HELP! Britannia Parking PCN Received for "Non-Parking Restricted Area or Access Way"

KeithP

I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be)...

Of course you are, you are the one appealing.

Did you mean to write "I am the keeper throughout..."?

Coupon-mad

Your numbering doesn't match up with the headings, #2 should be higher up.

QUESTION: Should, or can I add anything in here about parking bays not being clearly marked and open to interpretation? Also, the photos provided do not clearly show the vehicle is parked in a 'restricted bay, or area'

You can as long as the driver is not implied, and I hope your resolver complaint did not imply who parked the car.

If there was no NTK at all, and the driver has not been implied, you will win this anyway.

WEB LINK as per template – sorry if I’m being stupid here, but I’ve lifted this letter from another thread and can’t seem to find the ‘web links’ being referred to? Do they mean the wording below each?

It's a template, find it in the NEWBIES thread post #3 with working links.

dudders24

I copy pasted and must have missed this... should it read 'keeper' or 'appellant', or either?

dudders24

Should I mention that a complaint was submitted to Britannia Parking in the first instance, which has been wrongly treated as an appeal?

Also, I have been reading around parking bay markings / lines, but I am not sure whether to highlight this issue? Some say yes, some say no and I couldn't find a link in the Newbies thread to support such issues (or have I missed it?).

I'm particularly pee'd about this point because there are solid red parking bays for 'customer parking only' and disabled bays in this car park - both clearly designated / marked out. The bay for which the PCN was issued is not and looks like a valid parking bay (new white lines on top of older markings).

You just know Britannia is going to do nothing about this and continue to ticket anyone that gets confused and parks in this and the other spaces with similar issues to this.

Quentin

dudders24 wrote: »

I copy pasted and must have missed this... should it read 'keeper' or 'appellant', or either?

Keeper !

Coupon-mad

I wrote it, and 'keeper' is right (although I take the point it's not a great sentence).

Should I mention that a complaint was submitted to Britannia Parking in the first instance, which has been wrongly treated as an appeal?

No, it makes no odds.

Also, I have been reading around parking bay markings / lines, but I am not sure whether to highlight this issue?

I'm particularly pee'd about this point because there are solid red parking bays for 'customer parking only' and disabled bays in this car park - both clearly designated / marked out. The bay for which the PCN was issued is not and looks like a valid parking bay (new white lines on top of older markings).

Yes, if you can get photos for POPLA to see what you mean.

dudders24

Thanks Coupon-Mad... final draft below and waiting to go if you think it's ready?

Dear POPLA,

As the registered keeper of vehicle S24ARJ, I am not liable for this Parking Charge Notice (PCN) and I am appealing on the grounds outlined in points 1 to 6 (listed below):

1. A compliant Notice to Keeper (NTK) was never served !!!8211; no Keeper Liability can apply.
2. Understanding Keeper liability
3. The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself
4. No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice
5. The Terms of Contract are unfair
6. Complaint not accepted by Britannia Parking and treated unfairly as an appeal

1. A compliant Notice to Keeper (NTK) was never served !!!8211; no Keeper Liability can apply.
Britannia Parking has not fulfilled the 'second condition' for keeper liability as defined in Schedule 4 and as a result, they have no lawful authority to pursue any parking charge from myself, as a registered keeper appellant. There is no discretion on this matter. If Schedule 4 mandatory documents are not served at all, or in time (or if the document omits any prescribed wording) then keeper liability simply does not apply.

The wording in the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 is as follows:

''Right to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle:
4(1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. (2) The right under this paragraph applies only if

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6*, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met;

*Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4:
6(1) 'The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor) - (a)has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8. This is re-iterated further 'If a notice to driver has been given, any subsequent notice to keeper MUST be given in accordance with paragraph 8!!!8217;.!!!8221;

The NTK must have been delivered to the registered keeper's address within the 'relevant period' which is highlighted as a total of 56 days beginning with the day after that on which any notice to driver was given. Britannia Parking has failed to serve a NTK, not only have they chosen to flout the strict requirements set out in PoFA 2012, but they have consequently failed to meet the second condition for keeper liability. I therefore cannot be held liable to pay this charge as the mandatory series of parking charge documents were not properly given.

2. Understanding keeper liability
!!!8220;There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no !!!8216;reasonable presumption!!!8217; in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.''

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:

''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.''

3. The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself
I note that within the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 it discusses the clarity that needs to be provided to make a motorist aware of the parking charge. Specifically, it requires that the driver is given 'adequate notice' of the charge. POFA 2012 defines 'adequate notice' as follows:

''(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) 'adequate notice' means notice given by: (a) the display of one or more notices in accordance with any applicable requirements prescribed in regulations under paragraph 12 for, or for purposes including, the purposes of sub-paragraph (2); or (b) where no such requirements apply, the display of one or more notices which: (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and (ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land''.

Even in circumstances where POFA 2012 does not apply, I believe this to be a reasonable standard to use when making my own assessment, as appellant, of the signage in place at the location. Having considered the signage in place at this particular site against the requirements of Section 18 of the BPA Code of Practice and POFA 2012, I am of the view that the signage at the site - given the minuscule font size of the £sum, which is illegible in most photographs and does not appear at all at the entrance - is NOT sufficient to bring the parking charge (i.e. the sum itself) to the attention of the motorist.

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd vs. Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

Web link

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

Web link

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

Web link

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

Web link

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2' letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3' or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

Web link

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

Web link

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

4. No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice
As Britannia Parking does not have proprietary interest in the land, then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner.

The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details !!!8211; such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights, and of course all enforcement dates/times/days, and the boundary of the site !!!8211; is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do, and when/where.

It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is authorised on the material date, to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case, I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic but crucial information such as the site boundary and any bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the only restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge, as well as the date that the parking contract began, and when it runs to, or whether it runs in perpetuity, and of course, who the signatories are: name/job title/employer company, and whether they are authorised by the landowner to sign a binding legal agreement.

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b) any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c) any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d) who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e) the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement

5. The Terms of Contract are unfair
The amount being charged £100 (discounted to £60 if paid within 14 days) is absolutely punitive.

The following refers: Office of Fair Trading 'Guidance for the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999'(UTCCR 1999) that ''It is unfair to impose disproportionate sanctions for breach of contract. A requirement to pay more in compensation for a breach than a reasonable pre-estimate of the loss caused to the supplier is one kind of excessive penalty. Such a requirement will, in any case, normally be void to the extent that it amounts to a penalty under English common law...''

Test of fairness:

''A term is unfair if...contrary to the requirement of good faith it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract, to the detriment of consumers.
5.1 Unfair terms are not enforceable against the consumer.
9.2 ...terms of whose existence and content the consumer has no adequate notice at the time of entering the contract may not be binding under the general law, in any case, especially if they are onerous in character.''

The charge that was levied is an unfair term (and therefore not binding) pursuant to the UTCCR 1999. The OFT on UTCCR 1999, in regard to Group 18(a): unfair financial burdens, states:

'18.1.3 Objections are less likely...if a term is specific and transparent as to what must be paid and in what circumstances.

Schedule 2 of the Regulations gives an indicative (and non-exhaustive) list of terms which may be regarded as unfair and includes at Schedule 2(1)(e) "Terms which have the object or effect of requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation. "Furthermore, Regulation 5(1) states that: !!!8220;A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer".

The charge that was levied is an unreasonable indemnity clause pursuant to section 4(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 which provides that: "A person cannot by reference to any contract term be made to indemnify another person (whether a party to the contract or not) in respect of liability that may be incurred by the other for negligence or breach of contract, except in so far as the contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.

I contend it is wholly unreasonable for a company to attempt to profit by charging a disproportionate sum where no loss has been caused by the act of parking. I put F1rst Parking to strict proof to justify that their charge, under the circumstances described, does not cause a significant imbalance to my detriment and to justify that the charge does not breach the UTCCRs and UCT Act and the Consumer Contract (Information, Cancellation and Additional Payments) Regs 2013. These latter Regs require specific detailed information to be supplied by traders, by durable medium, as well as ensuring the consumer has given 'express consent' to any contract before it is performed - otherwise (unless among the stated exemptions, which a parking contract is not) any trader-consumer contract is now unenforceable and able to be cancelled by the consumer, even after the event.

6. Complaint not accepted by Britannia Parking and treated unfairly as an appeal
Following receipt of the PCN on 8 February 2018, a complaint was emailed to Britannia Parking via the Resolver website stating every !!!8216;space!!!8217;, !!!8216;access bay!!!8217; and !!!8216;restricted area!!!8217; is not clearly designated, per Britannia Parking!!!8217;s own restrictions / rules.

Within the Charles Cross car park there are # disabled bays and # !!!8216;customer parking only!!!8217; bays. Note, !!!8216;customer only!!!8217; bays are painted solid red in colour, not just outlined in red. The !!!8216;non-parking!!!8217; bay, for which the PCN was issued, has white !!!8216;parking lines!!!8217; painted on top of pre-existing lines. In addition, bollards have been installed to prevent drivers across this space - in/out of the car park.

If this appeal is not successful, then I hereby give notice to Britannia Parking that I cancel the contract alleged because they have failed to meet the requirements of the new Regulations.

Yours Faithfully,


The Registered Keeper

Castle

If that's your real VRN then I'd suggest that you redact it ASAP.

Umkomaas

We often recommend following:

'1. A compliant Notice to Keeper (NTK) was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.

with

2. The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who was liable for the charge

There's a ready-written template appeal point to insert into your current draft available for you to copy and paste in the NEWBIES FAQ sticky, post #3. Thereafter, renumber the current appeal paragraphs that follow.

Office of Fair Trading 'Guidance for the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999'(UTCCR 1999)

Obsolete. Now replaced by the 'Consumer Rights Act 2015', so it would be wise to check your reference to parts of UTCCR against new sections within CRA.

dudders24

Thanks Umkomaas. I have updated points 1 and 2, and read up on CRA 2015, as advised. Just want to check I've understood it and updated this section correctly? I got a lot confused by all the references to this and that case : (

5. The charge is a penalty, breaches the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and is prohibited/unfair under the CPUTRs. It is not saved by ParkingEye vs. Beavis.
The amount being charged £100 (discounted to £60 if paid within 14 days) is utterly punitive.

In reference to the ‘Parking (Code of Practice) Bill, Sir Greg Knight (East Yorkshire) (Con) stated that “Parking is an indispensable part of motoring. If you arrive by a car, you need to park it.”

Especially if you are a disabled driver and rely on a car to maintain independence.

He continues “Motorists should have the certainty that when they enter a car park on private land, they are entering into a contract that is reasonable, transparent and involves a consistent process. Poor signage, unreasonable terms, exorbitant fines, aggressive demands for payment and an opaque appeals process, together with some motorists being hit with a fine for just driving in and out of a car park without stopping, have no place in 21st-century Britain.”

This is a simple consumer / trader transaction with a ticket for parking in a designated space being purchased in good faith. Therefore, the Judges' findings at the Court of Appeal stage, which were not disputed nor overturned at the Supreme Court, stand as part of that binding case law – fully support my view that the case of 'Kemble vs. Farren' remains the binding authority in support of this position.

At 47 in the Court of Appeal Judgment, it was held:

“When the court is considering an ordinary financial or commercial contract, then it is understandable that the law, which lays down its own rules as to the compensation due from a contract breaker to the innocent party, should prohibit terms which require the payment of compensation going far beyond that which the law allows in the absence of any contract provision governing this outcome.”

At the Supreme Court it was held at 14, ''...where a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform an act, and also provides that, if he does not perform it, he will pay the other party a specified sum of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a secondary obligation which is capable of being a penalty...''

At 22, the Supreme Court explored Lord Dunedin’s speech in Dunlop and separated complex cases (Beavis) from ordinary/standard contracts with a transaction and tariff paid at a machine: ''Lord Dunedin's...four tests are a useful tool for deciding whether these expressions can properly be applied to simple damages clauses in standard contracts. But they are not easily applied to more complex cases.”

This is NOT a 'more complex' case by any stretch of the imagination. At 32, it was held that a trader, in this case a parking company: “...can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance”. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.

“Clearly a charge ‘out of all proportion’ to the tariff is an unfair penalty to the mind of any reasonable man.

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 supports my position, through Britannia Parking’s failure to ensure all parking spaces are clearly designated, that charges are not issued inappropriately, are unfair and unenforceable: Web link (legislation dot gov dot uk ukpga 2015 15 schedule 2 enacted)

Schedule 2: 'Consumer contract terms which may be regarded as unfair':

“A term which has the object or effect of inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer in relation to the trader or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate performance by the trader of any of the contractual obligations...”

“A term which has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation.”

This charge is clearly punitive and is not saved from breaching the 'penalty rule' (i.e. Lord Dunedin's four tests for a penalty) by the Beavis case, which does NOT supersede other defences. It turned on completely different facts and related only to that car park with its own unique complexity of commercial justification. This case is not comparable. The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 No. 1277 also supports my position that this commercial practice of charging for their own system failure is unfair: Web link (legislation dot gov dot uk ukdsi 2008 9780110811574 regulation 3)

Prohibition of unfair commercial practices
3.—(1) Unfair commercial practices are prohibited.
(2) Paragraphs (3) and (4) set out the circumstances when a commercial practice is unfair.
(3) A commercial practice is unfair if—
(a) it contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and
(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the
average consumer with regard to the product.
(4) A commercial practice is unfair if—
(a) it is a misleading action under the provisions of regulation 5;
(b) it is a misleading omission under the provisions of regulation 6;
(c) it is aggressive under the provisions of regulation 7; or
(d) it is listed in Schedule 1.

Per the above, a charge under these circumstances is prohibited and unenforceable. The Beavis case established that the penalty rule was certainly deemed ‘engaged’ in parking charge cases. Even if POPLA cannot consider consumer law (whyever not?) then the evidence shows that this charge is the very essence of ‘unconscionable’ which was the Beavis case definition of an unrecoverable penalty.

I contend it is wholly unreasonable for a company to attempt to profit by charging a disproportionate sum where no loss has been caused by the act of parking. I put Britannia Parking to strict proof, under the circumstances described, to justify their charge does not cause a significant imbalance to my detriment and to justify the charge does not breach the Consumer Credit Act 2015.


Also, do you think it's worth contacting the Consumer Council? According to their Unfair Private Parking Penalty Tickets/Fines Factsheet, they can help get the fine cancelled!?