Surprise CCJ from Excel Parking Services

Johnersh

So you applied for a set aside without providing evidence?  Lucky to have that order to make the position good, tbh. 

Olig777

Thanks @Johnersh

I'm a little lost to be honest. In brief, I am acting on behalf of my wife who cant have a CCJ to operate her business. I have limited knowledge of law/courts but not from a civil perspective, so will act as her lay rep.

I was under the impression that their failure to check where to send correspondence (over 12 months after the breach) was a mandatory set aside under CPR 13.2? I actually thought that was your stance from all the research I did? We moved out of the address they used shortly before their first letter was sent, so we only recently became aware a CCJ had been filed against her during a mortgage app.

At the time of filing the app we hadnt received the SAR back and thus couldnt write a defence at the time as we didnt have any facts. In addition, the general concensus was that we acted swiftly, so we didnt want to waste time waiting for the SAR. We initially offered a non contested set aside to their legal rep, which they refused unless we paid the now £257 cost plus £108 along with a reason for them agreeing to set aside - I thought the 13.2 failing would be enough reason for the set aside.

When you say evidence, we did send a version of the DO and a witness statement with our application, explaining the house move in detail but its the fact that they seem to be saying 'unless you can defend the original claim, your CCJ sticks and your liable for costs'. Surely it cant be right that CCJ's can be given without the def being aware and then getting additional costs just because the parking firm cant be bothered to run an equifax search?

How can I produce a defence when we have limited recollection of the breach nor what the parking signs said over 2 years ago? indeed my main issue here is not with the initial £60 charge, its their actions since that I am unwilling to accept. 

If they had followed their own CoP and made a reasonable attempt to trace her, we would have been aware and could look into the matter. Two years on and it seems very unfair.  

Any advice appreciated.

Coupon-mad

What if we dont want to defend the parking fine (we'd reluctantly pay the £60) but we cant afford to have the CCJ on my wifes credit file. 

Do that, and you will almost certainly annoy the Judge, lose your application and be likely to be pursued for costs.  You wife (or you, as lay rep) absolutely MUST NOT say she doesn't wish to defend the PCN (it was never a fine). Nor must you imply it is a 'credit file cleansing' exercise.

I suspect a rookie Judge has been reviewing cases in their box work and doesn't get how CPR 13.2 applies and is automatically thinking of CPR 13.3.  But in fact they've helped you because your wife can now provide a WS answering all those listed questions and reminding the court that:

- case law says a defectively-served claim is dead after 4 months and the remedy for the C is to serve a fresh claim;

- using an old, unchecked address for a court claim is in flagrant breach of the CPRs and also the Trade Body Code of Practice (quote it) and that the Govt's new statutory code, whilst not retrospective, has confirmed the Consumer Rights Act 2015 position that consumer notices must be prominently drawn to the attention of the consumer, which in private parking industry fair and best practice, involves checking addresses (a soft trace - in bulk, costs 29 pence) and re-serving the PCN to appeal, if a new address is found pre-action.  That's what should have happened.

As for the defence - easy peasy.  This is what the Template Defence is for, and you have all you need.

You have the SAR so you know the accusation, have seen their photos and can add as para 3 onwards, the D's facts about this local car park and put the C to strict proof of their clear signage and evidence of breach, which in an alleged overstay case is more likely to be an ANPR known flaw of recording a double visit to a shop within 24 hours, as if it was one long stay.

Shift the burden back to them.

Put the C to strict proof of their case, including what evidence they have of who parked (if you can't be sure) and that they complied with the POFA 2012 Schedule 4 and that there was a 'relevant obligation' or contract breached as well as 'adequate notice' of the parking charge.

Show us the draft WS and points 2 and 3 onwards that the D wants to add to the template defence.  We will help - but based on the step by step crib sheet the Judge has given you and the template defence resource, we hope you can show us a draft tonight or tomorrow - easier than it might appear!

Coupon-mad

. From memory, the car park used to be barriered, then they were removed and you got free 45 mins or longer if you shopped in the stores directly off the car park. It transpires my wife actually stayed there around 47mins.

Ok - not only do you not know that your wife was driving (you are both insured) but two minutes means there was no grace period allowed!

Also you don't know it was 47 minutes!  Why are you ready to believe random unsynchronised timings from two different unmanned, unchecked and uncalibrated cameras, that are often known to be minutes out with each other?

Olig777

Morning and big thanks to @Coupon-mad

I am very conscious of the Courts dislike for credit cleansing and your comments are duly noted but regardless of their view, the point I was making was the fact of the defective service should allow for set aside without a defence of the initial claim. However, I will avoid my personal view from clouding this aspect.

This is the DO & WS I sent to the Courts along with my application (and all Exhibits). Obviously at the time I had no details of the PCN so 2.0 may have to be updated? However, I think the WS answers all the requirements (1 a-c) of the Order. I am working on the Defence and will post that here shortly;

Draft Order

 

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT: Northampton County Court Business Centre

EXCEL PARKING SERVICES LIMITED (Claimant)

And

XXXX XXXX (Defendant)


CLAIM No: XXXXXXX



IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The default judgment dated 06.05.21 be set aside.

2. The claim struck out as the claim form having not been served within 4 months of issue

3. The Claimant to pay the Defendant’s costs of this application on an indemnity basis.

WITNESS STATEMENT

I am XXXXX and I am the defendant in this matter. This is my supporting

statement to my application dated 07.03.22 requesting to:

a. Set aside the default judgment dated 06.05.21 as it was not properly served at my

current address.

b. Order for the original claim to be struck out.

c. Order for the claimant to pay the defendant £275 as reimbursement for the set

aside fee and associated costs.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

1.1. I was the registered keeper of the vehicle at the time of the alleged offence.

1.2. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the

Defendant on 06.05.21. I am aware that the Claimant is Excel Parking Services, and

that the assumed claim is in respect of an unpaid Parking Charge Notice from the

28.01.20 at my then residence,XXXXXX . I wish for the

opportunity to contest this charge for the reasons to be outlined in my defence.

1.3. The claim form and any prior communications were not served at my current

address and thus, I was not aware of the claim or Default Judgment until 11th

February 2022 following correspondence from our mortgage lender following a credit

check. The address on the claim is XXXXX . I left this

address on the 14.02.20 and set up a Royal Mail forwarding service. I produce the

completion statement as XXXX

1.4. In addition to the above, it should be highlighted that the integrity and lawabiding

intention of the Defendant should be taken into consideration on the basis

that;

1.4.1 I discovered a CCJ was lodged onto my credit file on the 11.02.22 whilst on

holiday overseas. I can produce this notification email as XXXX

1.4.2 On the 11.02.22 and 15.02.22 I contacted the County Court Business Centre

via email in an attempt to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgment

but did not hear back. I can produce these emails as XXXX and XXXX

1.4.3 On returning to the UK I telephoned the County Court Business Centre at the

next opportunity, being the 21.02.22, to establish the relevant information.

1.4.4 On the 23.02.22, I sent a Subject Access Request email to the Claimants data

protection department so that I could have sight of the evidence against me. At the

time of submitting this application, no information has been received. I can produce

this email as XXXX

1.4.5 On the 01.03.22, following legal advice, I sent an email to the Claimants

litigation department, requesting that they consent to set aside on the basis of their

failure to take reasonable care in confirming my address in an effort to avoid wasting

the Courts time. Due to the damage the is causing me and being aware that I

needed to demonstrate I have acted expediently, should the matter go to Court, I

allowed 7 days for their response. I can produce this email as XXXX

1.4.6 On the 03.03.22, I received Elm legals’ response, acting on behalf of the

Claimant, informing me that I had to give ‘good reason’ for them to ‘consent’ to set

aside and pay a fee of £257 before a consented application would be considered. I

can produce this email as XXXX

1.4.7 On the 04.03.22 I responded to Elms explaining that I had already provided

them with a definitive reason for a non-contested set aside, in line with CPR 13.2

and allowing them until 12:00PM on 07.03.22 to avoid me submitting a contested set

aside. I can produce this email as XXXX

1.4.8 On 08.03.22 I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgment and

fairly present my case.

1.5. I believe the Claimant has behaved unreasonably in pursuing a claim against

me without ensuring they held the Defendant’s correct contact details at the time of

the claim.

1.6. On that basis, I believe the Claimant has not adhered to CPR 6.9 (3) where they

have failed to show due diligence in using an address that the Defendant no longer

resides. The claimant did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of my

current residence despite having some 12 months to establish an address. This has

led to the claim being incorrectly served to an old address and an irregular judgment.

1.6.2 Under CPR 13.2 The Court must set aside a judgment entered under part 12 if

judgment was wrongly entered. Given that CPR 6.9 (3) was not met, CPR 13.2

applies and the CCJ should be set aside.

1.6.3 The defendant was 'there to be found' via an inexpensive and immediate credit

reference agency address check.

1.6.4 Indeed the Claimant has failed to adhere to their own Code of Practice, The

International Parking Community (CoP) which states under Section 22.1;

Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the Motorist’s details are

still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court

proceedings.

1.7. According to publicly available information my circumstances are far from being

unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses results

is an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country.

Furthermore, Prime Minister May publicly pledged to investigate ‘abuse’ of the CCJ

System and so called ‘Credit Clamping’ as reported in the Daily Mail article dated 12

September 2016. The Right Honourable Sir Oliver Heald on 23 December 2016

"announced a crackdown on unresolved debts which can damage people’s credit

ratings without them knowing. The action comes after concerns were raised that

companies were issuing claims to consumers using incorrect addresses."

The Minister added "It cannot be right that people who are unaware of debts can see

their lives and finances ruined by county court judgments. That in the digital age, we

must ensure companies pursuing unpaid debts make every reasonable effort to

contact individuals, rather than simply relying on a letter to an old address.”

Furtherance to points raised in 1.3 above.

1.8. Considering the above I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the

Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside

and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £275 plus

associated costs from the Claimant, particularly as they have failed to agree to a

non-contested set aside which would have reverted the judgment more expediently

and reduced the unnecessary burden on the Courts time.

1.9 Given that more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings and

service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served) the Defendant submits

that this particular claim is dead and the period for service cannot be extended by

this application process.

2.0 The Defendant has no details of this claim, nor the parking charge that it relates

to, therefore, if the Claimant believes there is a cause of action then the correct

procedure would be to file a claim afresh and to the right address, after furnishing the

Defendant with the information required under the pre-action protocol for debt

claims, issued this time to the correct address for service for this Defendant, which is 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX

.

2.1 There are several authorities for this, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021]

EWHC 947 (TCC), which is a reminder of the strictness of the requirements of CPR

7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a

failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to

rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the

specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6(3) for extending the period for service of a

claim form…”

2.2 In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784 the Court of Appeal

considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in

circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form

but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5

and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant

relief on the basis that it did not have power to do so.

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that

proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or

causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth

without an honest belief in its truth.

XXXX XXXXX    07.03.2022

Olig777

and the Defence draft for comments;

Only queries here are;

A. Whether they can legitimately claim costs for getting the CCJ, ie Elms legal fees, CCJ Court application fee? If so do I need to adapt 12, 15 or 16? Their claim is now £257. 

B. The photo on the ANPR looks like a petite female (ie my wife) more than me at 6' 5". Should we accept it as her rather than potentially be seen to be being awkward? Due to the time elapsed, I feel it is fair to assume we can not be expected to recall who was driving that day but a Judge may look and say that it is more likely a female.

C. Also, how do I get the PoC, I assume from the CCBC? This did not come with the SAR.

Olig777

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  XXXXXX

Between

Excel Parking Ltd

(Claimant) 

- and -  

XXXXXX

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE

 

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver gave rise to a ‘parking charge’ and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue or to form contracts in their own name at the location.

 

The facts as known to the Defendant:

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question but liability is denied. 

 

3. The Defendant is not the only driver of this vehicle, her husband is a named driver on the policy and friends or family with their own comprehensive insurance would be allowed to drive this vehicle with the Defendants permission. Due to the defective service and consequential time elapsed in addition to the poor quality imagery, it is impossible to establish who the driver was on the day in question. 

 

 

 

4. The Defendant has been a frequent visitor to the car park in question in the past and does recall the previous parking rules entitled shoppers at the stores directly off the car park to free parking. The time the vehicle left the parking area is alleged to amount to 46 minutes (within the allowable free parking period) and thus the Claimant is put to strict proof as to the correct operation of all VRM validation machines within the stores and the ANPR system deployed on site on the day in question.

5. In addition, The VRM validation machines does not produce a receipt in a durable medium, which is in breach of The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 and would provide the Defendant with tangible proof that the machine was working and had identified and recorded the VRM correctly.

6. The Defendant has undertaken research and is aware that this specific car park has made the headlines in the Birmingham Mail due to the changes from a barrier system to the ANPR system which reports the following;

‘Frustrated shoppers using a Sutton Coldfield car park have slammed changes which have led to enormous queues and lots of confusion.’

‘Visitors to the Newhall Walk car park in the centre of the town have been caught out by a change from a barrier entry to a new automatic number plate recognition system – with just two machines available for payment.’

 ‘users have complained that poor signage and a lack of announcements of the changes has led to them being caught out with fines.’

7. Further research into reviews of the Car Park reveal a consistent theme of consumers reporting validation machines not registering their VRM and then being issued with a fine and others where the pay machines were ‘out of order’ or would only accept cash payments and unclear signage.

8. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  The Defendant should not be criticised for using some pre-written wording from a reliable source. The Claimant is urged not to patronise the Defendant with (ironically template) unfounded accusations of not understanding their defence. This Defendant signed it after full research and having read this defence several times, because the court process is outside of their life experience. The claim was an unexpected shock.

9. With regard to template statements, the Defendant observes after researching other parking cases, that the Particulars of Claim ('POC') set out a generic and incoherent statement of case.  Prior to this - and in breach of the pre-action protocol for 'Debt' Claims - no copy of the contract (sign) was served with a Letter of Claim.  The POC is sparse on facts about the allegation, making it difficult to respond in depth at this time.  

10.  This Claimant continues to pursue a hugely disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite indisputably knowing that this is now banned.  It seems they have intentions to also calculate interest at a rate of 8% to be added on that false sum. It is denied that the quantum sought is recoverable (authorities: two well-known ParkingEye cases where modern penalty law rationale was applied).  Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that admin costs inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal'.

11. This finding is underpinned by Government intervention and regulation.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

12. Adding costs/damages/fees (however described) onto a parking charge is now banned. In a very short section called 'Escalation of costs' the new statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued." 

13. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as the present claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

14. The DLUHC consulted for over two years and considered evidence from a wide range of stakeholders.  Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers. The DLUHC saw through this and in a published Response, they identified that some respondents were 'parking firms posing as motorists'.  Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt recovery/robo-claim law firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis; essentially Trade Body Board member colleagues passing motorists' data around electronically to share inflated sums of money.  

15. This Claimant has not incurred these additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an automated letter-chain business model that generates a healthy profit.

16. The driver did not agree to pay a parking charge, let alone unknown costs, which were not quantified in prominent text on signage. It comes too late when purported debt recovery fees are only quantified after the event.

17. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice.  The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'.  A clear steer for the Courts.

18. This overrides mistakes made in the appeal cases that the parking industry try to rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy).  Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals were findings by Circuit Judges who appeared to be inexperienced in the nuances of private parking law and were led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and the litigant-in-person consumers lacked the wherewithal to appeal further.  In case this Claimant tries to rely upon those cases, the Defendant avers that significant errors were made.  Evidence was either overlooked (including inconspicuous signage in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the BPA Code of Practice, including rules for surveillance cameras and the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority) or the Judge inexplicably sought out and quoted from the wrong Code altogether (Percy).  In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was unfairly aligned with the admitted contract in Beavis. The learned Judges were not in possession of the same level of facts and evidence as the DLUHC, whose Code now clarifies all such matters.

Olig777

POFA and CRA breaches

19. Pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a firm may have complied with other POFA requirements (adequate signage, Notice to Keeper wording/dates, and a properly communicated 'relevant contract/relevant obligation').  If seeking keeper/hirer liability - unclear from the POC - the Claimant is put to strict proof of full compliance. 

20. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA').  The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'.  In a parking context, this includes signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

21. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer.  In the case of a 'PCN', this must have been served to the driver whilst the vehicle was stationary or, at sites remotely monitored by ANPR/CCTV, served to the keeper so that the motorist learns about it quickly. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well placed and lit, and all terms unambiguous and obligations clear. The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair dealing and good faith. 

 

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

22. ParkingEye overcame the possibility of their £85 charge being dismissed as punitive, however the Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must be determined on their own facts.  That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, given the location and clear signs with the parking charge in the largest/boldest text.  Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, the Beavis case facts (in particular, the brief, conspicuous yellow & black warning signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

23. Without the Beavis case to support the claim and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with concealed pitfalls/traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations.

24.  In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. The Claimant’s small signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, and are considered incapable of binding a driver.  Consequently, it remains the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was seen or agreed.  Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge, include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(ii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound.  It was unsurprising that she did not see the sign, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space'' (NB: when parking operator Claimants cite Vine, they often mislead courts by quoting out of context, Roch LJ's words about the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio).  

25. Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the statutory Code and this is supported by the BPA & IPC Trade Bodies.  In November 2020's Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike." 

 

Lack of landowner authority evidence and lack of ADR

26. DVLA data is only supplied to pursue parking charges if there is an independently signed landowner agreement (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to a defined enforcement boundary, hours of operation, any extended grace period or exemptions (whatever these definitions were) nor that this Claimant has authority from the landowner to issue charges at this place or for the reason given.  The Claimant is put to strict proof of all of this, and that they have standing to make contracts with drivers and litigate in their own name, rather than merely acting as agents for a principal, as some parking firms do.

27. Further, the Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).  The rival Trade Bodies provided 'blink and you've missed it' time-limited appeals services which failed to consider facts or rules of law properly and unfairly rejected disputes: e.g. despite using legally qualified but anonymous Adjudicators, the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (IPC's 2020 Annual Report).  The Appeals Annex in the new Code shows that genuine disputes such as this, even if made late, would have seen the charge cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  Whether or not a person engaged with it, the Claimant's consumer blame culture and any reliance upon the industry's own 'appeals service' should not sway the court into a belief that a fair ADR was ever on offer.

 

28. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) that, in the event of a late Notice of Discontinuance (due to parking firms using and abusing the court process as a cheap - indeed lucrative - form of debt collection) the hearing continues as a costs hearing. CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) but this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   The Defendant may seek a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

 

Conclusion

29. With the DLUHC's ban on additional costs, there is now ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only dismiss extortionate costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings, whilst allowing other such claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers every year, who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts due to intimidating tactics at pre-action stage. The Defendant believes that knowingly enhanced parking claims cause consumer harm on a grand scale and it is in the public interest that claims like this should not be allowed to continue.  The Defendant invites the court to dismiss the false 'costs' element at least, and to consider whether an appropriate sanction is to resume the policy of striking out parking claims altogether, where the POC include a vague but fixed sum in 'damages/costs'. 

30. The claim is entirely without merit and the Claimant is urged to discontinue now, to avoid incurring costs and wasting the court's time and that of the Defendant. 

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Date:

Olig777

Can anyone assist with a proof read and my few queries as I only have a few days to get changes done and this submitted? I appreciate it looks like a lot but mostly copy and paste as per @Coupon-mad advice, it wasn't as daunting as first thought?

Le_Kirk

Your paragraph #4 states "does recall the previous parking rules entitled shoppers at the stores directly off the car park to free parking" which leads me to suppose that you are aware of new rules now.  I would remove "previous".  Also you seem to be submitting evidence with paragraph #6 which should come later with the witness statement.  Just introduce the point with the defence and leave the rest for the WS.