Request of Reviews. Witness Statement and Skeleton Arguement.

avagadro

Hi Parking Forum.




I've been working on my defense against UKCPM/Gladstones for some time and thanks to the massive help on this community. I had another thread (sorry, I know not great) but after help with my defense it went quiet, became buried and now I'd like guidance on the WS & SA I've decided to start a new thread. I apologise but I trust you understand a bit of visibility will help me enormously right now on such a busy forum.


Couple of Questions:
I'm taking my brother as a witness, should he submit a WS too with mine?


I haven't named the driver, I am worried they would then pursue the driver. There were two of us at the incident. Is that enough reasonable doubt to allow me not too?


I'm going to include the Defense for reference, and then let the WS/SA get you up to speed on the case as that's what I'll need it to perform on the day. Thanks again in advance for your help.
Please excuse the enormous amount of spelling mistakes and don't worry about commenting on them. I'm dyslexic, they're pretty unavoidable for me and the spell checker is not running on my version of office. I won't submit without running through a proper program. Cheers.
I've also written notes to myself about evidence and exhibits to collect in red/italics throughout. They will be made neater by the end.

IN THE COUNTY COURT

CLAIM No: XXXXXXX

BETWEEN:

UK CAR PARK MANAGEMENT LTD (Claimant)

-and-

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

________________________________________
DEFENCE
________________________________________

1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. It is true, that on the XXXXXXX, the vehicle in question stopped in XXXXXX for the purpose of unloading for a period no greater than 10 minutes. At no point was the vehicle to be considered parked, an activity entirely different from unloading.

3. The Particulars of Claim state that the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle(s). These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

4. Due to the sparseness of the particulars, it is unclear as to what legal basis the claim is brought, whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. However, it is denied that the Defendant, or any driver of the vehicle, entered into any contractual agreement with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.

5. Further and in the alternative, it is denied that the claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner which would be capable of binding any reasonable person reading them.

6. The terms on the Claimant's signage are also displayed in a font which is too small to be read from a passing vehicle, and is in such a position that anyone attempting to read the tiny font would be unable to do so easily. It is, therefore, denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding contract.

7. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient prorpietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

8. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £60, for which no calculation or explanation is given, and which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

9. The Particulars of Claim submitted by the Claimant is not compliant with the Practice Directions. The Claimant has not attached the contract(s) it wishes to rely on that it alleges were in place at the time. The Claimant has not clarified whether it is seeking keeper liability and has not attached any confirmation that it has gone through the necessary steps to do so.

10. The parking charge was issued by a 3rd party. The Claimant is put to strict proof that this party had been issued with, agreed and adhered to the IPC and BPA code of conducts under which it operates. Furthermore the submission of photo evidence by this 3rd party is in breach of GDPR as they are a member of the public and have no lawful basis for processing.

11. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

avagadro

________________________________________
Defendant’s Witness Statement
________________________________________

I, XXXXXX will say as follows:

Being the Defendant in this case. I am an unrepresented consumer with no experience of Court procedure. Should I not present my case as professionally as the Claimant’s, I trust that the Court excuses my inexperience and reserves any criticism for the extremely sparse particulars filed by the Claimant’s Solicitors.I am the defendant in this matter. Attached to this statement is a bundle of documents labeled AD1, to which I will refer.

Sequence of Events.

1. On the XX/2/2018 I, and my brother, had few but heavy items to unload onto our narrowboat located in the XXXXXX area of London, on the Grand Union Canal. The materials, required for renovation work, were stored in the back of the van, regestration number XXXXX, of which I’m the registered keeper.

2. The canal, and towpath, backs onto the XXXXXX residences, seperated by a low hedge. On one side is a car park, the other the towpath, exhibit AD1.a (google maps image) & exhibit AD1.b (photo of car park from canal).

3. Seeing an opportunity to pass the heavy lumber over the hedge, the van was driven into XXXXX. From a cluster of signs at the entrance, mostly illegible, it was clear that the road was private, however no indication was made clear at that instance the off road parking was private. Exhibit AD1.c (photo of entrance signs)

4. The van was backed towards the hedge, off the road and in the parking beside the buildings. Exhibit AD1.d & AD1.e photo’s from UKCPM & of Car Park.

5. Unloading quickly commenced, with my brother on the canal side of the hedge, myself in the car park. A matter of minutes later, my brother indicated behind me and I turned to see a man (herby refered to as Mr Public) in his mid to late 50s, in plain clothes, photographing the scene on his smartphone. He apeared to be carrying a grabber tool for collecting rubbish, and no markings or badges of official nature.

6. I Approached Mr Public, and below follows our verbal exchange:

‘Why are you photographing us?’

No answer.

‘Excuse me, why are you photographing us?’

‘I’m not photographing you, I’m photographing the van.’

‘Why are you photographing the van?’

Again Mr Public did not respond, but nodded towards the visible but illedgible UKCPM sign exhibit AD1fphoto of distant, high sign, then said:

‘You’re not allowed to be here’

‘If we’re causing a problem we will gladly move on.’

Unfortunately the individual declined to speak further, and in exacberation I repeated my offer to move on and he turned and walked away I asked:

‘Why are you doing this, why cannot you live and let live? If you don’t want us here you need only ask and we will go.’

But Mr Public kept his back to me and declined to comment further, instead walking away as I spoke.

7. With Mr Public now gone, I now approached the sign he had nodded towards, and with some difficulty until I was right beneath the sign and read the small printed text in displayed.exhibit AD1f & exhibit AD1g (photo of sign from where van was parked, photo of sign displaying conditions). Concluding from the writing on the sign that there was not problem with unloading/loading but in recognition of the aforementions member of the publics actions, I finished unloading the last remaining items and left the parking lot, along with the vehicle and declined to park. The whole incident could not have lasted more than 10 minutes.

8. I received a parking charge notice from UKPCM on the find date on SAR from UKCPM. Since I had read the terms & conditions on the sign at XXXXX thoroughly and found no restriction to unloading, which is a different act from parking exhibit AD1h. Jopson vs Homeguard, I was in the belief that the ticket was in error. Researching UKCPM and uncovering their reputation exhibit AD1i (news paper articles of fabricating evididence/robo claims) further to concluding the charge was not valid but the claiment seemed little more than a scam practitioner preying on ignorance.

9. Not leaving it at that, I further investigated how the charge had been issued. Discovering the prescence of a 3rd party app for smartphones exhibit AD1j news article of app I was perturbed at the now obvious source of the ticket and read through the BPA and IPC Codes of Practice (hearby refered to as CoP) to which UKCPM ltd is bound to adhere. ehxibit AD1k &Ad1m both CoP’s, highlighted at proffesionalism/3rd parties

10. I quickly deduced that Mr Public had not acted in faith to the either of the governing CoPs and concluded the claim was fraudalent for the breaches listed below:

• Was acting under financial incentive contradictory to the BPA CoP section 9.4 and IPC CoP section 17.1.
• [FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]BPA Section 9.4: [/FONT]“[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]Effective from 2 January 2018, the practice of offering financial incentives relating to the quantity of parking charge notices in new and existing employee contracts is prohibited.[/FONT]”
• In contradiction to The BPA CoP, section 9.1 exhibit AD1k: Mr Public wore no uniform, displayed or offered any official identification, or otherwise gave ligitamacy to his agency to issue a parking charge. [FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]Mr Public’s behavoiur was far below what could be a professional standard in manners, clarity, fairness or behavoiur.[/FONT]

• [FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]G[/FONT]race periods are required (BPA CoP section 13 & Ipc section 15), in order to ascertain terms of parking exhibit AD1k & AD1m . I offered to immedaitely move on, and Mr Public failed to grant me the required grace to do so as once reading the sign he indicated I then left the parking lot and declined to park.

11. In my inexperience in legalise, and nievety, I ignored further letters and bloviated escalations of the charge, considering it obvious no claim or agency to issue me a penalty as I had not breached the given terms as was not parked, and had been issued a ticket in a manner which breached the CoP’s underwhich it must operate.

12. Eventually, continued harasment by various parties, a letter before claim was received on 3rd October 2018 and the subsequent small claims proceedings began.

13. I invite the Court to dismiss this claim in its entirety, and to award my costs of attendance at the hearing, such as are allowable pursuant to CPR 27.14.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true.

Signature
Date

p { margin-bottom: 0.1in; line-height: 115%; }

avagadro

CLAIM No: XXXX

BETWEEN:

UK CAR PARK MANAGEMENT LTD (Claimant)

-and-

XXXXXXXXX (Defendant)

________________________________________
Defendant’s Skeleton Arguement
________________________________________

Table of Contents:

List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction
2. The parking compared to unloading issue.
3. Breaches of CoP by sub-contractors issue.
4. Breaches of GDRP by sub-contractors issue.
5. No existing contract issue.
6. Inadequate signage issue.
7. Improper practice issue.
8. Consumer rights issue.
9. Landowner authority issue.
10. Additional costs issue.
11. Conclusion

List of Abbreviations:

UKCPM ltd: United Kingdom Car Park Management Ltd.

IPC: International Parking Community

BPA: British Parking Association

CoP: Code of Practice

CRT: Canal and River Trust

GDPR: General Data Protection Regulation

Mr Public: Member of Public acting as Sub-contractor on behalf of UKCPM ltd as a ticket officer.

Bold highlighting added for emphasis by the Defendant

1. Introduction

It is alleged that on the XXXXX, the vehicle was parked in breach of contract at XXXXX, on a residential parking area managed by UKCPM ltd. The vehicle was involved in the act of unloading to the nearby Grand Union Canal. Images were captured by a sub-contractor for UKCPM ltd which resulted in the issue of a charge and subsequent legal prcoeedings against myself, XXXXX, as the registered keeper of the vehicle.

I dispute the merit of the offense, the validity of the issued charge, and the existance of the contract for the issues brought forth below.

On their basis and strength request the claim be struck out.

2. The parking compared to unloading issue

2.1. This claim refers to alleged parking infraction. At no time was the vehicle parked. The dictionary definaitions of parking are

Look up & include

and unloading/loading:

Look up & include

Exhibit. Take dictionary with you. Speed tab definitions.

2.2. In the case of Jopson -vs- Homeguard exhibit Jopson vs Homeguard, his honour Judge Harris QC clearly defines the difference between parking and loading/unloading as:

‘The concept of parking, as opposed to stopping, is that of leaving a car for some duration of time beyond that needed for getting in or out of it, loading or unloading it, and perhaps coping with some vicissitude of short duration’

2.3. In exhibit . Photo of van with rear doors open, back to hedge is is clear the vehicle is in no state to be left for some duration of time, to be parked. Further more, the time stamps on the evidence presented show a difference of...find photos, display time difference, exhibit mintues, clear evidence the vehicle was only ingaged in the act of unloading for a brief period time.

2.4.To Quote His Honour judge Harris again:

“A milkman leaving his float to carry bottles to the flat would not be “parked” Nor would a postman delivering letters, a wine merchant delivering a case of wine, and nor, I am satisfied, a retailer’s van, or indeed the appellant, unloading an awkward piece of furniture .”

2.5. I take the opportuntiy to stress the simlarity between the case, found in favour of the defendant, unloading akward furniture and myself unloading awkward materials at the closest possible point to the Grand Union Canal exhibit google maps close by canal.

2.6. As a licence holder with CRT exhibit licence valid February 2018 I also draw upon a right to access the towpath and canal as part of my licence conditions. Investigate public right of access to and include if applicable. In Jopson -vs- Homguard, attention is drawn to Bulstrode v Lambert 1953 where right of way if granted:

“To pass and re-pass with or without vehicles...for the purposes of obtaining access to the building...known as the auction mart.”

2.7. I therefore argue I was within my rights of access to the towpath, I am within my rights of way to briefly unload onto the towpath and canal, and Bridley Close in its proximity provided and obvious geographical location to do so exhibit google maps screenshot.

2.8. Without clear indication at the entrance of the car park that the land was private, it can be, and was reasoanabley assumed the car park was public land to which my access was automatically granted to excerise my above right of way to the towpath.

3. Breaches of CoP by sub-contractors issue

3.1. The Beavis case exhibit, draws attention to the Code of Practice of the British Parking Association ('the BPA'). And at 111 the Judge helpfully comments that “while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA. In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced.”

UKCPM Ltd. As an accreditated member of both the BPA and IPC and therefore is under obligtion to follow the relvant Code of Practices (CoP).

3.2. The ticket was issued by an unidentified member of the public, refered to hereafter as Mr Public. Mr Public used a smartphone app that automatically issues a ticket from photo’s uploaded by users and in return, and reward, pays out a fee for tickets issued exhibit news article to app. If we are to consider him a sub-contactor in his activities as vigilantie ticket warden the CoPs give clear constraints on the practices of sub-contractors

3.3. BPA CoP, section 15.1 exhibit :

“[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]You may use sub-contractors to carry out individual tasks to help you in your parking management and enforcement responsibilities. If you do this, you are responsible for making sure the sub-contractor keeps to the Code as if you were carrying out the tasks. If the sub-contractor does not keep to the Code, this failure will be treated as an act of non-compliance by you”[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.4. And the IPC CoP section 4.1:[/FONT]

“[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]You may use sub-contractors in order to carry out duties on your behalf. Subcontractors are your responsibility and any issue of non-compliance by them will be treated as non-compliance by you.”[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.5. The Claimant is put to strict proof that the sub-cotractor had been issued with, agreed and adhered to the IPC and BPA code of conducts under which it operates.[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.6. Furthermore, I directly dispute the sub-contractor acted in folowing with the CoPs, for the reasons that will follow.[/FONT]

3.7. The BPA CoP section 9.4 states:

“[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]Effective from 2 January 2018, the practice of offering financial incentives relating to the quantity of parking charge notices in new and existing employee contracts is prohibited.[/FONT]”

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.8. The alleged infraction date of 21/2/2018 is past the above date of application, and therefore ivalidates the use of the smartphone app offered a £10 payment for each ticket issued exhibit news. Such an app is clearly and without refute offering financial incentive relating to quantity of tickets issued, since no wage or retainer is paid to operaters of the app. Financial payment is given only on issueing of a parking ticket via the app. Therefore it is without doubt that the ticket was issued in direct breach of the BPA’s CoP in effect at the time.[/FONT]

3.9. And the IPC CoP section 17.1 :

“[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]may not use an incentive scheme which focusses solely on the volume of parking charges issued without introducing sufficient checks and balances so as to ensure that operatives do not issue Parking Charges where they should not[/FONT][FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]”[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.10. It is clear that insufficient checks were in place as the the ticket was issued from the app, the operation of which was outlawed by the BPA CoP section 9.4 a month prior and to a vehicle that was unloading, not parked, in an area with only parking restrictions in place.[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.11. Furthermore[/FONT]The BPA CoP, clearly states that in section 9.1 exhibit AD1k:

“y[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]our front-line operational staff wear a uniform and carry a photo-identity card that is visible and available for inspection by drivers you deal with drivers and other members of the public in a professional way, avoiding using aggressive or threatening language.[/FONT]”

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]Mr Public carried no identification and wore no uniform. Further more, he failed[/FONT] [FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]to identify himself and refused direct questions to[/FONT] [FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]explain his actions. [/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.12. IPC CoP section 13.1 on professional standards:[/FONT]

“[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]You agree to ensure that all your operators, servants or agents maintain a professional standard of behaviour when carrying out their duties and comply with the rule of law at all times.”[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.12. The lack of communication, and evasive and few[/FONT] [FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]vague, obstructive words Mr Public did say were far below any professional standard employed by other frontline public servants or ticket wardens. Coupled with his manner and rude behaviour as I tried to ascertain his agency and action, I would call again another clear infraction of the governing CoPs outlined in 2.11 & 2.12.[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.13. G[/FONT]race periods are required (BPA CoP section 13 & IPC section 15), in order to ascertain terms of parking exhibit AD1k & AD1m . I offered to immedaitely move on, and Mr Public failed to grant me the required grace to do so.

3.14. Once reading the sign he indicated I then left the parking lot and declined to park, excerising my right to grace period outlined as:

BPA section 13.1, “[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]They must have the chance to read the terms and conditions before they enter into the ‘parking contract’ with you. If, having had that opportunity, they decide not to park but choose to leave the car park, you must provide them with a reasonable grace period to leave, as they will not be bound by your parking contract.”[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.15. IPC section 15.1, “Drivers should be allowed a sufficient amount of time to park and read any signs so they may make an informed decision as to whether or not to remain on the site”[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.16. In contribution the Popla Annual Report 2015 [/FONT][FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]Exhibit[/FONT] [FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]on the subject of grace periods recomends:[/FONT]

“[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]If the motorist does not wish to accept the conditions they must be given time to leave the car park.”[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.17. The supposed parking contract displayed at Bridley Close made no restrictions to loading/unloading and once that activity was conducted, I declined to park and left immediately thus excersing my right to grace period.[/FONT]

[FONT=Liberation Serif, serif]3.18 For all of the above, it is clear and undisputable that the sub-contractor acted in several serious breaches of the Codes of Practice to which UKCPM and it’s subcontractors are bound, as highlighted in 3.1. In accordance with the BPA CoP section 15.1 and IPC CoP section 4.1 quoted in 3.3 & 3.4, the non-compliance by a sub-contractor is treated as a non-compliance by UKCPM Ltd and the claim is without out merit and foundation.[/FONT]

4. Breaches of GDPR by sub-contractors issue.

4.1. Article 6 of the GDRP gives defined reasons that a data processor may handle the data of a subject Exhibit article 6. 1b could be considered applicable in this case stating:

“processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract”

4.2. However, the images recorded of myself and my vehicle on the 21/2/2018 were taken not by UKCPM ltd (Data Controler) directly, with whom the aritcle would grant authority but by the sub-contractor Mr Public (Data Processor).

4.3. I ask the court to consider, whether considering the sub-contractors extreme negligence in following the required Code of Practices, and in absense of proof of any training, guidance or quilification in the handling of data in a manner compliant with the GDPR could therefore be considered an authorised party to process my data, the images they captured.

4.4. I argue, UKCPM ltd has in allowing members of the public with no training to process data in performance of their contracts as a breach in GDPR law, most specifically aritcle 28 which sets out the necessary contractual agreements to be made between a data controller and data processor exhibit article 28.

4.5. The claiment is put to strict proof the sub-contractor was trained in and authorised in the handling of data and under aforementioned and required contract with UKCPM, therefore granted rights to processing with intention of upholding a contract.

4.6. Since no such evidence of contractual obligation to the GDPR has not been given, Mr Public has not the athority to act as a data processor on behalf of UKCPM Ltd and his capture, collection and storage of images of me or my property were in breach of GDRP law, illegal, and therefore imissable and cannot be used in support of the alleged breach of contract.

5. No Existing Contract Issue

5.1. I understand from correspondence with the Claimant that the Claimant’s case relies upon the signage at the site (exhibit 10) constituting a ‘contract’ between myself and the Claimant as per ParkingEye vs Beavis. The ‘breach of terms’ on the Particulars Of Claim presumably refers to the supposed ‘contract’ formed by this signage.

5.2. In ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ exhibit, and section, on which the Claimant relies to justify this charge, it was found that a contract could exist because there was a meaningful ‘offer’ made to the Defendant (that of a licence allowing free parking for a set period of time) and that the Defendant’s agreeing not to overstay this period could constitute a ‘consideration’ in respect of this. The ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ judgement is littered with references to the disputed charge being justifiable only in the context of the ‘contractual licence to park’ being given to the Defendant, e.g. ‘They must regard the risk of having to pay £85 for overstaying as an acceptable price for the convenience of parking there’.

5.3. There is no such ‘offer’ made by the signage in this case, no ‘contractual licence’, no ‘benefit of free parking‘ and no conceivable way I could have benefitted from this alleged ‘contract’ without breaching its terms.

5.4. The parking contract in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ case was judged to be ‘objectively reasonable’ partly because ‘motorists generally’ did accept it (108). The landowner wanted as many people as possible to use the car park in question so the contractual arrangements were designed to be attractive to the average motorist. This is the complete antithesis of the supposed ‘contract’ in this case which is designed to actively discourage motorists from parking at the site. The terms of this ‘contract‘are not ‘objectively reasonable’, but deliberately designed to be so heinous that no one in their right mind would agree to them. It follows that this is not a ‘contract’ but a prohibitory notice masquerading as such.

5.5. In J Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw in the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning states that ‘the more unreasonable a clause is, the greater the notice which must be given of it’. This is commonly referred to the ‘Red Hand Rule’. As the terms of this ‘contract’ (specifically the clause relating to a £100 parking charge) are designed to discourage motorists from accepting them it follows that they must be ‘unreasonable’ and that therefore Lord Denning’s rule should apply.

5.6. The Claimant has not applied Lord Denning’s ‘Red Hand Rule’ to the terms and conditions in this case. The sentence that refers to a ‘parking charge’ is in an a smaller font exhibit sign which, given that this sign is supposed to be read from a vehicle, is woefully inadequate - particularly when compared to the signage in the ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ case exhibit beavis sign.

5.7. The very act of entering into this alleged ‘contract’ (parking) constitutes a breach of its terms, therefore making it impossible to perform.

5.8. Both the PCN and Notice to Keeper I was issued by the Claimant state the reason for the disputed charge as being ‘Unauthorised Parking’. I cannot be seen to have entered into a contract for something I was not ‘authorised’ to do.

5.9. The signage and its wording at this site is almost exactly the same as the signage in the case of ‘Parking Control Management v Bull’ (exhibit ) in which the Judge found that it was ‘impossible to construct out of this in any way, either actually or contingently or conditionally, any permission for anyone to park on the roadway.’ and that therefore any charges made on the basis of said signage would be damages for trespass and must constitute reparations for actual loss.

5.10.The Claimant is put to strict proof that the charges issued are proportinate and represantations of actual loss.

5.11. The signage at the site is also very similar to the signage in the cases of ‘Horizon Parking v Mr J. Guildford’ and ‘ES Parking Enforcement v Ms A. Manchester’ in which it was ruled that, if any contractual arrangement could be implied by such signage, then it only applied to vehicles which were ‘authorised’ to park and therefore charges could not be made on a contractual basis for vehicles that were not ‘authorised’ to park.

5.12. In consderation of the above I argue no contract existed, nor could, between myself and the Claimant.

p { margin-bottom: 0.1in; line-height: 115%; }

avagadro

6. Inadequate Signage Issue.

6.1. A key factor in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ was that the relevant signs were ‘large, prominent and legible, so that any reasonable user of the car park would be aware of their existence and nature’ and ‘The charge is prominently displayed in large letters at the entrance to the car park and at frequent intervals within it’. That is not the case here. The charge is displayed obscurely and in a font size illegible from a moving vehicle upon entering the site. Exhibit photo of entrance signs. Exhibit beavis sign. And within the parking area the sign detailing the terms and conditions in below the BPA required minimum CoP Section 18.3450mm x 450 mm Photo of high sign with tape measure.

6.2. In‘Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest’ find and exhibit the Court of Appeal ruled that a person cannot be presumed bound by terms and conditions on signage that they haven’t seen. In this case, which was found in favour of the motorist, the signage was deemed insufficient because there was no sign directly adjacent to the Appellant’s parking bay and the only signage that was displayed could not have been seen from within the vehicle whilst parking.

6.3. In this case there was no sign adjacent to my vehicle, The entrance sign I had passed was too small to be legible at the expected speed, and no signs in the vicinity could possibly be read from my vehicle. I would have had to have stopped the vehicle, exited and approached either sign to read the conditions at the entrance exhibit entrance sign or in the parking area. Exhibit high sign.

6.4. A key factor in ‘ParkingEye vs Beavis’ was that ParkingEye were found to have operated in line with the relevant parking operator’s code of practice (note section 3.1).

6.5. In this case the signage and operating practice of the Claimant fails, on numerous counts, to adhere to the standards laid out by the relevant accredited parking operator - The International Parking Community (IPC) and the British Parking Association (BPA) wthin their code of practices exhibit CoPs.

6.6.The IPC CoP , schedule 1, and BPA CoP section 18, state that signage at the entrance to the site should ‘Make it clear that the motorist is entering onto private land’. The signage at the entrance indicats only that the road is private, and makes no mention of the off road residential parking bays here the vehicle stopped Exhibit photo of entrance.

6.7. Schedule 1 of the IPC CoP states that text on signage ‘should be of such a size and in a font that can be easily read by a motorist having regard to the likely position of the motorist in relation to the sign.’ The text on the signage, particularly that which refers to ‘contractual terms’ and a ‘parking charge’ is very small. This, coupled with the fact that the sign is mounted at least 6ft off the ground, makes it very hard to read and impossible to read from a vehicle. Furthermore the BPA CoP, Apendix B, set’s out clear font sizes to which the signs fail to adhere. Measure sign fonts, compare and elucidate if in error.

7. Improper Practice Issue

7.1. The Particulars of Claim state that the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle(s). These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply withCivil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5 exhibit. Further, the particulars of the claim do not meet the requirements of Practice Direction 16 7.5 exhibit as there is nothing which specifies how the terms were breached.

7.2. The Particulars of Claim submitted by the Claimant is not compliant with the Practice Directions fins an exhibit. The Claimant has not attached the contract(s) it wishes to rely on that it alleges were in place at the time. The Claimant has not clarified whether it is seeking keeper liability and has not attached any confirmation that it has gone through the necessary steps to do so.

7.3. It is true that the Defendant is the registered keeper and was so at the time of the incidents. However, that does not deem the keeper liable as the Claimant has not identified the driver and would therefore need to adhere to the strict provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to hold the Defendant responsible for the driver’s alleged breach. Download & Digest PoFA2012 and bring out any indscrepencies. If none, discard.

7.4. In the Notice to Keeper they failed to give the statutory warning to the registered keeper about the '28 day period' which is mandatory wording as prescribed in paragraph 9(2)(f) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Consequently, the Claimant would be unable to rely on the 'keeper liability' provisions of the POFA 2012. Check you Notice to Keeper, did they do this? Can Photo be consider ANRP, shorter (14day) timelimit. Was that adherred to also?

8. Consumer Rights

8.1 If a contract were deemed to exist between myself and the Claimant it would, under the terms of The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (exhibit 13), be defined as a ‘distance contract’. As ‘distance contract’ is defined as ‘a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded’.

8.2 As a ‘distance contract’, the signage at the site does not carry the information required by The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (exhibit 13), specifically on the right to cancel required by paragraph (l) of Schedule 2.

8.3 As the signage does not carry the information required as specified in 4.2 (above) I have the right to cancel the contract as specified by The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (exhibit 13) clause 31 ‘Cancellation period extended for breach of information requirement’.


9. Landowner Authority Issue

9.1.The Claimant has not provided any indication that they are authorised by the landowner to issue parking charges and carry out court proceedings on their behalf. The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have they authority to do this, and that the terms and conditions of parking they impose at the site are in line with what they have been authorised to do.

10. Additional Costs Issue

10.1 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) exhibit states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £60, for which no calculation or explanation is given, and which appears to be an attempt at double recovery

10.2. The Particulars of Claim also include a further to the above £9.13. I have no idea what these charges refer to as there appears to be no contractual basis for them, even if one were to take the Claimants somewhat far-fetched view as to what constitutes a ‘contract’ into account. The Claimant is put to strict proof that these additional charges are justified.

10.3. The Particulars of Claim include £50 for ‘solicitors costs’ yet all I have received from the Claimant’s solicitors are automated letters. The Claimant is put to strict proof that these ‘solicitors costs’ are justified.

11. Conclusion.

To conclude, I xxxx as the defendant request that the claim be struck out and my costs awarded on the catastrophic failure of UKCPM ltd to issue a valid charge and pursue a worthy small claim.

In failing to understand the distictions in operation and practices which it conducts it’s business.

By the atrocious behaviour of it’s sub-contractor, failing to adhere to the Codes of Practices by which it is bound to adhere. Carrying out several serious breaches on conduct, some with merit to disqualify it’s operation as a parking authority with access to DVLA data, in attempt to issue an inflated financial charge. Further resulting in breaking GDRP laws, the Claimant pushed on attempting to establish a non exisiting contract with me, again outside of the recommendations in procedure and physical prescence of the CoPs it purpotes to be a member.

On these foundations of negligence and malpractice, the claimant then wasted mine and the courts time pursuing this matter in a manner outside of the proper proceedures that can only be seen to be an embarassment from a firm and it’s legal representitives which conduct themselves regularly in these affairs.

The evidence laid out in the argument above show clear and distinct fact and context to allow this claim to be swiftly and deftly dismissed, and I invite judge’s name do so on their basis.

p { margin-bottom: 0.1in; line-height: 115%; }