 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

30. DVLA data is only supplied if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority to form contracts at this site in their name.  The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to litigate.

31. The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The DLUHC Code shows that genuine disputes such as this should see PCNs cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject most disputes: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (2020 Annual Report).  This consumer blame culture and reliance upon their own 'appeals service' (described by MPs as a kangaroo court and about to be replaced by the Government) should lead Judges to know that a fair appeal was never on offer.

Conclusion

32. There is now evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims that are causing consumer harm.  The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis shows that the usual letter-chain costs eight times less than the sum claimed for it.  The claim is entirely without merit and the POC embarrassing.  The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out. 

31. In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

(a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

32.  Attention is drawn to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signature:

Date:

 

HHGGG

UncleThomasCobley said:

HHGGG said:

UncleThomasCobley said:

Paras #3 and #4 should be #2 and #3 plus the embedded CEL v Chan transcript.

Apologies, I'm not sure I quite follow. The original paragraph 2 should potentially be removed?

I didn't say remove anything. Your paras #2 and #3 should be the preliminary matter about the CEL v Chan case. Then, everything else should be renumbered sequentially after.

Thank you, is this picked up now with the inserted images? Or should paras 1 and 2 be combined to start at #2 for CEL v Chan? Apologies for not fully understanding!

Coupon-mad

I think that's fine.  Chan is high enough up as point 2 or 3.

I'd remove this bit from the end of para 6:  

The Operator is put to strict proof otherwise if they disagree with this point and would be required to show evidence including documentary proof from the Airport Authority that this land is not already covered by bylaws.

And replace it with this: 

This Claimant cannot invoke 'keeper liability' and have simply aimed a speculative claim at a registered keeper which is wholly unreasonable conduct in a case where they know they cannot rely upon the provisions of the POFA. 


Then add this as two new paras 7 and 8, then re-number all the rest below it:

7.  Outwith the POFA, parking firms cannot invoke 'keeper liability'. This legal point has already been tested on appeal (twice) in private parking cases and the transcripts will be adduced in evidence:

(i). In the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court, on appeal re claim number C0DP9C4E in June 2017, His Honour Judge Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable outwith the POFA.  Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all).  HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but did not. Mr Smith's appeal was allowed and Excel's claim was dismissed.

(ii). In April 2023, His Honour Judge Mark Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver, because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation.  HHJ Gargan held:

35.1. "The finding I make is consistent with the underlying purpose of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act, namely, that it was necessary to bring in keeper liability pursuant to that legislation, because liability could not be established.  If this were not the case car parking companies could simply have obtained the details of the registered keeper, launched proceedings and waited to see whether or not there was a positive defence put forward, and in the absence of a positive defence they would have succeeded. If the court took such an approach, it would have been imposing a duty on the registered keeper, to identify the driver or at least set out a positive case in order to avoid responsibility himself. In my judgment that was not the position before ... [the POFA] ... was in force; 

35.2.  my decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so; and 

35.3.  it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion..."

8.  Mr Edward's appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed.  In the extant case, this Claimant has launched 'roboclaim' cut & paste proceedings saying vaguely that the Defendant was 'keeper and/or driver' and waited to see if the registered keeper has the nous to research the POFA and to meaningfully defend, or if they could gain a default CCJ (as happens in 90% of small claims).  It is a lucrative gamble with the odds of wrongful success heavily weighted in parking operators' favour, but this is plainly an abuse of the court process.  This baseless claim demonstrates precisely the behaviour that HHJ Gargan identified in 35.1. This claim has no basis in law and neither the court nor the Defendant should be troubled with a hearing.

HHGGG

Coupon-mad said:

I think that's fine.  Chan is high enough up as point 2 or 3.

I'd remove this bit from the end of para 6:  

o

Excellent, thank you so much for the detail. Much appreciated. Final Draft Below:

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  xxxxxx

Between

MET Parking Services Ltd

(Claimant) 

- and -  

Defendant named on claim (can’t be changed to driver now)                        

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE 

1.  The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term.  Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the boilerplate text in the Particulars of Claim ('the POC').

2. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely. the Defendant observes after researching other parking claims with the same POC that this claim sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent statement of case.  The POC is sparse on facts and specific breach allegation, making it very difficult to respond. However, it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle.

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

3. The Defendant draws to the attention of the allocating Judge that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on Appeal).  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

4. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 and Practice Direction Part 16. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4

The facts known to the Defendant:

5. The Defendant is disabled and has not kept or found a copy of the dispute or reply, this was over five years ago. The hazy recollection is that the car was at all material times properly parked and authorised and who were genuine patrons of McDonalds and/or Starbucks. The Defendant cannot tell from the POC whether the allegation they have to answer is an alleged overstay, or something else.  Any contractual breach is denied. The site is notorious for spurious PCNs for 'parking on the wrong side' and this scam has even featured on national television and national press.

6. This site is also Airport land, which is not 'relevant land' as it is already covered by statutory bylaws and so is specifically excluded from 'keeper liability' under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. As the registered keeper, the Defendant is not legally liable as this Act does not apply on this land. This Claimant cannot invoke 'keeper liability' and have simply aimed a speculative claim at a registered keeper which is wholly unreasonable conduct in a case where they know they cannot rely upon the provisions of the POFA. 

7.  Outwith the POFA, parking firms cannot invoke 'keeper liability'. This legal point has already been tested on appeal (twice) in private parking cases and the transcripts will be adduced in evidence:

(i). In the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court, on appeal re claim number C0DP9C4E in June 2017, His Honour Judge Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable outwith the POFA.  Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all).  HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but did not. Mr Smith's appeal was allowed and Excel's claim was dismissed.

(ii). In April 2023, His Honour Judge Mark Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver, because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation.  HHJ Gargan held:

35.1. "The finding I make is consistent with the underlying purpose of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act, namely, that it was necessary to bring in keeper liability pursuant to that legislation, because liability could not be established.  If this were not the case car parking companies could simply have obtained the details of the registered keeper, launched proceedings and waited to see whether or not there was a positive defence put forward, and in the absence of a positive defence they would have succeeded. If the court took such an approach, it would have been imposing a duty on the registered keeper, to identify the driver or at least set out a positive case in order to avoid responsibility himself. In my judgment that was not the position before ... [the POFA] ... was in force; 

35.2.  my decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so; and 

35.3.  it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion..."

8.  Mr Edward's appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed.  In the extant case, this Claimant has launched 'roboclaim' cut & paste proceedings saying vaguely that the Defendant was 'keeper and/or driver' and waited to see if the registered keeper has the nous to research the POFA and to meaningfully defend, or if they could gain a default CCJ (as happens in 90% of small claims).  It is a lucrative gamble with the odds of wrongful success heavily weighted in parking operators' favour, but this is plainly an abuse of the court process.  This baseless claim demonstrates precisely the behaviour that HHJ Gargan identified in 35.1. This claim has no basis in law and neither the court nor the Defendant should be troubled with a hearing.

9. Subsequent research by the defendant shows that the parking signage at the site in question and the boundary delineation between purported areas was wholly inadequate, misleading and confusing, and therefore cannot reasonably be construed as having created a contractual relationship between the Claimant and the driver(s). The Claimant is put to strict proof that, at the time of the parking event, the signs and lines were prominent and clearly visible on the site in question and that this incident was a single 'period of parking', and not two visits.  As well as images of the actual signs and delineation of the boundaries, ANPR raw data is required, showing every capture of the vehicle that day as it traversed and returned/left the site, or an area within the site.

10. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

11. The Defendant denies (i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'), which is fully distinguished.

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

12. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred by this Claimant, who is put to strict proof of:

(i). the alleged breach, which is not pleaded in the POC and

(ii). a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced sum in the POC, including how interest was calculated, which looks to be improperly applied on the entire inflated sum, as if that was all overdue on the day of the alleged event.

13. The Defendant avers that this claim is unfair and inflated and it is denied that any sum is due, whether in debt or damages. This Claimant routinely pursues an unconscionable fixed sum added per PCN, despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban it.

14. This case is a classic example where adding exaggerated fees funds the 'numbers game' of bulk litigation of weak and/or archive parking cases.  MoJ statistics of bulk litigators reveal that there are several hundred thousand parking claims per annum, with some 90% causing default CCJs totalling hundreds of millions of pounds.  No checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit or a proper cause of action (given away by the woefully inadequate POC).

15. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('the DLUHC') published a statutory Parking Code of Practice in February 2022, here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

The Ministerial Foreword is damning: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

 

16. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code - marked as temporarily withdrawn - it is thankfully 'live' after a draft Impact Assessment (IA) was published on 30th July 2023. The Government's analysis exposes what they say are industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'fees'. The analysis is found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

 

17. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 state that the parking industry has shown the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the former calls debt recovery or 'enforcement' (= pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per case (not per PCN).

18. With that in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an extreme sum, believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team, not the Claimant.  In this Claim it is additional to the intended 'legal representatives fees' cap set within small claims track rules.  This conduct has been examined and found - including in a detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute 'double recovery'. The Defendant takes that position.

19. The draft IA shows that the intimidating letter-chains actually cost 'eight times less' than the seemingly 'price-fixed' +£70 per PCN. This causes consumer harm in the form of almost half a million wrongly-enhanced CCJs each year, that District Judges are powerless to prevent.  This false fee was enabled by the self-serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies who suddenly aligned in 2021 re allowing +£70, each led by a Board of the very parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it. 

20. It is denied that the purported damages/fee sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs' inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of template letters and 'would appear to be penal'.

21. This Claimant has not incurred costs. A parking charge model already includes what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' and it is a model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 pre-action letters/reminders and the £85 'PCN' was held to more than cover the minor costs of the operation.  The DLUHC's IA confirms that the parking charge more than covers the minor costs of the letters (NB: the debt collectors do not charge anything in failed collection cases).

22. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, all non-monetary clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry. The 2022 DLUHC Code will replace the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes, which are not regulation and carry limited weight.  In a clear steer for the Courts and for the avoidance of doubt: the DLUHC say they are addressing 'market failure'.

23. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper.  Further, the Claimant is put to strict proof of POFA compliance.

24. The Defendant avers that the DLUHC's analysis now overrides plainly wrong assumptions made by Circuit Judges steered by Counsel in astonishingly weak appeal cases that the parking industry engineered their way: Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy. Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals cherry-picked litigant-in-person consumers without the wherewithal to appeal. Incorrect presumptions were made in every case; and there were major evidence discrepancies (e.g. in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority). One Judge inexplicably sought out for himself and quoted from the wrong Code of Practice (Percy). In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was wrongly aligned with the agreed contract in Beavis.

25. The Defendant avers that there was no agreement to pay a parking charge or added 'damages' which were not even incurred, let alone quantified in bold, prominent text. This Claimant failed to erect well-placed, large and readable signs on a par with the yellow & black warnings seen in Beavis, and unlike the signage requirements set out in the DLUHC Code which reflects the already statutory requirement for 'prominence' (Consumer Rights Act 2015 - the 'CRA').

HHGGG

CRA breaches

26. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the CRA which introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

27. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well-placed (and lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

28. The CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

 

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

29.  Unlike in Beavis, the penalty rule remains engaged, not least due to the unconscionable added 'Fee'.  The CRA covers disproportionate sums, which are not exempt from being assessed for fairness because a 'fee' is not the core price term and neither was it prominently proclaimed on the signs.  

30. The Supreme Court held that deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms or cumbersome obligations ('concealed pitfalls or traps').  In the present case, the Claimant has failed those tests, with small signs, hidden terms and minuscule small print that is incapable of binding a driver.  Court of Appeal authorities about a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (Lord Denning's ‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space''. 

31.  Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the DLUHC Code and these clauses are supported by the BPA & IPC. In Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t." 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

32. DVLA data is only supplied if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority to form contracts at this site in their name.  The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to litigate.

33. The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The DLUHC Code shows that genuine disputes such as this should see PCNs cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject most disputes: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (2020 Annual Report).  This consumer blame culture and reliance upon their own 'appeals service' (described by MPs as a kangaroo court and about to be replaced by the Government) should lead Judges to know that a fair appeal was never on offer.

Conclusion

34. There is now evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims that are causing consumer harm.  The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis shows that the usual letter-chain costs eight times less than the sum claimed for it.  The claim is entirely without merit and the POC embarrassing.  The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out. 

35. In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

(a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

36.  Attention is drawn to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signature:

Date: