UKPC POPLA Draft - Deadline: 10th Feb 2017

Pyro908

Hi guys, thank you so much for your help and advice so far.

<<<<Please see later draft>>>>

Coupon-mad

No idea which ancient POPLA appeal example you got this from but it must be removed. 'No GPEOL' as a defence or appeal point, was chucked out by the Supreme Court in the Beavis case in 2015:

1. No genuine pre-estimate of loss
The demand for a payment of £100 is punitive, unreasonable, exceeds an appropriate amount, and has no relationship to the loss that would have been suffered by the Landowner. Parking charges must be based on the loss that is suffered as the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice states:
19.5 If the parking charge that the driver is being asked to pay is for a breach of contract or act of trespass, this charge must be based on the genuine pre-estimate of loss that you suffer.

and

19.6 If your parking charge is based upon a contractually agreed sum, that charge cannot be punitive or unreasonable.
The keeper therefore declares that the charge is punitive and therefore an unenforceable penalty.
The UKPC Notice to Keeper (NTK) alleges 'breach of terms' and as such, the landowner/occupier (not their agent) can only pursue liquidated damages directly flowing from the parking event. This might be, for example, a reasonable sum based purely upon the alleged lost parking revenue, or even loss of retail revenue at the nearby shops and cafes if another car was prevented from parking. The vehicle was parked causing no obstruction to access-ways to/from the estate nor were any other residents, maintenance vans or visitors prevented from parking.
I have not received any breakdown of how UKPC calculated their charge and so therefore require UKPC to provide a detailed breakdown of how the amount of the 'charge' was arrived at. I am aware from court rulings and previous POPLA adjudications that the cost of running the business may not be included in these pre-estimate losses. Heads of cost such as normal operational costs and tax-deductible back office functions, debt collection, etc. cannot possibly flow as a direct consequence of this parking event. The landowner/occupier would have been in the same position had the parking charge notice not been issued, and would have had many of the same business overheads even if no vehicles breached any terms at all.
The DfT Guidance and the BPA Code of Practice require that a parking charge for an alleged breach must be an estimate of losses flowing from the incident. UKPC cannot change this requirement so they have no option but to show POPLA their genuine pre-estimate of loss for this charge, not a statement that merely claims that charges were calculated to compensate UKPC for their “losses”.

This is also clutching at straws because UKPC's NTKs are 'OK', so don't try this, POPLA will not agree so this is wasted words:

4. Non-compliant Notice to Keeper - no keeper liability established under POFA2 2012
The 'period of parking' is not shown on the NTK, only the time of issue of an alleged PCN. Therefore the wording makes this a non-compliant NTK under the POFA 2012, Schedule 4. According to Schedule 4 para 8, the Notice must specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates.
The NTK is a nullity so no keeper liability exists.

5. No Creditor identified on the Notice to Keeper
The ‘Notice to Keeper’ does not comply with paragraph 9(2)(h) of Schedule 4 of the POFA 2012 as it does not identify the creditor. Whilst the Notice has indicated that the operator requires a payment to be made to UKPC, there is no specific identification of the Creditor, who may, in law, be UKPC or some other party. The POFA 2012 requires a ‘Notice to Keeper’ to have words to the effect that 'The Creditor is….' and the Notice does not.

Pyro908

Hi Coupon-Mad, thanks for your comments. My second draft was an adaptation of a few 2016 POPLA appeals which had been successful.

I've noted your points and will now reconfigure my appeal for number 3.

Quick question - is my first introductory paragraph ok? I've tried to tie in the second pcn and a comment about quiet enjoyment.

-Will work on draft 3 now.

Coupon-mad

The two £100 ‘fines’ were issued by UK Parking Control (UKPC) within 12 hours of each other, within the same bout of parking and the vehicle was not moved in between.

Pyro908

Hi Guys, so following further research - please see my third draft POPLA appeal below. I have stuck much more closely to the NEWBIE template appeal points.

I am hoping to send off my appeal early this week... Unless there is any benefit in waiting until it is close to the deadline??

A few questions:
- The section in red will only appear in my second POPLA appeal (I only received a NTK for the first). Should it feature higher up in the appeal? i.e. as point 1?

- I've added reference to Beavis back in because the case features heavily in the templates. I've also had a go at mentioning the Jopson case having seen the appeal point in another thread.

- Regarding URLs to images and links. I intend to copy screenshots and images into my appeal but do you recommend these to be embedded in the appeal body or referenced to/from Appendices? Currently I have a mixture of the 2 (and I have left the URLs in for anyone that comes across my thread).

- I am planning to include UKPC's photos of the two "offences" in order to prove that they must have removed or tampered with the first PCN windscreen ticket in order to affix the second. This is the only attachment I was planning to include - unless you recommend more?

Thanks so much for all your help with my appeal. I really appreciate any comments and feedback.

P.S. My appeal is over 25000 characters and is therefore split between two posts.

Pyro908

Re: UKPC PCN: XXXXXXX
POPLA Code: XXXXXXX

Dear POPLA Adjudicator,

As a law abiding citizen who always pays his way, I was extremely upset to hear of the two £100 ‘parking charge notices’ displayed on the vehicle of which I am registered keeper for. The vehicle in question was parked in a residential car park within the estate I live in. The two £100 ‘fines’ were issued by UK Parking Control (UKPC) within the same 12 hour period, for a single bout of parking and the vehicle was not moved inbetween.

By targeting vehicles in this way, UKPC is preventing residents of the estate and their visitors from the quiet enjoyment of their homes.

From UKPC’s own photos it can clearly be seen that UKPC have tampered with the first £100 PCN in order to issue a second £100 PCN. Please see photo evidence in Appendix A and also POPLA ref: XXXXXXX for my appeal for this second PCN.

I submit the points below to show that I am not liable for the parking charge:

1. The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.
2. No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice.
3. No legitimate interest in enforcing a charge – (Parking Eye vs Beavis Case not relevant).
4. This charge is incompatible with the rights under the lease - as decided by the Appeal case of 'JOPSON V HOME GUARD SERVICES' case number: B9GF0A9E on 29th June 2016, which held that the Beavis case does not apply to residential car parks.
5. The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who may have been potentially liable for the charge.
6. A compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.


1. The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

i.imgur.com/tciAdhU.jpg

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

2.bp.blogspot.com/-eYdphoIIDgE/VpbCpfSTaiI/AAAAAAAAE10/5uFjL528DgU/s640/Parking%2Bsign_001.jpg

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:
archive.mozilla.org/newlayout/testcases/css/sec526pt2.htm

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

signazon.com/help-center/sign-letter-height-visibility-chart.aspx

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2” letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3” or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

ebay.co.uk/gds/Outdoor-Dimensional-Sign-Letter-Best-Viewing-Distance-/10000000175068392/g.html

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

 
2. No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement
 

3. The Operator has no legitimate interest in enforcing their charge, the charge is disproportionate, a penalty and an unenforceable Unfair Contract Term.

This case can easily be distinguished from the ParkingEye v Beavis case. With regards to the location and type of the car park and the interests of the operator, there is no comparison with the Beavis decision. The legitimate interest lies with the tenant of the flat to which this bay is allocated and as stated this vehicle was fully permitted by them to park there. As the parking bay is already paid for in a separate contract, no loss has been incurred by UKPC nor do any of the commercial justifications judged to be present in that case apply here.

The Operator may seek to rely on the case of ParkingEye v Beavis as legitimising the charge in this case. The appellant will make the following observations as to why the material case can be easily distinguished from it. The Supreme Court adjudged that the charge in ParkingEye v Beavis could not be considered a penalty, despite the fact that ParkingEye made no loss, because they had a legitimate interest in enforcing that charge and that the charge was not disproportionate to that interest. The legitimate interest was described in paragraph 97 of the Supreme Court judgment as:

“97 a. The need to provide parking spaces for their commercial tenants prospective customers;-
b. The desirability of that parking being free so as to attract customers;-
c. The need to ensure a reasonable turnover of that parking so as to increase the potential
number of such customers;-
d. The related need to prevent `misuse' of the parking for purposes unconnected with the tenants business, for example by commuters going to work or shoppers going to off-park premises; and
e. The desirability of running that parking scheme at no cost, or ideally some profit, to themselves.”

In that case the penalty rule had been engaged by the charge but was then disengaged for the above reasons. In this case the appellant would submit that the penalty rule has similarly been engaged but in contrast it is not disengaged, the Operator has made no loss and the charge remains a penalty. The vehicle was fully entitled to be parked as it was – as stated in the tenancy agreement (enclosed) there is no requirement to display any permit and the parking bay is already paid for in the monthly rent, as agreed in the contract between the tenant and letting agent.

Further to this, this residential car park can only be accessed with permission from the tenants or landowner as there is an electronic entry system to unlock the gates. Therefore, the general public are unable to access this private resident’s car park in the same way as that of the Parking Eye vs Beavis case - so there is no legitimate commercial interest in enforcing a charge to ensure a turnover of customer vehicles. In further contrast to the Beavis case, these penalty charges cannot be expected to underwrite any free parking for customers – this is a purely residential car park so no free parking is offered to any customers, and secondly the resident already pays for their allocated parking spaces through their rental agreement.

The Operator has no legitimate interest in enforcing this charge; their only interest is to seek to profit and intimidate genuine residents into paying their speculative invoices – for parking in a bay they have already paid for and have every right to park in. Their charge remains an unenforceable penalty as none of the legitimate interests pursued in Parking Eye v Beavis are present in this case. To quote the passage referred to in the Supreme Court judgment.

“The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation.”

The Supreme Court made clear that their judgment related only to that particular car park and how it operated. In this situation, it is impossible, without intellectual dishonesty, to believe that they would determine that this alleged offence would justify such a disproportionate, extravagant and unconscionable charge when the vehicle was parked in the flat’s own allocated bay where it has every entitlement to.

Careful analysis of the Supreme Court judgment is not, as the Operator may believe, a judicial green light legitimising all parking charges. It is indeed quite the reverse, and the onus is on the Claimant to demonstrate that they have a legitimate interest in enforcing their charge and that the charge is proportionate to that interest.

With regards to the findings of the ParkingEye vs Beavis case regarding signage and its application to this case, the sum of £100 is not communicated to drivers clearly and unambiguously. Therefore, it falls foul of the findings of the Supreme Court Judges in ParkingEye v Beavis, where the prominence of the £85 charge depicted on a simple sign in contrasting large lettering, was key. If a driver is unable to read the sum of the parking 'charge' (the £100 in this case) before parking - because the sign is wordy and unremarkable, the charge not prominent and the words too small to read from a driver's seat - then they cannot have agreed to it. I refer you to the enclosed photographs of the signage on the site displaying the view of the signage from a driver’s seat.

The Beavis case depended upon clear, prominent and unambiguous signage and equally, a specific and compelling commercial justification, giving rise to a rare exception to the penalty rule in that case only. It may be useful to refer to but it cannot be used to strike out the majority of private parking ticket appeals. The signs provided do not clearly state the amount that will be charged to motorists that do not comply with the terms and conditions of parking at the location. The signage in place at the location is not “conspicuous” or “legible” as required under the BPA Code of Practice. It therefore does not meet the standards outlined by the Supreme Court in that the “wording of the notices” is not sufficiently “clear” to bring the parking charge to the attention of the appellant and other motorists who use this car park.

I would remind POPLA that, at the end of September 2015, the outgoing POPLA Service Manager confirmed the following in writing, as the official POPLA policy regarding the requirement for proper application of the Beavis case by both parties. By definition, it is never the remit of POPLA to 'make the Beavis case' for an operator whose argument is weak or silent as regards any 'legitimate' basis for their charge:

''It does remain the position that it is for the party seeking to rely on any authority from a case in the higher courts, to explain how they submit it relates to the appeal in question and in particular the matter to be determined.

Yours sincerely
R Reeve
POPLA Administrative Team”


 
4. This charge is incompatible with the rights under the lease - as decided by the Appeal case of 'JOPSON V HOME GUARD SERVICES' case number: B9GF0A9E on 29th June 2016, which held that the Beavis case does not apply to residential car parks.

In Beavis it was held that the purpose of a parking charge must not be to penalise drivers. Justification must depend on some other 'legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of pecuniary compensation flowing directly from the breach in question'. The true test was held to be 'whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest [...] in the enforcement of the primary obligation'.

There can be no 'legitimate interest' in penalising residents for loading their possessions when leaving their home, under the excuse of a scheme where ostensibly - and as far as the landowner is concerned - the parking firm is contracted for the benefit of the residents. It is unconscionable, contrary to the requirement of good faith and 'out of all proportion to any legitimate interest' to fine residents for loading a car with possessions.

This question was tested recently in an Appeal case in June 2016 (transcript attached as evidence for POPLA). Please note this is an Appeal case, decided by a Senior Circuit Judge and as such, its findings on the definition of parking as opposed to loading and the findings on residents' lease rights superseding parking signs (signs which are of little consequence to residents) are persuasive on the lower courts.

Beavis did not deal with any of these matters - nor was it relevant to a residential car park - but the following case and transcript I have provided, is relevant and the Judge even states that Beavis DOES NOT APPLY to this type of car park:

Appeal case at Oxford County Court, 'JOPSON V HOME GUARD SERVICES' case number: B9GF0A9E on 29th June 2016.

Sitting in Oxford County Court, Judge Charles Harris QC, found that Home Guard Services had acted unreasonably when issuing a penalty charge notice to Miss Jopson, a resident of a block of flats who parked in front of the communal entrance to unload furniture, rather than use her own parking space. After an initial appeal to the Independent Parking Committee was rejected, Home Guard Services sued Miss Jopson in the small claims court and won. Miss Jopson instructed a firm of solicitors in Aylesbury who successfully appealed the case, arguing that the charge was incompatible with the terms of the lease. The Judge found that Laura Jopson and her fellow tenants (as well as people making deliveries or those dropping off children or disabled passengers) enjoy a right of way to the block’s entrance and that Home Guard Services’ regulations disregarded these rights. Home Guard Services were required to pay £2,000 towards the defendant's costs.

I also rely upon the Croydon Court decision in Pace Recovery and Storage v Mr N C6GF14F0 16/09/2016, where District Judge Coonan dismissed the claim and refused leave to appeal, stating: ''I have to deal with this on the evidence that is before me now. I have before me a tenancy agreement which gives Mr [N. redacted] the right to park on the estate and it does not say “on condition that you display a permit”. It does not say that, so he has that right. What Pace Recovery is seeking to do is, unilaterally outside the contract, restrict that right to only when a permit is displayed. Pace Recovery cannot do that. It has got to be the other contracting party, Affinity Sutton, which amends the terms of the tenancy agreement to restrict the right to park on a place in circumstances in which a permit is displayed but that is not in this tenancy agreement and you as a third party cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the tenancy agreement.''

Pyro908

5. The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who may have been potentially liable for the charge

In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.

In this case, no other party apart from an evidenced driver can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made and regardless of whether a purported 'NTK' was served or not, because the fact remains I am only appealing as the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability
“There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no ‘reasonable presumption’ in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.''

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator cannot transfer the liability for the charge using the POFA.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:
''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.'' 

6. A compliant Notice to Keeper was never served - no Keeper Liability can apply.

As aforementioned in the introduction to this appeal, UKPC has issued two £100 ‘fines’ within the same 12 hour period, for a single bout of parking and the vehicle was not moved inbetween.

UKPC have issued only one Notice to Keeper (NTK) which was for PCN ref: XXXXX, POPLA ref: XXXXXX. However as only one NTK was received, UKPC have failed to issue a Notice to Keeper the PCN ref: YYYYY for which this POPLA appeal is for. It can therefore be assumed that UKPC have admitted the invalidity of this second PCN.

As such, UKPC has not fulfilled the 'second condition' for keeper liability as defined in Schedule 4 and as a result, they have no lawful authority to pursue any parking charge from myself, as a registered keeper appellant. There is no discretion on this matter. If Schedule 4 mandatory documents are not served at all, or in time (or if the document omits any prescribed wording) then keeper liability simply does not apply.

The wording in the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 is as follows:

''Right to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle:
4(1) The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. (2) The right under this paragraph applies only if

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6*, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met;

*Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4:
6(1) ''The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor)— (a)has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8. This is re-iterated further ‘If a notice to driver has been given, any subsequent notice to keeper MUST be given in accordance with paragraph 8.’

The NTK must have been delivered to the registered keeper’s address within the ‘relevant period’ which is highlighted as a total of 56 days beginning with the day after that on which any notice to driver was given. As this operator has evidently failed to serve a NTK, not only have they chosen to flout the strict requirements set out in PoFA 2012, but they have consequently failed to meet the second condition for keeper liability. Clearly I cannot be held liable to pay this charge as the mandatory series of parking charge documents were not properly given.


This concludes my appeal and I respectfully request that my appeal be upheld and the charge be dismissed.

Yours faithfully,

Coupon-mad

- The section in red will only appear in my second POPLA appeal (I only received a NTK for the first). Should it feature higher up in the appeal? i.e. as point 1?

Yes I would put this as point #1.

I also recommend photos are embedded into the appeal as I think it makes the 'story' of a long written appeal easier for POPLA to follow and agree, 'yep those signs are not readable'.

Your other questions are fine to do as you intend. Looks good.

Pyro908

Thanks for the help everyone. I've completed my appeals and will be sending them off tomorrow.

One quick question:

- Should I wait until after the appeal decision to write/email UKPC requesting that they send any correspondence to my regular postal address rather than my dvla address? (Appeal rejection went to my current address but the NTK went to dvla one).

Coupon-mad

UKPC won't see the address you input on the POPLA webpage (don't post a physical form or letter in the mail to POPLA).

So if you want UKPC to use a particular address, email them:

appealmoreinfo@ukparkingcontrol.com

You could also tell them to email the POPLA evidence pack(s) rather than post it, as you will wish to comment and will be complaining to POPLA and the BPA and DVLA if there is any delay in you seeing their 'evidence'.