HX Car Park Management - No Stopping PCN (Court Date Arranged)

Adam16

Thought i would create a quick post about an upcoming court case i have on Friday.

The case is being claimed by Gladstones on behalf of HX Car Park Management.

My car was parked in late 2020 for a total of 8 mins, not obstructing anyone, in an area supposedly marked as “No Stopping”.

Interestingly, the same site has now been in the news for ripping people off with false charges and aggressive tactics. 

In summary my case rests on the following key defence items:

1. Unreasonable Terms - it is not clear where the signage applies to, and it could be assumed that anyone using the petrol station to fill up would also be in breach. One must stop their car in order to actually notice, or indeed read, the terms by which point they would be entrapped and already in breach.

2. No offer - "No Stopping" is an absolute forbidding term, and no offer of value has been communicated to form a valid contract

3. Grace Period - the vehicle was stopped for 8 minutes, which is within the 10 minute grace period that the operator is required to allow according to their own Code of Practice

4. Unclear Signs - the signage is unclear, and not in line with the requirements of the Code of Practice. The signs in the operators witness pack are not those displayed at the time, and it's apparent that they have changed the signs since the time of the event.

5. No landowner authority - the contract provided is redacted, and it is unclear who signed it. It is apparent however that it was not the landowner, or a Director, as required to form a valid contract.

6. Inflated charges - the addition of £60 on top of the £100 charge is against various rules, case law, etc.

Adam16

____________________ DEFENCE ____________________ The Particulars of Claim refer to an alleged incident involving vehicle with registration XXX on 05/12/2020 at the location of Shell Salterhebble, Salterhebble Hill, Halifax, HX3 0QE (hereafter referred to as the site) whereby the Defendant is alleged to have parked in breach of the signage thus incurring a parking charge (the ‘PCN’).

• The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all. It is denied that a contract was entered into - by conduct or otherwise - whereby it was ‘agreed’ to pay a ‘parking charge’.

• The Claimant, HX Car Park Management Ltd (‘HX’), is not the land owner and strict proof is required that HX contract with the land owner includes the right to take legal action.

• Notwithstanding, the signage referred at the site is so deficient and poorly visible that it cannot be said that a contract for parking was clearly offered to the driver at the time, and it is denied that one was considered and accepted by the Defendant. The signage is also not in accordance with the requirements of the Defendants own Accredited Trade Association.

• The signage is absolutely prohibitive, and doesn’t communicate any offer of parking or value, and therefore there can be no contract to substantiate this moneyclaim.

• The Claimant belongs to an Accredited Trade Association and agrees to abide by its Code of Practice, which allows a reasonable grace period for reasons spelt out in the Beavis decision that are binding upon the Claimant. The grace period is stated as 10 minutes, and the Defendants vehicle was stopped for less than this grace period. Therefore no breach has occurred and no cause for action exists.

• The Claimant has abused process by issuing an inflated claim for a sum which it is not entitled to recover by adding £60 of additional costs above the amount of the PCN, separate to the court fee and legal representative’s costs. The Court is therefore invited to strike out the claim ab initio as an abuse of process, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

  Unclear and inadequate signage

• The Claimant’s case relies upon signage at the site constituting a contract between the Defendant as the driver of the vehicle in question, and the Claimant, and that the terms of this contract have been breached.

• The Claimant’s signage has vague/hidden terms, and a mix of small white font on a light green background with very poor contrast and visibility as to be legible from a moving vehicle or otherwise.

• The signage is also placed at such a height where it would be extremely difficult for a driver of a moving low sitting vehicle to notice whilst also paying attention to the road. This is further exacerbated due to the fact that on entering and driving through the site, the notices are naturally situated on the left hand passenger side of the vehicle when viewed from the driving direction. This means that the vehicle roofline further obstructs the view of the signage.

• According to the current Contract between DVLA and parking companies, in order to obtain "Keeper of a Vehicle at the Date of an Event" (KADOE) information from the DVLA, Clause A6.1 states that, "The Customer shall at all times be a member of a DVLA Accredited Trade Association ("ATA") and maintain membership of the ATA and comply with the ATA's Code of Practice or Conduct".

• The Claimant is an Accredited Operator and a member of the International Parking Community (‘IPC’), and according to the 'Notice to Keeper' issued to the Defendant, operates in accordance with their Code of Practice.

• The IPC Code of Practice (Seventh Edition) (‘IPC CoP’), that was in force at the time of the alleged breach of contract, states in Clause 8.1 that:

  “The Operator must have clear signage located on the Private Land to confirm the Terms and Conditions in place”.

• Schedule 1 of the IPC CoP describes the signage characteristics Operators must adhere to, and states:

  “The size of the text on the sign must be appropriate for the location of the sign and should be clearly readable by a Motorist having regard to the likely position of the Motorist in relation to the sign.”. It also states that, “The colours used on signage should be such that the contrast between the background and the text makes the wording on the sign clearly legible. For example, black text on a white background or white text on a black background will provide a suitable contrast. Other colour combinations can be adopted at the Operators discretion, but the Operator should avoid combinations which are difficult to read.”

  It is clear that the signage presented by the Claimant fails to meet the requirement of their own trade body. The size of the text is not appropriate for the location of the signage, and is not easily readable whilst driving a moving motor vehicle. The location of the signage means it is on the passenger side of the vehicle, furthest away and most obscured to the driver, and thus there has been insufficient regard to the likely position of the Motorist in relation to the signage. Moreover the choice of colours, white text on a light green background, does not make the wording on the signage clearly legible and is instead difficult to read.

• In the case of Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, the Court of Appeal held that it was unsurprising that the appellant did not see the sign ''in view of the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the southern parking space''. In other cases where parking firm Claimants and/or their legal teams have cited Vine in their template witness statements, they have misled courts by quoting out of context from Roch LJ, whose words related to the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the decision. In fact, Miss Vine won because it was held as a fact that she was not afforded a fair opportunity to learn of the terms by which she would be bound.

• It is therefore the Defendants position that the signage unclear and not sufficiently legible to constitute the formation of a valid contract, and in contradiction to the requirements of the Claimants own trade body. As such no contract exists between the Claimant and Defendant to substantiate this moneyclaim.

  Grace Period

• As the Claimant is an Accredited Operator and a member of the International Parking Community (‘IPC’), and according to the 'Notice to Keeper' issued to the Defendant, operates in accordance with their Code of Practice, they are required to operate a reasonable Consideration and Grace Period.

• The IPC Code of Practice (Seventh Edition) that was in force at the time of the alleged breach of contract, in Clauses 13.1 & 13.2, state that a ‘grace’ period must be allowed:

  “Motorists must be allowed a sufficient Consideration Period so they may make an informed decision as to whether or not to enter or remain on the Private Land.”

  “Before a Parking Charge is issued Motorists must be allowed a Grace Period save and except when 13.3 is applicable. A Grace Period is a 10 minute period at the end of a Permitted Period of Parking.”

• In the case of Beavis it was determined that Codes of Practice, where they relate to a PCN, are crucial when assessing the fairness of a term. The judge stated (paragraph 111), “And, while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA. In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced.”

• The signage displayed at the time of the alleged breach of contract did not display any large prominent wording to state that a grace period did not apply.

• The Defendant believes that the vehicle in question was stopped of less than 10 minutes. As a grace period of 10 minutes should be allowed in accordance with the Claimants own Code of Practice, no breach has therefore occurred and no cause for action exists.

  No offer to park

• The basis of contract law requires the basic principles of offer, consideration and acceptance.

• No meaningful and valuable ‘offer’ has been made to the Defendant by the Claimant, such as a licence allowing free parking for a set period of time, nor has the Defendant undertaken any period of “consideration” in respect of this. There is no such offer in the signage presented by the Claimant in this case - no contractual licence, no benefit of free parking.

• The Beavis case, explored in the section entitled “The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case is distinguished” below, is littered with references to the disputed charge being justifiable only in the context of the ‘contractual licence to park’ being given to the Defendant - e.g. ‘They must regard the risk of having to pay £85 for overstaying as an acceptable price for the convenience of parking there’.

• Therefore, in the absence of any valuable offer or consideration of such, no contract exists and there is no basis for this moneyclaim.

  Entrapping & forbidding terms

• The signage reads “No stopping at all”, however in order to read and understand the signage one would need to stop, park and exit their vehicle by which time you would already be in breach of the terms. The terms of the signage are therefore entrapping and forbidding, and no contractual relationship exists in this case.

• In the cases of PCM-UK v Bull et all [2016] B4GF26K6, UKPC v Masterson [2016] B4GF26K6, and Horizon Parking v Mr J [2016] C5GF17X2 it was found that the signage displayed was forbidding in nature, and thus only a trespass had occurred and would be a matter for the landowner.

• In the case of Ransomes vs. Anderson (“the Ransomes case”), a persuasive County Court judgement on appeal, Judge Moloney QC said:- “the notice was insufficiently clear to constitute a valid contractual offer capable of acceptance by conduct. [...] Although the doctrine of acceptance by conduct, on the basis of the terms on a notice in a parking place or similar zone, is an obviously right, valuable and useful one, it is an essential minimum that the contract be sufficiently simple and clear that the motorist is in no doubt before he performs the accepting conduct what he is letting himself in for”.

• It is the Defendant’s position that the accepting conduct and declining conduct set out in the signage is contradictory as one cannot be performed without first performing the other, and this is entrapping and unreasonable.

• It is denied that accepting conduct laid out on the signage was sufficiently clear, simple and readily legible to form a valid contract without having first performed the accepting conduct, and therefore fails when viewed in the context of the Judge’s comments in the Ransomes case in that there is doubt before performing the accepting conduct.

• It is the Defendants position that the signage is incapable of binding any person under common contract law, and that the signage would also be considered void pursuant to Schedule 2 of the CRA.

• As the signage presented by the Claimant states “no stopping at all”, there was no offer of parking, and therefore there can be no contract to substantiate this moneyclaim. The signage is absolutely prohibitive, and doesn’t communicate any offer of parking.

  The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case is distinguished

• Unlike in this case, ParkingEye demonstrated a commercial justification for their £85 private PCN, which included all operational costs, and they were able to overcome the real possibility of the charge being struck out as punitive and unrecoverable. However, their Lordships were very clear that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in such cases. Their decision was specific to that ‘unique’ set of facts: the legitimate interest argued, the car park location, and the ‘brief and clear’ signs with the parking charge itself in bold and the largest text. The unintended consequence is that, rather than persuade courts considering other cases that all private PCNs are automatically justified, the Beavis case facts and pleadings (and in particular, the brief and prominent signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

• Due to the authority set by their earlier Somerfield case - mentioned at the start of this defence - it is worth noting that ParkingEye no longer add ‘debt letter costs/damages’ to their private PCNs and their own claims have escaped any reports of being summarily struck out for abuse of process. This Claimant has failed to plead their case or to set out their terms or construct their charges in the same way as in Beavis and the penalty rule remains firmly engaged.

• Without the Beavis case to prop it up, and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail. Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of an overriding legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a motorist - nor to present them with concealed pitfalls, traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations - and nor can the operator claim an unconscionable sum.

• Also the parking contract in Beavis case was judged to be ‘objectively reasonable’ partly because ‘motorists generally’ did accept it. The landowner wanted as many people as possible to use the car park in question so the contractual arrangements were designed to be attractive to the average motorist. This is the complete antithesis of the supposed ‘contract’ in this case which is designed to actively discourage motorists from stopping at the site. The terms of this ‘contract’ are not ‘objectively reasonable’, but deliberately designed to be so heinous that no one in their right mind would agree to them. It follows that this is not a ‘contract’ but a prohibitory notice masquerading as such.

• In Beavis case the Supreme Court Judges reiterated the requirement for fair and open dealing, at Para 205: “The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should begiven to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.”

Adam16

• The Vehicle Control Services LTD CS v Nick Idle & Damien Ward [2019] E8 DP 25C7 & E7 DP 95C3 case is distinguished

• Unlike in this case, Idle & Ward related to land which consisted of a private roadway which then lead and attached to the car parks of various retail and business
  operations. Users were presented with a large entrance sign at the entrance of the roadway clearly legible and in direct frontal view of the drivers entering, with repeater signs throughout the roadway. It was clearly apparent that the signage applied only to the roadway by the very nature that it was only a roadway, with the sole purpose of allowing access to the car parking areas it lead to.

• The facts of the Idle & Ward case, and the basis of that decision, therefore fundamentally differ to this case.

• In this case the site is not a roadway, but a fuel station forecourt - a large area of mixed use land. It is a reasonable assumption that stopping is an implicitly allowable act on a fuel station forecourt, unlike a dedicated roadway which has a clear purpose for access and egress only.

• In this case it is not apparently obvious where the signage applies on the fuel station forecourt, and which areas of the site stopping is permitted, and which areas it is not - there is no accompanying wording, map or road markings to clearly define on the forecourt where the terms apply.

• In the case of Idle & Ward there was very large and prominent signage at the entrance of the roadway in direct frontal view of any driver entering the land. In this case no such large and clearly legible signage existed at the entrance of the site.

• This principle is further enforced by the Beavis case where the Supreme Court held that the charge was only enforceable by the principle that the signage was large, and prominently displayed at the entrance of the land.

  The Claim is tainted by an abuse of process and should not proceed to trial

• It is an abuse of process for a Claimant to issue an inflated claim for a sum which it is not entitled to recover. The above authorities could not be clearer. Parking firms must choose between a ‘Beavis-level’ charge calculation or loss-based damages. A parking firm cannot seek to plead their claim in both, but the Claimant has done in this case.

• At the Bradford County Court, District Judge Claire Jackson (now HHJ Jackson, a Specialist Civil Circuit Judge) decided to hear a 'test case' where £60 had been added to a parking charge despite Judges up and down the country repeatedly disallowing that sum and warning parking firms not to waste court time with such spurious claims. That case was Excel v Wilkinson [2020]: G4QZ465V, and leave to appeal was refused and that route was not pursued. The Judge concluded that such claims are proceedings with 'an improper collateral purpose'. This Judge - and others who have since copied her words and struck dozens of cases out in late 2020 and into 2021 - went into significant detail and concluded that parking operators (such as this Claimant) are seeking to circumvent CPR 27.14 as well as breaching the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

• Where it is clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a Claimant were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks, a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and money, and the Defendant submits that it is proper that this action should be taken out of court as soon as possible

• The Defendant's position is that this moneyclaim is in part/wholly a penalty, applying the authority in the ParkingEye cases (ref: paras 98, 100, 193, 198) ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 and para 419 of HHJ Hegarty’s High Court decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was set at £75 (discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment) then increasing ultimately to £135. Much like the situation in this claim, the business model involved sending a series of automated demands to the keeper. At para 419, HHJ Hegarty found that adding £60 to an already increased parking charge 'would appear to be penal' and unrecoverable. ParkingEye had dropped this punitive enhancement by the time of Mr Beavis' famous parking event.

• The Claimant cannot be heard to base its charge on the Beavis case, then add damages for automated letter costs; not even if letters were issued by unregulated 'debt recovery' third parties. It is known that parking firms have been misleading the courts with an appeal at Salisbury Court (the Semark-Jullien case) where the Judge merely reset an almost undefended case back for a hearing. He indicated to Judges for future cases, how to consider the CRA 2015 properly and he rightly remarked that the Beavis case was not one that included additional 'costs' per se, but he made no finding of fact about the illegality of adding the same 'automated letter costs' twice. He was not taken by either party to Somerfield in point #31 above and in any event it is worth noting that the lead Southampton case of Britannia v Crosby was not appealed. It is averred that District Judge Grand's rationale remains sound, as long as a court has sufficient facts to properly consider the CRA 2015 s62, 63 and 67 before turning to consider the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Sch4 ('the POFA').

• Even if the Claimant had shown the global sum claimed in the largest font on clear and prominent signs - which is denied - they are attempting double recovery of costs. The sum also exceeds the maximum amount which can be recovered from a registered keeper as prescribed in Schedule 4, Section 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (‘the POFA’). It is worth noting that in the Beavis case, even though the driver was known, the Supreme Court considered and referred more than once to the POFA because it was only right that the intentions of Parliament regarding private PCNs were considered.

• The Defendant avers that parking firm claims which add a duplicitous ‘costs’ sum to the private PCN are easily identified to be unlawful from the outset, without any need for a hearing to determine where the truth lies in terms of evidence. The Court is, therefore, invited to strike out the claim ab initio as an abuse of process, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4 and also give serious consideration to Practice Direction 3C, as to whether the level of similar abusive (and thus, wholly without merit) claims cluttering up the courts may provide grounds for issuing an Extended Civil Restraint Order to protect consumers in future from this Claimant and to save the courts time and money.

  Unfair Terms contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015

• If, by pursuing this claim, the Claimant is denying that the Defendant has declined the alleged contract in accordance with the declining conduct, then the Defendant avers that the Claimant is forcing the contract irrevocably on the Defendant who has not had reasonable time to read and digest the terms, rendering it an unfair term as stated in Schedule 2 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015:

  “A term which has the object or effect of irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which the consumer has had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract.”

  Failure to comply with Codes of Practice

• According to the current Contract between DVLA and parking companies, in order to obtain “Keeper of a Vehicle at the Date of an Event” (KADOE) information from the DVLA, Clause A6.1 states that “The Customer shall at all times be a member of a DVLA Accredited Trade Association (“ATA”) and maintain membership of the ATA and comply with the ATA’s Code of Practice or Conduct”.

  The Claimant is an Accredited Operator and a member of the International Parking Community (IPC), and according to the ‘Notice to Keeper’ issued to the Defendant, operates in accordance with their Code of Practice.

• The IPC Code of Practice (Seventh Edition) was in force at the time of the alleged breach of contract.

• In its conduct and signage this Claimant has failed to comply with the CoP that they are signed up for, such as it is. Under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, it is an unfair/misleading business practice to state that a Trader complies with a Code of Practice, but in reality, does not. This Claimant’s conduct is alsosignificantly different from the Beavis case [para 111.] where even the Supreme Court were wrongly convinced that the CoP was some sort of regulatory framework:

  “And, while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA. In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced.’’

  Landowner authority

• The Claimant is also put to strict proof, by means of contemporaneous and unredacted evidence of a chain of authority flowing from the Landowner or Lessor of the relevant site to the Claimant. There is no evidence that the freeholder authorises this particular Claimant to issue private PCNs or what the site enforcement boundary and start/expiry dates are/were, and whether this Claimant has standing to enforce such charges by means of civil litigation in their own name rather than a bare licence to issue PCNs ‘on behalf of’ the landowner on an agency basis.

In the matter of costs; if this claim is not struck out, the Defendant seeks:

Standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and (b) that any hearing is not vacated but continues as a costs hearing, in the event of a typical Notice of Discontinuance. The Defendant seeks a finding of unreasonable behaviour in the pre-and post-action phases, by this Claimant. Pursuant to CPR 46.5, whilst indemnity costs cannot exceed two thirds of the applicable rate if using legal representation, the Defendant notes that LiP costs are not necessarily capped at £19 ph. It is noted that a Defendant may ask in their Summary Costs Assessment for the court to award their usual hourly rate for the many hours spent on this case [ref: Spencer & anor v Paul Jones Financial Services Ltd].

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Defendant’s name: Mr XXX

Date: XXX

Adam16

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT FOR HEARING ON 29th APRIL 2022

• I, Mr XXX of XXX, am the defendant in this matter, and will say as follows:

• The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge. In my statement, I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate.

  Sequence of events

• The approach to the entrance to the land is on the A629 Salterhebble Hill road. This is a busy road with multiple businesses along it, where stopping is impossible due to the double yellow lines and traffic (including many buses) not being able to pass. The only safe way to stop to view the lands park terms and conditions is by entering.

• At the point of entry (exhibit XX-01) there are no visible entrance terms and conditions signs, and the only visible signage is that of the petrol station and the McDonalds that shares the same entrance.

• After finding a suitable place to park, ensuring I was not in a yellow box or blocking use of the petrol station forecourt, I exited my vehicle.

• I did not, at any point, notice the signage stating no stopping was allowed. This is not unsurprising given the height of my vehicle roofline compared to the signage, and the poor font and contrast.

• I received a PCN in the post stating I had stopped my vehicle in contravention of the terms and conditions on the land, and am now asked to pay an inflated charge.

  New signage, and inadequate original signage

• It is apparent, on inspecting Google StreetView, that the operator has installed new signage since the time of the event (exhibit XX-02 – marked with red circle). It can only be assumed that this is in recognition that their previous signage was deficient.

• The original signage, installed at the time of the event, had much smaller fonts than that now displayed (exhibit XX-03 and XX-04).

• A key factor in the leading authority from the Supreme Court, was that ParkingEye were found to have operated in line with the relevant parking operator’s code of practice and that there were signs that were clear and obvious and ‘bound to be seen’. I have included a copy of this sign in exhibit XX-05 for comparison.

• In this case, the signage fails to adhere to the standards as laid out by the relevant accredited parking association, the International Parking Community (‘IPC’). The IPC Code of Practice V7 (November 2019), as shown in exhibit XX-06, which was in place at the time of the event states “the size of text on the sign must be appropriate for the location of the sign and should be clearly readable by a Motorist having regard to the likely position of the Motorist in relation to the sign”. It also states that “the colours used on the signage should be such that the contrast between background and the text makes the wording on the sign clearly legible. For example, black text on a white background or white text on a black background will provide a suitable contrast”.

• The IPC Code of Practice V7 also goes on to state that operators should display entrance signs, and gives an example of such on page 29 of the document as shown in exhibit XX- 06 for reference.

  Grace period

• The IPC Code of Practice V7 states that “before a parking charge is issued motorists must be allowed a grace period save and except when 13.3 is applicable. A grace period is a 10 minute period at the end of a permitted period of parking.” Section 13.3 states that “a grace period is not required when the permitted period of parking does not exceed 1 hour providing that the signage on the site makes it clear to the motorist, in a prominent font, that no grace period applies on that land”. A copy of this excerpt is shown in exhibit XX- 07 for reference.

• It can be seen on the signage in place at the time of the event that no text in a prominent font is present stating that no grace period applies on the land. Therefore Section 13.3 of the code does not apply, and a 10 minute grace period is required to be allowed by operators complying with the IPC’s code of practice.

• The vehicle was stopped for a period less than 10 minutes. This is confirmed by both the GPS phone data at the time which shows I was in the location for only 5 minutes between 12:54 and 12:59 (exhibit XX-08), as well as the operators own admission of a period of 8 minutes between 12:50 and 12:58 as admitted when I originally disputed the charge using their independent appeals service (exhibit XX-09). Therefore, I believe no cause for action exists.

  My fixed witness costs - ref PD 27, 7.3(1) and CPR 27.14

• As a litigant-in-person I have had to learn relevant law from the ground up, and in doing so have spent a considerable amount of time researching the law online, processing and preparing my defence, and this witness statement. I therefore ask for my fixed witness costs. I am advised that costs on the Small Claims track are governed by rule 27.14 of the CPR and, unless a finding of ‘wholly unreasonable conduct’ is made against the Claimant, the court may not order a party to pay another party’s costs – except fixed costs such as witness expenses which a party has reasonably incurred in traveling to and from the hearing (including fares and/or parking fees) plus the court may award a set amount allowance for loss of earnings or loss of leave.

• The fixed sum for loss of earnings/loss of leave apply to any hearing format and are fixed costs at PD 27, 7.3(1)...are: (1) for the loss of earnings or loss of leave of each party or witness due to attending a hearing... a sum not exceeding £95 per day for each person.”

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Defendant’s name: XXX 

Date: XXX

Jenni_D

Good luck for Friday ... looks like you're well on top of things, having used the resources here without needing your hand held.

The only thing your WS didn't expand on was the forbidding terms/no contract angle.

Coupon-mad

And the fact that the added £60 is 'extorting money from motorists' so says the Ministerial Foreword of the new Parking Code of Practice, published 7.2.22.

Adam16

Coupon-mad said:

And the fact that the added £60 is 'extorting money from motorists' so says the Ministerial Foreword of the new Parking Code of Practice, published 7.2.22.

Thanks for this.

I'll add to my crib sheet for Friday.

To be honest I almost got our solicitors to deal with it, but thought I'd have a crack at it myself.

Would have been much better financially to have just paid the "penalty", but the principle of it got under my skin somewhat!

Coupon-mad

Under our skin too!  I am the lady filmed on the beach in this documentary 'Parking, the Big Con' which also features bargepole from this forum too:

https://www.channel5.com/show/parking-the-big-con

PPCs hate me for my involvement in the new Parking Code of Practice and Government regulation coming in:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6333036/breaking-news-government-has-announced-the-statutory-code-of-practice-and-enforcement-framework/p1p

You don't need s solicitor, once you get the bit between your teeth re fighting this scam industry!  That's what we do here every day and IANAL.

Adam16

The court ruled in my favour today. 

Gladstones didn’t bother turning up, and the Judge sounded like he’d already made up his mind. Nice chap actually.

The Judge stated that the signage was completely deficient to form a valid contract, the addition of the £60 on top of the £100 charge was unjustified, and the case was completely distinguished from the Beavis Supreme Court decision.

My costs were awarded.

I’ll be making a complaint to the IPC and DVLA. 

Umkomaas

Lovely result. Well done and thanks for the welcome feedback. 👍

ANOTHER HX PARKING ONE BITES THE DUST!

Le_Kirk

Adam16 said:

I’ll be making a complaint to the IPC and DVLA. 

Well done on your win - sounds like a clued up judge - did you mean ICO?