Letter before claim from Gladstones

Le_Kirk

Joey_Santiago wrote: »

Thanks - yep, that is where 90% of the above came from

You need a point about landowner authority. Also to answer you question about signage, there is a Bargepole defence that covers dubious signage in the NEWBIE thread, plus if you read the BPA CoP as pointed out by Redx, you should find that recent signage changes have to be pointed out so as not to confuse locals who would have become used to the old ways.

Joey_Santiago

Thanks all, revised version below.
@Le_Kirk - cheers, my point 4 was taken from the dubious signage defence. I've added the point about landowner authority
Point 5: I've added statements from both CoP
Point 8: Added abuse of process
My wording doesn't feel very 'legal' so any changes welcome. One other thing I wondered is should I clarify here that I am fighting their point that I didn't remove my child from the car (as well as the presence of the child in the car).


1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The facts are that the vehicle, registration XXXX, of which the Defendant is the registered keeper, was parked on the material date in a marked child and parent bay accompanied by a 2 year old child.

3. The Particulars of Claim state that they believe the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5.

4. It is denied that the Claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner. There is no signage in front of the child and parent bay. It is in front of an adjoining disabled bay and is not clearly visible unless parked in that bay.

5. The Claimant has stated that the signage was changed on 29th November 2017, 0x days before the material date, when the statement ’No parking in a parent and child bay unless accompanied out of the vehicle by a child 12 year old or less’ was added. The Claimant failed to highlight this change of contract terms as demanded by British Parking Association Approved Operator Code of Practice (version 7 January 2018, Clause 18.10 ) "Where there is a change in the terms and conditions that materially affects the motorist then you must make these terms and conditions clear on your signage. Where such changes impose liability where none previously existed then you must consider a transition to allow regular visitors to the site to adjust and familiarise themselves with the changes. Best practice would be the installation of additional/temporary signage at the entrance and throughout the site making it clear that new terms and conditions apply. This will ensure such that regular visitors who may be familiar with the previous terms become aware of the new ones.”
IPC Code of Practice (Part E, Schedule 1 - Signage. Changes in Operator’s Terms and Conditions) also states "Where there is any change in the terms and conditions materially affecting the motorist you may place additional (temporary) signage at the entrance making it clear that new terms and conditions/charges apply, such that regular visitors who may be familiar with the old terms do not inadvertently incur parking charges. This signage should be in addition to the signage ordinarily required."

6. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

7. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £77.44, for 'contractual costs persuant to the Contract and PCN terms and conditions, together with statutory interest' which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

8. Further to point 7 above I believe this to be an abuse of process from the claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover as this recently dismissed case refers. Claim number is F0DP201T District Judge Taylor. Southampton Court, 10th June 2019

9. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Redx

the abuse of process paragraphs are numerous , perhaps up to 10 in themselves, so that reference to them in point 8) doesnt cut the mustard


you need to add the full section and do a renumber, almost doubling the points and length , I did tell you this in post #29 above

Coupon-mad

Why are people only referring to the DJ Taylor decision, when I wrote a full version of several paragraphs about added costs, mentioning DJ Grand (the one with the tangible judgment to use in evidence later)?

Easy to find by searching.

Redx

beamer gave him the link in post #27 , he hasnt read it properly

Joey_Santiago

Hi, I did read it all, I just thought you were referring to the case reference at the top of the post. I've added all those points so hope i'm closer now.
Not sure about the last summary para now as the AOP section had it's own summary?



1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The facts are that the vehicle, registration XXXX, of which the Defendant is the registered keeper, was parked on the material date in a marked child and parent bay accompanied by a 2 year old child.

3. The Particulars of Claim state that they believe the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5.

4. It is denied that the Claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner. There is no signage in front of the child and parent bay. It is in front of an adjoining disabled bay and is not clearly visible unless parked in that bay.

5. The Claimant has stated that the signage was changed on 29th November 2017, 0x days before the material date, when the statement ’No parking in a parent and child bay unless accompanied out of the vehicle by a child 12 year old or less’ was added. The Claimant failed to highlight this change of contract terms as demanded by British Parking Association Approved Operator Code of Practice (version 7 January 2018, Clause 18.10 ) "Where there is a change in the terms and conditions that materially affects the motorist then you must make these terms and conditions clear on your signage. Where such changes impose liability where none previously existed then you must consider a transition to allow regular visitors to the site to adjust and familiarise themselves with the changes. Best practice would be the installation of additional/temporary signage at the entrance and throughout the site making it clear that new terms and conditions apply. This will ensure such that regular visitors who may be familiar with the previous terms become aware of the new ones.”
IPC Code of Practice (Part E, Schedule 1 - Signage. Changes in Operator’s Terms and Conditions) also states "Where there is any change in the terms and conditions materially affecting the motorist you may place additional (temporary) signage at the entrance making it clear that new terms and conditions/charges apply, such that regular visitors who may be familiar with the old terms do not inadvertently incur parking charges. This signage should be in addition to the signage ordinarily required."

6. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

7. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £77.44, for 'contractual costs persuant to the Contract and PCN terms and conditions, together with statutory interest' which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

8. Further to point 7 above I believe this to be an abuse of process from the claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover.

9. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

10. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

11. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

12. Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims. The court is invited to note that no named Solicitor has signed the Particulars, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity.

13. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

14. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

15. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing:
''IT IS ORDERED THAT The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

16. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged.

17. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

18. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.

19. In summary, it is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.

Redx

A lot better, lol

I would move the in summary at 16 down to the other one at 19, remove the second 2 words in summary and make it read correctly, so combine the two and renumber so it finishes as 18 and not 19

Then I would wait for any more critique before submitting, but I believe that your defence is very good now, much better than before

If judges are getting wise to the AOP issue these spurious claims may get struck out en masse once it's pointed out, we can but hope, especially when you think that Parking Eye do not add them onto claims

beamerguy

#15

''IT IS ORDERED THAT The claim is struck out"

District Judge Taylor stated ....

The English language being what it is, you do not want the judge thinking YOU are ordering

Le_Kirk

You've made the point about the child in your point 2, anything else about it (removing child from car etc.) would come in the witness statement which is in effect, what happened on the day.

Joey_Santiago

Thanks all, no other critique received over the weekend so have made those changes. Hopefully good to go?


1. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.

2. The facts are that the vehicle, registration XXXX, of which the Defendant is the registered keeper, was parked on the material date in a marked child and parent bay accompanied by a 2 year old child.

3. The Particulars of Claim state that they believe the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or the driver of the vehicle. These assertions indicate that the Claimant has failed to identify a Cause of Action, and is simply offering a menu of choices. As such, the Claim fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4, or with Civil Practice Direction 16, paras. 7.3 to 7.5.

4. It is denied that the Claimant's signage sets out the terms in a sufficiently clear manner. There is no signage in front of the child and parent bay. It is in front of an adjoining disabled bay and is not clearly visible unless parked in that bay.

5. The Claimant has stated that the signage was changed on 29th November 2017, 0x days before the material date, when the statement ’No parking in a parent and child bay unless accompanied out of the vehicle by a child 12 year old or less’ was added. The Claimant failed to highlight this change of contract terms as demanded by British Parking Association Approved Operator Code of Practice (version 7 January 2018, Clause 18.10 ) "Where there is a change in the terms and conditions that materially affects the motorist then you must make these terms and conditions clear on your signage. Where such changes impose liability where none previously existed then you must consider a transition to allow regular visitors to the site to adjust and familiarise themselves with the changes. Best practice would be the installation of additional/temporary signage at the entrance and throughout the site making it clear that new terms and conditions apply. This will ensure such that regular visitors who may be familiar with the previous terms become aware of the new ones.”
IPC Code of Practice (Part E, Schedule 1 - Signage. Changes in Operator’s Terms and Conditions) also states "Where there is any change in the terms and conditions materially affecting the motorist you may place additional (temporary) signage at the entrance making it clear that new terms and conditions/charges apply, such that regular visitors who may be familiar with the old terms do not inadvertently incur parking charges. This signage should be in addition to the signage ordinarily required."

6. The Claimant is put to strict proof that it has sufficient proprietary interest in the land, or that it has the necessary authorisation from the landowner to issue parking charge notices, and to pursue payment by means of litigation.

7. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper, in this case £100. The claim includes an additional £77.44, for 'contractual costs persuant to the Contract and PCN terms and conditions, together with statutory interest' which appears to be an attempt at double recovery.

8. Further to point 7 above I believe this to be an abuse of process from the claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover.

9. CPR 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –
(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and
(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

10. Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported costs are wholly disproportionate and do not stand up to scrutiny. In fact it is averred that the Claimant has not paid or incurred such damages/costs or 'legal fees' at all. Any debt collection letters were a standard feature of a low cost business model and are already counted within the parking charge itself.

11. The Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis case is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in Beavis) was held to already incorporate the minor costs of an automated private parking business model. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that the alleged 'parking charge' itself is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover the cost of all letters.

12. Any purported 'legal costs' are also made up out of thin air. Given the fact that robo-claim solicitors and parking firms process tens of thousands of claims handled by an admin team or paralegals, the Defendant avers that no solicitor is likely to have supervised this current batch of cut & paste claims. The court is invited to note that no named Solicitor has signed the Particulars, in breach of Practice Direction 22, and rendering the statement of truth a nullity.

13. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA a Claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs allegedly incurred by already remunerated administrative staff.

14. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (POFA) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (and the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

15. Judges have disallowed all added parking firm 'costs' in County courts up and down the Country. In Claim number F0DP201T on 10th June 2019, District Judge Taylor sitting at the County Court at Southampton, echoed an earlier General Judgment or Order of DJ Grand, who on 21st February 2019 sitting at the Newport (IOW) County Court, had struck out a parking firm claim. One was a BPA member serial Claimant (Britannia, using BW Legal's robo-claim model) and one an IPC member serial Claimant (UKCPM, using Gladstones' robo-claim model) yet the Order was identical in striking out both claims without a hearing: District Judge Taylor stated "IT IS ORDERED THAT The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998…"

16. There are several options available within the Courts' case management powers to prevent vexatious litigants pursuing a wide range of individuals for matters which are near-identical, with meritless claims and artificially inflated costs. The Defendant is of the view that private parking firms operate as vexatious litigants and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

17. The Court is invited to make an Order of its own initiative, dismissing this claim in its entirety and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14 on the indemnity basis, taking judicial note of the wholly unreasonable conduct of this Claimant, not least due to the abuse of process in repeatedly attempting to claim fanciful costs which they are not entitled to recover.

18. In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading and indeed mendacious in terms of the added costs alleged. It is the Defendant's position that the claim discloses no cause of action, is without merit, and has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, the Court is invited to strike out the claim of its own initiative, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence are true.