Tower Road Newquay

Coupon-mad

pirateship wrote: »

Coupon Mad I'm sorry but I can't find anything under that search for Kelvin Reynolds and I have put the exact wording in. Do you have any other pointers please?

DollyDee has the right article. However you can find the right wording already written about that article in several POPLA appeals.

I just put this in to 'search this forum' and found several listed underneath your thread first:

POPLA grace period observation Kelvin Reynolds BPA

I expect the difference in our searches is, I always change it to 'show posts' (not show threads). You may have to do 'advanced search' (then 'show posts').

pirateship

Hi. I would really appreciate more feedback on this. I am hoping to win my appeal on grace periods alone but the rest of it is obviously helpful. Have I made it more relevant now?

Re: ParkingEye PCN, reference code: xxxxxxxxxxxx

POPLA Ref: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

I received a Parking Charge Notice for apparently ‘not purchasing the appropriate parking time or by remaining at the car park for longer than permitted’ at Tower Road , Newquay.
I feel the charge for the requested amount is not only unwarranted but also completely unfair and unrecoverable. I paid for 4 hours parking, but an 11 minute overstay was calculated from the time of entry to the car park and not from the time of purchase of the ticket.

I submit the points below to show that I am not liable for the parking charge:

1) Lack of Grace Period
2) No landowner authority nor legal standing to form contracts or charge drivers.
3) The signage in the car park was inadequate
4) The charge is a penalty, breaches the CRA and is not saved by the decision in ParkingEye vs Beavis

1) Grace periods
The BPA Code of Practice (CoP) makes it mandatory for operators to allow grace periods at the start and end of parking, before enforcement action can be taken.
The CoP states:
13.2 You should allow the driver a reasonable ‘grace period’ in which to decide if they are going to stay or go.
13.4 You should allow the driver a reasonable period to leave the private car park after the parking contract has ended, before you take enforcement action. If the location is one where parking is normally permitted, the Grace Period at the END of the parking period should be a MINIMUM of 10 minutes.
For the avoidance of doubt, the second 'grace' period of at last ten minutes (not a maximum, but a minimum) is in addition to the separate, first grace/observation period that must be allowed to allow the time taken to arrive, find a parking bay, lock the car and go over to any machine to read & observe the signage terms, before paying.
Kelvin Reynolds of the BPA says there is a difference between ‘grace’ periods and ‘observation’ periods in parking and that good practice allows for this:

Link removed

Good car parking practice includes ‘grace’ periods
“An observation period is the time when an enforcement officer should be able to determine what the motorist intends to do once in the car park. The BPA’s guidance specifically says that there must be sufficient time for the motorist to park their car, observe the signs, decide whether they want to comply with the operator’s conditions and either drive away or pay for a ticket,” he explains.
“No time limit is specified. This is because it might take one person five minutes, but another person 10 minutes depending on various factors, not limited to disability.”
The BPA’s guidance defines the ‘grace period’ as the time allowed after permitted or paid-for parking has expired but before any kind of enforcement takes place.
The observation period (at the start)
The ANPR photos on the PCN show an arrival time of 12:29:51 and a departure time of 16:41:19 – an alleged overstay of 11 minutes.
The BPA (Kelvin Reynolds is the Director of Policy & Public Affairs) is on record as shown above, as saying that the 'observation period' at the start might take one person five minutes, but another person 10 minutes, depending on various factors”.
The day in question was a particularly warm sunny day in Newquay, a well-known seaside resort which was fairly busy with locals and New Year holiday makers making the most of the unseasonably warm weather. It is therefore, not unreasonable to suggest that the queue to enter the car park and pay for a ticket was slow. Add to this the fact that the ticket machine was not accepting some pound coins, and you have an initial grace period of anything up to 10 minutes being used through no fault of the driver.
The grace period (at the end)
The same arguments relating to difficulty in arriving are made as to the difficulty of leaving the car park at the end of the day. The car park was not well lit and having arrived back at the car within the 4 hour, PAID FOR time period, it was difficult getting my young son dry and clean from spending time happily playing on the sand in the dark. I would suggest that it was reasonable for this to have taken up to, but no more than, 10 minutes.

This captured photo shows how dark the car park was at the time of departure:

Photo of PCN exit photo here

Given that no evidence has been provided as to the trustworthiness of the timing system used to generate the date stamps attached to the photographs, 11 minutes is perfectly within scope of both the MINIMUM grace periods and any potential error in time recording.
Taking both BPA 'Observation' and 'Grace' Periods into account, the 11 minute apparent overstay is well within the 20 minutes suggested as reasonable by the BPA and makes the PCN no more than a scam.
2) No landowner authority nor legal standing to form contracts or charge drivers.
As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement


3) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.
There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

link removed

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.


This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

link removed

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

link removed

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

link removed

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

link removed

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

4) The charge is a penalty, breaches the CRA and is not saved by the decision in ParkingEye vs Beavis.
This situation is an 'ordinary' contract involving no overstay and no breach of the legitimate interests of the landowner. This was a simple consumer/trader transaction with a ticket for parking being purchased in good faith and produced by a machine and can be very easily distinguished from the case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis.

Indeed, the Judges' findings at the Court of Appeal stage - which were not disputed nor overturned at the Supreme Court, so the findings stand as part of that binding case law - fully support my view that the case of 'Kemble v Farren' remains the binding authority in support of this position.

At 47 in the Court of Appeal Judgment in 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' it was held:

''When the court is considering an ordinary financial or commercial contract, then it is understandable that the law, which lays down its own rules as to the compensation due from a contract breaker to the innocent party, should prohibit terms which require the payment of compensation going far beyond that which the law allows in the absence of any contract provision governing this outcome. The classic and simple case is that referred to by Tindal CJ in Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing. 141 at 148: “But that a very large sum should become immediately payable, in consequence of the non-payment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered a penalty, appears to be a contradiction in terms, the case being precisely that in which courts of equity have always relieved, and against which courts of law have, in modern times,endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess the real damages sustained by the breach of the agreement.” ''

And at the Supreme Court it was held at 14. ''…where a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform an act, and also provides that, if he does not perform it, he will pay the other party a specified sum of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a secondary obligation which is capable of being a penalty;’ ''

At 22, the Supreme Court explored Lord Dunedin’s speech in Dunlop and separated complex cases (Beavis) from ordinary/standard contracts with a transaction and tariff paid at a machine:
''Lord Dunedin's...four tests are a useful tool for deciding whether these expressions can properly be applied to simple damages clauses in standard contracts. But they are not easily applied to more complex cases.''

This is NOT a 'more complex' case by any stretch of the imagination.

At 32, it was held that a trader, in this case a parking company:
''...can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.''

Clearly a charge out of all proportion to the tariff - which was paid in any case - is an unfair penalty. A huge charge arising under the excuse of such a minor term is unjustified and unfair, if the remedy is out of all proportion with the 'breach' and the (completely different) Beavis case does NOT apply to this argument.

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (the CRA, enacted after the Beavis parking event) supports a consumer's position in at least two ways:

- the signage failed to make any obligation and/or risk of penalty prominent. The CRA states: ''A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract or a written consumer notice is transparent. To be transparent it must be expressed in plain and intelligible language and be legible...any subject matter terms must not be hidden in any small print otherwise the price and the subject matter terms will be assessed for "fairness". ''

- Under Schedule 2 'Consumer contract terms which may be regarded as unfair' it includes: ''A term which has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation.''

As this charge is clearly punitive and is not saved from breaching the 'penalty rule' (i.e. Lord Dunedin's four tests for a penalty) by the Beavis case, which turned on completely different facts and related only to that car park with its own unique complexity of commercial justification.



This concludes my POPLA appeal.

Signed

pirateship

Is anyone available to check my appeal before I send it please?

Coupon-mad

For the avoidance of doubt, the second 'grace' period of at last ten minutes (not a maximum, but a minimum)

Typo above, should read 'at least'.

I would change this:

The grace period (at the end)
The same arguments relating to difficulty in arriving are made as to the difficulty of leaving the car park at the end of the day. The car park was not well lit and having arrived back at the car within the 4 hour, PAID FOR time period, it was difficult getting my young son dry and clean from spending time happily playing on the sand in the dark. I would suggest that it was reasonable for this to have taken up to, but no more than, 10 minutes.

To this, nothing about getting your son dry and all about strapping him in and then the time to actually drive out:

The grace period (at the end)
The same arguments relating to difficulty in arriving are made as to the difficulty of leaving the car park at the end of the day. The car park was not well lit and having arrived back at the car within the 4 hour, PAID FOR time period, leaving involved:

- strapping a young child in
- loading bags and beach paraphernalia into the car securely
- it was dark by then and the surface here even in the car park is obstructed by pebbles, sand and potholes as well as the physical obstructions of other pedestrians blocking the route towards the exit as they also packed up to go. Then there were other cars reversing out of spaces into the path of the leaving queue, which also leads out onto a busy main road which (quite reasonably) will delay all cars in that queue, especially after dark.

This final 'grace' period alone, certainly took several minutes - but the car was not actually parked for over 4 hours at all. Given the popular and busy time of year for beach traffic and the badly-surfaced nature of this car park and the machines playing up with pound coins, an unproven (approximate, given the camera clocks not being synchronised nor exact to the second) eleven minutes all told either side of paid-for time is very clearly perfectly reasonable.

The_Deep

Have you read this?


http://parking-prankster.blogspot.co.uk/2014/03/waiting-for-space-is-not-parking.html

The_Slithy_Tove

pirateship wrote: »

Hi. I would really appreciate more feedback on this. I am hoping to win my appeal on grace periods alone but the rest of it is obviously helpful.

I see you have used Para 47 from the Beavis Court of Appeal case:

pirateship wrote: »

4) The charge is a penalty, breaches the CRA and is not saved by the decision in ParkingEye vs Beavis.
This situation is an 'ordinary' contract involving no overstay and no breach of the legitimate interests of the landowner. This was a simple consumer/trader transaction with a ticket for parking being purchased in good faith and produced by a machine and can be very easily distinguished from the case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis.

Indeed, the Judges' findings at the Court of Appeal stage - which were not disputed nor overturned at the Supreme Court, so the findings stand as part of that binding case law - fully support my view that the case of 'Kemble v Farren' remains the binding authority in support of this position.

At 47 in the Court of Appeal Judgment in 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' it was held:

''When the court is considering an ordinary financial or commercial contract, then it is understandable that the law, which lays down its own rules as to the compensation due from a contract breaker to the innocent party, should prohibit terms which require the payment of compensation going far beyond that which the law allows in the absence of any contract provision governing this outcome. The classic and simple case is that referred to by Tindal CJ in Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing. 141 at 148: “But that a very large sum should become immediately payable, in consequence of the non-payment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered a penalty, appears to be a contradiction in terms, the case being precisely that in which courts of equity have always relieved, and against which courts of law have, in modern times,endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess the real damages sustained by the breach of the agreement.” ''

I think Para 46 is also useful in pay-per-hour car parks, as it is quite clear about how Beavis does not apply in such cases:

46. The terms of use of the car park need, therefore, to provide a disincentive to drivers which will make them tend to comply with the two hour limit. That is afforded by the parking charge of £85. It would not be afforded by a system of imposing a rate per hour according to the time overstayed, unless that rate were also substantial, and well above what might be regarded as a market rate for the elapsed time, even if the market rate were in some way adjusted to take account of the benefit to the driver of the first two hours being free.

pirateship

Many thanks for your suggestions Coupon Mad.
Hopefully this is the final draft and can be sent.

Re: ParkingEye PCN, reference code: xxxxx

POPLA Ref: xxxxxxxxxxx

I received a Parking Charge Notice for apparently ‘not purchasing the appropriate parking time or by remaining at the car park for longer than permitted’ at Tower Road, Newquay.
I feel the charge for the requested amount is not only unwarranted but also completely unfair and unrecoverable. I paid for 4 hours parking, but an 11 minute overstay was calculated from the time of entry to the car park and not from the time of purchase of the ticket.

I submit the points below to show that I am not liable for the parking charge:

1) Lack of Grace Period
2) No landowner authority nor legal standing to form contracts or charge drivers.
3) The signage in the car park was inadequate
4) The charge is a penalty, breaches the CRA and is not saved by the decision in ParkingEye vs Beavis

1) Grace periods
The BPA Code of Practice (CoP) makes it mandatory for operators to allow grace periods at the start and end of parking, before enforcement action can be taken.
The CoP states:
13.2 You should allow the driver a reasonable ‘grace period’ in which to decide if they are going to stay or go.
13.4 You should allow the driver a reasonable period to leave the private car park after the parking contract has ended, before you take enforcement action. If the location is one where parking is normally permitted, the Grace Period at the END of the parking period should be a MINIMUM of 10 minutes.
For the avoidance of doubt, the second 'grace' period of at least ten minutes (not a maximum, but a minimum) is in addition to the separate, first grace/observation period that must be allowed to allow the time taken to arrive, find a parking bay, lock the car and go over to any machine to read & observe the signage terms, before paying.
Kelvin Reynolds of the BPA says there is a difference between ‘grace’ periods and ‘observation’ periods in parking and that good practice allows for this:

Link removed

Good car parking practice includes ‘grace’ periods
“An observation period is the time when an enforcement officer should be able to determine what the motorist intends to do once in the car park. The BPA’s guidance specifically says that there must be sufficient time for the motorist to park their car, observe the signs, decide whether they want to comply with the operator’s conditions and either drive away or pay for a ticket,” he explains.
“No time limit is specified. This is because it might take one person five minutes, but another person 10 minutes depending on various factors, not limited to disability.”
The BPA’s guidance defines the ‘grace period’ as the time allowed after permitted or paid-for parking has expired but before any kind of enforcement takes place.
The observation period (at the start)
The ANPR photos on the PCN show an arrival time of 12:29:51 and a departure time of 16:41:19 – an alleged overstay of 11 minutes.
The BPA (Kelvin Reynolds is the Director of Policy & Public Affairs) is on record as shown above, as saying that the 'observation period' at the start might take one person five minutes, but another person 10 minutes, depending on various factors”.
The day in question was a particularly warm sunny day in Newquay, a well-known seaside resort which was fairly busy with locals and New Year holiday makers making the most of the unseasonably warm weather. It is therefore, not unreasonable to suggest that the queue to enter the car park and pay for a ticket was slow. Add to this the fact that the ticket machine was not accepting some pound coins, and you have an initial grace period of anything up to 10 minutes being used through no fault of the driver.
The grace period (at the end)
The same arguments relating to difficulty in arriving are made as to the difficulty of leaving the car park at the end of the day. The car park was not well lit and having arrived back at the car within the 4 hour, PAID FOR time period, leaving involved:

- strapping a young child in
- loading bags and beach paraphernalia into the car securely
- it was dark by then and the surface here even in the car park is obstructed by pebbles, sand and potholes as well as the physical obstructions of other pedestrians blocking the route towards the exit as they also packed up to go. Then there were other cars reversing out of spaces into the path of the leaving queue, which also leads out onto a busy main road which (quite reasonably) will delay all cars in that queue, especially after dark.

This final 'grace' period alone, certainly took several minutes - but the car was not actually parked for over 4 hours at all. Given the popular and busy time of year for beach traffic and the badly-surfaced nature of this car park and the machines playing up with pound coins, an unproven (approximate, given the camera clocks not being synchronised nor exact to the second) eleven minutes all told either side of paid-for time is very clearly perfectly reasonable.

This captured photo shows how dark the car park was at the time of departure:

Photo of car departing car park in darkness

Given that no evidence has been provided as to the trustworthiness of the timing system used to generate the date stamps attached to the photographs, 11 minutes is perfectly within scope of both the MINIMUM grace periods and any potential error in time recording.
Taking both BPA 'Observation' and 'Grace' Periods into account, the 11-minute apparent overstay is well within the 20 minutes suggested as reasonable by the BPA and makes the PCN no more than a scam.
2) No landowner authority nor legal standing to form contracts or charge drivers.
As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement


3) The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.
There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

Link removed

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.


This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

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As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

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''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

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''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed, in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

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This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

4) The charge is a penalty, breaches the CRA and is not saved by the decision in ParkingEye vs Beavis.
This situation is an 'ordinary' contract involving no overstay and no breach of the legitimate interests of the landowner. This was a simple consumer/trader transaction with a ticket for parking being purchased in good faith and produced by a machine and can be very easily distinguished from the case of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis.

Indeed, the Judges' findings at the Court of Appeal stage - which were not disputed nor overturned at the Supreme Court, so the findings stand as part of that binding case law - fully support my view that the case of 'Kemble v Farren' remains the binding authority in support of this position.

At 47 in the Court of Appeal Judgment in 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' it was held:

''When the court is considering an ordinary financial or commercial contract, then it is understandable that the law, which lays down its own rules as to the compensation due from a contract breaker to the innocent party, should prohibit terms which require the payment of compensation going far beyond that which the law allows in the absence of any contract provision governing this outcome. The classic and simple case is that referred to by Tindal CJ in Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing. 141 at 148: “But that a very large sum should become immediately payable, in consequence of the non-payment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered a penalty, appears to be a contradiction in terms, the case being precisely that in which courts of equity have always relieved, and against which courts of law have, in modern times, endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess the real damages sustained by the breach of the agreement.” ''

And at the Supreme Court it was held at 14. ''…where a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform an act, and also provides that, if he does not perform it, he will pay the other party a specified sum of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a secondary obligation which is capable of being a penalty;’ ''

At 22, the Supreme Court explored Lord Dunedin’s speech in Dunlop and separated complex cases (Beavis) from ordinary/standard contracts with a transaction and tariff paid at a machine:
''Lord Dunedin's...four tests are a useful tool for deciding whether these expressions can properly be applied to simple damages clauses in standard contracts. But they are not easily applied to more complex cases.''

This is NOT a 'more complex' case by any stretch of the imagination.

At 32, it was held that a trader, in this case a parking company:
''...can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.''

Clearly a charge out of all proportion to the tariff - which was paid in any case - is an unfair penalty. A huge charge arising under the excuse of such a minor term is unjustified and unfair, if the remedy is out of all proportion with the 'breach' and the (completely different) Beavis case does NOT apply to this argument.

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (the CRA, enacted after the Beavis parking event) supports a consumer's position in at least two ways:

- the signage failed to make any obligation and/or risk of penalty prominent. The CRA states: ''A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract or a written consumer notice is transparent. To be transparent it must be expressed in plain and intelligible language and be legible...any subject matter terms must not be hidden in any small print otherwise the price and the subject matter terms will be assessed for "fairness". ''

- Under Schedule 2 'Consumer contract terms which may be regarded as unfair' it includes: ''A term which has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation.''

As this charge is clearly punitive and is not saved from breaching the 'penalty rule' (i.e. Lord Dunedin's four tests for a penalty) by the Beavis case, which turned on completely different facts and related only to that car park with its own unique complexity of commercial justification.



This concludes my POPLA appeal.

Yours faithfully,

pirateship

Do you think this is good to go please?

Coupon-mad

Looks good - I would just add The Slithy Tove's suggested para 46 as well, just before you quote para 47 of Beavis.

pirateship

Many thanks for all your help. My appeal has been submitted. I will update the thread once I know the outcome.