CIVIL ENFORCEMENT LTD have filed a CCJ for old address

Umkomaas

Castle wrote: »

The "date posted" is missing from the PCN.

Nice spot. Yep PoFA Sch4, para 9 (2) (i).

(i)specify the date on which the notice is sent (where it is sent by post) or given (in any other case).

Coupon-mad

PCN issue date is there.

Umkomaas

Coupon-mad wrote: »

PCN issue date is there.

Is that necessarily the date it was 'sent'? I know it might be semantic, but the OP needs to exploit every opportunity and require the PPC to prove their case?

Coupon-mad

I think it would pass as OK with a Judge, but who knows for sure.

But the OP should say it is non POFA and be prepared to try everything.

sppc42

That's fine. I'll prepare my skeleton defense and share it out with you folks for your final feedback. I'll stick to the non-POFA argument as suggested, with all possible points. Hearing is just a week from now!

nosferatu1001

No, its a skeleton argument. Not defence.

You had one defence, that you submitted ages back.

Your SAR - you include any elements of it you think help you, of course. Submit what helps, omit what doesnt. Simple mantra

So if the SAR shows that their evidnece now is different to the evidence inthe SAR, then your WS highlights this and points out that either the claimant has falsified evidence to the court, or has falsified documetns to respond to a SAR. Either way round it shows their evidence to be unreliable.

sppc42

Hi All,

Am finally able to draft my Skeleton Argument, much thanks to the pointers in the Newbies section. I would really appreciate if you can have a quick read and let me know if it seems fine. With the case hearing on coming Tuesday, am just reeling a bit now and hoping to get this final bit correct. Any inputs would be highly appreciated. This forum has been immensely helpful to me to be able to get to this point!

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Skeleton Argument

i. The date of the alleged contravention (17th February 2017) relates to my older address. Claimant never tried to ascertain the current address and hence is in violation of Civil Procedure Rules – Service of the documents, CPR(6.4). As the proceedings were not validly served, it leads to no service and thus they are not entitled to judgement and the court must set aside the claim

CPR – SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.1


ii. Other credit agencies (‘Pastdue Credit Solutions’) were able to contact me both via email (on 14th July 2017) and paper mail (on 7th July 2017) at my current address. This exhibits correct working practices and adherence to CPR(6.4) by other firms.

EMAIL AND MAIL COPY FROM PASTDUE CREDIT SOLUTIONS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.2

iii. Am a law-abiding citizen, who when notified by ‘Pastdue Credit Solutions’ on 14th July 2017 of incorrect vehicle registration after house move, immediately contacted DVLA and paid any relevant fines, pending tax and corrected the vehicle registration immediately to reflect the current address. This demonstrates that I have never tried to evade any payments, fines, tax and have been diligent to correct any mistakes.

MAIL COPY FROM DVLA DATED 18th July 2017 APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.3

iv. Private parking companies, like Civil Enforcement Ltd are serial abusers of the CCJ system. This was particularly highlighted by the Daily Mail article dated 12th September 2016, in which Prime Minister Theresa May has pledged to root out the ‘abuse’ of the county court judgements by announcing an investigation. The article outlines the modus-operandi of such private parking companies who have been deliberately serving notices to victims’ old addresses and eventually filing a CCJ without their knowledge.

DAILY MAIL ARTICLE DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 2016 APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.4

v. The vital matter of 'keeper liability' regarding the law when parking on private land was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015 in the Annual Report where he stated:

“There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If... {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is}... not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass."

POPLA ANNUAL REPORT 2015 APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.5

vi. Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is unable to transfer the liability for the charge using the POFA, in this case because of the indisputable fact that the event pre-dated the law. This claim is founded upon a misrepresentation of facts and misrepresentation of the law.

vii. It is clear that no checks have been made as to the facts of the alleged contract, signs or parking charge, in this Claimant's undue haste to issue robo-claims in their thousands, scraping the barrel of archive cases to bring to court, under excuse of jumping on the bandwagon started by the (completely different and complex) case in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 ('the Beavis case')

BEAVIS CASE IS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E6

viii. The claimant has not met the requirements of the Schedule 4 of POFA, which is not just limited to the PCN issued. The court’s attention has been drawn to –

a.

PCN not conforming to POFA Schedule-4 requirements
b. Lack of adequate notice of the parking charge on clear signage.
i. In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only (Evidence E.10).
ii. In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges. Appended (Evidence E.9) is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case
iii. This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed. Here, the signs are sporadically placed. The wording is mostly illegible as it is so small in size, particularly notice of the actual parking charge itself
iv. This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2nd June 2016, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operator’s signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

PCN IS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.7
SIGNAGE FOR ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION IS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.8
THE BEAVIS CASE SIGN IS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.9
THE BEAVIS CASE SUPREME COURT MESSAGE FOR CLEAR WORDING: E.10

ix. The original PCN (E.7) posted by this Claimant states a Full Charge of £60.00 (£40.00 discounted) however the Claimant's legal firm has inflated these sums, in a deliberate or negligent attempt at more than quadruple recovery:
a. £100.00 Principal debt
b. Claimant’s Initial costs £40.00
c. Administration Fees of £60
d. Claimant’s legal fees £36
e. Interest £12.16
f. Solicitor’s fees £50
g. Court fees £25
h. Outstanding balance to pay now £323.16

x. The claimant has no evidence of landowner authority or a legal contract. Section 7 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice states that

“if you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the land owner (or their appointed agent) … In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges”.

The Claimant has failed to provide this evidence. Therefore, it cannot be determined if the Claimant has permission from the landowner to operate on this land and issue PCN’s. As such, section 7 of the BPA Code of Practice has not been met.

BPA CODE OF PRACTICE SECTION 7 APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.11

xi. The Claimant had no locus standi at the time of this parking event and at best, were contractors of a principal, the landowner. They have failed to show a cause for action by way of sight of a copy of the contract they have with the landowner to assign the right to enter into contracts with the public and to make claims and take civil action against drivers in their own name, in 2017

xii. The Claimant places reliance on its provision of signage at the site and upon the content of that signage. However, the Claimant is under a duty to the Court to provide full and fair disclosure by informing it of all relevant issues. The Claimant has failed to advise the Court that a criminal offence was being committed by the display of its signage. At the time the driver allegedly parked at this location, it is contended that a criminal offence was being committed in order to artificially create the appearance of a contract

xiii. The commission of an illegal wrong being present at the time of a driver allegedly entering the contract means that the Claimant will not be able to enforce the contract. The illegality is central to the contract (the terms on the signs themselves) and is not merely a minor aspect thus it should not be held to be too remote so as to render the contract enforceable

xiv. The Claimant has omitted to obtain Planning Permissions or Advertising Consent from XXXX Borough Council & the present Landowner for the Signage or the ANPR Cameras. The XXXX Borough Council Planning Register does not show any such applications in its planning history

EVIDENCE FROM THE COUNCIL WEBSITE APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.12

xv. It is contended that the signs are in place without consent and are therefore illegal advertisements. By virtue of Regulation 30 of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 (as amended) it is a criminal offence to display an advertisement in contravention of the Regulations. The penalty on conviction for the offence is at level 4 on the standard scale (current maximum £2,500) plus £250 for each day that the offence continues

xvi. The Beavis case at 96, draws attention to the Code of Practice of the British Parking Association ('the BPA'). And at 111 the Judge helpfully comments that “while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA. In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced.” (Defendant’s emphasis of the key point)

xvii. In any event, this Claimant fails to fulfil the requirements of CPR16.2 for particulars of claim in that they have neglected to set out any facts or state what it is they are claiming monies for. Their particulars of claim just state "parking charge notice of ********" and do not say whether the sum is due as a contractual sum, damages for breach of contract or money due for something else, such as a liability for a failure of duty of care or trespass under common law tort

xviii. My case can be distinguished from the Beavis case, which was dependent upon Mr Beavis being the driver who accepted a clear contract, formed by unusually prominent signage. Strict compliance with the BPA Code of Practice and the clear, prominent terms on brief signs was held to be paramount. None of this applies in this material case. Beavis case sign has been appended as Evidence E.

xix. The claimant cannot rely on Elliot v Loake ('EvL') to claim that the driver and the keeper can be 'assumed' to be the same, since this was a criminal case and referred to the owner, not the keeper. In any event, in EvL there was overwhelming forensic evidence from other sources that the defendant was the driver at the time. By contrast, in my case this Claimant has not offered any evidence to the driver's identity and cannot make any lawful assumption.

xx. It is noted that in view of all of the above, the Court could decide of its own volition to strike this claim out under CPR 16.4 and as an unrepresented Defendant I ask the presiding Judge to use their case management powers and relieve me of the burden of having to appear to defend myself as registered keeper, in view of the Claimant having supplied no evidence of any basis for a claim against me in law

I believe that the facts stated in this Skeleton Defence are true.


Signed xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Dated xxxxxxxxxxx

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Thanks

Coupon-mad

I would remove this and certainly not append the Beavis case, which is a ridiculous amount of printing and it's a case the Judge will know about:

vii. It is clear that no checks have been made as to the facts of the alleged contract, signs or parking charge, in this Claimant's undue haste to issue robo-claims in their thousands, scraping the barrel of archive cases to bring to court, under excuse of jumping on the bandwagon started by the (completely different and complex) case in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 ('the Beavis case')

BEAVIS CASE IS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E6

If this is just a set aside hearing, your real priorities will not be going into detail about the defence (the Judge might ask for a brief summary) but instead:

- prove that you acted quickly as soon as you were aware of the CCJ

- prove that the claim went to the old address, and thus was not served on you

- ask the Judge at the end to order to be refunded, OR in the alternative, to reserve your costs as you are concerned this Claimant will (because they ALWAYS do - we've seen it dozens of times) just run away and discontinue once the CCJ is set aside, leaving you out of pocket by £255 and the loss of leave/salary and travel/parking costs for attending the set aside hearing. Ask that in that event, your costs will then be ordered to be refunded if you alert the Judge.

Take along a wage slip/proof of income & a costs schedule (see Newbies thread example). Ensure that the matter of costs IS mentioned at the end, do not let it slide.

See and make use of this useful post by IamEmanresu (he's legally qualified):

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/74821051#Comment_74821051

and also see Johnersh's reply in post #14 (he is a solicitor poster), and the script that poster used on the day to structure his thoughts - he got his set aside!

sppc42

I can't thank you enough for your reply, and the link to the posting for the OP getting a set-aside. It was immensely helpful and has guided me to re-structure my argument. I have now divided it into two parts - one for set-aside and other for dismissal of claim, as it helps structure my thoughts and arguments for the two of them.

Kindly let me know how this looks, the first part of the 'SET-ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGEMENT' is the new bit, the second section for the 'ORDER DISMISSAL', only the first point (i) is new, which is more like summary of the points I want present to the judge which I believe are important for order dismissal case.

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Skeleton Argument

I am XXXXX, the defendant in this matter.

SET-ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

i. The Defendant has at no time tried to avoid paying for any known debt and was at all times there to be found by a simple trace. Defendant was not aware of the Default Judgement until his new employer made him aware after running the Experian Background Search. The Defendant has never received any previous documentation from the Claimant in this matter and acted promptly to ascertain the details of the default CCJ. Following are the sequence of events, thus –

. a. 11th June 2018 – Defendant starts his new job with employer XXXXXX

. b. 13th June 2018 –
. i. Defendant notified by his new employer of a default CCJ after running Experian Background Search
. ii. Defendant contacted Experian via phone and worked with employer to get more information about the default CCJ as he was unaware of it
. iii. Defendant did a credit search on Experian and also CCJ search on Registry Trust Ltd, both of which contain no information of default CCJ

. c. 14th June 2018 –
. i. Employer updated Defendant on the reply received from Experian, which asked it to contact Northampton County Court
. ii. Defendant contacted Northampton County Court, is given scant details of default order and a premium number to contact Civil Enforcement Ltd.
. iii. Defendant promptly called Civil Enforcement Ltd at the premium phone number provided, but gets no further information

d. 19th June 2017 – Defendant files a set-aside appeal at Northampton County Court.

JOB OFFER WITH JOINING DATE FROM NEW EMPLOYER APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.1
EMAIL COPY FROM EMPLOYER CITING CCJ APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.2
COPY OF EXPERIAN BACKGOUND CHECK APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.3
COPY OF SEARCH ON REGISTRY TRUST LIMITED APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.4
EMAIL COPY FROM EMPLOYER WITH REPLY FROM EXPERIAN APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.5

ii. The Claimant has not adhered to CPR 6.9 (3) where they had reason to believe that the address of the Defendant is an address at which the Defendant no longer resides or carries on business. The claimant did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence or place of business despite having 9 months to establish an address between the alleged incident (17th Feb 2017) and the default judgment (25th Nov 2017). This has led to a defective service and an irregular judgment. As the proceedings were not validly served, it leads to no service and thus they are not entitled to judgement and the court must set aside the claim

CPR – SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.6

iii. Claimant continued to use outdated addresses rather than take reasonable steps. As per Freedom of Information Request (FOIR3988) from June 2014, the claimant knew about the DVLA allowing the use of Credit Reference Agencies and Tracing Agencies, and the sensible reasons for using, specifying that similar circumstances to be applying equally to the car parking industry, but has been clearly ignored and not followed by the Claimant in an attempt to obtain a default judgement.

COPY OF DVLA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION (FOIR3988) APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.7

iv. Other credit agencies (‘Pastdue Credit Solutions’) were able to contact the Defendant both via email (on 14th July 2017) and paper mail (on 7th July 2017) at Defendant’s current address. This exhibits correct working practices and adherence to CPR 6.9 (3) and diligently following guidance by DVLA on using Credit Reference Agencies and Tracing Agencies by other firms during the same time period.

COPY OF PAPER MAIL FROM PASTDUE CREDIT SOLUTIONS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.8
COPY OF E MAIL FROM PASTDUE CREDIT SOLUTIONS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.9

v. Defendant is a law-abiding citizen, who when notified by ‘Pastdue Credit Solutions’ on 14th July 2017 of incorrect vehicle registration after house move, immediately contacted DVLA and paid any relevant fines, pending tax and corrected the vehicle registration immediately to reflect the current address. This demonstrates that the Defendant has never tried to evade any payments, fines, tax and have been diligent to correct any mistakes.

COPY OF MAIL FROM DVLA DATED 18th July 2017 APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.10

vi. In view of the above, Defendant invites the court to set-aside the default judgement on the basis that there was no reasonable presumption that the defendant resided at the address in question, as none of Claimant’s post was responded to. This entails that proceedings till now have never been served and are, thus, defective.

vii. Further, the Defendant asks the court to order the Claimant to refund the costs, OR in the alternative to reserve the costs as the Defendant is concerned the Claimant will discontinue once the CCJ is set aside, leaving the Defendant with a loss of court fees of £255 and the loss of leave/salary and travel/parking costs for attending the set aside hearing. In such an event, the Defendant requests his costs will then be ordered to be refunded if the Court is alerted of the matter.

DEFENDANT’S SCHEDULE OF COSTS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.11

 
ORDER DISMISSING THE CLAIM
i. The Defendant believes the order to the claim be dismissed due to the following reasons, which are further outlined below –
. a. Claimant failed to meet the Notice to Keeper obligations of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA 2012)
. b. Lack of adequate notice of the parking charge on clear signage, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court in the Parking Eye vs Beavis case
. c. Unrecoverable sums to the original parking charge, in contravention to the BPA Code of Practice and established legal precedents
. d. Claimant has no evidence of landowner authority or a legal contract, in contravention to the BPA Code of Practice
. e. Illegal signage at alleged site from Claimant, no planning permissions for usage of ANPR and signboards

The above points are detailed below.

ii. The Defendant believes that the Claimant failed to meet the Notice to Keeper obligations of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA 2012), which is not just limited to the PCN issued. The court’s attention has been drawn to –

. a. PCN not conforming to POFA Schedule-4 requirements
. b. Lack of adequate notice of the parking charge on clear signage.
. i. In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only (Evidence E.10).
. ii. In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges. Appended (Evidence E.9) is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case
. iii. This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed. Here, the signs are sporadically placed. The wording is mostly illegible as it is so small in size, particularly notice of the actual parking charge itself
. iv. This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2nd June 2016, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operator’s signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''
PCN IS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.12
SIGNAGE FOR ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION IS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.13
THE BEAVIS CASE SIGN IS APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.14
THE BEAVIS CASE SUPREME COURT MESSAGE FOR CLEAR WORDING: E.15

iii. The Claimant further failed to meet the Notice to Keeper obligations of POFA 2012 Schedule 4 9(5) and (6). Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof that they did post such communications to the Defendant’s address

iv. The vital matter of 'keeper liability' regarding the law when parking on private land was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015 in the Annual Report where he stated:

“There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If... {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is}... not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass."

POPLA ANNUAL REPORT 2015 APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.16

v. It is neither admitted nor denied that the Defendant was the driver. It is now 20 months since the material date. The particulars of claim set out no positive case regarding the identity of the driver and are speculative in nature. The claimant is put to strict proof.

vi. The Claimant has added unrecoverable sums to the original parking charge. The Defendant believes that Civil Enforcement Ltd has artificially inflated this claim. According to Ladak v DRC Locums UKEAT/0488/13/LA the claimant can only recover the direct and provable costs of the time spent on preparing the claim in a legal capacity, not any administration costs. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to any interest whatsoever. The claimant has not explained how the claim has increased from the original parking notice to £323.16. If the Claimant alleges that they claim the cost of its in-house administration, these cannot be recovered – they are staff performing the task that they have been employed for and are essential to the Claimant's business model. The original PCN provide via a SAR issued by the Defendant states a Full Charge of £60.00 (£40.00 discounted) however the Claimant's legal firm has inflated these sums, in a deliberate or negligent attempt at more than quadruple recovery:
a. £100.00 Principal debt
b. Claimant’s Initial costs £40.00
c. Administration Fees of £60
d. Claimant’s legal fees £36
e. Interest £12.16
f. Solicitor’s fees £50
g. Court fees £25
h. Outstanding balance to pay now £323.16

vii. The claimant has no evidence of landowner authority or a legal contract. Section 7 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice states that

“if you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the land owner (or their appointed agent) … In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges”.

The Claimant has failed to provide this evidence. Therefore, it cannot be determined if the Claimant has permission from the landowner to operate on this land and issue PCN’s. As such, section 7 of the BPA Code of Practice has not been met.

BPA CODE OF PRACTICE SECTION 7 APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.17

viii. The Claimant had no locus standi at the time of this parking event and at best, were contractors of a principal, the landowner. They have failed to show a cause for action by way of sight of a copy of the contract they have with the landowner to assign the right to enter into contracts with the public and to make claims and take civil action against drivers in their own name, in 2017

ix. The Claimant places reliance on its provision of signage at the site and upon the content of that signage. However, the Claimant is under a duty to the Court to provide full and fair disclosure by informing it of all relevant issues. The Claimant has failed to advise the Court that a criminal offence was being committed by the display of its signage. At the time the driver allegedly parked at this location, it is contended that a criminal offence was being committed in order to artificially create the appearance of a contract

x. The commission of an illegal wrong being present at the time of a driver allegedly entering the contract means that the Claimant will not be able to enforce the contract. The illegality is central to the contract (the terms on the signs themselves) and is not merely a minor aspect thus it should not be held to be too remote so as to render the contract enforceable

xi. The Claimant has omitted to obtain Planning Permissions or Advertising Consent from Reading Borough Council & the present Landowner for the Signage or the ANPR Cameras. The Reading Borough Council Planning Register does not show any such applications in its planning history

EVIDENCE FROM THE COUNCIL WEBSITE APPENDED AS EVIDENCE: E.18

xii. It is contended that the signs are in place without consent and are therefore illegal advertisements. By virtue of Regulation 30 of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 (as amended) it is a criminal offence to display an advertisement in contravention of the Regulations. The penalty on conviction for the offence is at level 4 on the standard scale (current maximum £2,500) plus £250 for each day that the offence continues

xiii. The Beavis case at 96, draws attention to the Code of Practice of the British Parking Association ('the BPA'). And at 111 the Judge helpfully comments that “while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA. In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced.” (Defendant’s emphasis of the key point)

xiv. In any event, this Claimant fails to fulfil the requirements of CPR16.2 for particulars of claim in that they have neglected to set out any facts or state what it is they are claiming monies for. Their particulars of claim just state "parking charge notice of ********" and do not say whether the sum is due as a contractual sum, damages for breach of contract or money due for something else, such as a liability for a failure of duty of care or trespass under common law tort

xv. My case can be distinguished from the Beavis case, which was dependent upon Mr Beavis being the driver who accepted a clear contract, formed by unusually prominent signage. Strict compliance with the BPA Code of Practice and the clear, prominent terms on brief signs was held to be paramount. None of this applies in this material case. Beavis case sign has been appended as Evidence E.

xvi. The claimant cannot rely on Elliot v Loake ('EvL') to claim that the driver and the keeper can be 'assumed' to be the same, since this was a criminal case and referred to the owner, not the keeper. In any event, in EvL there was overwhelming forensic evidence from other sources that the defendant was the driver at the time. By contrast, in my case this Claimant has not offered any evidence to the driver's identity and cannot make any lawful assumption.

xvii. It is noted that in view of all of the above, the Court could decide of its own volition to strike this claim out under CPR 16.4 and as an unrepresented Defendant I ask the presiding Judge to use their case management powers and relieve me of the burden of having to appear to defend myself as registered keeper, in view of the Claimant having supplied no evidence of any basis for a claim against me in law

I believe that the facts stated in this Skeleton Argument are true.


Signed xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Dated xxxxxxxxxxx

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Le_Kirk

I believe that the facts stated in this Skeleton Defence are true.

I thought it was a skeleton argument!