County Court Defense - Gladstones Solicitors Limited and private Parking Solutions (LONDON) LTD

Le_Kirk

7. The terms on the signage in the car park is are of a forbidding nature. The terms are forbidding. This means that there was never a contractual relationship. I The defendant refer refers you to the following case law: PCM-UK v Bull et all B4GF26K6 [2016], UKPC v Masterson B4GF26K6[2016], Horizon Parking v Mr J C5GF17X2 [2016]. In all three of these cases the signage was found to be forbidding and thus only a trespass had occurred and would be a matter for the landowner.

Defences are written in the third person and you don't need to repeat facts, hence the change suggested above.

1505grandad

"PCM-UK v Bull (et all) B4GF26K6 [2016],...."
Pedantic observation  -  (et al)

haibtcr

Thanks All - I have finally submitted the Defense yesterday.  You all have been a big help.  Will keep you posted on the next steps.  

haibtcr

Hi All,

My defense was received on 22-05-2023 according to the mcol website.  However I have not received the dq n180 form.  What should be the action from my side if there is no progress.  Is everything updated on the mcol website? As in when they send me a DQ N180 form will I see an update on the mcol website.  

Coupon-mad

Yes you will see it on MCOL. Check every week but it is taking two months or more at the moment.

haibtcr

Thanks - I got the DQ N180 form.  Please guide me what should be my reason for selecting No for D1 (determination without a hearing).  

haibtcr

@Coupon-mad Thanks for all the help - I have reached the witness statement stage.  I have reworded the defense and added a few paragraphs from recent WS submissions.  I know I am probably making some blunders here but I fail to understand many of the points myself.  

Please review it and any help is appreciated

 

 

                                                            WITNESS STATEMENT OF MR  (DEFENDANT)

                                  

 

I, Mr , UK (), will say as follows :

 

INTRODUCTION

·         I make this Witness Statement (hereinafter referred to as WS) in readiness for the hearing listed on 30.04.2024 at Brentford County Court and in support of my Defence against the Claimant’s claim.

 

In my statement I shall refer to (See Exhibits HJ1 - HJ8 ) within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My defence is as follows:

 

Facts and Sequence of events.

 

1.    I entered a dead-end public road called Matisse Rd in Hounslow.  I then took a U-turn at the end of the road and stopped by the side of the road to ask for directions and re buckle the car seat belt of one of my daughters who had managed to unbuckle it. 

2.    I submit Exhibit HJ1 to show that the road is called Matisse Rd and I never entered Holloway street as mentioned in the parking charge notice.  Exhibit HJ2 shows the street sign as well.  There is no signage that shows that I was entering a private land. 

3.    I stopped my car on the side of the road and I was not trying to enter the private space.  From pictures taken by the Claimant it can be clearly shown that there is no clear demarcation on the road showing where the private space begins.  The white striped area is rubbed off in places and parking bays are inside.

4.    I was present in the car at all time and did not leave the car unattended. 

5.    I submit Exhibit HJ3 showing my car is only partially parked on the white stripes and there is no signage showing this is private land.  Parking bays are closer to the wall and I did not enter the area which has parking bays.

6.    I submit Exhibit HJ4 to show how the white striped area is rubbed off next to the parking bays.  The area belonging the claimant is not marked

7.    The facts in this WS come from my own knowledge and honest belief. Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC is devoid of any detail and even lacks specific breach allegation(s), making it very difficult to respond.

8. The terms on the signage in the car park are of a forbidding nature. This means that there was never a contractual relationship. I refer to the following case law: PCM-UK v Bull (et al) B4GF26K6 [2016], UKPC v Masterson B4GF26K6[2016], Horizon Parking v Mr J C5GF17X2 [2016]. In all three of these cases the signage was found to be forbidding and thus only a trespass had occurred and would be a matter for the landowner.

9. The alleged contract does not permit parking, but states a parking charge of £100, which is contradictory and confusing. The pictures also show parking bays but signage says no parking at any time.

13.  This Claimant continues to pursue a disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that this is now likely to be confirmed as banned by the Government this year. It is denied that the purported 'damages' or 'debt fee' sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal'.

14. The Claimant claims an additional sum of £70 as contractual costs and an additional £ 23.18 as interest. 

15. This finding is underpinned by the Government, who stated in 2022 that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

16. Whilst the new Code is temporarily stalled for a final Impact Assessment, it is anticipated that adding false costs/damages or 'fees' to enhance a parking charge claim is likely to remain banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the (stalled but incoming in 2023) statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued."

17. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as this claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

18. The DLUHC consulted for over two years, considering evidence from a wide range of stakeholders.  Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers.  Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt/robo-claim firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis, seeking to inflate these claims with 'costs/damages' in addition to the strictly capped legal fees the small claims track allows. 

19. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters including reminders.  The parking charge was held to cover that work.

21. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice.  The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'.  A clear steer for the Courts which it is hoped overrides mistakes made in a few appeal cases that the parking industry desperately rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy).

22.  Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals saw Circuit Judges led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and the litigant-in-person consumers lacked the wherewithal to appeal. In case this Claimant tries to rely upon these, the Defendant avers that errors were made in every case.  Evidence was either overlooked (including signage discrepancies in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the BPA Code of Practice and the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority) or the Judge inexplicably sought out and quoted from the wrong Code altogether (Percy).  In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was unfairly aligned with the admitted parking contract in Beavis. Those learned Judges were not in possession of the same level of information as the DLUHC, whose incoming statutory Code of Practice now clarifies such matters as a definition of 'parking' as well as consideration and grace periods and minor matters such as 'keying errors' or 'fluttering tickets/permits' where a PCN should not have been issued at all, or should have been cancelled in the pre-action dispute phase.

 

haibtcr

POFA and CRA breaches

23. Pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a firm may have complied with other POFA requirements (adequate signage, Notice to Keeper wording/dates, and a properly communicated 'relevant contract/relevant obligation').  If seeking keeper/hirer liability - unclear from the POC - the Claimant is put to strict proof of full compliance and liability transferred.

24. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA').  The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'.  In a parking context, this includes signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

25. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer.  Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well placed and lit, and all terms unambiguous and obligations clear. The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith.

Unenforceable Additional Costs

 

19. In the signage it is stated that "futher legal action may be taken which may incur additional charges" However, I submit that these "additional charges" are not defined anywhere in the signage or contract terms allegedly relied upon by the claimant, rendering them vague and unenforceable under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA), which requires that contract terms be both fair and transparent.

 

20. In the Particulars of Claim, the claimant has added £70 per Parking Charge Notice (PCN), claiming this as "contractual costs as per the contract terms and conditions." However, these additional costs are not referred to or specified on the signage at the site. The claimant cannot impose additional costs that are not clearly stated in the contract (assuming a contract even existed, which is disputed). This lack of transparency violates Schedule 2, Paragraph 10 of the CRA, which prohibits unfair terms 'that have the object or effect of irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which the consumer has had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract.'

 

Penalty Charge, Not Genuine Pre-Estimate of Loss

 

21. Furthermore, these additional costs appear to be arbitrary and penal in nature. Under established law principles, such as ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015], parking charges must either be a genuine pre-estimate of loss or commercially justified. In this case, the additional £70 is neither justified nor explained.

 

22. The claimant has provided no breakdown or explanation of how this amount was calculated or why it is appropriate. It can only be viewed as a punitive charge designed to penalise the defendant, which is contrary to established legal principles that prohibit excessive and unfair contractual penalties.

 

23. The claimant’s demand for additional costs of £70 per PCN is entirely baseless. It is not supported by any clear contractual term, it violates the CRA's requirements for fairness and transparency, and it constitutes an unlawful penalty charge. The court should strike out this portion of the claim as unenforceable.Offensive and Baseless Allegation Regarding My Ability to Understand CPR and Legal Issues

 

24. In paragraph 22 of the claimant's Witness Statement, the claimant’s legal representative — who, as already noted, has no direct involvement in the events surrounding the alleged claim — makes a wholly inappropriate and offensive assertion about my ability to understand the complexities of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). The witness claims, without any basis, that I have relied on a "generic defence" found on the internet and implies that I do not understand the references I have made to the law and CPR requirements.

 

25. This is a baseless and entirely unfounded personal attack. The claimant's witness has no knowledge whatsoever of my level of education, professional background, or capacity to understand legal matters. It is deeply unprofessional and, quite frankly, embarrassing that a firm of supposed legal professionals would resort to such unfounded insults in an official court document. As a litigant in person, I am not expected to have the same legal expertise as the claimant’s solicitors. However, I have made every effort to research and present a reasonable defence. The claimant’s solicitors, being professionals, should be held to a higher standard of compliance with legal procedures, especially with respect to the Civil Procedure Rules.

 

26. I respectfully remind the court that I am a litigant in person. I have every right to research legal matters and use any available resources to present my defence, just as the claimant’s solicitors have evidently relied on templates for both their Particulars of Claim and Witness Statement. My defence is fully supported by relevant case law and legal principles, regardless of the method by which I prepared it.

 

27. Moreover, this unwarranted and disparaging comment about my ability as a litigant in person amounts to unreasonable behavior on the part of the claimant's solicitors. Such conduct is clearly designed to intimidate and belittle me, rather than address the actual legal issues in the case. I believe this behaviour violates the spirit of fair litigation and may amount to a breach of the Overriding Objective under CPR 1.1, which requires the parties to act justly and fairly.

 

28. I respectfully request that the court take note of this unprofessional conduct when making any assessment of costs. The claimant’s solicitors' reliance on personal attacks, rather than focusing on the substance of the legal matters, reflects poorly on their conduct and should be considered when determining whether the claimant has behaved unreasonably in the proceedings.

 

Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4

 

36. In paragraph 31 of the claimant’s Witness Statement, the claimant attempts to excuse their failure to fully comply with CPR 16.4 by asserting that the information provided in their Particulars of Claim (PoC) and previous PCN where the address was inaccurate was sufficient to make me aware of the nature of the claim. This is a feeble and unconvincing attempt to justify their non-compliance, and I have already provided evidence of recent persuasive cases where similar failures led to claims being struck out.

 

37.  In CPMS v Akande [2024] and CEL v Chan [2023], the court found that vague and inadequate PoCs that failed to provide essential details were grounds for striking out the claim. The claimant’s PoC in this case suffers from the same deficiencies — lacking crucial information such as the specifics of the alleged contravention, the terms supposedly breached, or any supporting evidence.

 

38. I respectfully submit that the claimant’s continued reliance on these deficient PoCs should result in the court giving no weight to their justification, and I once again refer the court to the persuasive appeal cases I have cited, CPMS v Akande [2024]and CEL v Chan [2023], which I have included as evidence.

 

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished (lack of legitimate interest/prominence of terms)

26. ParkingEye overcame the possibility of their £85 charge being dismissed as punitive, however the Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must each be determined on their own facts.  That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, and took into account the prominent yellow/black uncluttered signs with £85 in the largest/boldest text.  Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, the Beavis case facts set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

27. Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor 'concealed pitfalls or traps'.

28.  In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. The Claimant’s small signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, and are considered incapable of binding a driver.  No contract to pay an onerous 'penalty' was seen or agreed.  Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge, include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space'' (NB: when parking operator Claimants cite Vine, they often mislead courts by quoting out of context, Roch LJ's words about the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio). 

29. Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the statutory Code and this is supported by the BPA & IPC Trade Bodies.  In November 2020's Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike."

 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

30. DVLA data is only supplied to pursue parking charges if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority from the landowner to issue charges in this place in their own name.  The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have standing to make contracts with drivers and litigate in their own name.

31.  The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The Appeals Annex in the new incoming statutory Code shows that genuine disputes such as this would see the charge cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  Whether or not a person engaged with it, the Claimant's consumer blame culture and reliance upon the industry's own 'appeals service' should not sway the court into a belief that a fair appeal was ever on offer. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject almost any dispute: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (IPC's 2020 Annual Report). 

 

 

Conclusion

33. There is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of intimidating pre-action threats.

34. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

35.  Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."  

 

 

Statement of truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed: 

Coupon-mad

"My defence is as follows:"

No.  This isn't your defence. In the examples you see here almost every day the intro says:

"My defence is repeated and I will say as follows".

See recent ones by:

@Defendant911

@Milliered

@Harry77