No stopping zone airport claim defence

DoaM

KeithP wrote: »

I am going to assume that you filed an Acknowledgment of Service after 25th January. Please confirm.

You've been asked a few times already - it is important to know the above.

Farmlady

Hi sorry for missing that part out, to confirm the AOS was filed after the 25th January.

Thanks

Coupon-mad

The PPC is VCS
Location of incident was at London Southend Airport.

As I said before then, this will be an easy defence to copy & adapt:

Search the forum for the name of the Airport and copy. We have loads.

And the SAR example is where you'd expect it to be, in the NEWBIES thread.

Farmlady

Many thanks for your help so far, I have been working on my defence for the last week and so should have it completed within the next day or so. Do you advise posting it up for you to have a quick look through before I submit it?
Thanks

Le_Kirk

Yes, that is the usual procedure.

nosferatu1001

However - anything youve just copy and pasted? Tell us that. Find a way to highlight YOUR work, not the work of others. Cite your sources as well - link to the defence you cribbed from. 

Farmlady

Hi and thanks for all your great help so far in my preparation for my claim defence which I undoubtedly could not have got this far without. Below is my defence which I have cited from another post for another claim defence in which the circumstances were very similar to my case although I have tried to remove any irrelevant pieces of information and add to areas where it was required. I have printed out for family members to proof for spelling, punctuation but your advice on the content of this draft would be greatly appreciated. I also do not know if it would help my defence or if the argument would have any legs to stand on in regards to making a counter claim for as quoted from the defence draft below 'Airport Land is not ‘relevant land’ such is the case with London Southend Airport which therefore specifically excludes anyone from ‘keeper liability’. The fact that the claimant has accessed the registered keeper’s details through the DVLA is a clear breach under schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.'

 

Defence is broken into parts due to word count allowed in post.

PART 1

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The facts are that the vehicle, registration XXXX, of which the Defendant is the registered keeper but not the driver, was using London Southend Airport access roads on the material date.

3. The Particulars of Claim state that the Defendant XXXXX; was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle XXXXX;. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5.

4. It is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

5. Further and in the alternative, it is denied that the claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner which would be capable of binding any reasonable person reading them. The following two types of signs are in use; (I) Entrance sign (ii) Repeater signs. The entrance sign is larger in size and noticeably more visible than the smaller repeater signs but this still even if it did contain the required information to create a legally binding contract, which it and the smaller repeater signs do not, is not located in a place which would comply with the Department of Transport calculations for cut-off distance, reading time and font size, yet the Claimant avers that the Defendant is in breach of the advertised terms and conditions; namely stopping in a zone where stopping is prohibited on a private land. Even if the signage did offer a contract, which is does not, the font size is too small and the words too many to be safely read while driving. They can therefore only be read while stopped and the normal time allowed in these situations is 5-10 minutes in car parks to allow for a genuine meeting of minds and for the driver to understand and comprehend any potential contract. There can therefore be no contract entered into by consideration.

 

6. Even if a contract was entered into by consideration, the signage does not contain the information required by the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation And Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, enacted 13 June 2014. As per clause 13(1), without this information any contract is not binding on the consumer.

 

7. It is, therefore, denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding contract. There has been no "grace period" applied to allow the Defendant to read the Claimant's signage. For these reasons, the case of VCS v Ward, on appeal in the County Court before His Honour Judge Saffman, should not have a bearing in this instance. This is because with respect to VCS v Ward, HHJ Saffman accepted that the signage (being the entrance and 66 repeater signs) represented an offer of a contractual licence, which was accepted when the user drove onto the private land. In this instance, the text is too small to alert the user to the fact that they are entering private land, and is therefore, not capable of creating a legally binding contract.

8. It is an ironic fact that the Claimant’s repeater signs provide helpline phone number, which cannot be used by drivers without breaking alleged contractual agreement with the Claimant or the law (using mobile phone while driving).

9. If it is the Claimant's case that the area is intended as a 'no stopping zone' then they cannot also offer parking at a price, if the landowner (Airport) in fact intends to prohibit stopping. If cars are never authorised to stop under any circumstances, then any breach would be a matter that falls firmly under the tort of trespass.

10. In the Beavis case it was reiterated that only a landowner can sue for damages/loss for alleged trespass, and ParkingEye could not have recovered monies for unauthorised parking/trespass. It was only because they were able to offer something of value (a parking space) and that the charge was part of that contractual licence, that ParkingEye could charge more than any nominal loss that a landowner could have recovered under tort.

11. If it is the Claimant's case that they were offering a parking licence or a space that had value, then they have produced no evidence to this effect and will be in difficulty if (as suspected) the signage in fact attempts to create a 'no stopping zone'. This would void any credible legal argument relying upon a 'legitimate interest' supporting the intentions of the landowner, because in a 'no-stopping zone' the landowner intends 'no stopping at all' on the one hand, and any driver conduct in breach of that rule could not on the other hand be allowed by a private company offering the prohibited behaviour under a pseudo contract.

12. It is believed that the contract this Claimant has with the Airport limits the parking firm to act as agent of the Airport who remain the (known) principal, in which case only the Airport can sue, not the agent in their own name.

13. Based on the “PCM vs Bull” case, where defendants were issued parking tickets for parking on private roads with signage stating “no parking at any time”, the claimant has no standing to litigate this matter. District Judge Glen in his final statement mentioned that “the notice was prohibitive, and didn’t communicate any offer of parking and that landowners may have claim in trespass, but that was not under consideration.

14. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

15. London Southend Airport is subject to Byelaws which by virtue of schedule 3, paragraph 6 of the Airports Act 1986 came into operation from 22nd September 1997. This is not only available information in the public domain but this information is actually placed on signs along side the access road of the Airport which read ‘At any time On access roads The London Southend Airport Byelaws 1997’. Airport Land is not ‘relevant land’ such is the case with London Southend Airport which therefore specifically excludes anyone from ‘keeper liability’. The fact that the claimant has accessed the registered keeper’s details through the DVLA is a clear breach under schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Furthermore, the registered keeper not being the driver at the time of this incident excludes them from being held in anyway liable for this claim.

16. This Claimant may try to persuade the court using the perverse decision in “VCS v Ward”, which can be fully distinguished and is far from persuasive when scrutinised. In that case, at appeal, the Defendant did not appear and the case reportedly ran completely against the interests of the victim consumer, such that the Judge even lamented the dreadful position he had been steered towards by this Claimant's legal representation, who, it seems, effectively ambushed the court with a case not first raised at the original hearing. In any event, the “VCS v Ward” case involved a business park and has no application to an Airport case, where the byelaws take precedent and must be adhered to.

 

17. Even if the Claimant is able to overcome the difficulties they face in showing that:

(a) they have locus to sue in their own name regarding this location, and that
(b) they offered a parking space with value, and a licence to park there, and that
(c) the Defendant was afforded the opportunity to accept contractual terms and that
(d) these terms were prominently displayed and well lit, and that
(e) this charge is somehow saved from the penalty rule, and
(f) the driver was in breach, despite the stopping of the car for matter of seconds

the Claimant is also put to strict proof that:

(g) this access road is not part of the public highway. A 'public highway' is any road maintained by public expense where the public would normally have a right to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle. It is averred that the Airport approach road is public highway and the Claimant is put to strict proof to the contrary.

17.1. The road comes off a roundabout and is not clearly demarcated as private land, nor is it a private car park and thus, any parking/traffic contraventions would be a matter for the local authority. Such roads are subject to the rules of the Road Traffic Act and statutory instrument and any 'PCN' must be a proper penalty charge notice issued under the Traffic Management Act 2004.

17.2. The claimant is put to strict proof that this approach road is a part of 'the Airport' site where road traffic enactments do not apply.

18. This Claimant uses CCTV camera systems (365 days a year, 24 hours a day, seven days a week) and processes personal data excessively and disproportionately, and thus fails to comply with the Information Commissioner's 'Data Protection Code of Practice for Surveillance Cameras and Personal Information' ('the ICO Code').!

18.1. The ICO Code applies to all CCTV systems, and states that the private sector is required to follow it, in order to meet its legal obligations as a data processor. Members of the International Parking Community ('IPC') trade body are required to comply fully with the Data Protection Act ('DPA') and all ICO rules and guidelines, as a pre-requisite of being able to use the DVLA KADOE system to harvest VRN data, including the addresses of registers keepers.

18.2. Whilst CCTV has its uses to keep Airport approach roads clear - to stop drivers from choosing to park and leaving their vehicles or using the roads as a drop-off point, for example - this must be with reasonable and proportionate application, with sufficient checks and balances being an ICO Code requirement when operating such a data-intrusive regime.!

18.3. The Claimant's failures to comply include, but are not limited to the following, and the Claimant is put to strict proof otherwise on all counts:

i) Lack of an initial Surveillance Camera privacy impact assessment, and

ii) Lack of an evaluation of proportionality and necessity, considering concepts that would impact upon fairness under the first data protection principle, and

iii) Failure to regularly evaluate whether it is necessary and proportionate use CCTV to issue penalties in all cases, applying no human intervention or common sense approach e.g. having no checks and balances to exclude from the 'immediate penalty' approach. 

iv) Failure to prominently inform a driver in large lettering on clear signage, of the 'commercial intent' and purpose of the CCTV system and how the data captured would be used.

19. This Claimant has therefore failed to meet its legal obligations and has breached principle 1 (at least) of the DPA, as well as the IPC and the ICO Codes of Practice.

20. The Defendant avers that a breach of the DPA and failure to comply with ICO rules regarding data captured by CCTV, also transgresses the tests of fairness and transparency of consumer contracts, as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (enacted after the final hearing in Beavis and not considered in that case).

20.1. In any case involving a consumer contract, Courts must evaluate and apply a test of fairness, whether the Defendant raises the issue or not, and transparency of terms must also be considered carefully in every case.

20.2. It is averred that this Claimant at this location, fails on both counts and therefore the charge is unjustified and just the sort of 'unconscionable' parking charge that the Supreme Court had in mind when retaining the 'penalty rule' for use in cases such as this, where the facts are less complex than in Beavis.

20.3. Further, the IPC Code of Practice specifically prohibits 'predatory tactics', therefore this Claimant is operating in breach of the effectively 'regulatory framework' of their trade body code that the Supreme Court in Beavis found was a pre-requisite of a transparent and lawful operation.

22. Alleging that the letters the parking firm sent have caused an additional loss, is simply untrue. The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is/was on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

23. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred an additional £60 in damages or costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. The arbitrary addition of a fixed sum purporting to cover 'damages/costs' is also potentially open to challenge as an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs, where 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

23.1. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported added £60 'damages/costs' are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, binding case law and two statute laws have the effect that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added to the 'parking charge' as if they are additional losses.

Farmlady

PART 2

24. Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 ('the Beavis case') is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in the Beavis case) was held to already incorporate the costs of an automated private parking business model including recovery letters. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that an alleged 'parking charge' penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending upon the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters.

24.1. This charge is unconscionable and devoid of any 'legitimate interest', given the facts. To quote from the decision in the Beavis case at Para [108]: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''. Ad at [199]: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests.''

24.2. In the Beavis case it was said at para [205]: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

24.3. At para 98. {re ...The desirability of running that parking scheme at no cost, or ideally some profit, to themselves} ''Against this background, it can be seen that the £85 charge had two main objects. One was to manage the efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of those outlets who wish to find spaces in which to park their cars [...] The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable ParkingEye to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services...''

24.4. At para 193. ''Judging by ParkingEye’s accounts, and unless the Chelmsford car park was out of the ordinary, the scheme also covered ParkingEye's costs of operation and gave their shareholders a healthy annual profit.'' and at para 198: ''The charge has to be and is set at a level which enables the managers to recover the costs of operating the scheme. It is here also set at a level enabling ParkingEye to make a profit.''

25. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 ('the POFA') at paras 4(5) and 4(6) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (further, the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

26. Further, the purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, vague and in breach of the CRA 2015 Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair'. This Claimant has arbitrarily added an extra 60% of the parking charge in a disingenuous double recovery attempt that has already been exposed and routinely disallowed by many Courts in England and Wales. It is atrocious that this has been allowed to continue unabated for so many years, considering the number of victims receiving this Claimant's exaggerated Letter before Claim, or the claim form, who then either pay an inflated amount or suffer a default judgment for a sum that could not otherwise be recovered. It is only those who defend, who draw individual cases to the attention of the courts one by one, but at last in 2019, some areas noticed the pattern and have moved to stop this abuse of process at source.

26.1. In the Caernarfon Court in Case number F2QZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated: ''Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''

26.2. That decision in Wales was contested in a N244 application by VCS, but the added £60 was still disallowed on 30 Oct 2019. District Judge Jones-Evans stated that even in cases parking firms win, he never allows the £60 add on, and despite parking firms continuing to include it in their Particulars, most advocates have now stopped pushing for it at hearings. The Judge said that a contract formed by signage is a deemed contract, which the motorist does not have the opportunity to negotiate. That, and the fact that there is no specified sum on the signage, means that the extra £60 cannot possibly be recoverable. He said that the £60 was clearly a penalty, and an abuse of process. The considered sum in that case was reduced to £100 with a full case hearing to follow, but the £60 would not be awarded under any circumstances, and further, he ordered that the Claimant must now produce a statement of how they pleaded claims prior to Beavis, and subsequently.

26.3. In Claim numbers F0DP806M and F0DP201T - BRITANNIA PARKING -v- Mr C and another - less than two weeks later - the courts went further in a landmark judgment in November 2019 which followed several parking charge claims being struck out in the area overseen by His Honour Judge Iain Hamilton-Douglas Hughes QC, the Designated Civil Judge for Dorset, Hampshire, Isle of Wight & Wiltshire.

26.3.1. Cases summarily struck out in that circuit included BPA members using BW Legal's robo-claim model and IPC members using Gladstones' robo-claim model, and the Orders from that court were identical in striking out all such claims without a hearing during a prolonged period in 2019, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in the Beavis case. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

26.3.2. BW Legal made an application objecting to two 'test' cases that had been struck out by District Judge Taylor against a parking firm for trying to claim for £160 instead of £100 parking charge. This has been repeated conduct in recent years, on the back of the Beavis case, where parking firms have almost unanimously contrived to add £60, or more, on top of the 'parking charge'. Members of both ATAs who have influence on their self-serving 'Trade Bodies' have even voted to have this imaginary 'damages/debt collection' sum added to their respective two Codes of Practice, to create a veil of legitimacy, no doubt to allow their members to confuse consumers and to enable them to continue to 'get away with it' in several court areas which are still allowing this double recovery.

26.3.3. That N244 application to try to protect the cartel-like position of some of the 'bigger player' parking firms, was placed before the area Circuit Judge and a hearing was held on 11th November 2019, with other parking charge cases in that circuit remaining struck out or stayed, pending the outcome. The Defendants successfully argued on points including a citation of the CRA 2015 and the duty of the court to apply the 'test of fairness' to a consumer notice (a statutory duty that falls upon the courts, whether a consumer raises the issue or not). All three points below were robustly upheld by District Judge Grand, sitting at the Southampton Court, who agreed that:
(a) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was in breach of POFA, due to paras 4(5) and 4(6).
(b) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was unconscionable, due to the Beavis case paras 98, 193, 198 and 287.
(c) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge where the additional 'recovery' sum was in small print, hidden, or in the cases before him, not there at all, is void for uncertainty and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14.

26.3.4. At the hearing, the Judge refused their request to appeal. It was successfully argued that the parking firm's consumer notice stood in breach of the CRA 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14. Using the statutory duty upon the Courts to consider the test of fairness and properly apply schedule 2 of the CRA 2015 it was irrelevant whether or not the consumers' defences had raised it before, which they had not. The same issues apply to this claim.

26.3.5. A transcript will be publicly available shortly. In his summing up, it was noted that District Judge Grand stated: ''When I come to consider whether the striking out of the whole claim is appropriate, that the inclusion of the £60 charge means that the whole claim is tainted by it, the claimant should well know that it is not entitled to the £60. The very fact that they bring a claim in these circumstances seems to me that it is an abuse of process of the court, and in saying that, I observe that with any claim that can be brought before the court that if a party doesn't put in a defence to the claim, default judgments are entered. So, the Claimant, in bringing the claims is, in other cases, aware that if the defendant doesn’t submit a defence, the Claimant is going to get a judgment of a knowingly inflated amount. So I conclude by saying that I dismiss the application to set aside Judge Taylor’s ruling.''

26.4. Consumer notices - such as car park signs - are not excused by the CRA 'core exemption'. The CMA Official Government Guidance to the CRA says: ''2.43 In addition, terms defining the main subject matter and setting the price can only benefit from the main exemption from the fairness test ('the core exemption') if they are transparent (and prominent) – see part 3 of the guidance.'' and at 3.2 ''The Act includes an exemption from the fairness test in Part 2 for terms that deal with the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the price, provided they are transparent and prominent. (This exemption does not extend to consumer notices but businesses are unlikely to wish to use wording that has no legal force to determine 'core' contractual issues).'' The parking industry is the exception to this rule because they have no consumer 'customers' yet are consumer-facing. Their intention is very clearly in many cases (including this case) for a consumer not to see the onerous terms hidden in their notices and it is averred that no regard is paid to consumer law.

26.5. The definition of a consumer notice is given at 1.19 and the test of fairness is expanded at 1.20: ''A consumer notice is defined broadly in the Act as a notice that relates to rights or obligations between a trader and a consumer, or a notice which appears to exclude or restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer. It includes an announcement or other communication, whether or not in writing, as long as it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to be seen or heard by a consumer. Consumer notices are often used, for instance, in public places such as shops or car parks as well as online and in documentation that is otherwise contractual in nature. [...] Consumer notices are, therefore, subject to control for fairness under the Act even where it could be argued that they do not form part of the contract as a matter of law. Part 2 of the Act covers consumer notices as well as terms, ensuring that, in a broad sense any wording directed by traders to consumers which has an effect comparable to that of a potentially unfair contract term is open to challenge in the same way as such a term. There is no need for technical legal arguments about whether a contract exists and whether, if it does, the wording under consideration forms part of it.''

27. In December 2019 in a different Court circuit, Deputy District Judge Joseph sitting at Warwick County Court had clearly heard about the decisions affecting the IOW, Hampshire, Dorset and Wiltshire circuit because he summarily struck out multiple parking ticket claims from various firms all due to the adding of the false £60 costs to £100 parking charge, that already indisputably (in law and case law) includes those costs.

27.1. The Judge determined that ''it is an abuse of process for the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover.'' further, in issuing his Orders striking out several £160 parking claims without a hearing, the Judge stated that he had ''considered S71(2) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 for the fairness of the contract terms and determined that the provision of the additional charge breached examples 6, 10 and 14''.

Farmlady

PART 3

28. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading, harassing and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made.

29. The Defendant is of the view that this Claimant knew or should have known that to claim in excess of £100 for a parking charge on private land is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA 2015, and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

30. If this claim is not summarily struck out for the same reasons as the Judges cited in the multiple Caernarfon, Southampton, IOW and Warwick County Court decisions, then due to this Claimant knowingly proceeding with a claim that amounts to an abuse of process, full costs will be sought by the Defendant at the hearing, such as are allowable pursuant to CPR 27.14.
Statement of Truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true.

 

Sources of information used are listed below;

one source was another thread regarding another VCS Claim; Claim Form for parking at Doncaster Airport - Page 3

The parking prankster website was very helpful particularly in the case of; Liverpool Business Park - Motorist wins claim for £250 for data protection breach

VCS v Phillip, Claim number C9DP2D6C Liverpool 07/12/2016

KeithP

Farmlady said:

The fact that the claimant has accessed the registered keeper’s details through the DVLA is a clear breach under schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

Not sure why you say that.

The Claimant has the right to the keeper's details, if only to ask the keeper who the driver was.