Being taken to court for two PCNs from VCS for stopping at Liverpool Airport in 2018

Doddle1

In the County Court at ***** Claim Number: xxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

Vehicle Control Services Ltd Claimant vs ******** Defendant

Date XXXXXX

 

 

 

Index

 

Content	Page / paragraph number(s)
1. Witness Statement	Page 2   Paragraph 1
2. Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA)	Page 2-3 Paragraph 2
3. Sequence of events	Page 4-5 Paragraph 3
4. Stopping is not Parking
5. Breach of Contract
6. There is no contract between the Claimant and the Defendant
7. There is no contract between Liverpool John Lennon Airport and VCS
8. Signage
9. Claimant Levy of Additional Costs (double recovery)
10. Defendants Costs
11. Statement of Truth
12. Exhibits

1. Witness Statement  

1.1 I am the Defendant against whom this claim is made. I represent myself as a litigant-in-person with no formal legal training. Everything in the following statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

1.2 The date in question of the incident is 28 October 2018 on land at Liverpool John Lennon Airport. I dispute the claim and state that the Claimant’s case is not valid based on the following:

1.2.1 I was not the driver on 28 October 2018

1.2.2 It is admitted that I was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question however liability is denied as the Claimant has failed to comply with the strict provisions of Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012  

1.2.3 The vehicle stopped for less than 22 seconds. Stopping is not parking and therefore a Parking Charge Notice cannot be enforced  

1.2.4 Breach of Contract - it was not possible to enter into a contract as the elements of a contract ie offer, acceptance and consideration did not exist due to inadequate signage

1.2.5 Liverpool John Lennon Airport is private land. VCS do not have authority from the landowner to issue parking charges on roads that are covered by airport byelaws. It was confirmed in a recent court case that VCS' authority does not extend to roads - it is only inside car parks that VCS have authority. LJLA's own parking T&Cs state categorically that VCS have authority only when a car enters a car park. 

1.2.6 The contract between VCS and Liverpool John Lennon Airport expired in 2015 and was never signed nor witnessed in compliance with UK government legislation therefore VCS continue to issue PCNs at Liverpool Airport without a valid contract.  

1.2.7 Signage to the free drop off point was unclear and perhaps a deliberate act of entrapment. It is noted that 3.5 years later there are now prominent signs

1.2.8 The claimant has added an additional penalty charge of £60 plus 8% interest which amounts to double recovery and an incentive to prolong the case for 3.5 years

1.3 I confirm as fact I was not the driver (nor a passenger) in the vehicle on this particular date and submit the following evidence:

1.3.1 Exhibits A and B are signed witness statements by the passengers confirming that I was not in the vehicle.

1.3.2 Exhibit C shows a photo of the rescue dog that I was looking after that day. The dog suffers from anxiety and I was unable to leave a room without him so to leave him for a two hour round trip would have been impossible - witness statement Exhibit C testifies to this.

1.3.3 The Claimant was made aware that I was not the driver in November 2018 see Exhibit D however despite this awareness the Claimant has continued to send intimidating and demanding letters for various amounts of money ranging from ‘discounts’ for prompt payment to threats of additional unjustified costs and interest at 8% per annum.  

 

2. Protection of Freedom Act POFA

2.1 The Claimant has relied on The Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 to obtain my details as the registered keeper of the vehicle. However POFA Schedule 4 sub-section ‘keeper liability’ states that Airport land is not 'relevant land' as it is already covered by statutory byelaws and is specifically excluded from 'keeper liability'  

2.2 As the roads outside of the car parks at Liverpool Airport are publicly accessible, they are covered by the Road Traffic Enactments and therefore under authority of the police. Additionally, driving and parking at Liverpool Airport is under the statutory control of Liverpool Airport Byelaws 2012 “Prohibited Acts on private airport roads and other parts of the airport to which traffic enactments do not apply”. The airport is not ‘Relevant Land’ and POFA does not apply, therefore as the Registered Keeper I am not legally liable as this Act does not apply on this land.

2.3 As the Registered Keeper I informed the Claimant that I was not the driver therefore I maintain that my contact details were obtained illegally from the DVLA. The only basis in the DVLA KADOE contract for obtaining the Registered Keeper details using POFA however POFA can't apply on airport land where byelaws apply. Additionally POFA is only relevant for parking. I put The Claimant to strict proof otherwise if they disagree with this point and would require them to show evidence including documentary proof from the Airport Authority that this land is not already covered by bylaws and/or other statutory instruments.

2.4  As POPLA assessor Steve Macallan found in case 6062356150 in September 2016, that land under statutory control cannot be considered ‘relevant land’ for the purposes of POFA 2012. He stated ‘As the site is not located on ‘relevant land’, the operator is unable to rely on POFA 2012 in order to transfer liability to the hirer. Additionally, as I am not satisfied the appellant was the driver, I am unable to conclude that the operator issued the PCN correctly, and I must allow this appeal.’

2.5 In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured.

2.6 Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

2.7 The burden of proof rests with the Claimant, because they cannot use the POFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

2.8 Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA 2012 was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, a POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015: Understanding keeper liability “There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

2.9 There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass."

2.10 Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

2.11 This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against Parking Eye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found: "I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal." The same conclusion was reached by POPLA Assessor Steve Macallan, quoted in  point 2.4 above.

2.12 The BPA code of practice also says '20.14 When you serve a Notice to Keeper, you must also include information telling the keeper the ‘reasonable cause’ you had for asking the DVLA for their details.' The PCN does not provide this information; this does not comply with the BPA code point 20.14.

2.13 My research has found that the Claimant has lost all arguments about 'presuming a keeper was driving' and/or 'the driver was an agent of the keeper'. An example is Excel v Smith, heard by His Honour Judge Smith sitting at Manchester.  Excel are the sister/umbrella company for VCS with the same Director/owner, so they are well aware of this case

Doddle1

3. Sequence of events 

3.1 The following was described to The Defendant by a passenger in the vehicle and expands on the information given in the Defence statement submitted on 29 December 2021 (see Exhibit ?)

3.1.1 On 28 October 2018 the driver took two passengers to Liverpool John Lennon Airport. The driver had not visited the airport for some years and was unfamiliar with the new drop off arrangements. They attempted to follow signs for the drop-off area but the signs were misleading and the driver was unable to locate an entrance.

3.1.2 The passengers were becoming anxious about not being able to locate the drop off area and subsequently missing their flights so they asked the driver to stop briefly (less than 22 seconds) to allow the passengers out of the car.

3.1.3 There were no other vehicles or pedestrians in the area and the driver was not causing an obstruction.  

3.1.4 Had clear signage been available the free drop off facility would have been used and the terms and conditions applying to the car park adhered to.  Use of the official car park for the stopped period would be free so there is no loss incurred by the company. Instead they are seeking to impose a fine for stopping which they are not entitled to do and an inflated sum that includes double recovery.

 

4. Stopping is not parking

4.1 The claimant has raised a Parking Charge Notice, however the vehicle was “stopped” for 22 seconds and not “parked”. It is contended that the act of stopping a vehicle does not amount to parking as determined in the case of Laura Jopson vs Homeguard Services, case number B9GF0A9E. Note that this was an appeal court case and therefore persuasive on the lower courts.

4.2 It is likely that the Claimant may try to rely upon two ‘trophy win’ cases, namely VCS vs Curtchley and/or VCS vs Ward, however neither of these cases were at an airport location.

4.3 The term “No Stopping”, as written on the signs, is forbidding and not an offer to stop and pay a charge. Therefore, no contract to pay a charge in the event of stopping was agreed to by the Driver and so no charge can be brought about by doing so. Precedence in Case Law can be found in CS036 PCMUK v Bull et al B4GF26K6.

4.4 In the Parking Charge Notice Claimant uses the term ‘Period of Parking’ when referring to the drivers actions at LJLA. The original Notice to Keeper (NTK) gives the contravention as ‘Stopping in a zone where stopping is prohibited’. I submit that the Claimant is deliberately conflating parking and stopping in order to confuse the court.

 

5. Breach of contract

5.1 The Claimant is pursuing the Defendant for a breach of contract, however not at any point in material time was any contract agreed. It is denied that the Defendant breached any advertised terms and conditions that were specifically detailed on signage.  It is disputed that the signage constitutes the making a contractual offer.

5.2  As the signage is forbidding, it does not fulfil the basic requirement of a contract, which is that each party to the contract must offer valuable consideration to the other party, on clear terms capable of acceptance. In this case, neither the Claimant, nor their principal, the landowner, is offering anything to the Defendant. The notices cannot, therefore, reasonably be construed as having created a contractual relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.  The aforementioned point was tested in the County Court at High Wycombe, in the case of Parking Control Management (UK) Ltd v Bull & 2 Others (B4GF26K6, 21 April 2016), where District Judge Glen dismissed all three claims on these grounds.

5.3 Furthermore, it is disputed that the signage is clear and prominent. Exhibit ? gives examples of signage in use at the airport and demonstrates that it was Inadequate and thus incapable of binding the driver. The font size is too small and the words too many ie it falls far short of the requirements for road signs as detailed in the UK government’s  “Traffic Signs Manual”. 

5.4 The details given on the signage are inadequate to form the basis of a contract. -

·        5.4.1 No offer is defined.

5.4.2 The geographical area over which any contract would apply is not defined, thus rendering compliance impossible.

·        5.4.3 The specific circumstance under which stopping would/would not contravene the contract are not defined. Within an area open to public access by vehicles, there clearly needs to be provision for vehicles to stop in specific circumstances. For example, if way were blocked by pedestrians, in such case compliance would be illegal. Furthermore, as this is an airport access road the vast majority of the traffic will be using the road to conduct business at the airport and this will in most cases entail stopping.

5.5 These inadequacies in signage render any motorist attempting to safely travel through the site at 30mph, whilst navigating traffic, wholly incapable of even reading/understanding any alleged terms offered by said signage. It then follows that the formation of any contract based upon these terms is impossible. It is an ironic fact that the only way any sign could be read, would be to stop.

5.6 On the material date, the Driver was unaware that they were entering private land and was unfamiliar with any local rules for stopping in the vicinity of Liverpool John Lennon Airport (LJLA).  The Driver was not alerted to this fact by any signage and thus could not have entered into any contract. The Driver stopped at the side of the road for maximum 22 seconds as they could not locate the free drop off zone. The driver only became aware of the local rules for stopping when a PCN was received after the event. 

5.7 The Claimant has failed to comply with the IPC Code of Practice which states: “Motorists must be allowed a sufficient Consideration Period so they may make an informed decision as to whether or not to enter or remain on the Private Land.”  The Driver was not offered opportunity to consider the terms of the alleged contract or the opportunity to decline it.  

5.8 The Claimant is put to strict proof at the time of the alleged event they had both advertisement consent and the permission from the site owner to display the signs.

5.9 Airport approach roads are subject to road traffic enactments (public highway) and even if the Claimant is able to overcome the difficulties they face in showing that:

(a) they have locus to sue in their own name regarding this location, and that
(b) they offered a parking space with value, and a licence to park there, and that
(c) the Defendant was afforded the opportunity to consider and accept contractual terms
(d) these terms were prominently displayed, and that
(e) this charge (described by the Airport as a 'fine') is somehow saved from the penalty rule,

the Claimant is also put to strict proof that:

(f) this access road is not part of the public highway. A 'public highway' is any road maintained by public expense where the public would normally have a right to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle. It is averred that the Airport approach road is public highway and the Claimant is put to strict proof to the contrary.

5.10 The road is not clearly demarcated as private land, nor is it a private car park and thus, any parking/traffic contraventions would be a matter for the local authority. Such roads are subject to the rules of the Road Traffic Act and statutory instrument and any 'PCN' must be a proper penalty charge notice issued under the Traffic Management Act 2004.

5.11 The claimant is put to strict proof that this approach road is a part of 'the Airport' site where road traffic enactments do not apply.

 

6. There is no contract between VCS and the Defendant:

 

It is contended that no Legal contract existed between the Claimant and the Defendant at the time of this incident and that the Claimant knows this is the case.

 

6.1 - In the Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber, Court of Appeal (Appeal number: FTC 51/2011) in Vehicle Control Service (the Claimant) v’s HMRC, Judges’ Berner and Aleksander said “39. We find that there was no contract between VCS and the motorist. Any contract requires there to be an offer and acceptance.” The court also stated “40. On the facts of this case we do not consider that any offer was made by VCS that was capable of forming the basis for a contract between it and the motorist. VCS was not in a position, by virtue of its limited licence, to make any offer of a right to park. The ability to offer such a right was not conferred by the contract with the client, either expressly or by virtue of the nature of the interest in the car park conferred on VCS. That interest did not amount to a licence to occupy, or give VCS any right to possession. It merely conferred a right of entry to perform VCS’s obligations under the contract.” The Lord Justices continued “41. The warning signs erected in the car park do not assist VCS in these circumstances. The reference in those signs to the fact that the motorist is entering into a contractual agreement cannot create a contract where there is no relevant offer from VCS that can be accepted.”

 

6.2 - It is clear from the above that the Appeal Court is saying that any contract is between the landowner and the Claimant, and not between the Claimant and the Defendant. It is the landowner that is allowing the motorist on to their land, not the Claimant therefore there is no contractual relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant. 

 

5) I do not believe that the Operator has demonstrated a proprietary interest in the land, because they have no legal possession which would give VCS any right to offer parking spaces, let alone allege a contract with third party customers of the lawful owner/occupiers. In addition, VCS’s lack of title in this land means they have no legal standing to allege trespass or loss, if that is the basis of their charge.

VCS is an agent working for the owner (without a contract) and their signs do not help them to form a contract without any consideration capable of being offered. VCS -v-HMRC 2012 is the binding decision in the Upper Chamber which covers this issue with compelling statements of fact about this sort of business model.

I believe there is no contract with the landowner/occupier that entitles VCS to levy these charges and therefore it has no authority to issue parking charge notices. This being the case, the burden of proof shifts to VCS to prove otherwise so I require that VCS produce a copy of their contract with the owner/occupier for the judge to scrutinise.

6.3 The Claimant states that the vehicle was stopped on the "access road" to the airport. Given that there are four access roads into the airport, depending on where a motorist is arriving from, ‘access road’ is extremely vague. So vague as to be without merit and the case be thrown out. You would have thought the Claimant would know, and therefore specify, the name of said access road.

 

6.4 In any event, an access road would surely be of such significance that it would be under statutory control and subject to Road Traffic Act 1988 and/or airport byelaws rather than a private parking company.

 

6.5 The Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof that the road in question is not under statutory control.

 

Doddle1

7. There is no contract between Liverpool John Lennon Airport and VCS

 7.1 The Service Agreement between Vehicle Control Services and Liverpool Airport dated 08/07/2013 clearly states for a fixed period of 24 months meaning the contract expired almost 9 years ago. Therefore, there can be no contract established between the Claimant and the Defendant as there was no valid contract between the Claimant and the Airport owner at the time of the alleged contravention.

 7.2 There is no mention in the contract of ‘No Stopping’ being a contravention that a PCN can be issued for. Therefore, even if the court accepts that there was a valid contract in existence, the Claimant was not granted power by the landowner to issue a PCN for this contravention. Furthermore, ‘No Stopping’ is prohibitive and therefore cannot form the basis of a contract.

 7.3 Planning application for the relevant signage was made on 11/03/2015 which expired on 24/08/2015, however without permission being granted this application was later withdrawn by the applicant on 16/06/2021

7.4 Definition of "Relevant contract” from POFA 2 [1] means a contract (including a contract arising only when the vehicle was parked on the relevant land) between the driver and a person who is— (a)the owner or occupier of the land; or (b) authorised, under or by virtue of arrangements made by the owner or occupier of the land, to enter into a contract with the driver requiring the payment of parking charges in respect of the parking of the vehicle on the land. According to https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/44 a contract to be valid requires a director from each company to sign and then two independent witnesses must confirm those signatures. The fact that no witness signatures are present means the deed has not been validly executed. Therefore, there can be no contract established between VCS and the motorist. And even if "no stopping" could form a contract [which it cannot], it is immaterial. There is no valid contract. Peel Group/Ancala are the land owners NOT Liverpool Airport. More recently, Ancala Partners LLP, the independent infrastructure Investment Manager completed the acquisition of a 45% interest in the Airport in September 2019, with Peel and Liverpool City Council retaining 45% and 10% interests respectively.

7.5 VCS, a company that signs innumerable contracts must be aware that no valid contract exists at Liverpool Airport. Two points arise from that.

7.5.1 The first is that by issuing many PCNs at Liverpool Airport with knowingly not having a valid contract is bordering on fraudulent.

7.5.2 Second, in order to gain access to DVLA data VCS have averred  that they have complied in their Code of Practice with all the legal necessities, which appears patently untrue.

7.5.3 As Lord Neuberger said in the famous Parking Eye v Beavis at the Supreme Court [2015] UKSC 67- "And, while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA.

7.5.4 In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced". The Noble Lord is correct and should call into question the right of VCS to obtain information from the DVLA.

7.6 VCS lost a case in court on 10 March 2022 over a No Stopping issue at LJLA as the were unable to provide proof of authority to act on land there as they have no contract with LJLA.

8 Signeage 

8.1 Permission to enter Airport land is implicit in the operation of an airport to allow airline passengers access to the airport to take flights. I believe that misleading sineage which fails to direct drivers to the free drop off point and instead leads them to a dead end with poorly painted double red lines is entrapment.

8.2 Red Route Signage on land at Liverpool Airport

8.2.1 Signage asserts that the airport roads are “Red Routes”. First introduced in London in 1991, Red Routes are urban clearways that form a network of major roads which carry a significant amount of traffic, especially during rush hours. Red routes are commonly roads with heavy traffic and often incorporate public transport routes. More recently Red Routes are being used with the aim of reducing accident rates. The red routes within the airport private land are not official Red Routes nor do the forbidding signs adhere to the specified format for Red Routes. The landowner has, instead, mimicked red routes for their own purpose. The road in question is separate from the main roads within the airport and no other vehicles used the road at the time of the alleged incident.

8.3 The Claimant has failed to provide the contract between the Claimant and the landowner to provide evidence that the landowner has given them the necessary authority to issue parking charge notices and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

8.4 The Claimant has failed to provide the proof of planning permission granted for alleged signage etc under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990  

 9 Claimant Levy of Additional Costs  

 9.1 The Claimant seeks recovery of the original £100 parking charge plus an additional £60 described as “contractual costs and interest (at 8%)”. No further justification or breakdown has been provided as required under Civil Procedure Rule 16.4.  

9.2 The Claimant's Particulars of Claim also includes £50 legal costs, yet in a letter I received on 21/12/2021 The Claimant states that they are not represented by ELMS solicitors but are representing themselves"

 9.3 In a letter received on 10/4/22 VCS offered a settlement of £192.50. Failure to accept this offer would allow The Claiment to ….. “seek futher costs of £220 incurred in having to instruct a local Solicitor to attend the hearing”.

 9.4 The quantum and interest has been enhanced beyond the parking charge sum.  It is denied that the sum sought is recoverable and this claim seems to represent (in whole or in part) a penalty, applying the authority from two well-known ParkingEye cases.  The court's attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the same modern penalty law rationale was applied, yet this was a case where the learned Judge also considered added 'costs'.  The parking charge was set at £75 (discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment) then increased ultimately to £135.  At paras 419-428, HHJ Hegarty sitting at the High Court (decision later ratified by the Court of Appeal) found that adding £60 on top and taking the sum sought to £135 'would appear to be penal' and was unrecoverable.  

9.5 The Defendant's stance regarding the pseudo 'debt recovery/admin fees' enhancement is supported by the Government. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published on 7 February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice which all private parking operators are required to comply with, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice/private-parking-code-of-practice

9.6 The Government has clarified that adding 'debt recovery' fees on top of a parking charge is unjustified and is banned. In a very short section called 'Escalation of costs' the new statutory Code of Practice now being implemented says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued."  

9.7 This particular Claimant continues to add a sum on top of each PCN, despite indisputably knowing that these are banned costs which they have neither paid nor incurred.  The DLUHC considered evidence and took over two years to consult a wide mix of stakeholders before deciding this contentious issue. According to the DLUHC, almost a fifth of all respondents in 2021 'called for the proposal to be scrapped and debt collection to be banned altogether'. Although the parking industry flooded both public consultations, some even resorting to masquerading as consumers, the DLUHC saw through this and identified in its published Response to the Technical Consultation (also on 7/2/22) that some respondents were clearly 'parking firms posing as motorists'. Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt recovery/robo-claim law firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis and are effectively Trade Body Board/member colleagues, passing data around electronically.  Parking firms such as the Claimant have not incurred any additional costs (not even for their own letters) because the full parking charge itself more than covers what is merely a 'letter chain' business model that generates a healthy profit.

9.8 The Ministerial Foreword to the new Code is unequivocal, saying this about existing cases such as the present claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

9.9 The Government banning such add-ons altogether must be viewed as a clear steer for the Courts in existing cases and overrides the mistakes and/or presumptions in the appeal cases the parking industry used to rely upon (Semark-Jullien, Wilshaw or Percy) where Circuit Judges who appeared to be somewhat inexperienced in niche private parking law, DVLA rules about landowner authority and the proper application of the CRA 2015, were led in one direction by legally trained counsel for the parking firms, and were not in possession of the same level of facts and evidence as the DLUHC considered.

 10.The Defendant’s costs

I invite the Court to dismiss this claim in its entirety and to award the Defendants costs of preparation for this hearing, such as are allowable pursuant to CPR 27.14 (see Section 05 – Schedule of Costs)

Fixed witness costs – ref PD 27, 7.3(1) and CPR 27.14 

Upon confirmation of attendance at a hearing I will ask for my fixed witness costs of £95 as specified by CPR Practice Direction 27, 7.3(1), and due under CPR 27.14(2)(e).

Further costs - CPR 44.11 

As a litigant-in-person I have had to spend considerable time researching the law online, attempting to correctly interpret the legal terminology, preparing my defence and preparing my witness statement. On top of this, due to the threatening and harassing language of the Claimant’s letter chain (behaviour akin to that acknowledged by Lord Hunt of Wirral – “Highly undesirable practices in the private parking industry range from threatening letters sent to motorists, poor signage in car parks and aggressive debt collection practices”.) I have had to endure the emotional strain of the threat of Court action and worry about the integrity of my future credit records.

Therefore, I am appending with this bundle a fully detailed schedule of costs assessment (Exhibit ?) which covers my proportionate but unavoidable costs and I invite the court to consider making an award to include these, pursuant to the court's powers in relation to misconduct (CPR 44.11).

11.Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

  

KeithP

In para 2.3 you claim that the parking company acted illegally in obtaining the keeper's data from the DVLA.

It is quite legal for anyone to ask for keeper's details from the DVLA if they have reasonable cause.
In this situation the reason for asking the DVLA for keeper's details is simply to ask the keeper for the driver's details.
Perfectly legal.

Paras 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 (why aren't you using simple numbering?) have obviously been extracted from a PoPLA appeal. Further work is needed to adjust them for a court Defence.
E.g. "I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be)," is clearly lifted from a PoPLA appeal and is inappropriate. At this time you are not the Appellant, you are the Defendant.

Para 2.12 mentions para 20.14 of the BPA's Code of Practice - there isn't a para 20.14 in the version of the BPA's CoP covering the date of this alleged parking event.
Anyway, the Claimant is not a member of the BPA's Approved Operator Scheme.
Which again means all that PoPLA stuff is irrelevant.

I'll stop there.

Doddle1

Thanks KeithP - I'll do a bit more work on it. 

Coupon-mad

However POFA Schedule 4 sub-section ‘keeper liability’ states that...

Which sub-section?  I usually append as well, the official 2012 Guidance on section 56 of POFA:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9155/guidance-unpaid-parking-charges.pdf

It has a page explaining relevant land, and where keeper liability does (and does not) apply.

Doddle1

My court date is 14th June but I haven't received any papers from VCS - in the Directions paragraph of the letter from the court on 4 April it stated that “Each party must deliver to the other party and to the court office copies of all documents on which that party intends to rely at the hearing no later than fourteen days before the hearing” ie 1 June (not a bank holiday). Is this worth pointing out at the hearing?  

Thanks to mcan541908 for the summary of your win - my case is almost identical so I'll use your experience as preparation. 

When I receive the documents from VCS should I prepare and send the court and VCS a suplimentary WS responding to their points/highlighting any errors? 

Many thanks for your help

Le_Kirk

Doddle1 said:

My court date is 14th June but I haven't received any papers from VCS - in the Directions paragraph of the letter from the court on 4 April it stated that “Each party must deliver to the other party and to the court office copies of all documents on which that party intends to rely at the hearing no later than fourteen days before the hearing” ie 1 June (not a bank holiday). Is this worth pointing out at the hearing?  

When I receive the documents from VCS should I prepare and send the court and VCS a suplimentary supplementary WS responding to their points/highlighting any errors? 

It is normal to point out to the judge as a preliminary matter that the claimant has failed to adhere to the court order and you feel prejudiced and request that the claimant's witness statement (should it arrive at all) be struck out.  It quite often happens (as reported on the forum) that judges do not bother too much if claimants are late - despite them supposedly being professional - but take it out on defendants if they are so much as one minute late submitting paperwork

Umkomaas

Each party must deliver to the other party and to the court office copies of all documents on which that party intends to rely at the hearing no later than fourteen days before the hearing” ie 1 June (not a bank holiday).

Can I assume you have submitted your WS and evidence by the due date?

Doddle1

Umkomaas said:

Each party must deliver to the other party and to the court office copies of all documents on which that party intends to rely at the hearing no later than fourteen days before the hearing” ie 1 June (not a bank holiday).

Can I assume you have submitted your WS and evidence by the due date?

I did - I sent it on the 27th May