County court business centre claim form from Uk parking control limited

ox141jf

ok this is where it stands so far:
I need to send it tomorrow i think?

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.: XXXXXXXX

Between

UK Parking Control Limited

(Claimant) 

- and -  

***********************

 (Defendant)

____________________

DEFENCE

____________________

1.       The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that a contract was entered into - by conduct or otherwise - whereby it was ‘agreed’ to pay a ‘parking charge’ and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue, nor to form contracts in their own name at the location.

 

The facts as known to the Defendant:

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver of the vehicle in question, but liability is denied.

3. On the 23/01/2017 when the defendant utilised the abandoned property on Paradise street in order to collect items from a nearby business, the building had no obvious stopping restrictions in place such as painted lines and no obvious signage indicating the defendant could not stop or load/unload. Instead, there were only remnants from posters and graffiti as posters and signs were regularly put up and removed in that area. Had the defendant seen clear signage stating loading/unloading was not allowed, they would have used an alternative location. In addition, the signage that was in place was sparse and poorly located meaning the defendant would not have noticed the signage when coming into the area as it was facing their back and located above eye level.

4. In Laura Jopson vs Homeguard Securities case number B9GF0A9E, His Honour Judge J Harris QC determined that loading and unloading is not parking. This was an appeal court case and thus persuasive on the lower courts. The court transcript of that hearing and judgment, heard on appeal by HHJ Harris sitting at Oxford Court, will be provided at witness statement stage in support of this defence.

5.  The sign provided by UKPC, photographed on the day the fine was issued is forbidding in nature and therefore, had the sign been clearly visible, there could have been no offer to a motorist who does not have a permit, therefore there could have been no acceptance, and therefore there could have been be no contract formed. The Defendant avers that the parking signage in this matter was inadequate. At the time of the material events the signage was deficient in number, distribution, wording and lighting to reasonably convey a contractual obligation. The signage did not comply with the requirements of the Code of Practice of the British Parking Association Accredited Operators Scheme, an organisation to which the Claimant was a signatory. The signage contained particularly onerous terms not sufficiently drawn to the attention of the visitor as set out in the leading judgment of Denning MR in J Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] EWCA Civ 3

 

6. The property has been boarded up, closed and derelict since prior to 2012, UKPC has declined to provide proof that they had authority or charge to manage the parking area outside the abandoned property.

7.   The Defendant denies accepting any contract with the Claimant. The Claimant has no right to harass the Defendant with demands for payment and threats of legal action.

8. The Defendant avers that the abandoned site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The Claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context.

9. Only the landowner can pursue a case under the tort of trespass not this Claimant. The Supreme Court in the Beavis vs ParkingEye (2015) [2015] UKSC 67 case confirmed, such a matter would be limited to the Landowner themselves.  Meaning at most, the driver is guilty of trespass which is strictly only actionable only by the Landowner, not this Claimant.

10. This claim inflates the total charges in a clear attempt at double recovery. The Defendant trusts that the presiding Judge will recognise this wholly unreasonable conduct as a gross abuse of process. It was held in the Supreme Court in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67  (where £85 was claimed, and no more) that a private parking charge already includes a very significant and high percentage in profit and more than covers the costs of running an automated regime of template letters. Thus, there can be no 'costs' to pile on top of any parking charge claim.

11. In addition to the original penalty, the Claimants have artificially inflated the value of the Claim by adding purported legal costs of £50, which have not actually been incurred by the Claimant. UKPC Ltd have not expended any such sum in this case, given that they have a Legal Team with salaried in-house Solicitors and (shamefully) this firm whose main business is supposed to be parking 'management' as a service provision, files tens of thousands of similar 'cut & paste' robo-claims per annum. No genuine legal costs arise, per case, and their in-house Solicitors cannot possibly be believed to be paid in the millions per annum for their services.

12. The added 'legal' cost is in fact an artificially invented figure, which represents a cynical attempt to circumvent the Small Claims costs rules and achieve double recovery. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA, a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent by legally qualified staff on actually preparing the claim and/or the cost of obtaining advice for that specific claim, in a legal capacity.

13. The defendant denies the claim in its entirety voiding any liability to the claimant for all amounts claimed due to the aforementioned reasons. The Court is invited to dismiss the Claim, and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14.

14. The Particulars of Claim set out an incoherent statement of case and the quantum has been enhanced in excess of any sum hidden in small print on the signage that the Claimant may be relying upon.  Claiming ‘costs/damages’ on an indemnity basis is stated to be unfair in the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, CMA37, para 5.14.3.  That is the official Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA 2015') legislation which must be considered, given the duty in s71.  The Defendant avers that the CRA 2015 has been breached due to unfair terms and/or unclear notices (signs), pursuant to s62 and with regard to the requirements for transparency and good faith, and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 and 18 in Sch2.  NB: this is different from the UTCCRs considered by the Supreme Court, in that there is now a requirement for contract terms and notices to be fair.

15.       It is denied that the exaggerated sum sought is recoverable.  The Defendant's position is that this moneyclaim is in part/wholly a penalty, applying the authority in ParkingEye cases (ref: paras 98, 100, 193, 198) ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 and para 419 of HHJ Hegarty’s High Court decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was set at £75 (discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment) then increasing ultimately to £135.  Much like the situation in this claim, the business model involved sending a series of automated demands to the keeper.  At para 419, HHJ Hegarty found that adding £60 to an already increased parking charge 'would appear to be penal' and unrecoverable.  ParkingEye had dropped this punitive enhancement by the time of Mr Beavis' famous parking event.

16.       Even if the Claimant had shown the global sum claimed in the largest font on clear and prominent signs - which is denied - they are attempting double recovery of the cost of their standard automated letter-chain.  It is denied that the Claimants have expended additional costs for the same letters that the Beavis case decision held were a justification for the (already increased from the discount) parking charge sum of £85.  

17.  The Claimant cannot be heard to base its charge on the Beavis case, then add damages for automated letter costs; not even if letters were issued by unregulated 'debt recovery' third parties.  It is known that parking firms have been misleading the courts with an appeal at Salisbury Court (the Semark-Jullien case) where the Judge merely reset an almost undefended case back for a hearing.  He indicated to Judges for future cases, how to consider the CRA 2015 properly and he rightly remarked that the Beavis case was not one that included additional 'costs' per se, but he made no finding of fact about the illegality of adding the same 'automated letter costs' twice.  He was not taken by either party to Somerfield in point #15 above and in any event it is worth noting that the lead Southampton case of Britannia v Crosby was not appealed.  It is averred that District Judge Grand's rationale remains sound, as long as a court has sufficient facts to properly consider the CRA 2015 s62, 63 and 67 before turning to consider the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Sch4 ('the POFA').

18.  Pursuant to Sch4 of the POFA at 4(5), the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a parking firm has complied with its other requirements (denied in this case).  It is worth noting that even though the driver was known in Beavis, the Supreme Court considered the POFA, given that it was the only legislation specifically dealing with parking on private land.  There is now also the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 with a new, more robust and statutory Code of Practice being introduced shortly, which evolved because the two Trade Bodies have failed to properly govern this industry.

The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case is distinguished

19.       Unlike in this case, ParkingEye demonstrated a commercial justification for their £85 private PCN, which included all operational costs, and they were able to overcome the real possibility of the charge being dismissed as punitive and unrecoverable.  However, their Lordships were very clear that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in such cases.  

20.       Their decision was specific to what was stated to be a unique set of facts: the legitimate interest/commercial justification, the car park location and prominent and clear signs with the parking charge itself in the largest/boldest text.  The unintended consequence is that, rather than persuade courts considering other cases that all parking charges are automatically justified, the Beavis case facts and pleadings (and in particular, the brief and very conspicuous yellow/black signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

21.   Without the Beavis case to support the claim and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of an overriding legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  

22.   The Supreme Court held that the intention cannot be to punish a motorist - nor to present them with concealed pitfalls, traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations - and nor can the operator claim an unconscionable sum. In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of the tests in Beavis.

23.       The Claimant’s signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, such that they would be considered incapable of binding any person reading them under common contract law, and would also be considered void pursuant to Sch2 of the CRA.  Consequently, it is the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was seen, known or agreed.

24.   Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of an onerous parking charge, would include:

(i)                 Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (the ‘red hand rule’ case) and

(ii)                Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd  [1970] EWCA Civ 2,

both leading authorities confirming that an unseen/hidden clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(ii)                 Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000,

where the Court of Appeal held that it was unsurprising that the appellant did not see the sign ''in view of the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the southern parking space''.  In many cases where parking firm Claimants have cited Vine in their template witness statements, they have misled courts by quoting out of context from Roch LJ, whose words related to the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio.  To pre-empt that, in fact Miss Vine won because it was held as a fact that she was not afforded a fair opportunity to learn of the terms by which she would be bound.

25.   Fairness and clarity are paramount in the new statutory CoP being finalised by the MHCLG and this stance is supported by the BPA and IPC alike. In the November 2020 issue of Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, the Chief Executive of the IPC Trade Body, observed:  'Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike."   The Defendant's position is that the signs and terms the Claimant is relying upon were not clear, and were in fact, unfair and the Beavis case is fully distinguished.

26.  In the alternative, the Claimant is also put to strict proof, by means of contemporaneous and unredacted evidence, of a chain of authority flowing from the landholder of the relevant land to the Claimant.  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to the landholder's definitions, exemptions, grace period, hours of operation, etc. and any instructions to cancel charges due to complaints.  There is no evidence that the freeholder authorises this Claimant to issue parking charges or what the land enforcement boundary and start/expiry dates are, nor whether this Claimant has standing to enforce such charges by means of civil litigation in their own name rather than a bare licence to act as an agent ‘on behalf of’ the landowner.

 

In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

Le_Kirk

I wouldn't send it on a Saturday as it has been known for the CCBC servers not to accept/acknowledge receipt of e-mail outside of working hours.  Either today before 16.00 or Monday after 09.00.

1505grandad

Is para 12 in the D template?

ox141jf

sorry huh?

1505grandad

"According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA,....."

Just wondering why you have included para 12 as that case used to be in a previous defence template but is no longer used.

Coupon-mad

Good spot, get rid!

ox141jf

I am unsure when is the latest i can submit?

Le_Kirk

ox141jf said:

I am unsure when is the latest i can submit?

This advice 16 December 2021 at 1:55PM was given to you by @KeithP

ox141jf

yes thanks, I went back and spotted it:)

ox141jf

ok so I have my form saved in PDF format signed and dated.
I just want to clarify for monday I am to do the below for county court business center
The email in question is correct and there is not region specific email i should use?

1. Send that pdf as an email attachment to CCBCAQ@Justice.gov.uk 
2. Just put the claim number (check it very carefully) and the word Defence in the email title, and in the body of the email something like 'URGENT RE CLAIM XXXXXXXX - Please find my Defence attached.