LPS - Parking Charge Notice - Stratford On Avon

Redx

standard rejection letter

no profit in acceptance , so they reject and put you through more stress

as you said above , start drafting a popla appeal

post #4 told you all of this

Button_Moon

Bit of a delay as I've been abroad yet again - I've done some reading and it's a lot of content to absorb. From my circumstances I believe the below works best? I have yet to receive an NTK and without going back to the parking machine I cannot tell if the on screen display shows a valid time - if you remember I was 1 minute short of the set afternoon rate which would have been perfectly fine for what I paid.

Appeal re POPLA code:

Dear POPLA Adjudicator,

I am writing to you to lodge a formal appeal against a parking charge notice sent to myself as registered keeper of the vehicle in question. I contend that I am not liable for this parking charge on the basis of the below points:

1) A compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.

2) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.

3) No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice.

A compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.

This operator has not fulfilled the 'second condition' for keeper liability as defined in Schedule 4 and as a result, they have no lawful authority to pursue any parking charge from myself, as a registered keeper appellant. There is no discretion on this matter. If Schedule 4 mandatory documents are not served at all, or in time (or if the document omits any prescribed wording) then keeper liability simply does not apply.

The wording in the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 is as follows:

''Right to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle: 4(1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. (2) The right under this paragraph applies only if

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6*, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met;

*Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4: 6(1) ''The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor)— (a)has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8. This is re-iterated further ‘If a notice to driver has been given, any subsequent notice to keeper MUST be given in accordance with paragraph 8.’

The NTK must have been delivered to the registered keeper’s address within the ‘relevant period’ which is highlighted as a total of 56 days beginning with the day after that on which any notice to driver was given. As this operator has evidently failed to serve a NTK, not only have they chosen to flout the strict requirements set out in PoFA 2012, but they have consequently failed to meet the second condition for keeper liability. Clearly I cannot be held liable to pay this charge as the mandatory series of parking charge documents were not properly given.

Evidently, the operator has withheld from me (as the registered keeper) the required details of my liabilities in the event that the driver is not identified. This might be an omission on the part of the operator or a deliberate attempt to mislead, but regardless, the Notice to Keeper fails to comply with PoFA 2012 (section 9).

2) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself

The signs were contradictory and crowded with different terms, so this is not an example of ‘plain intelligible language’, contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015: 68 Requirement for transparency (1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent. (2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case where the terms were concise and far clearer.

In the Beavis case, the signs were unusually clear. The Supreme Court were keen to point out within hours of their decision that it related to that car park and those signs and facts only so it certainly does not supersede any other appeal/defence about a different car park.

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background.

It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. For this appeal, I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

3) No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b) any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c) any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d) who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e) the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement

Yours faithfully

Redx

seems ok to me, but does not mention clause #13 of the BPA CoP, namely , grace periods , so I would add that in too (if you dont add relevant points they wont be considered)

also add a NOT THE SAME AS BEAVIS paragraph in case these muppets try to say the BEAVIS case applies

and ensure that you have added the relevant wording for

NO TRANSFER OF LIABILITY FROM DRIVER TO KEEPER

make it clear to the popla assessor that they failed to transfer the liability

Button_Moon

would clause #13 apply in this case? Ticket has a departure time of 17:59 and PCN time of issue was 18:51.

Redx

maybe not , but you mentioned something about 1 minute or whatever and you are allowed maybe 5 to 10 minutes to park up and read the signs under clause #13 of the BPA CoP , then purchase a ticket and go and put it on the vehicle

so misleading signage seems to also play a large part in this due to the fact that the driver was on the cusp of the changeover time and yet no mention of this is made in their signage or their evidence pack

plus the machine may not be accurate

there was a clear intention to pay , because a ticket was purchsed in good faith

Button_Moon

I'm a little unsure what to put for NOT SAME AS BEVIS? Something such as the following at the end of section 2?

Whilst the PCN is not identical to the Bevis case, there is uncertainty over the signage and contract that has been formed

I've added a bit more meat at the end of section 2, does it need its own paragraph and number?

Appeal re POPLA code:

Dear POPLA Adjudicator,

I am writing to you to lodge a formal appeal against a parking charge notice sent to myself as registered keeper of the vehicle in question. I contend that I am not liable for this parking charge on the basis of the below points:

1) A compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.

2) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.

3) No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice.

1) A compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.

This operator has not fulfilled the 'second condition' for keeper liability as defined in Schedule 4 and as a result, they have no lawful authority to pursue any parking charge from myself, as a registered keeper appellant. There is no discretion on this matter. If Schedule 4 mandatory documents are not served at all, or in time (or if the document omits any prescribed wording) then keeper liability simply does not apply.

The wording in the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 is as follows:

''Right to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle: 4(1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. (2) The right under this paragraph applies only if

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6*, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met;

*Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4: 6(1) ''The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor)— (a)has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8. This is re-iterated further ‘If a notice to driver has been given, any subsequent notice to keeper MUST be given in accordance with paragraph 8.’

The NTK must have been delivered to the registered keeper’s address within the ‘relevant period’ which is highlighted as a total of 56 days beginning with the day after that on which any notice to driver was given. As this operator has evidently failed to serve a NTK, not only have they chosen to flout the strict requirements set out in PoFA 2012, but they have consequently failed to meet the second condition for keeper liability. Clearly I cannot be held liable to pay this charge as the mandatory series of parking charge documents were not properly given.

Evidently, the operator has withheld from me (as the registered keeper) the required details of my liabilities in the event that the driver is not identified. This might be an omission on the part of the operator or a deliberate attempt to mislead, but regardless, the Notice to Keeper fails to comply with PoFA 2012 (section 9).
There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.''

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator cannot transfer the liability for the charge using the POFA.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:

''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.''

2) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself

The signs were contradictory and crowded with different terms, so this is not an example of ‘plain intelligible language’, contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015: 68 Requirement for transparency (1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent. (2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case where the terms were concise and far clearer.

In the Beavis case, the signs were unusually clear. The Supreme Court were keen to point out within hours of their decision that it related to that car park and those signs and facts only so it certainly does not supersede any other appeal/defence about a different car park.

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background.

It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. For this appeal, I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

A ticket was purchased at the fee of £2 and clearly displayed on the dashboard in view of any ticket officers. £2 either constitutes as up to 2 hours parking "daily rate" or an "evening rate" of 16:00-08:00 hours. In this instance the PCN was raised at 18:51 hours for exceeding time limit. The ticket displays a departure time of 17:59 hours, this would mean that the ticket was purchased at 15:59 with the intent for "evening rate" - there is no clear malice to abuse the ticket or pricing system.

There are areas of concern I would bring into question on the ticket machines and method of offering PCN in this instance: a) the digital screen is hard to read, b) the ticket machine is under insufficient lighting, c) the date stamp on the ticket did not coincide to my mobile phone (which is digitally synchronised to GMT), d) there has been no clear grace period from the ticket officer on the close proximity of the time displayed on ticket.
Is there evidence (during this particular PCN) that the ticket machine is working under correct GMT time, and printed time stamp (on parking ticket) coincides exactly to digital clock on LCD screen? Are the ticket machines calibrated and maintained with proof of time tolerance to GMT, if there is a tolerance how can this be proven on the printed ticket which holds no decimal placing on time other than hours and seconds.

Under clause 13 of BPA Code of Practice there is a grace period for entering and leaving. would this not constitute as part of the contract from purchasing the ticket to displaying on the vehicle? The ticket was issued 1 minute prior to "evening rate" but the time taken to walk and display the ticket on the vehicle was over 1 minute therefore within the "evening rate" time of 16:00 hours. Is there a BPA or Local Parking Security Ltd tolerance or grace period for time overlap from "daily" to "evening" rates?

As stated above, there has been no clear intent to manipulate the pay parking system and has in fact brought up a lack of information on what fee should be paid in this instance. Rather than give the benefit of doubt a heavy fee has been placed which is hugely incorrect to what has occurred.

3) No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b) any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c) any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d) who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e) the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement

Yours faithfully

Button_Moon

Any thoughts on above?

Redx

seems ok to me on a skim read

maybe add another point about BEAVIS and that this seems to be a penalty on a pay and display car park , whereas in the BEAVIS case there was no option to extend the time etc

you should be able to find this particular point in other appeals

ie:- you are using the BEAVIS argument against them , useful if they try to go "BEAVIS M`LUD"

Umkomaas

ie:- you are using the BEAVIS argument against them , useful if they try to go "BEAVIS M`LUD"

You mean “BEAVIS M’ LUD - INNIT”!

Button_Moon

Redx wrote: »

seems ok to me on a skim read

maybe add another point about BEAVIS and that this seems to be a penalty on a pay and display car park , whereas in the BEAVIS case there was no option to extend the time etc

you should be able to find this particular point in other appeals

ie:- you are using the BEAVIS argument against them , useful if they try to go "BEAVIS M`LUD"

I'm struggling to find any of this info

I have till next Monday to submit to POPLA, so a bit of time to amend

Please note that there was no means to extend the time so it would be identical to BEAVIS. The only alternative would have been to purchase the ticket again under the same value. If I'm claiming that the machine was not calibrated or was not obvious to read the time whilst ticket was printed, is it a pointless argument? ie if I purchased the ticket assuming it was of correct time I would not have needed to buy another ticket or seek a technical number to rectify what I had purchased - as far as I was aware the ticket was purchased at the evening rate.

Is there anything else I can use to argue against this case?