We are in the wrong, should I pursue Britannia?

fresian_cow

I have read the advice for newbies I promise (despite being utterly confused by it) and have submitted a PCN which has been rejected using the wording in newbies. The driver parked for 4 hours, max limit was 3, they didn't realise. It was a pub carpark but they weren't in that pub, they were in restaurant over the road. Is it worth a POPLA appeal or should I pay now at reduced rate?

waamo

I would still appeal. He was spending money helping a local business survive. Does that henious crime deserve being whacked for a mickey Mose charge?

Quentin

Throughout you are advised never to reveal who was driving


You need to edit your post to remove details of who was driving


Read up on this in the Newbies FAQ thread to see the journey needed to deal with this - of course you should travel on that journey!

fresian_cow

waamo wrote: »

I would still appeal. He was spending money helping a local business survive. Does that henious crime deserve being whacked for a mickey Mose charge?

Thanks, I totally agree. The car parks are only strict in the area as they are between 3/4 very large employers and so its needed to prevent abuse during the day. At night I think it's ridiculous!

Thanks Quentin, I have edited the post. I am currently working through the POPLA bit but am seriously confused so thought I'd check it was worth pursuing before spending time working out what it means.

The_Deep

You should fight it. They may not have proper written authority from the landowner, planning permissions and/or advertising permissions, for their signs, their signs may be unlawful, their timings may be awry.

They have so many hurdles to jump that they often fail on one of them. If they do, it is game over for them.

fresian_cow

Firstly thank you so much to everyone on this forum for all the advice and help available. I'd have gotten nowhere near this far along without it. I would be very grateful for any opinions/advice on this draft of my appeal letter, I have used some other letters as a template and built on that, I hope I've done it right.

A notice to keeper was issued on 13th December 2017 and received by me, the registered keeper of ******** for an alleged contravention of !!!8216;PARKED LONGER THAN THE MAXIMUM TIME PERMITTED!!!8217; at *********l on 7th December 2017. I was NOT the driver. I contend that I am not liable for this parking charge on the basis of the below points:

1) Amount demanded is a penalty and is punitive, contravening the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The authority on this is ParkingEye v Beavis. That case was characterised by clear and ample signage where the motorist had time to read, and then consider the signage and decide whether to accept or not. In this case the signage was neither clear not ample, and the motorist had not time to read the signage, let alone consider it, as the charge was applied instantly the vehicle stopped. The signage cannot be read safely from a moving vehicle.

2) If Britannia Parking want to make use of the Keeper Liability provisions in Schedule 4 of POFA 2012 and Britannia Parking have not issued and delivered a parking charge notice to the driver in the place where the parking event took place, your Notice to Keeper must meet the strict requirements and timetable set out in the Schedule (in particular paragraph 9). I have had no evidence that Britannia Parking have complied with these BPA Code requirements for ANPR issued tickets so require them to evidence their compliance to POPLA.

3) In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.

Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made because the fact remains I am only the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator, because they cannot use the POFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA 2012 was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability

!!!8220;There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no !!!8216;reasonable presumption!!!8217; in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass."

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:
"I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal."

The same conclusion was reached by POPLA Assessor Steve Macallan, quoted in appeal point 5 above.

4) I do not believe that the Operator has demonstrated a proprietary interest in the land, because they have no legal possession which would give Britannia Parking any right to offer parking spaces, let alone allege a contract with third party customers of the lawful owner/occupiers. In addition, Britannia Parking!!!8217;s lack of title in this land means they have no legal standing to allege trespass or loss, if that is the basis of their charge. I require Britannia Parking to demonstrate their legal ownership of the land to POPLA.

I contend that Britannia Parking is only an agent working for the owner and their signs do not help them to form a contract without any consideration capable of being offered. VCS-v-HMRC 2012 is the binding decision in the Upper Chamber which covers this issue with compelling statements of fact about this sort of business model.

I believe there is no contract with the landowner/occupier that entitles Britannia Parking to levy these charges and therefore it has no authority to issue parking charge notices (PCNs). This being the case, the burden of proof shifts to Britannia Parking to prove otherwise so I require that Britannia Parking produce a copy of their contract with the owner/occupier and that the POPLA adjudicator scrutinises it. Even if a basic contract is produced and mentions PCNs, the lack of ownership or assignment of title or interest in the land reduces any contract to one that exists simply on an agency basis between Britannia Parking and the owner/occupier, containing nothing that Britannia Parking can lawfully use in their own name as a mere agent, that could impact on a third party customer.

5) There are no time stamps on the photographs providing any evidence of the times of entry or exit. Britannia Parking have provided no evidence of the entry/exit times. I require Britannia Parking to provide robust evidence of the times of entry/exit as this is clearly absent from the PCN.

6) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself. Sunset time on 7th December 2017 was 15:52. The reported entry time to the car park was 18:27:15. Given that the light conditions were poor and the signage within the car park was not clear, legible and unlit, it is reasonable to suggest that the signs present within the car park are not fit for purpose.

The signs were contradictory and crowded with different terms, so this is not an example of !!!8216;plain intelligible language!!!8217;, contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015:
hxxp://vvv.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted
68 Requirement for transparency (1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent. (2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.
It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case where the terms were concise and far clearer with no tariff lists which is the primary prominent information on the board. In the Beavis case, the signs were unusually clear. The Supreme Court were keen to point out within hours of their decision that it related to that car park and those signs and facts only so it certainly does not supersede any other appeal/defence about a different car park:-

hxxp://imgur.com/a/AkMCN

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

hxxp://2.bp.blogspot.com/-eYdphoIIDgE/VpbCpfSTaiI/AAAAAAAAE10/5uFjL528DgU/s640/Parking%2Bsign_001.jpg

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

hxxp://vvv-archive.mozilla.org/newlayout/testcases/css/sec526pt2.htm

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

hxxp://vvv.signazon.com/help-center/sign-letter-height-visibility-chart.aspx

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2!!!8221; letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3!!!8221; or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

hxxp://vvv.ebay.co.uk/gds/Outdoor-Dimensional-Sign-Letter-Best-Viewing-Distance-/10000000175068392/g.html

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

hxxp://vvv.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.


I therefore request that POPLA uphold my appeal and cancel this PCN.

Coupon-mad

Bumping for others to see & comment!

fresian_cow

Thank you, can anyone offer any advice. X

logician

fresian_cow wrote: »

Firstly thank you so much to everyone on this forum for all the advice and help available. I'd have gotten nowhere near this far along without it. I would be very grateful for any opinions/advice on this draft of my appeal letter, I have used some other letters as a template and built on that, I hope I've done it right.

A notice to keeper was issued on 13th December 2017 and received by me, the registered keeper of ******** for an alleged contravention of !!!8216;PARKED LONGER THAN THE MAXIMUM TIME PERMITTED!!!8217; at *********l on 7th December 2017. I was NOT the driver. I contend that I am not liable for this parking charge on the basis of the below points:

1) Amount demanded is a penalty and is punitive, contravening the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The authority on this is ParkingEye v Beavis. That case was characterised by clear and ample signage where the motorist had time to read, and then consider the signage and decide whether to accept or not. In this case the signage was neither clear not ample, and the motorist had not time to read the signage, let alone consider it, as the charge was applied instantly the vehicle stopped. The signage cannot be read safely from a moving vehicle.

2) If Britannia Parking want to make use of the Keeper Liability provisions in Schedule 4 of POFA 2012 and Britannia Parking have not issued and delivered a parking charge notice to the driver in the place where the parking event took place, your Notice to Keeper must meet the strict requirements and timetable set out in the Schedule (in particular paragraph 9). I have had no evidence that Britannia Parking have complied with these BPA Code requirements for ANPR issued tickets so require them to evidence their compliance to POPLA.

3) In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.

Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made because the fact remains I am only the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator, because they cannot use the POFA in this case, to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA 2012 was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability

!!!8220;There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no !!!8216;reasonable presumption!!!8217; in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass."

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator is NOT attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:
"I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal."

The same conclusion was reached by POPLA Assessor Steve Macallan, quoted in appeal point 5 above.

4) I do not believe that the Operator has demonstrated a proprietary interest in the land, because they have no legal possession which would give Britannia Parking any right to offer parking spaces, let alone allege a contract with third party customers of the lawful owner/occupiers. In addition, Britannia Parking!!!8217;s lack of title in this land means they have no legal standing to allege trespass or loss, if that is the basis of their charge. I require Britannia Parking to demonstrate their legal ownership of the land to POPLA.

I contend that Britannia Parking is only an agent working for the owner and their signs do not help them to form a contract without any consideration capable of being offered. VCS-v-HMRC 2012 is the binding decision in the Upper Chamber which covers this issue with compelling statements of fact about this sort of business model.

I believe there is no contract with the landowner/occupier that entitles Britannia Parking to levy these charges and therefore it has no authority to issue parking charge notices (PCNs). This being the case, the burden of proof shifts to Britannia Parking to prove otherwise so I require that Britannia Parking produce a copy of their contract with the owner/occupier and that the POPLA adjudicator scrutinises it. Even if a basic contract is produced and mentions PCNs, the lack of ownership or assignment of title or interest in the land reduces any contract to one that exists simply on an agency basis between Britannia Parking and the owner/occupier, containing nothing that Britannia Parking can lawfully use in their own name as a mere agent, that could impact on a third party customer.

5) There are no time stamps on the photographs providing any evidence of the times of entry or exit. Britannia Parking have provided no evidence of the entry/exit times. I require Britannia Parking to provide robust evidence of the times of entry/exit as this is clearly absent from the PCN.

6) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself. Sunset time on 7th December 2017 was 15:52. The reported entry time to the car park was 18:27:15. Given that the light conditions were poor and the signage within the car park was not clear, legible and unlit, it is reasonable to suggest that the signs present within the car park are not fit for purpose.

The signs were contradictory and crowded with different terms, so this is not an example of !!!8216;plain intelligible language!!!8217;, contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015:
hxxp://vvv.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted
68 Requirement for transparency (1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent. (2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.
It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case where the terms were concise and far clearer with no tariff lists which is the primary prominent information on the board. In the Beavis case, the signs were unusually clear. The Supreme Court were keen to point out within hours of their decision that it related to that car park and those signs and facts only so it certainly does not supersede any other appeal/defence about a different car park:-

hxxp://imgur.com/a/AkMCN

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

hxxp://2.bp.blogspot.com/-eYdphoIIDgE/VpbCpfSTaiI/AAAAAAAAE10/5uFjL528DgU/s640/Parking%2Bsign_001.jpg

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

hxxp://vvv-archive.mozilla.org/newlayout/testcases/css/sec526pt2.htm

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

hxxp://vvv.signazon.com/help-center/sign-letter-height-visibility-chart.aspx

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2!!!8221; letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3!!!8221; or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

hxxp://vvv.ebay.co.uk/gds/Outdoor-Dimensional-Sign-Letter-Best-Viewing-Distance-/10000000175068392/g.html

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

hxxp://vvv.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.


I therefore request that POPLA uphold my appeal and cancel this PCN.

Firstly, I am firstly struggling to decipher the where there appears to the !!!!and numbers - is this a copy and paste issue?


Secondly your point 2) is flawed. If this was an ANPR issued ticket, then there is no need for a notice to driver to be served.

Notices to keeper can be served after compliance with either Section 7 and 8 or Section 9 of POFA.

You have not really drilled down as to why Ntk did not meet the requirements of POFA


Thirdly, I note that the parking event took place at dusk/night time.

You need to highlight more then that if signage was not illuminated sufficiently, then there could be no contract formed with the driver, thus no obligation be transferred to the keeper.

Point out the relevant sections in the BPA Code of Practice regarding this and also mention Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule specifically with regards to lack of illumination - for signs.

Criteria for making a contract not fulfilled, 'intention to create legal relations/offer/consideration and acceptance of terms'


You need to expand on the authority issue - again quote relevant sections in the COP
Point out that a Witness Statement does not prove authority and many parking companies have submitted false statements to POPLA

Those are some pointers to start with ...

The_Deep

This is well worth watching. Complain to your MP, the more complaints they get the quicker these scammers will go out of business.


http://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/2f0384f2-eba5-4fff-ab07-cf24b6a22918?in=12:49:41

Lizabeth21

logician wrote: »

Firstly, I am firstly struggling to decipher the where there appears to the !!!!and numbers - is this a copy and paste issue?

This seems to be happening a lot where ones are typing apostrophes