DVLA - Freedom of Information Request FOIR3988, where to get a copy?

mar_88

Castle said:

mar_88 said:

KeithP said:

mar_88 said:

Only thing I've got are A4 printed copies of the sign from the solicitor. 

Are those photographs of the actual signs onsite, or are they just pictures of artwork that is supposed to represent what a sign might look like?

Artwork, not photographs. They've sent a map with the location and size of each type of signs on site (airport, it is a "stopped in a no stopping area" for 39 seconds) , but it does not mark where the infraction took place.

Airports are subject to Byelaws; so, no POFA.

The NTK states that the location is a "Privately Operated access road" - VCS is IPC accredited and "Members of The IPC who issue parking charges within the private parking sector are required to subscribe to the IPC’s Accredited Operator Scheme (AOS) and adhere to this Code of Practice which defines the core standards necessary to ensure transparency and fairness." Are bylaws relevant in this case?

Coupon-mad

Yes.

The whole Airport site is under statutory control (the Airport bylaws) and thus there can be no 'keeper liability' because such land doesn't fall under POFA.

Only helps a Defendant who wasn't driving.

All seen in other VCS Airport threads, including a case lost (wrongly - might be appealed) 2 weeks ago and another case won on the same argument last week.

mar_88

Reference of the winner if possible please?

Coupon-mad

Dunno, can't recall, sorry.

But the losing Defendant was @Doddle1 who posted on the winning Defendant's thread.

So you can find both threads from the replies on his profile.

mar_88

Latest: 

ORDER DISMISSING THE CLAIM

17. In order to pursue this claim, the Claimant is relying on Schedule 4 of Protection of Freedoms Act

2012 (POFA). However, paragraph 1 of this schedule states that “This Schedule applies where — (a)

the driver of a vehicle is required by virtue of a relevant obligation to pay parking charges in respect of

the parking of the vehicle on relevant land”. Firstly, it is to be noted that this is an event of stopping

but not parking. No parking event has, nor is alleged to have occurred in relation to this claim and

so Schedule 4 of the POFA does not apply.

18. Paragraph 3 goes on to clarify: “In this Schedule ’Relevant Land’ means any land (including land

above or below ground level) other than — … (b) a parking place which is provided or controlled by

a traffic authority. (c) any land (not falling within paragraph (a) or (b)) on which the parking of a

vehicle is subject to statutory control.” However, as the roads outside of the car parks at Liverpool John

Lennon Airport are publicly accessible, they are covered by the Road Traffic Enactments and therefore

under authority of the police. Additionally, driving and parking at Liverpool John Lennon Airport was

under the statutory control of Liverpool John Lennon Airport Byelaws 2019, section 5 “PROHIBITED

ACTS ON PARTS OF THE AIRPORT TO WHICH THE ROAD TRAFFIC ENACTMENTS DO

NOT APPLY”. Therefore, the airport is not ‘Relevant Land’ and POFA does not apply. (Exhibit XX)

19. The Particulars of Claim indicate that the Claimant wishes the courts to believe that a contract was

agreed to by the Driver of the vehicle by the act of entering the land of Liverpool John Lennon Airport.

However, it is not possible to read, consider and accept the terms of the signage which the Claimant

relies upon from a moving car and indeed stopping to read a sign constitutes the very contravention

for which this charge has arisen – ‘No Stopping’. Therefore, this supposed contract is paradoxically

impossible to accept without breaking.

20. Furthermore, the term “No Stopping”, as written on the signs, is forbidding and therefore not an offer

to stop and pay a charge. Therefore, no contract to pay a charge in the event of stopping was agreed

to by the Driver and so no charge can be brought about by doing so. Precedence in Case Law can be

found in PCMUK v Bull et al (B4GF26K6).

21. Even in the hypothetical scenario of POFA being applicable in this case, the Claimant is not legally

entitled to assume keeper’s liability. The Notice To Keeper (NTK) issued by the Claimant on 20

December 2019 does not comply with the wording specified under paragraph 9(2)(f) of Schedule 4 of

POFA which defines the start of the 28 days period as the day the notice is given, and not the date

the notice is issued (posted) as per the NTK wording (Exhibit XX) . The date the notice is presumed

given is specified under paragraph 9(6) as ”the second working day after the day on which it is posted;

and for this purpose ’working day’ means any day other than a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday

in England and Wales”. Therefore, the conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4 (Right

to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle) in 6(1)(b) are not met.

22. Furthermore, the conditions set by the IPC Code Of Practice to be met by the Claimant in order to

be entitled to pursue the unpaid Parking Charge against the keeper of the vehicle are specified under

Schedule 3: ”Where a Parking Charge remains unpaid 28 days after a Notice to Keeper has been

served, further correspondence may be sent to the Motorist to pursue the unpaid Parking Charge.

Where Parking Charges are pursued against the keeper of the vehicle using the liability created by

Schedule 4 of POFA the operator must ensure compliance with all relevant sections”.

23. The vital matter of ’keeper liability’ regarding the law when parking on private land was confirmed by

parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in the 2015

Annual Report where he stated:

“There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver.

Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice

issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted

that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution

where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to

Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to

name the driver. [...] If... POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is... not complied with then keeper liability does

not generally pass.” (Exhibit XX)

24. It is neither admitted nor denied that the Defendant was the driver of the vehicle at the time the

alleged incident took place. It is now 2 years and 7 months since the material date. The Particulars

of Claim set out no positive case regarding the identity of the driver. As a consequence, the Claimant

is not legally entitled to assume keeper’s liability and thus the claim should be struck out.

25. Given that more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings and service of the claim was

defective (i.e. it was never served) the Defendant submits that this particular claim is dead and the

period for service cannot be extended by this application process. The Defendant had no details of this

claim until 16 June 2022, therefore, if the Claimant believes there is a cause of action then the correct

procedure would be to file a claim afresh and to the right address, after furnishing the Defendant with

the information required under the pre-action protocol for debt claims, issued this time to the correct

address for service for this Defendant, which is known.

26. There are several authorities for this, including the judgment in Boxwood Leisure Ltd v Gleeson

Construction Services Ltd & Anor [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which is a reminder of the strictness of

the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to

rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely

on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out

in CPR 7.6(3) for extending the period for service of a claim form”.

27. In Michael Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784 the Court of Appeal considered whether

any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had

been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months

as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused

to grant relief on the basis that it did not have power to do so.

28. As the Claimant have not provided evidence that they have applied for an extension of the period of

service in line with CPR 7.6, the claim must be dismissed.

These should cover most bases - Thoughts?

Doddle1

Coupon-mad said:

Dunno, can't recall, sorry.

But the losing Defendant was @Doddle1 who posted on the winning Defendant's thread.

So you can find both threads from the replies on his profile.

The winner was John3994 and I was very much the loser thanks to Judge lottery 

mar_88

Doddle1 said:

Coupon-mad said:

Dunno, can't recall, sorry.

But the losing Defendant was @Doddle1 who posted on the winning Defendant's thread.

So you can find both threads from the replies on his profile.

The winner was John3994 and I was very much the loser thanks to Judge lottery 

That's rather unfortunate and I'm sorry to hear 

mar_88

Do you know whether exhibits count towards the total page count of a WS?

mar_88

I think I might have to shed weight off it - A lot! Do I need to put Exhibits for the defence arguments for a WS aimed to be used for a set aside hearing?

Coupon-mad

Yes the pages all count.  All you do is use a PDF compressor to make it a zip file.

For a set aside hearing you should not need too much stuff about defending the actual claim, especially not if you are arguing the '4 months dead' point to dismiss the claim.