DCBL - Letter of Claim - Defence to be filed

Maybelle

Thanks @Le_Kirk I did refer back to Keith's post but as I mentioned the newbie thread 2nd post doesn't outline how to send it via email. I am using a mobile however so it may be I am just missing it so will switch to a laptop and see if I can find anything

Maybelle

Here is what I plan to send off before 24th May. Please let me know if there is anything to amend. Once I've got the all clear I'm going to do a digital signature (prob will use something like paint or one of my sister's fancy macbook tools) and then save as PDF and send to mcol(at)hmcts.gsi.gov.uk. I imagine I would have to put the reference number in the subject title? Is there anything I should include in the body of the email?

@Coupon-mad I've decided to leave in the part about the additional things you said to remove. I figured there's no harm leaving them in in case the judge decides to side with First Parking and ignores the fact they've got the wrong driver! Do let me know if you think this will potentially hinder my case

  (First Parking LLP) 

- and -  

(xxx)

____________________

DEFENCE

____________________

1.       The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that a contract was entered into - by conduct or otherwise - whereby it was ‘agreed’ to pay a ‘parking charge’ and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue, nor to form contracts in their own name at the location.

 

The facts as known to the Defendant:

2.       It is denied that the Defendant was either the registered keeper or the driver of the vehicle in question and liability is denied.  

3.  The Defendant was not the driver at the time of incident, nor have they ever been the registered keeper. Despite highlighting this to the Claimant they have continuously bombarded the Defendant with ‘debt recovery’ letters.  The Defendant cannot be held liable due to the Claimant not complying with the ‘keeper liability’ requirements set out in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4. In addition to this the Defendant is not the right individual they should be pursuing for this PCN. The Claimant’s have misused the Defendant’s data and presumed that the Defendant was the keeper or driver simply because the Defendant sent communications on behalf of the Keeper using the Defendant’s email address. The Claimant and DCB Legal are aware of this but have used the Defendant’s data to constantly hound the Defendant with debt demands and now a court claim. The Defendant has made repeated attempts to advise them that they are pursuing the wrong individual. The Defendant also has an email from their HR/Recruitment rep that confirms they were working in a different location on this day and therefore could not possibly be the driver. This is not news to the Claimant and the claim is a clear abuse of process, using the courts as a cheap form of intimidation.

4.  The Particulars of Claim set out an incoherent statement of case and the quantum has been enhanced in excess of any sum hidden in small print on the signage that the Claimant may be relying upon.  Claiming ‘costs/damages’ on an indemnity basis is stated to be unfair in the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, CMA37, para 5.14.3.  That is the official Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA 2015') legislation which must be considered, given the duty in s71.  The Defendant avers that the CRA 2015 has been breached due to unfair terms and/or unclear notices (signs), pursuant to s62 and with regard to the requirements for transparency and good faith, and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 and 18 in Sch2.  NB: this is different from the UTCCRs considered by the Supreme Court, in that there is now a requirement for contract terms and notices to be fair.

5.       It is denied that the exaggerated sum sought is recoverable.  The Defendant's position is that this moneyclaim is in part/wholly a penalty, applying the authority in ParkingEye cases (ref: paras 98, 100, 193, 198) ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 and para 419 of HHJ Hegarty’s High Court decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was set at £75 (discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment) then increasing ultimately to £135.  Much like the situation in this claim, the business model involved sending a series of automated demands to the keeper.  At para 419, HHJ Hegarty found that adding £60 to an already increased parking charge 'would appear to be penal' and unrecoverable.  ParkingEye had dropped this punitive enhancement by the time of Mr Beavis' famous parking event.

6.       Even if the Claimant had shown the global sum claimed in the largest font on clear and prominent signs - which is denied - they are attempting double recovery of the cost of their standard automated letter-chain.  It is denied that the Claimants have expended additional costs for the same letters that the Beavis case decision held were a justification for the (already increased from the discount) parking charge sum of £85.  

7.  The Claimant cannot be heard to base its charge on the Beavis case, then add damages for automated letter costs; not even if letters were issued by unregulated 'debt recovery' third parties.  It is known that parking firms have been misleading the courts with an appeal at Salisbury Court (the Semark-Jullien case) where the Judge merely reset an almost undefended case back for a hearing.  He indicated to Judges for future cases, how to consider the CRA 2015 properly and he rightly remarked that the Beavis case was not one that included additional 'costs' per se, but he made no finding of fact about the illegality of adding the same 'automated letter costs' twice.  He was not taken by either party to Somerfield in point #5 above and in any event it is worth noting that the lead Southampton case of Britannia v Crosby was not appealed.  It is averred that District Judge Grand's rationale remains sound, as long as a court has sufficient facts to properly consider the CRA 2015 s62, 63 and 67 before turning to consider the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Sch4 ('the POFA').

8.  Pursuant to Sch4 of the POFA at 4(5), the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a parking firm has complied with its other requirements (denied in this case).  It is worth noting that even though the driver was known in Beavis, the Supreme Court considered the POFA, given that it was the only legislation specifically dealing with parking on private land.  There is now also the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 with a new, more robust and statutory Code of Practice being introduced shortly, which evolved because the two Trade Bodies have failed to properly govern this industry.

 

The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case is distinguished

9.       Unlike in this case, ParkingEye demonstrated a commercial justification for their £85 private PCN, which included all operational costs, and they were able to overcome the real possibility of the charge being dismissed as punitive and unrecoverable.  However, their Lordships were very clear that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in such cases.  

10.       Their decision was specific to what was stated to be a unique set of facts: the legitimate interest/commercial justification, the car park location and prominent and clear signs with the parking charge itself in the largest/boldest text.  The unintended consequence is that, rather than persuade courts considering other cases that all parking charges are automatically justified, the Beavis case facts and pleadings (and in particular, the brief and very conspicuous yellow/black signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

11.   Without the Beavis case to support the claim and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of an overriding legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  

12.   The Supreme Court held that the intention cannot be to punish a motorist - nor to present them with concealed pitfalls, traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations - and nor can the operator claim an unconscionable sum. In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of the tests in Beavis.

13.       The Claimant’s signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, such that they would be considered incapable of binding any person reading them under common contract law, and would also be considered void pursuant to Sch2 of the CRA.  Consequently, it is the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was seen, known or agreed.

14.   Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of an onerous parking charge, would include:

(i)                 Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (the ‘red hand rule’ case) and

(ii)                Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd  [1970] EWCA Civ 2,

both leading authorities confirming that an unseen/hidden clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(ii)                 Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000,

where the Court of Appeal held that it was unsurprising that the appellant did not see the sign ''in view of the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the southern parking space''.  In many cases where parking firm Claimants have cited Vine in their template witness statements, they have misled courts by quoting out of context from Roch LJ, whose words related to the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio.  To pre-empt that, in fact Miss Vine won because it was held as a fact that she was not afforded a fair opportunity to learn of the terms by which she would be bound.

15.   Fairness and clarity are paramount in the new statutory CoP being finalised by the MHCLG and this stance is supported by the BPA and IPC alike. In the November 2020 issue of Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, the Chief Executive of the IPC Trade Body, observed:  'Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike."   The Defendant's position is that the signs and terms the Claimant is relying upon were not clear, and were in fact, unfair and the Beavis case is fully distinguished.

 

16.  In the alternative, the Claimant is also put to strict proof, by means of contemporaneous and unredacted evidence, of a chain of authority flowing from the landholder of the relevant land to the Claimant.  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to the landholder's definitions, exemptions, grace period, hours of operation, etc. and any instructions to cancel charges due to complaints.  There is no evidence that the freeholder authorises this Claimant to issue parking charges or what the land enforcement boundary and start/expiry dates are, nor whether this Claimant has standing to enforce such charges by means of civil litigation in their own name rather than a bare licence to act as an agent ‘on behalf of’ the landowner.

 

Maybelle

In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

17.   (a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) that any hearing is not vacated but continues as a costs hearing, in the event of a late Notice of Discontinuance.  The Defendant seeks a finding of unreasonable behaviour in the pre-and post-action phases by this Claimant, and will seek further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

18.   The Defendant invites the court to find that this exaggerated claim is entirely without merit and to dismiss the claim. 

Counterclaim

19. This counterclaim is for damages for distress caused by the Claimant's multiple breaches of statutory duty.  The Defendant will rely upon the authorities of (i) Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46 and (ii) Harrison v Link Financial Ltd [2011] EWHC B3 (Mercantile) and other similar authorities as well as primary statute law.  Further, the authority in Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA 311 confirms that pecuniary loss is not necessary for compensation to be payable and that pure distress is enough. 

20.  The bands of awards for injury to feelings, known as the Vento bands, have been updated from April 2020.  This stems from a landmark case from 2003 (Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police) where the Court of Appeal set out clear guidelines for Courts and Tribunals to apply when they are assessing injury to feelings awards for pure distress, as opposed to financial loss.  The Vento case decided that there is now an accepted quantum for compensation and courts have followed this guidance. In a judgment at the Leeds County Court, 3SP00071 - Blamires v LGO - which was a claim for damages including a breach of the DPA, an award of £2,500 was granted as compensation for distress, so the Defendant believes this counterclaim is extremely reasonable, given the circumstances.  Current applicable Vento bands are as follows: 

• a lower band of £900 to £9,000 (less serious cases) 

• a middle band of £9,000 to £27,000 (cases that do not merit an award in the upper band), and 

• an upper band of £27,000 to £45,000 (the most serious cases), with the most exceptional cases capable of exceeding £45,000 

21.  To simplify the counterclaim and to assist the court in determining the issue without complicated calculations, it is set - notwithstanding which allegation(s) succeed - at a single sum in compensation at the lowest end of established guidance in the Vento bands, pursuant to the following:  

a) damages for distress caused by the Claimants’ breach of statutory duties under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and misleading actions within the meaning of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, as amended by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (“the Regulations”);   

b) damages for distress caused by breach of statutory duty under the Data Protection Act 2018 and General Data Protection Regulation ('the GDPR'); 

c) damages for distress caused by harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ('the PFHA') ref section 3;

 

Damages for distress caused by the Claimants’ breach of statutory duties under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and misleading actions within the meaning of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, as amended by the Consumer Protection Regulations (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (“the Regulations”): 

 

22.  The Claimant alleges that the Defendant was the driver or Registered keeper which the Defendant denies. The Claimant alleges that as a result of the previous point there was a contract formed at the moment of parking the car by which the Driver is bound.  However, as the Defendant denies this claim, it is clear that no contract was formed and therefore they are not bound by any terms and conditions.

23.  The Claimants behaviour represents a clear attempt to mislead the Defendant into thinking that their details were recovered from the DVLA and that they had been identified as both the registered keeper and driver. In reality the Defendant has confirmed through the Freedom of Information records provided by the Claimant that the DVLA had not supplied their details nor had they identified themselves as the driver at any point in any of the correspondences. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Schedule 4 states: 

4(1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

(2) The right under this paragraph applies only if—

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met; 

Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4.

5(1) The first condition is that the creditor— (a) has the right to enforce against the driver of the vehicle the requirement to pay the unpaid parking charges; but (b) is unable to take steps to enforce that requirement against the driver because the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver.

(2) Sub-paragraph (1)(b) ceases to apply if (at any time after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the notice to keeper is given) the creditor begins proceedings to recover the unpaid parking charges from the keeper.''

 

24. In addition to this, before this claim was filed and, in an attempt, to narrow the issues and prevent this unjustified litigation against the wrong party, the Defendant drew the Claimant's and their legal representatives' attention to this information in two separate letters which they disregarded.

25. Thus, the Claimant was fully aware that the Defendant was not the driver nor the registered keeper before commencing court proceedings and the proper course of action for them was to pursue that registered keeper (or decide to cancel the parking charge). There was no longer any reasonable cause to continue to use and process the data of the registered keeper that the Claimants had originally harvested from an email appeal sent on behalf of the registered keeper. Yet both the Claimant and their legal representatives continued to tell the Defendant that they were liable and used their data incorrectly.

26. This misleading action questions the real intentions of the Claimant as they are legally represented and fully aware of the liable party. The Defendant made it clear that if a claim were to be filed against the Defendant (the wrong party) despite knowing the above, they would seek to defend the claim in full as their conduct was wholly unreasonable and unlawful. Despite knowing this they continued to file a claim against the wrong party (Defendant) and ignorance of the law is no defence and under the Regs (above) a misleading action is in fact illegal (and actionable under civil law too).   

27.  Accordingly the Claimants’ conduct amounted to: 

(i) an unfair commercial practice which is prohibited under regulation 3 and  

(ii) a misleading action within the meaning of regulations 5 and 6, for which redress is available under regulation 27(J)(b) of the Regulations. 

Damages for distress caused by breach of statutory duty under the Data Protection Act 2018 and General Data Protection Regulation ('the GDPR'):

 

28.  Personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully.  The Claimants stand in breach of Article 5 (1) of the GDPR (the requirement for lawfulness, fairness and transparency).  Predatory pursuing of the wrong person is entirely at odds with those doctrines and despite the wishes of their principal to cancel this unfair charge, the Claimant's aggressive pursuit and abuse of the Defendant's data has continued.  Accordingly, the processing of the Defendant’s data was not “necessary for the performance of, or commencing, a contract” and nor was it necessary or justified under any other data processing excuse.  Distress is now included under Article 82 of the GDPR and the 2018 DPA. The Claimants had, and still have, no prospect of furthering their purpose and no legitimate cause to store and/or then to continue processing the Defendant's data. In accordance with Principles 1,2 and 5 of the Data Protection Principles they were not permitted to process or keep it.  

 

29.  The Claimants noted, photographed and stored the Vehicle Registration Mark then requested and received the Defendant’s personal data due to the Defendant filing an appeal on the behalf of the registered keeper whom is disabled. The purpose was to seek payment of the parking charge which is the subject of the Claimants’ claim. The VRM itself and the Defendant’s details are 'personal data' within the meaning of the DPA 2018 and the associated General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).  

 

30.  Accordingly, at all material times the Claimants were data controllers, and the Defendant a data subject, within the meaning of the Acts. The Claimants were thereby under a statutory duty to process the Defendant’s data only in strict accordance with the DPA 2018 and the GDPR Articles 5 (1)(a) and (b) and 6 (1)(f)).  

 

31.  Article 5 of the GDPR sets out seven key principles which lie at the heart of the general data protection regime. These are broadly the same as the DPA Principles. Article 5(1) requires that personal data shall be: 

(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to individuals (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’);  

(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; (‘purpose limitation’); (c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’);  

(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’);  

(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed (‘storage limitation’);  

(f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’). 

 

32.  Article 5(2) adds that: “The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability').   Article 6(1)f of the GDPR states an exemption if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data

Maybelle

33.  The processing of the Defendant’s data should have ceased once the Claimant was made aware of the fact they were neither the driver nor the registered keeper. The Claimants had no legitimate cause to continue processing the Defendant’s data for the purposes of pursuing a parking charge. 

34.  In summary for this allegation, the Claimants as data controllers were and continue to be in breach of their statutory duty under the Acts as follows :- 

 i) by obtaining the Defendant’s personal data from an appeal without a lawful basis, contrary to the DPA Principles and GDPR article 5(1)(a) and (b) 

 ii) after being made aware that the Defendant was neither the driver not the registered keeper the Claimant continued to process the Defendant’s personal data unlawfully and unfairly and for a purpose other than pursuing the Claimants’ legitimate interests, contrary to the DPA 2018 and GDPR article 5 (1) (a) and (b) and article 6 (1)(f); 

 iii) by retaining the Defendants’ data after the purpose for obtaining it (if any) had ended

 

Damages for distress caused by harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ('the PFHA') ref section 3:

 

35.  It is alleged that the Claimant's conduct has crossed the line into harassment and that it has breached the PFHA, which states: 

(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct— 

(a) which amounts to harassment of another, and 

(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. 

(2) For the purposes of this section [or section 2A(2)(c)], the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to [or involves] harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other. 

(3) Subsection (1) [or (1A)] does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows— 

(a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, 

(b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or 

(c) that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable. 

36.  None of the justifications in (3) above can possibly apply.   Despite the Defendant’s appeal, information of registered keeper at the time and continuing reasonable responses, the Claimants persisted in aggressively and unjustifiably pursuing their unreasonable charge. The Claimant’s harassing course of conduct included sending, by themselves or through their agents and/or from First Parking LLP, multiple demands threatening legal action and misleading the Defendant.  As the Defendant explained to both the debt collection agency and Claimant that they were were not nor have they ever been the registered keeper or driver of the vehicle. The proper course of action was to continue pursuing the registered keeper or cancel the PCN but instead, the Claimant's hostile correspondence and threats of court action have been particularly intimidating over a period of time, leaving the Defendant feeling both emotionally vulnerable and anxious during a global pandemic.

37. The Claimants’ course of conduct in pursuing this spurious parking charge, including the issue of these proceedings, amounts to harassment within the meaning of section 1, Protection from Harassment Act 1997.  Instead of pursing the registered keeper, driver or cancelling the PCN, the Claimant embarked on a harassing course of conduct that has continued on several occasions and has plagued the Defendant, exacerbating anxiety, distress and symptoms of their medical conditions, causing loss of sleep and interfering with their peace of mind.  In all the premises, the conduct of the Claimant amounts to harassment under section 1 of the PFHA as well as harassment pursuant to the EA.  Accordingly, the Defendant respectfully seeks damages pursuant to s3(2) of the PFHA. 

Damages  

38.  By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Defendant suffered serious distress and anxiety as a result of the Claimant's conduct.   The 'thin skull' rules applies in that the Claimant must take its victim as they find them; the claim being served despite the Defendant's detailed response in pre-action communications.   It has taken - and continues to take - a monumental effort to deal with the aggressive conduct of this Claimant.  The Defendant has suffered substantial and exhausting distress which has impacted upon family and work life and respectfully seeks damages in the sum of £500 or such sum as the court sees fit. 

 

AND THE DEFENDANT COUNTERCLAIMS: -  

39. 

a). Compensation in the sum of: £500 or such sum as the Court sees fit including any award of aggravated damages at the court's discretion; 

b). Court fees: £60.00 filing fee (if the Defendant does not get help with fees: applied for); 

c).  Interest pursuant to s.69 of the County Courts Act 1984, at such rates / for such periods on the sums found due to the Defendant as the Court may deem fit; 

d). Costs to be assessed.  As a result of the Claimants’ unreasonable behaviour, the Court is respectfully invited to order the Claimants to pay the Defendants’ costs on an indemnity basis, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rules, rule 27.14 (2) (g).  

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Date:

 

 

Maybelle

The only question I have is the amount i should seek in the counter claim? I've put £500 is this ok or should i increase/decrease?

Redx

Maybelle said:

Thanks @Le_Kirk I did refer back to Keith's post but as I mentioned the newbie thread 2nd post doesn't outline how to send it via email. I am using a mobile however so it may be I am just missing it so will switch to a laptop and see if I can find anything

It's in the defence template thread by Coupon mad , where your template Defence originated , linked in the newbies FAQ sticky thread

Redx

Maybelle said:

The only question I have is the amount i should seek in the counter claim? I've put £500 is this ok or should i increase/decrease?

It's not about what is ok , it's what you think is right , plus the fee charge for the amount claimed by you , without milking it such that a judge believes it's unreasonable and retaliatory. Most people would not go higher than twice the claim total by the claimant , so say £600 or less , or the £300 for £25

edit , I believe the fees have changed so coupon mad said its now £50 for up to £500 , so there you go, decision made

Castle

Maybelle said:

In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

25. Thus, the Claimant was fully aware that the Defendant was not the driver nor the registered keeper before commencing court proceedings and the proper course of action for them was to pursue that registered keeper (or decide to cancel the parking charge). There was no longer any reasonable cause to continue to use and process the data of the registered keeper that the Claimants had originally harvested from an email appeal sent on behalf of the registered keeper. Yet both the Claimant and their legal representatives continued to tell the Defendant that they were liable and used their data incorrectly.

Shouldn't that read Defendant.

Le_Kirk

E-mail address for defence is: -
CCBCAQ@Justice.gov.uk
Rest of the instructions are: -

Just put the claim number (check it very carefully) and the word Defence in the email title, and in the body of the email something like 'URGENT RE CLAIM XXXXXXXX - Please find my Defence attached.

1505grandad

You have included paras contrary to C-m's post 16 May at 4:59PM under:-

"I'd remove all this because it's just not needed in your case:

5.       It is denied that the exaggerated sum sought is recoverable."

and other paras mentioned.