ANPR Overstay - Advertisement Consent Refused by Local Council

DoaM

The_Deep wrote: »

Would a Civil Court judge conside Mens Rea?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mens_rea

Based on the Wiki link provided - no, as civil law applies:

In civil law, it is usually not necessary to prove a subjective mental element to establish liability for breach of contract or tort, for example. But if a tort is intentionally committed or a contract is intentionally breached, such intent may increase the scope of liability and the damages payable to the plaintiff.

Clivero

Good morning,

Thank you all for your replies. I did have some troubles logging back in, but the site admins have since kindly resolved these for me.

I have updated my defence based on the previous comments, and would be grateful for any further feedback please.

*************************
IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: xxxxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

National Car Parks LTD (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1. Background

1.1 The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

1.2 The Defendant is the registered keeper of the vehicle in question. The Claim relates to an alleged debt in damages arising from the driver’s alleged breach of contract, when parking on the material date in a marked bay at XXXXXXXX car park.

1.3 The Particulars of Claim state that the claimant's claim is for a parking contravention on the XXXXXX. These assertions indicate that the claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

1.4. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

2. Criminal Conduct

2.1 The Claimant places reliance on its provision of signage at the site, and upon the content of that signage. However, the Claimant is under a duty to the Court to provide full and
fair disclosure by informing it of all relevant issues. The Claimant has failed to advise the Court that a criminal offence was being committed by the display of its signage.

The Claimant's signage did not benefit from advertisement consent, the application initially being refused by XXXXXX on 13th December 2018, such that at the time the Defendant parked at XXXXXX a criminal offence was being committed in order to create a contract with the Defendant.

The Defendant’s Witness Statement includes additional evidence to show that the Claimant was fully aware that a crime is being committed by the Claimant at additional car parks. The signage at XXXXX is classified in planning law as an advertisement. By virtue of Regulation 30 of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 (as amended) it is a criminal offence to display this kind of advertisement in contravention of the Regulations. The penalty on conviction for the offence is at level 4 on the standard scale (current maximum £2,500) plus £250 for each day that the offence continues.

2.2 The Claimant has since made application for advertisement consent under the 2007 Regulations, and this was granted by the XXXXXX on 24th June 2019. However the
2007 Regulations make no provision for any future consent to be backdated, such that a consent that may be in place by the time that this case is heard will only apply going forward from the date of consent. Any consent cannot and will not grant authority and legality for display of the signage prior to the approval date so that the crime being committed when the defendants car was parked will remain a crime for all time.

2.3 The Court’s attention is drawn to the case of Andre Agassi v S Robinson (HM Inspector of Taxes). Whilst not wholly aligned to the issues in this case it has been produced because of the principle it extols that no one should profit from their unlawful conduct. The Court’s attention is drawn in particular to paragraph 20 of the Transcript of that case “It is common ground that, whatever costs may be recoverable by a litigant in respect of professional services such as those provided by Tenon to the appellant, they cannot include the cost of any activities which are unlawful”. Paragraph 28 continues - “cannot on any view recover the cost of activities performed by Tenon which it was not lawful for them to perform.” In this case it was not lawful for the Claimant to have in place its signs upon which it relies for the formation of an asserted contract with the Defendant.

2.4 The Judge’s attention is also drawn to RTA (Business Consultants) Limited V Bracewell [2015] EWHC 630 (QB) (12 March 2015). This case is drawn to the Court’s attention for the purposes of evidencing paragraph 34 in which the Judge discusses the relevance of the public law principle going back well over 200 years that no man should profit from his crime; it is submitted that this is particularly relevant in this action. The Judge cited Lord Mansfield CJ to explain that: “The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the Court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and the defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in default, potior est conditio defendentis.” In this claim there has been a transgression of a law (the 2007 Regulations) and it is submitted that the Court should not “lend its aid” to this Claimant “who founds his cause of action upon an illegal act”.

2.5 It seems to follow from paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 that, if there was a contract between the Claimant and the Defendant, it was illegal in its formation because it was incapable of
being created without an illegal act (the erection of the un-consented signage stating the terms and conditions relied on by the Claimant). Where a contract is illegal when formed, neither party will acquire rights under that contract, regardless of whether or not there was an intention to break the law; the contract will be void and treated as if it had never been entered into. As such, the asserted contract cannot be enforced. Further, it is submitted, it must be contrary to public policy for a court to enforce such a contract whereby a party may profit from its criminal conduct.

2.6 To add weight, rather helpfully, the Defendant also cites from ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores (B/6) which concerns an alleged illegal contract. Whilst the facts of that case are
not relevant, the Judge’s comments at paragraph 29 of the Transcript of the Somerfield case are of importance: “At common law, historically, a distinction has been drawn between cases where the guilty party intended from the time of entering the contract unlawfully and cases where the intention to perform unlawfully was only made subsequently”. As has already been stated, in this case the problem arose at the formation of the contract and was not in relation to any subsequent act. Laws LJ, in Somerfield, concluded that ParkingEye did not have an intention, when creating that contract, to deliberately break the law so the contract was upheld. Differently in this case, the Claimant did deliberately break the law by erecting the parking signs that stated their contractual terms, without first having in place the mandatory prior consent required by law. Thus a crime was committed then. The illegality in this action was not merely incidental to the creation and part of the performance of the contract as in Somerfield but, as indicated in the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim, it was central to it. Somerfield guides us that where there was a chance to remove the illegality from future performance the contract could remain in force. On the other hand, there was less scope to rectify a one-off contract so it was more likely to be held unenforceable. In this action the illegality of the Claimant’s signage that existed on the day of the Defendant’s parking cannot be undone, even by any subsequent grant of advertisement consent. At paragraphs 65-74 of the Somerfield transcript Laws LJ set out three
factors which need to be considered in a defence of illegality. The Defendant submits that the key issues in this action are that:

2.6.1 The commission of an illegal wrong being present at the time of entering the contract means that the Claimant will not be able to enforce the contract.

2.6.2 The illegality is central to the contract and is not merely a minor aspect thus it should not be held to be too remote so as to render the contract enforceable.

2.6.3 The nature of the illegality: in this case it was a crime and not merely a civil tort as in Somerfield. The gravity of the illegality is therefore far greater.

2.7 None of these issues were argued in Beavis.

3. British Parking Association Code of Practice and its Relationship with Consumer Protection Laws

3.1. Beavis/96 draws our attention to the Code of Practice of the British Parking Association Limited. At Beavis/111 the Judge helpfully comments that “while the Code of Practice is
not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA. In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced.”

Paragraph 2.4 within version 7 of the Code sets out how and in what circumstances a term may be enforced. It states: “All AOS members must be aware of their legal obligations and implement the relevant legislation and guidance when operating their businesses.” Broadly, the Code of Practice obliges the Claimant to comply with the law in creating and in enforcing its contract with a motorist and in communicating the terms of that contract. The Claimant failed to do so in several aspects.

3.2 At paragraph 2 above the Court’s attention has been drawn to the failure of the Claimant to ensure that the relevant legislation had been complied with, thereby resulting in criminal conduct in their operation of parking enforcement. This is a clear breach of paragraph 2.4 of the Code of Practice. If there is any liability argued on the part of the Defendant then, in considering paragraph 2.4 above, it is submitted that a contractual term cannot be fair if the requirements of the Code of Practice are disregarded and a crime has been committed to create that term and/or the contract between a motorist and the parking enforcement company.

4. Denial of parking contravention

4.1 The allegation is described by the Claimant in previous correspondence as “parking longer than the time paid for”, although this is not clarified within the Particulars of Claim.

4.2 The Defendant denies any contravention due to the alleged overstay period being within a reasonable period of time allowed for observation, locating a parking space, parking, obtaining a ticket, and exiting the car park.

4.3 The BPA’s Code of Practice states that there are two grace periods: one at the end and a separate 'observation period' at the start. For the avoidance of doubt this is NOT a single period with a ceiling of just ten minutes, and the authority for this view is within the BPA article by Kelvin Reynolds, BPA Director of Corporate Affairs where he states on behalf of the BPA that there is a difference between “grace' periods” and “observation” periods in parking and that good practice allows for this:

“An observation period is the time when an enforcement officer should be able to determine what the motorist intends to do once in the car park. Our guidance specifically says that there must be sufficient time for the motorist to park their car, observe the signs, decide whether they want to comply with the operator’s conditions and either drive away or pay for a ticket. No time limit is specified. This is because it might take one person 5 minutes, but another person 10 minutes depending on various factors, not limited to disability.”

4.3.1 Furthermore, the British Parking Association Code of practice (Paragraph 28.4) states:

"If a driver is parking with your permission, they must have the chance to read the terms and conditions before they enter into the contract with you. If, having had that opportunity, they decide not to park but choose to leave the car park, you must provide them with a reasonable grace period to leave, as they will not be bound by your parking contract.

4.3.2 Similarly, the British Parking Association Code of Practice (Paragraph 13.2) also declares:

''If the parking location is one where parking is normally permitted, you must allow the driver a reasonable grace period in addition to the parking event before enforcement action is taken. In such instances the grace period must be a minimum of 10 minutes.''

4.3.3 Whereby the British Parking Authority (Paragraph 13.4) reiterates this fact:

''You should allow the driver a reasonable period to leave the private car park after the parking contract has ended, before you take enforcement action. If the location is one where parking is normally permitted, the Grace Period at the end of the parking period should be a minimum of 10 minutes.''

Notwithstanding the BPA rules, relevant contract law also dictates that consumers must be given an opportunity to consider terms and conditions before entering into a consumer contract, especially where one of the terms is unexpected (new terms for this site) and onerous. POPLA Assessors have stated in recent decisions that a reasonable time period for this would be up to about 10 minutes.

4.4 In a recent (2nd May 2019) Court of Appeal decision in the case between NCP (Appellant) and HMRC (Respondent) it was made clear that offer and acceptance of a parking contract can only take place once the payer has inserted payment into the machine and pressed the green button to obtain a ticket:

“English law, of course, generally adopts an objective approach when deciding what has been agreed in a contractual context. Here, it seems to me that, taken together, the tariff board and the statement that "overpayments" were accepted and no change given indicated, looking at matters objectively, that NCP was willing to grant an hour's parking in exchange for coins worth at least £1.40. In the hypothetical example, the precise figure was settled when the customer inserted her pound coin and 50p piece into the machine and then elected to press the green button rather than cancelling the transaction. The best analysis would seem to be that the contract was brought into being when the green button was pressed. On that basis, the pressing of the green button would represent acceptance by the customer of an offer by NCP to provide an hour's parking in return for the coins that the customer had by then paid into the machine. At all events, there is no question of the customer having any right to repayment of 10p. The contract price was £1.50.
This is the contractual analysis in the hypothetical example where the customer has only a pound coin and a 50p piece, and therefore has no alternative but to pay £1.50 if she wishes to park in the car park. However, the analysis is the same even if it is possible for the customer to obtain the right coins, for example by obtaining change from another user of the car park. If the customer nevertheless chooses to insert £1.50 and presses the green button, it remains the case that she has accepted the offer to provide an hour's parking at that price.
This analysis may be slightly different from that of the UT, which referred to an offer by NCP to grant the right to park for up to one hour in return for paying an amount between £1.40 and £2.09. In fact the offer made by NCP is more specific, to grant the right to park for an hour in return for the coins shown by the machine as having been inserted when the green light flashes. That is the offer which the customer accepts.”

4.5 It is clear from this decision that a contract cannot possibly begin upon driving into the car park, not least because at that point the driver has not had the opportunity to read the terms and conditions of the contract that may or may not be entered into.

4.6 Timestamps from the Claimant’s ANPR camera images indicate that the vehicle entered the car park at 09:59:05 and on exited the park at 12:22:43. The Claimant’s PDT machine record indicates that the driver of the vehicle paid for 2 hours parking. The Defendant submits that the vehicle was not parked for longer than 2 hours.

4.6.1 Furthermore, it is supported that due to the design of the XXXXXXX car park, whereby only a single lane entry and exit system is available, a bottleneck is created within the carpark futher delaying entry and exit to and from the XXXXX car park.

4.6.2 Given the time periods specified by the BPA, the Defendant submits that the vehicle was not parked for ‘longer than the time paid for’ and that no parking contravention took place. Therefore, the Defendant invites the court to dismiss the claim as being without basis.

5. The purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, a disingenuous double recovery attempt, vague and in breach of both the CPRs, and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair'.

5.1 Alleging that the letters the parking firm sent have caused an additional loss, is simply untrue. The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is/was on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

5.2 The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred an additional £60 in damages or costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. The arbitrary addition of a fixed sum purporting to cover 'damages/costs' is also potentially open to challenge as an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs, where 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

5.3 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported added £60 'damages/costs' are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, binding case law and two statute laws have the effect that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added to the 'parking charge' as if they are additional losses.

Statement of Truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true.


Name

Signature


Date

nosferatu1001

1.3 The Particulars of Claim state that the claimant's claim is for a parking contravention on the XXXXXX.

-> how is this a "menu of choices"? Where is the "menu"? I see no choices. If you instead said that it gives no detail as to the alleged contravention, how it arose etc - and THAT is why it fails to meet the PDs, then you would have a point

Dont copy if you dont know what youre doing, Flag it as a query if you dont understand.

1.4 to my mind contradicts 1.2, where you say it is a claim for ... damages, then in 1.4 you say you dont know. Cant have it both. You could say you ASSUME the cae is about damages...

to me the 2.1 excerpts I woul dhave thought would be exhibited in the witness statement? You are also hiding the actual reason you are saying you have a defenc e- ex turpi - well after hte point any one has lost the will to live.

Argument: Statement. You have a statement of "criminal onduct" but absolutely nothing in there that tells me quickly why you think that should matter.

Get to the point, in essence!

2.5 - how could it be illegal in formation? I dont understand how theree would be an *illegal* contract - i just think there could be no *lawful* contract, which is NOt the same thing.

3 - same thing. Introduce why your point is at all relevant, or watchpeoples eyes glaze over.

Fialure to comply with CoP means the charge is an unenforceable penalty, as outlined in Beavis - short and snappy. Tells us why the failing is relevant, and provides a defence (penalties cannot be privately recovered)

4) is the first time I have any clue what actually happened on the day. Youve gone through ex tupri, to the supreme court, and only now I learn it is about an overstay? Maye include that bit in the top?

4.3.1 - why not include the newest CoP which ha shelpfully clarified this? That the inital period must also be at least 10 minutes

You must make it clear that, while this was not the CoP in place at hte time, it sets a reaosnable idea on what the BPA EXPECTED this undefined period to be, at a minimum.

4.4 - so now its a pay and display car park? So is the time parked plus grace period within limits from entry until exit or ONLY if it is counted from when the ticket was bought? Its not clear.

4.6 - so how long were they pakred for? when was the TICKET bought?

Le_Kirk

You have paragraphs without numbers. Why are you making reference to "the defendant's" witness statement? A) you haven't written it yet and the defendant is you. I is confused!

Clivero

Thanks again for the comments. I have had another attempt at the defence statement, this time trying to simplify the points made.

The one point that I don;t feel comfortable with the wording is point 3.2, where I want to showcase the point that the ticket could not have been purchased 55 seconds after the APNR camera pictured my car entering the car park. I will be using CM's point re driving back in, but I was going to use that for the WS when required.

As always please let me know of any changes that may need to made to this defence statement.

********

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: xxxxxxxxxx

BETWEEN:

National Car Parks LTD (Claimant)

-and-

xxxxxxxxxxxx (Defendant)

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1. Background

1.1 The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

1.2 The Defendant is the registered keeper of the vehicle in question. However due to the sparseness of the Particulars of Claim, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. It is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

1.3 As the Claimant in previous correspondence has described the contravention as “parking longer than the time paid for”, it is therefore assumed that this is the basis for the Claimants claim.

2. Criminal Conduct

2.1 The Claimant has failed to advise the Court that a criminal offence was being committed by the display of its signage, as the Claimant's Advertising consent application was refused on 13th December 2018. The Claimant is under a duty to the Court to provide full and fair disclosure by informing it of all relevant issues.

2.1.1 The nature of this illegality: which in this case was a crime and not merely a civil tort means the gravity of the illegality is therefore far greater.

2.2 The Claimant has since made application for advertisement consent under the 2007 Regulations, which was granted on 24th June 2019. However the 2007 Regulations make no provision for any future consent to be backdated, such that a consent that may be in place by the time that this case is heard will only apply going forward from the date of consent.

2.3 The Court’s attention is drawn to the case of Andre Agassi v S Robinson (HM Inspector of Taxes). Whilst not wholly aligned to the issues in this case it has been produced because of the principle it extols that no one should profit from their unlawful conduct. In particular paragraph 20 of the Transcript for that case “It is common ground that, whatever costs may be recoverable by a litigant in respect of professional services such as those provided by Tenon to the appellant, they cannot include the cost of any activities which are unlawful”. Paragraph 28 continues - “cannot on any view recover the cost of activities performed by Tenon which it was not lawful for them to perform.” In this case it was not lawful for the Claimant to have in place any signs upon which it relies for the formation of an asserted contract with the Defendant.

3. Denial of parking contravention

3.1 The Defendant denies any contravention due to the alleged overstay period being within a reasonable period of time allowed for observation, locating a parking space, parking, obtaining a ticket, and exiting the car park.

**3.2 Timestamps from the Claimant’s ANPR camera images indicate that the vehicle entered the car park at 09:59:05 and exited the car park at 12:22:43. Whereas the Claimant’s PDT transaction log records the timestamp for payment of the 2 hour parking ticket as 10:00am. However given the design of the XXXXXXX car park, whereby only a single lane entry and exit system is available, it is disputed that the time recorded on the ticket issued by the PDT was correct, and equally that the APNR and PDT clocks in operation were not correctly synchronised.

3.3 The British Parking Association Code of Practice (v7 Jan 2018 - Paragraph 13.2) declares:
''If the parking location is one where parking is normally permitted, you must allow the driver a reasonable grace period in addition to the parking event before enforcement action is taken. In such instances the grace period must be a minimum of 10 minutes.''

3.4 Furthermore the British Parking Authority Code of Practice (v7 Jan 2018 - Paragraph 13.4) reiterates this fact for exiting a car park:
''You should allow the driver a reasonable period to leave the private car park after the parking contract has ended, before you take enforcement action. If the location is one where parking is normally permitted, the Grace Period at the end of the parking period should be a minimum of 10 minutes.''

3.5 The British Parking Assocation Code of Pratice (v7 Jan 2018 - Paragraph 2.4) sets out how and in what circumstances a term may be enforced. It states: “All AOS members must be aware of their legal obligations and implement the relevant legislation and guidance when operating their businesses.” Broadly, the Code of Practice obliges the Claimant to comply with the law in creating and in enforcing its contract with a motorist and in communicating the terms of that contract. The Claimant has failed to do so in several aspects.

3.6 At paragraph 2 above the Court’s attention has been drawn to the failure of the Claimant to ensure that the relevant legislation had been complied with, thereby resulting in criminal conduct in their operation of parking enforcement. This is a clear breach of paragraph 2.4 of the Code of Practice. If there is any liability argued on the part of the Defendant then, in considering paragraph 2.4 above, it is submitted that a contractual term cannot be fair if the requirements of the Code of Practice are disregarded and a crime has been committed to create that term and/or the contract between a motorist and the parking enforcement company.

4. The purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, a disingenuous double recovery attempt, vague and in breach of both the CPRs, and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair'.

4.1 Alleging that the letters the parking firm sent have caused an additional loss, is simply untrue. The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is/was on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

4.2 The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred an additional £60 in damages or costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. The arbitrary addition of a fixed sum purporting to cover 'damages/costs' is also potentially open to challenge as an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs, where 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

4.3 Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported added £60 'damages/costs' are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, binding case law and two statute laws have the effect that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added to the 'parking charge' as if they are additional losses.

Statement of Truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true.


Name

Signature


Date

Clivero

A friendly "bump" to see if anyone is able to give feedback on the latest DS please?. Thanks :-)

Fruitcake

Can you make a video of someone driving in, parking, and buying a ticket to prove it cannot be done in 55 seconds, therefore the timestamps cannot be true/accurate?

For 2.1, I suggest you mention the Town and Country Planning Act that has been breached, and the relevant section.

Coupon-mad

That would be good. Choose a busy Saturday just before Christmas.

nosferatu1001

I wouldnt hide 3.1 (the timing issues) at all; I owul dhave it as a separate item which is that there was no overstay due to the inaccurate time stamps, THEN prove that there is no way to drive, park, find a space and buy a ticket within 55 seconds.
Cast doubt on their logs, and their cause of action goes pooft

Fruitcake

Not having Advertising Consent appears to be a breach of the DVLA KADOE contract. The contract defines the scammer as The Customer.

PART C

USE OF THE DATA

C1. Signage, Terms & Conditions and Correspondence

C1.1. The Customer shall ensure that signage, terms and conditions of service for parking customers and correspondence with data subjects comply with the Law and with the requirements of the ATA’s Code of Practice or Conduct.

I suggest a complaint to the DVLA is made pointing this out as well as adding this to your defence.

A breach of KADOE contract means the scammers had no right to access the data subject's data (VRN) which is a DPA/GDPR breach.