VCS issued 3 CCJ’s against me through DCBL

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I have my revised WS below. I have also put together a chronology to send with key facts and dates. Do I add exhibit’s at the bottom of the WS and will I need to put together a draft order? Sorry for all the questions, hopefully this WS is relevant to me and good enough to send? I won’t send however until you have the time to check it over for me please if you don’t mind? Thanks in advance

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

1.       I am XXX  of XXX  I am the Defendant in this matter and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgment (CCJ) entered against me on 21/11/2018, in default due to a defective service of Claim.

2.      I was not aware of the claims made against me until I checked my credit file for the purpose of building my credit on 19th July 2023. This is when I found out the Claimant had obtained two further default CCJ”s against me. I was looking forward to checking and building my credit as this year meant that 6 years had passed from a previous CCJ I had received from the same Claimant whom I paid over £1,000 to DCBL for the same situation. 

3.         This is the third claim made against me by the Claimant; the first was issued to the correct address as I will detail below. The Claimant's conduct in issuing three claims against me , with substantially identical particulars (except for dates) for the same cause of action is a clear abuse of the civil litigation process because the parking charge within this claim should have been pleaded in the first claim.

4.         In light of the legal principles detailed below, the Defendant respectfully requests that the Court exercises its authority under CPR 3.4 2(b) to strike out the second claim on the grounds of cause of action estoppel.

5.      The Claimant served the further two claims to an old address. This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address.

6.      The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the IPC Code of Practice 22.1 and CPR 6.9, as more than 12 months have passed since the PCN.

7.      I have not received any correspondence or notice regarding this matter until I became aware as per paragraph 2 above.

8.     The first PCN and CCJ  ordered against me were in early 2017. The second was given on 09th January 2018 and CCJ issued 21st November 2018 and the third  PCN was given on 23rd January 2018 and CCJ raised 31st January 2019 which in both cases was more than four months since the CCJ was issued, during which time I have not been aware of the claim or the CCJ. As per CPR 7.5, the claim should now be dismissed.

3.5. Authorities to support the Defendant's position that the subsequent claims are all estopped are:

a. Arnold V National Westminster Bank PLC [1991] 3 ALL ER 41. The court noted that ‘....cause of action estoppel applies where a cause of action in a second action is identical to a cause of action in the first, the latter having been between the same parties, or their privies and involving the same subject matter’. This case involves the same Claimant and Defendant, The same vehicle, The same Car Park and the same manner in which the PCN was issued.

b. In Henderson v Henderson [1843]67 ER 313 The court noted the following…’when a matter becomes subject to litigation, i) the parties are required to advance their whole case, ii) the Court will not permit the same parties to reopen the same subject of litigation regarding matters which should have been advanced in the earlier litigation, but were not owing to negligence, inadvertence or error

9.      I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim, and should it not be dismissed, I wish to have the opportunity to defend it properly as per CPR 13.3.

THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM

10. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on 21/11/2018 and 31/01/2019. I am aware that the Claimant is Vehicle Control Services and that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice for not having a permit on display in my car parking space. A permit both myself and many other tenants did not receive.

11. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."  I had updated my new address with both my car insurance company and DVLA it is clear that the Claimant, having obtained a previous address from the DVLA and having received no response, did not perform the requisite "reasonable diligence" required to find my correct address to serve the claim form in. Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, such as the DVLA and HMRC. The claimant did not have any contact with the defendant, and thus should have considered they had obtained incorrect details. It appears that the claimant continued to issue correspondence to the incorrect address intentionally, in line with the concerns raised by the government regarding this abhorrent industry (Relevant case law cited below in paragraphs 25 - 32).

12. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until I attempted to take control and build my credit on 18th July 2023. This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgment was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).

13. The address on the claim is XXX I moved from this address to another address at XXX in February 2018. In support of this, I have provided documentation showing my updated address on the assured tenancy agreement. I changed my car and also updated my address with the DVLA.

14. The fact that there was no response from a series of letters sent to my previous address should have alerted the Claimant to the possibility that I was not residing there. Silence after sending a Notice to Keeper, a reminder and then a Letter before Claim is a clear indicator that the Registered Keeper may not live there.

15. I believe the Claimant has not adhered to CPR 6.9 (3) where they had failed to show due diligence in using an address at which I no longer resided. The claimant did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of my current residence, despite having over 12 months to establish a valid address. This has led to the claim being incorrectly served to an old address and an irregular judgment.

16.  According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses of results is an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country.

17. In early 2017, Four years into my tenancy the management company appointed VCS to manage the car park. Along with a number of other tenants I did not receive a parking permit and a note was put on the windscreen of my car to notify the attendant. I then received my first PCN, I spoke to my estate agent and management company who advised us to ignore and shortly after we were told that they were no longer using Vehicle Control Services. A year later they were reinstated with the exact same situation happening again and me now receiving a further two PCN”s.

18. The vehicle that the claim refers to was sold in 2018, thus I have limited supporting documentation. The failure to send communication to me regarding the PCN has  meant that I have been unable to collect adequate evidence for the purpose of collating a defence, which has disadvantaged me in this matter. 

THE INTERNATIONAL PARKING COMMUNITY CODE WAS NOT FOLLOWED

19. International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice which requires a soft trace to be undertaken was not followed. The IPC Code of Practice 2019 - Version 7, November 2019, clause 22.1 states;

20. Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings”

DVLA ADDRESS DATA MAY NOT BE RELIABLE

21. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the registered keeper to name the driver or pay the invoice or inform the registered keeper they will be liable if not, and notify of appeal rights.

22. The system, called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event), is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out.

23. There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was 'kept').

24. A claim sent to an old DVLA registered keeper address with no soft trace checks (costing as little as 29 pence and offered free by debt collectors connected to the parking industry) fails to meet the IPC Code of Practice, fails to satisfy the specific 'pre-action Protocol for debt claims', and is in breach of the CPRs about the obligation to take 'reasonable steps' to check a Defendant's address so that service is effective.

25. Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside.

26. There is a wealth of case law making reference to the failures of parking companies to correctly ascertain the addresses of defendants. Of note:

27. In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said

28. "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? … As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble of making applications to set aside default judgments."

29. The same sentiment was echoed by:

30. HHJ Hacon in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)

31. HHJ Behrens in Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012)

32. In Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) it would appear that obtaining the information from a source that an individual is required by law to keep updated is adequate knowledge. However, i would submit that it is incumbent to have recent knowledge and not outdated knowledge as HHJ Hacon put it in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)

33. As it was put in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016) by LJ McCombe

34. “If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgment. He is simply not in default at all."

CLAIM IS DEAD AS MORE THAN 4 MONTHS HAVE PASSED FROM THE ISSUE DATE OF PROCEEDING

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RELEVANT CASE LAW

35. Case law precludes the court from resurrecting a dead claim more than 4 months after it was improperly served and does not give the courts any scope to do so.

36. There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.”

37. In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out." 

38. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity.

39. “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...]

40. In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...]

41. Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...]

42. The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.”

43. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so.

44.  CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016):

45. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a).

46. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable.

47. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.”

 

THE CLAIM IS DEAD

48. Continuing a dead claim more than 4 months after it was raised (but never properly served) is impossible under any rule of law or practice (CPR 7.5). 

49. The Claimant is wholly responsible for failing to serve the claim correctly within the 4 months (as required by CPR 7.5) and as a result this claim is dead.

50. The Claimant should not be given extra opportunities to waste the Court’s time after failing to follow pre-action protocols for debt claims, breaching the IPC code of practice and the CPRs about taking 'reasonable steps' (CPR 6.9) to check a Defendant's address.

51. If the Claimant believes they still have a claim then filing afresh is the only way forward. The Claimant may send a ‘Letter Before Claim’ to the right address, this time following the pre-action protocol for debt claims. The court is reminded that this Defendant has received nothing to build any defence on. No claim form and no detailed particulars of the claim have ever been sent to the Defendant’s current address.

52. This claim should be struck out as more than 4 months have passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served).

53. I have responded to this matter as promptly as possible. I discovered two CCJ”s were lodged onto my credit file on the 19th July 2023.. The following day (20th July 2023) I contacted the County Court Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgement. The following day on 20th July 2023 I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgment and fairly present my case

54. Considering the above I was unable to defend these claims. I believe that the Default judgments against me were issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside.

Statement of truth:

55. I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed

KeithP

A very very minor point, but in your para 53 should the second 'following day' perhaps be 21st July?

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Yes - I didn’t realise the time lol

Thank you @KeithP

Coupon-mad

I would remove these words from the start because it muddles the meaning of the whole sentence:

", in default"

because the parking charge within this claim should have been pleaded in the first claim.

Based on your dates, I am not sure it could have been?  Wasn't at least one PCN date after the first claim?  Also were these 2nd & 3rd claims only for one parking charge each, or plural?

4.         In light of the legal principles detailed below, the Defendant respectfully requests that the Court exercises its authority under CPR 3.4 2(b) to strike out the second claim on the grounds of cause of action estoppel.

If I'm right about the dates, then I think only the third claim can be argued to fall within cause of action estoppel?  But let the Judge decide!  Might be better to say in both WS:

"...strike out one (or even both) of claims 2 and 3 (CLAIM NUMBERS XXXXXXXX and XXXXXXX) on the grounds of cause of action estoppel given that all three exaggerated claims involve the exact same facts, details, residential location, same vehicle and alleged contractual terms/breach and all cases involved the same parties, "

5.      The Claimant served the further two claims to an old address. This is a breach of CPR 13.2 (a) as the claim form was never served to my current address.

I'm not sure it can be a breach of CPR 13.2 because surely that rule is about setting aside a CCJ?  They can't have been in breach of THAT rule.  That's the one you are relying on to set aside the CCJ not a rule that a Claimant must follow when serving a claim.

Off the top of my head, I don't know which Civil Procedure rule relates to service of a claim form - but Google will!

And somewhere near the top of your WS you should state that this N244 is a mirror image of another one because you've been forced to apply twice, given there are 2 CCJs discovered relating to claim numbers xxxxxxxx and xxxxxxx.  The court is respectfully asked to consider the Overriding Objective and to exercise its case management powers to consolidate these two applications, to be heard at a single hearing. 

Do ONE Draft Order (a WORD document with blank effective dates) stating that both CCJs be set aside due to improper service (ref CPR 13.2) and further, that one or both similar facts claims be struck out for abuse of the court process under the doctrine of cause of action estoppel

And that the Claimant do pay the Defendant's costs for attending the hearing.

I'd also attach a downloaded & completed N180 setting out any dates you cannot attend a hearing, right through till next Spring. If in doubt cross out whole weeks.  I say this because when you make an application I don't think the CCBC send out a N180 (weirdly) which catches people out when their eventual hearing is, of course, a date they can't do!

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@Coupon-mad Your advice and help is greatly appreciated.

5 and 12 both mention a breach should I take these out? Sorry I just copied those parts and didn’t realise they were not relevant to me. With the CPR 13.2 being what I need to have this set aside is there something else I should out and does this need to be near the top? I have taken out and added the other comments.

The first PCN and claim were in early 2017 when VCS first took over and the second and third PCN were in January 2018  when they were reinstated I believe these were separate as both have a different case ref and CCJ for each. For those three weeks in JAN 2018 I did not have a permit they could have given me and many others one every day. My old estate agent told me today I am not the only one to have had so many CCJs from that time.

Many thanks

Coupon-mad

How many PCNs in each claim?

Surely the £1000 wasn't for one PCN?

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I have no idea, is there a way of me finding out more information on this?I know that letting them through my door pretty much doubled what it was. The other two show on my credit report as £185.00 each.

many thanks 

Coupon-mad

Ask the CCBC for all three Particulars of Claim to be emailed to you. The POC will also help you show the Judge how similar the 3 claims are (same everything!).

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Spoke to CCBC and they are going to email me over the POC for the active 2 claims They said they would have no info on the first claim with it being 6 years and paid in full.