Defence assistance

Lop5

beamerguy wrote: »

Therefore the £60 of fabricated ‘debt recovery charges’ or ‘damages’ as the Claimant refers to in Paragraph 66 of their WS is unrecoverable

You are making too light of this fake £60

IT IS ABUSE OF PROCESS
Read this ....
https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6014081/abuse-of-process-district-judge-tells-bwlegal

Pay particular attention to coupon-mad post # 14

You can see that judges have kicked out these fake claims as Abuse Of Process so YOU MUST highlight this to the judge and help him or her by advising of the cases

Amazing thank you for bringing this to my attention! It's a shame these cases were pre defence submission. I've added this into my skeleton argument and will be highlighting again in my summary.

Lop5

Do I need to have a printed copy of every single piece of legislation and case law I've mentioned with me on the day?

Coupon-mad

Yes, copies of everything but not the Beavis case.

Also a wage slip, and are you submitting a costs schedule with this skelly, as it's a good time to put in some high costs in the hundreds, and rehearsing how to argue for those costs on the 'indemnity' basis, like here:

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6001157/ukcpm-gladstoned

is a mute argument.

Moot?

Lop5

Not even the specific parts I've quoted from Beavis? I was just going to print certain sections?

Yes moot! =D thank you for pointing that out. Yes also definitely adding a costs schedule.

Have I covered every basis I need to? I'm just adding my intro and summary and then I'll repost for a final check.

Lop5

Hi all, here is hopefully my last draft. I've added a few extra bits in. I still need to do all of the fiddly bits and a quick intro but hopefully now the main body is finished. The mute to moot still needs to be found and changed =D Any feedback is most welcome. Thanks in advance.

THE CLAIMANT’S WITNESS STATEMENT

The defendant will address the Claimant’s Witness Statement (WS) which the Defendant avers is inaccurate, untruthful and contradictory.

The Paralegal who produced and submitted the WS on behalf of the Claimant commenced their employment for the Claimant in January 2019, 5 months after the alleged parking offence, therefore all of the information provided in the WS is not to their own knowledge and the facts stated by them cannot be classified as true. An example of this is evidenced in the Defendant’s WS paragraph 3 relating to page 22 of the Claimant’s WS whereby an inaccurate depiction of the car park, its spaces and the amount of signage has been provided. The Defendant has included as evidence to this document a Google Maps Satellite View which was not available at the time of producing their WS and could therefore not be included.

Paragraph 5 of the Claimant’s WS claims they are an Accredited Member of an Approved Trade Association (ATA) and received Approved Operator Status (AOS) by fully complying with the ATA’s Code of Practice (CoP) enabling them to obtain keeper information from the Driver and Vehicle Licencing Agency (DVLA). The claimant stipulates the CoP merely ‘gives recommendations’ whereas the Supreme Court in ParkingEye v. Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 found a CoP to be ‘binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA’. Therefore the CoP does not merely comprise ‘recommendations’, it effectively regulates an AOS and therefore full compliance is required to obtain DVLA data. Part B2 (2.1) of the International Parking Community (IPC) CoP states ‘It is therefore of fundamental importance that the signage meets the minimum standards under The Code as this underpins the validity of any such charge.’

The Defendant denies the signage within the car park meets the minimum standards stipulated by the CoP, therefore VCS have not fully complied with the IPC’s CoP and should have not been able to obtain data from the DVLA. In addition, the prolix text of varying sizes makes the signage illegible from a moving vehicle and from the parking space in which the vehicle was parked. There are an insufficient amount of warning signs within the carpark, with no signs located at the entrance, to the north or to the east. There are only 3 signs located within the car park, none of which are located in a way in which could be easily read upon entrance to the car park or from the bay in which the vehicle was parked. The defendant’s vehicle was facing to the north and therefore there was no signage distinctly visible from the parking bay. It is therefore denied the signage within the car park is adequate for the purpose of creating a legally binding contract.

The Claimant states in paragraph 7 of their WS the Defendant was confirmed as the driver of the vehicle whilst the vehicle was parked within the development (XXXXX). This statement is factually incorrect as the Defendant was only confirmed as the driver of the vehicle when an appeal was lodged with the Claimant on XXXX and the Defendant identified themselves as the driver of the vehicle.

Paragraph 9 of the Claimant’s WS implies the Claimant has the authority to implement a parking scheme on the land in which the car park is situated, however the contract the Claimant has provided in their evidence has an expiration date of 12 months from the date of 08/12/2017. The Claimant states due to clause 6.5 of the contract, the Claimant still has the authority to provide a parking control service and that the contract between the Claimant and the landowner is still ‘live’, however as the Claimant has not provided any evidence that they have not received a notice of termination from the landowner, the Claimant is again put to strict proof they have the necessary authorisation to issue parking charge notices (CN) and pursue payment by means of litigation.

The Claimant stipulates in paragraph 15 of their WS that there are 4 warning signs detailing the terms and conditions of the car park and these warning signs are visible upon entry to the car park. Again this statement is factually incorrect due to there only being 3 warning signs within the car park which is evidenced in the Defendant’s witness statement, none of which are visibly legible upon entry to the car park. Paragraph 16 states that there is sufficient and adequate signage, however the Claimant has given an inaccurate description of the car park including the amount of signage, the Claimant has clearly never been to this carpark and therefore cannot comment on the sufficiency or adequacy of the signage.

Paragraph 18 and 19 describes ‘a card’ which was affixed to the Defendant’s windscreen on the specified date of the alleged contravention. According to The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA 2012) Schedule 4 Para 7(2)(a) to (f) stipulates the requirements a Notice To Driver (NTD) must meet. The only requirement met by the Claimant is requirement 7(2)(f) as the notice does specify the time and date it was given. All other requirements have not been met. Para 7(4)(a) and (b) also stipulates a Notice To Driver must be given whilst the vehicle is stationary and before it is removed from the relevant land. The Claimant specifically states in in Paragraph 52 of their WS the card attached to the windscreen of the vehicle was merely a ‘warning card’ not a NTD as they state in Paragraph 53 the NTD is the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) issued on 24/08/2018, therefore the “warning card” does not satisfy the requirements of Para 7(2)(a) to (e) of POFA 2012 Schedule 4.

Paragraph 30 refers to Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking 1971 2 QB 163. The findings of this case are somewhat relevant to the current case, however not in the way the Claimant has described. The main judgement of this case found that the Claimant could only be bound by the terms known at that time, in this case upon the sign at the entrance to the car park, and not by any further terms printed elsewhere. Mr. Justice Mocatta states in the original case

‘if you do desire to impose upon your customers stringent conditions such as these, the least you can do is to post a prominent notice at the entrance to the premises, warning your customers that there are conditions which will apply’
which Sir Gordon Willmer further endorses in his final conclusion of the appeal. In regards to the current case there are no such warning signs at the entrance to the car park and therefore an acceptance of contract cannot be made in relation to the terms set out on the Claimant’s signage.

‘By entering this private land you are entering into a contract with Vehicle Control Services Ltd.’
As there is no signage at the entrance to the carpark, the Defendant could therefore not agree to the contractual offer as the Defendant would have to enter the car park to locate a sign which stipulates this contractual term. The signage is therefore inadequate for the purpose of creating a legally binding contract as the Defendant was unable to accept the term of the contract without physically entering the land. Therefore paragraph 34 of the Claimant’s WS is untrue; the Claimant has not done what is reasonable to draw attention to the existence of the contractual terms.

The quote included in paragraph 32 regarding Vine v Waltham Forest LBC [2002] 1 WLR 2383, 2390 is misquoted and misleading. Roch L.J. was merely referencing the arguments put to him before passing judgement and the paragraph the Claimant has quoted is the Respondent's argument in the original case. The full paragraph states
‘The respondents’ case is that the Recorder having found that the notice was clearly visible, it should be inferred that the Recorder concluded that the appellant saw the notice and consented to her car being clamped or voluntarily assumed the risk of that occurring. Alternatively, and this is the ground principally urged upon us by Mr Mott, the question whether a person voluntarily assumes a risk or consents to trespass to his or her property is to be judge objectively and not subjectively. Once it is established that sufficient and adequate warning notices were in place, a car driver cannot be heard to say that he or she did not see the notice. Were that to be the law, it would be too easy for car drivers who trespass with their cars to evade the only method land owners have of stopping the unauthorised parking of cars in parking spaces or parking areas on their property.’'

Roch L.J. does however go on to state in their judgement, ‘Normally the presence of notices which are posted where they are bound to be seen, for example at the entrance to a private car park, which are of a type which the car driver would be bound to have read, will lead to a finding that the car driver had knowledge of and appreciated the warning.’ thus supporting the Defendant’s defence that the signage was inadequate in creating a legally binding contract due to the lack of warning signage at the entrance to the car park. The Defendant was not made aware of the terms and conditions of parking upon entrance to the car park and could therefore not have consented to such terms.

Paragraph 33 is strongly denied by the Defendant. The Defendant appealed to the Claimant 2 days after the alleged contravention which the Claimant acknowledges in paragraph 40 of their WS, therefore it is fallacious for the Claimant to state the Defendant failed to act upon each notice addressed to them as this is clearly not factually accurate.

The Defendant notes the Claimant is confusing Practice Direction 16 7.3 to 7.5 for 7.1 in Paragraph 47 of the Claimant’s WS. The Claimant also inaccurately quotes an extract from their signage. ‘By parking or remaining on this private land you are entering into a contract with Vehicle Control Services Ltd.’, as mentioned previously and evidenced by the Claimant in their WS, the actual sign states: ‘By entering this private land you are entering into a contract with Vehicle Control Services Ltd.’ By entering the car park the Defendant had unknowingly entered into a contract with the Claimant as there is no signage at the entrance to the car park. Therefore there was no offer and acceptance of a contract.

Paragraph 50 states the amount of £100 for breaching the terms and conditions is the consideration of the contract. This statement is incorrect. The Defendant’s consideration is the agreement to pay the specified amount in order to park, in this case £1.50 per hour, which was paid on the specified date for an allotted period of 4 hours. The £100 charge levied by the Claimant’s CN is a penalty for breach of contract, thus the penalty rule is engaged. In this the case, the inflated £160 demand is extravagant and unconscionable and a clear punishment of a paying consumer.

Paragraph 57 incorrectly states there are 4 warning signs within the car park including one located at the entrance to warn motorists they are entering the car park subject to terms and conditions. There is no such sign located at the entrance to the car park evidenced in the Defendant’s WS. There is in fact a sign that reads “The Strawberry Car Park, Pay & Display, Entrance”. The Defendant would certainly not class this as a warning sign informing motorists of the terms and conditions of the car park they are about to enter.

The Defendant is unsure as to what document the Claimant is describing as ‘the first PCN’ in Paragraph 63, however by stating the Defendant ‘could not have been in any doubt, at worst, after the issue of the first PCN’ of the terms and conditions is a mute argument. As adduced by the Claimant in their WS Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking 1971 2 QB 163 establishes the Claimant could only be bound by terms known at the time, certainly not after the issue of a ‘first PCN’.

LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW SUPPORTING THE DEFENDANT’S DEFENCE

The Defendant would like to place significant emphasis on The Claimant’s quite blatant breach of The Data Protection Act 2018. As evidenced in the Defendant’s WS they have received numerous communications from a company known as Excel Parking Services Limited. This company is not the Claimant named on the County Court Claim Form, is not named on the warning signs demonstrated in the Claimant’s evidence nor the company named on the contract provided by the Claimant stipulating they were authorised to enforce parking management on the land situated at XXXXXXX. The Defendant avers they did not give the Claimant authorisation to share their personal data.

Due to the sparseness of the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim, the Defendant was thus unable to prepare an initial specific defence. The Particulars fail to identify a cause of action and disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed nor do they give any indication on what basis the claim is brought; whether for breach of contract, contractual liability, or trespass. The Claimant has therefore failed to fulfil Civil Practice Rule (CPR) Part 16.4 1(a), as a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies has not been supplied. The Claimant has claimed they were restricted by the 1080 character limit of an online claim form; however as highlighted in Paragraph 18 of the Defendant’s WS the Claimant has only used 530 characters of the 1080 limit. The Claimant failed to utilise 550 free characters which would have enabled them to provide a more detailed set of particulars. The Claimant has also failed to comply with Practice Direction (PD) 16 7.5 as they have not specified how the terms of the alleged contract were breached.

The Claimant has failed to adhere to POFA 2012 Schedule 4, terminating their right to claim unpaid parking charges. The conditions stipulated in Paragraph 7, which must be met in order to enable the creditor to recover unpaid parking charges, have not been met.

7(1)A notice which is to be relied on as a notice to driver for the purposes of paragraph 6(1)(a) is given in accordance with this paragraph if the following requirements are met.
(2)The notice must—
(a)specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates;
(b)inform the driver of the requirement to pay parking charges in respect of the specified period of parking and describe those charges, the circumstances in which the requirement arose (including the means by which it was brought to the attention of drivers) and the other facts that made those charges payable;
(c)inform the driver that the parking charges relating to the specified period of parking have not been paid in full and specify the total amount of the unpaid parking charges relating to that period, as at a time which is—
(i)specified in the notice; and
(ii)no later than the time specified under paragraph (f);
(d)inform the driver of any discount offered for prompt payment and the arrangements for the resolution of disputes or complaints that are available;
(e)identify the creditor and specify how and to whom payment may be made;
(f)specify the time when the notice is given and the date.
(3)The notice must relate only to a single period of parking specified under sub-paragraph (2)(a) (but this does not prevent the giving of separate notices each specifying different parts of a single period of parking).
(4)The notice must be given—
(a)before the vehicle is removed from the relevant land after the end of the period of parking to which the notice relates, and
(b)while the vehicle is stationary,
by affixing it to the vehicle or by handing it to a person appearing to be in charge of the vehicle.

The Claimant has failed to meet the conditions of Paragraph 7(2)(a)to(e) and 7(4)(a)and(b). The ‘warning card’ the Claimant states is not a NTD does not satisfy the conditions of POFA 2012 Schedule 4.

It is strongly denied that the Defendant entered into a contract with the Claimant. The signage in which the Claimant asserts is the basis of the contractual agreement is inadequate for the purpose of creating a legally binding contract. As previously mentioned, the Claimant inaccurately states there is a warning sign containing the terms and conditions of parking at the entrance to the site. There is no such sign. The specific wording of the signage renders the offeree of the contract incapable of accepting the contractual terms due to the lack of signage at the entrance. By entering the site the Defendant had already, unbeknown to them, entered into the contract. However, as there was no contractual offer upon entrance to the car park, the Defendant was unable to accept the contractual terms. Therefore due to the lack of offer and acceptance, no contractual licence was created. The Defendant again highlights the findings in Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking 1971 2 QB 163 and Vine v Waltham Forest LBC [2002] 1 WLR 2383, 2390.

It is also denied the wording on the signage satisfactorily sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear and discernible manner for the purpose of creating a legally binding contract. The Defendant brings to the courts attention the image of the signage which was deemed sufficient of creating a binding contract by the Supreme Court in the case of ParkingEye v. Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, evidenced on page 23 of the Defendant’s WS. The Defendant would like to highlight the difference in the text on each sign. The information and terms of parking on the Beavis case sign are set out in a clear manner, with succinct wording in large font sizes and a minimal amount of text which is easy to read and therefore hard to misinterpret. It is evident the signage presented as evidence by the Claimant has a great deal more text than the Beavis sign. The prolix text is of various font sizes, most of which are illegible unless standing directly in front of the sign. The excessive amount of wording in various font sizes creates a very haphazard and confusing document, which cannot be deemed sufficient of binding any reasonable person who attempts to read them from a moving vehicle into a contractual agreement. Part E Schedule 1 of the IPC’s CoP clearly states ‘Text should be of such a size and in a font that can be easily read by a motorist having regard to the likely position of the motorist in relation to the sign.’

POFA 2O12 Schedule 4 makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that ‘The maximum sum which may be recovered from the keeper by virtue of the right conferred by this paragraph is the amount specified in the notice to keeper under paragraph 8(2)(c) or (d) or, as the case may be, 9(2)(d) (less any payments towards the unpaid parking charges which are received after the time so specified).’

ParkingEye v. Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 upholds this as it was found that a parking company cannot recover damages as they do not own the land in which the alleged parking offence took place, as well as the case being brought as breach of contract and not for trespass. Therefore the £60 of fabricated ‘debt recovery charges’ or ‘damages’ as the Claimant refers to in Paragraph 66 of their WS is unrecoverable. The Defendant avers this is an abuse of process. Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption state: ‘As it was not the owner of the car park, ParkingEye could not recover damages, unless it was in possession, in which case it may be able to recover a small amount of damages for trespass. This is because it lost nothing by the unauthorised use resulting from Mr Beavis overstaying.’

Two very recent cases were subsequently dismissed without a hearing on the basis of abuse of process. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. Both Orders were identical in striking out each claim without a hearing:
'IT IS ORDERED THAT The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.'

CPR 44.3 (2) states: ‘Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will–
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.’

Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, the Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'debt recovery charges' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

The final judgement of ParkingEye v. Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 is not applicable to this case as the circumstances involved in each case are distinctly different. The Beavis judgement focuses on the doctrine of penalties and found that each case is fact specific and to correctly test for a penalty will depend on the particular facts and circumstances established in each individual case. I refer the court to Paragraph 255 in which Lord Hodge states:
‘I therefore conclude that the correct test for a penalty is whether the sum or remedy stipulated as a consequence of a breach of contract is exorbitant or unconscionable when regard is had to the innocent party’s interest in the performance of the contract. Where the test is to be applied to a clause fixing the level of damages to be paid on breach, an extravagant disproportion between the stipulated sum and the highest level of damages that could possibly arise from the breach would amount to a penalty and thus be unenforceable.’

In the case of Beavis the car park operated a scheme in which consumers could park for free for a period of 2 hours, whereas this case involves a pay and display scheme in which the consumer must pay a fee of £1.50 per hour to park. The Defendant reiterates that a fee of £6 was paid in order to park for a period of 4 hours, evidenced by the valid pay and display ticket the Defendant still possesses and which was presented as evidence to the Claimant as part of the appeal, making the Claimant aware that no monies were owed for the period of parking. The Supreme Court found that ParkingEye had a legitimate interest in charging an £85 fee which was to deter inconsiderate parking practices and to provide an income stream and make a profit. In this case the Claimant cannot claim they were serving a legitimate interest in charging the Defendant £100 as the Defendant paid to park and has proven this. The £100 charge is a clear punishment of a paying consumer who made every reasonable effort to comply with the terms of parking by purchasing and displaying a ticket, therefore the penalty rule remains engaged and the court is urged to find the charge to be extravagant and unconscionable. In Jolley v Carmel Ltd [2000] 2 –EGLR -154, it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours and takes reasonable steps to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach outside of their control.

The Defendant also relies on Schedule 2, Part 1, Paragraph 6 of the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 2015, whereby a term in a contract may be regarded as unfair if it ‘has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation’ and Part 2, Paragraph 62(1) whereby ‘An unfair term of a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer’. Part 2, Paragraph 71 of the CRA 2015 stipulates that the Court has a duty to consider the fairness of the terms.

Lop5

In the case of ParkingEye v. Cargius [2014] A0JD1405 (Wrexham County Court) Deputy District Judge C. Mahy also highlights that in cases such as these, claims are fact specific and judgement should be based on the individual circumstances of each case. The judgement distinguished the case from two previous ParkingEye Ltd cases as both cases dealt with free car parks and therefore the charges were found to be commercially justifiable as it was the only source of revenue received by the parking company; whereas in the case of Cargius, and also this case, the parking company charge a significant sum of money to park. Furthermore, the case of Cargius is distinguished from this case in that the Defendant owed £2 due to an overstay, whereas in this case the Defendant has proven that no monies were owed as they had a valid parking ticket for the time in which the alleged parking offence occurred. It was found that as the Claimant had brought the case to the County Court it was for them to prove that the £100 charge was reasonable and commercially justified. The final judgement found the £100 charge to be completely disproportionate to the level of loss, which in this case is nothing.

The Defendant would like to draw to the court’s attention a Bill which was recently enacted on the 15th March 2019. The Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 is an act of legislation to make provision for and in connection with a CoP containing guidance about the operation and management of private parking facilities. Private parking companies will soon have to adhere to a new single CoP which will ensure parking is consistent, transparent and easier to understand. The Act also includes the provision of a new independent appeals service giving drivers greater support to challenge unjustified parking tickets. Paragraph 13 of the Defendant’s WS goes into further detail of the private parking industry and its rogue and unjust practices which lead to the enactment of this Bill. FJ 1 page 36 of The Defendant’s WS also includes a letter of support from Mary Glindon MP. It is reassuring to know that the will of Parliament is to ensure greater regulation of rogue private parking companies and their illegal and unfair practices, such as the Claimant in this case.


SUMMARY

In summary, it is the Defendant’s position that the Claimant’s poorly pleaded claim discloses no liability in law for any sum at all. The claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit and has no real prospect of success.

The Defendant denies a contractual agreement ever existed between the Defendant and the Claimant. Due to the specific wording of the warning signs and the lack of signage upon entrance to the car park, a sufficient contractual offer was therefore not presented to the Defendant. The Defendant avers the signage is inadequate for the purpose of creating a legally binding contract and relies on the case of ParkingEye v. Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 for comparison.

The Claimant has failed to comply with the stipulations of POFA 2012 Schedule 4, therefore terminating their right to claim unpaid parking charges.

The Claimant’s Particulars of Claim fail to fulfil Civil Procedure Rule Part 16 and Practice Direction 16.

The Claimant has demonstrated a clear breach of the Data Protection Act 2018 by sharing the Defendant’s personal details without their knowledge or consent.

The Defendant avers the £160 parking charge for an alleged breach of contract is unjustified and a clear punishment of a paying consumer, therefore the penalty rule remains engaged and any such sum is unrecoverable.

The Claimant has also demonstrated a clear abuse of process in their repeated attempts to claim additional inflated costs which they are not entitled to recover. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.

The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim fictitious costs which they are not entitled to recover.

Coupon-mad

The mute to moot still needs to be found and changed

Control & F to search for a word, and there it is in 0.00001 seconds!

Not even the specific parts I've quoted from Beavis? I was just going to print certain sections?

Not needed, but print once, for YOUR file for the hearing, to help you.

Obviously you will be putting DJ Grand's judgment in evidence which was the entire point of why I linked it in my reply in Beamerguy's Abuse of Process thread. The whole point is, that one has a judgment/order to use as evidence.

And re this:

Paragraph 57 incorrectly states there are 4 warning signs within the car park including one located at the entrance to warn motorists they are entering the car park subject to terms and conditions. There is no such sign located at the entrance to the car park evidenced in the Defendant’s WS.

You need to evidence that entrance with pics of from Google Street View from the right time, or photo evidence of your own.

And don't head a Defendant's WS up:

THE CLAIMANT’S WITNESS STATEMENT

:eek:

KeithP

Don't forget paragraph numbering.

Lop5

Obviously you will be putting DJ Grand's judgment in evidence which was the entire point of why I linked it in my reply in Beamerguy's Abuse of Process thread. The whole point is, that one has a judgment/order to use as evidence.

Am I just copying and pasting the judgement or is there something important I'm missing?

I have images of the car park entrance in my WS I'll mention the page for it in that paragraph.

Coupon-mad

The judgment/order can't be copied & pasted. I don't mean the words, I mean the PDF.