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Tom Brennan High Court Appeal
Nathan_Spleen
Posts: 559 Forumite
IN THE HIGH COURT Claim no. 6MY03995.
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF A CLAIM AGAINST NATWEST FOR UNLAWFUL PENALTIES AND CHARGES LEVIED IN BREACH OF THE UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS REGULATIONS 1999
BETWEEN:
In that order of HHJ Simpson ordered that:
<DIR><DIR><DIR>a. Permission to re-amend the Claimant’s particulars of claim be refused;
b. Permission for the Claimant to call Professors Molyneux and Struthers as expert witnesses be refused; and
c. The remainder of the Claimant’s claim be struck out and summary judgment be granted in favour of the Defendant.
</DIR></DIR></DIR>In that order HHJ Simpson also refused permission to appeal.
The Claimant appeals against each part of that order on the basis that HHJ Simpson made an error on a finding of fact and, further, misdirected himself on the applicable law.
</DIR>Background
<DIR>This appeal centres on the lawfulness of charges imposed by the Defendant bank on the Claimant’s bank account for breaches of an overdraft facility. The issue of the lawfulness of bank penalty charges has been widely reported in the national press and has generated a great number of claims, including a test case by the Office of Fair Trading on this issue. To date, no case involving the lawfulness of bank penalty charges has been heard by either the High Court or the Court of Appeal. There have, however, been a number of conflicting decisions on this issue by a number of District Judges.
This particular case has been followed by the national press, and is undoubtedly of great public interest. It raises a number of legal issues in respect of the extent of the liability of a bank to a customer if it has imposed disproportionate penalty charges. The issues raised in this case will undoubtedly be applicable to a great number of similar claims that have been issued against a variety of banks.
In his particulars of claim, the Claimant claimed that the charges imposed by the Defendant were disproportionate and therefore ‘unfair’ by virtue of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (“the Regulations). The Claimant brought an action in tort (specifically tortious interference with goods) claiming, inter alia, damages for: all charges imposed on the account, the punitive interest levied on those charges, the adverse affect on his credit rating, aggravated damages for stress and inconvenience caused by the charges, and a claim for exemplary damages.
In the process of the claim, it became apparent that the pleaded tort was inappropriate as interference with goods does not apply to money. The Claimant applied to amend his particulars of claim to plead the tort of Intentional Infliction of Harm by Unlawful Means. Meanwhile the Defendant brought an application to strike out the Claimant’s claim, and sought summary judgment on the basis of specific payments that had been forced into the Claimant’s account (against his express wishes) and on the basis that the account had been closed by the Defendant.
Part way through the hearing, the House of Lords changed the law relating to the tort of Unlawful Means, and the Claimant sought permission for further amendments to the particulars of claim to include the tort of breach of statutory duty, a claim for breach of contract, and a claim for restitution and an account of profits.
During the course of proceedings, the Claimant qualified as a barrister having completed a pupillage in a specialist planning and environmental law chambers. The Claimant was a litigant in person with no experience of consumer protection law, banking law, exemplary damages or restitutionary remedies. This was the Claimant’s first appearance before a Circuit Judge. In contrast, the Defendant is a multi-billion-pound multi-national corporation with the benefit of full legal representation. At least three different barristers have appeared on behalf of the Defendant in the proceedings to date. There was undoubtedly a great imbalance between the parties.
</DIR>Grounds of Appeal
I) The Claim has been Satisfied in Full
<DIR>HHJ Simpson ruled as a matter of fact and law that the claim had been satisfied in full through payments forced into the Claimant’s account. HHJ Simpson ruled that “the claimant's maximum claim is £2,802.98, but the bank has repaid £3,013.90”. These amounts are incorrect. As of 18 May 2007, the claimant’s claim was for £2,844.60 (including £220 paid in court fees), whilst the Defendant had forced £2,580.40 into the Claimant’s account (which included £200 in court fees). The Claimant’s claim was therefore not satisfied, and certainly not overcompensated. HHJ Simpson made a wrong finding of fact on the figures before him, a finding that went against the evidence tendered by both parties, and was therefore wrong to strike out the claim and grant summary judgment.
In any event, the payments forced into the account had been expressly rejected by the Claimant in settlement of the claim. HHJ Simpson, when applying the overriding objective and the applicable law, was wrong to take such payments into account during the proceedings. Those payments are properly considered an unsolicited gift. The consequences of allowing sellers or suppliers to avoid a legal test as to the fairness of their terms and conditions by forcing payments into a claimant’s account would undermine both the English legal system and the Regulations.
II) Refusal of permission to call Expert Witnesses
The Claimant, a litigant in person, has no experience relating to banking procedure or efficiency, and has no way of establishing through his own evidence the true cost to the Defendant of any breaches of the overdraft facility. As such, the Claimant’s case will depend entirely on expert evidence (unless the Office of Fair Trading reports on the issue of bank charges in the meantime). HHJ Simpson was wrong to refuse the tendered experts. Both professors have investigated the central issue of this case and both professors have the necessary academic expertise on the subject.
It is a breach of the Claimant’s Article 6 Convention right, the right to a fair trial, to refuse the Claimant the opportunity to adduce the only evidence that will support his case, and then to strike out his case as a result of refusing such evidence.
III) Refusal of Permission to Amend
HHJ Simpson was wrong to refuse permission to the Claimant to amend his particulars of claim. The substitution of one tort for another, in circumstances where no trial date had been set down, did not cause any prejudice to the Defendant. Refusing permission for the Claimant to amend the particulars of claim to reflect his true case was prejudicial to the Claimant’s case, and went against the Overriding Objective.
In circumstances where the claimant is a litigant in person, and where the legal issues involved are both numerous, complex, and previously untested, HHJ Simpson was wrong to refuse permission to amend the particulars of claim.
IV) No Damages for Adverse Effects on a Consumer’s credit rating
HHJ Simpson’s ruling that only trading customers can claim damages for adverse effects on their credit rating was wrong. This decision went against the only authority put before HHJ Simpson.
</DIR>V) Incomplete pleadings
<DIR>HHJ Simpson was wrong to apply strict procedural drafting points to a litigant-in-person, particularly where the pleadings raised a serious issue to be addressed. An adverse effect on the Claimant’s credit rating was specifically pleaded, and the extent of that effect is a properly a matter for evidence. If HHJ Simpson had genuine concerns that the Defendant would be prejudiced by a lack of specifics in the particulars of claim, the appropriate remedy would be to require further and better particulars to be submitted, rather than use of the extreme measure of striking out that part of the claim.
VI) Refusal of a Declaration
HHJ Simpson was wrong to rule out the remedy of a Declaration. HHJ Simpson was wrong to conclude that a declaration would not effect other consumers; the specific clause that was alleged to be unfair in this case was a standard term and condition, and applied equally to all of the Defendant’s customers. As a matter of common sense, a ruling that a standard term in a consumer contract is unfair would apply to all consumer contracts in which that terms was used. If HHJ Simpson was correct in his ruling, then the Office of Fair Trading would have to bring injunctive action against the use of unfair terms on a contract by contract basis, which is a manifestly absurd conclusion.
</DIR>VII) No Breach of Statutory Duty
<DIR>HHJ Simpson was wrong to find that there was no basis for a claim of breach of statutory duty. Authority from the House of Lords and the European Court of Justice indicates that the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, and the Directive that spawned them, are capable of creating a statutory duty. The European Court of Justice stated that the Directive establishes a “trader's non-contractual obligation to refrain in his dealings with consumers from certain behaviour deemed unacceptable by the legislature”. In light of this ruling, there is at least some prospect of success for a claim of breach of statutory duty.
The Claimant’s claim for aggravated damages and exemplary damages relied on a tortious cause of action. If there is some realistic prospect of success that there is a valid claim for breach of statutory duty, then it follows that the claim for aggravated and exemplary damages should also be considered by the trial judge.
There has been no legal ruling as to whether the 1999 Regulations create a statutory duty, and as an area of uncertain or developing jurisprudence, HHJ Simpson was wrong to refuse permission to amend the particulars of claim to include this cause of action.
VIII) Part of the Claim Statute-Barred by the Statute of Limitations
HHJ Simpson was wrong to rule that the six-year limitation under the Statute of Limitations applies to this claim. Where a Defendant has breached a duty to the Claimant, in circumstances where the Defendant knew such a breach would not be discovered for some time, the limitation period under the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until that breach has been discovered by the Claimant. Only recent investigations have established that
IX) Strike out and Summary Judgment
This claim raises a number of serious legal issues, and those issues will also to be raised in a great number of cases involving bank penalty charges. In circumstances where there is great uncertainty on this issue, conflicting decisions from various District Judges, and where members of the judiciary are making public calls for a test case, HHJ Simpson was wrong to strike out this case and/or grant summary judgment for the defendant.
The issues raised by this case surround the consequences of such penalty charges being ruled as unlawful, namely whether – and to what extent – damages are recoverable for: the charges imposed; interest on those charges; effect on credit rating; consequential loss; aggravated damages; exemplary damages; and the appropriate level of interest to be awarded. All these issues amount to strong and compelling reasons for the case to continue, and HHJ Simpson was wrong, as a matter of law and procedure, to exercise his powers to strike out the claim and grant summary judgment.
HHJ Simpson’s decision to strike out and grant summary judgment was particularly harsh where the Defendant had not even satisfied the value of the claim, and where the Defendant had breached the CPR in serving the application for summary judgment with only 3 days notice, rather than giving the requisite two-weeks notice.
X) OFT has jurisdiction over the Issues Raised in this Claim
HHJ Simpson was wrong to take into account the upcoming test case being brought by the OFT. That case will only govern whether such bank penalty charges can be imposed in future. What that case will not do is determine what the consequences are of such penalty charges being ruled as unlawful. The issues of appropriate level of damages, effect on credit rating, consequential loss, aggravated damages, exemplary damages, and the appropriate level of interest to be awarded, will all still need to be determined. Those are the precise issues which are raised in this case.
</DIR>Conclusion
<DIR>This appeal has reasonable prospects of success, and raises important issues of law that could potentially affect thousands of claims currently in the court system, and permission to appeal should therefore be granted.
<DIR>Furthermore, given the potential impact of any ruling in this case, the important points of principle and practice that are being raised, and the number of claims that it could potentially effect, the appeal Court considering the application for permission to appeal is invited to use its power under CPR Part 52.14 to refer this appeal to Court of Appeal.
</DIR></DIR>
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF A CLAIM AGAINST NATWEST FOR UNLAWFUL PENALTIES AND CHARGES LEVIED IN BREACH OF THE UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS REGULATIONS 1999
BETWEEN:
THOMAS BRENNAN
Appellant
- and -
<DIR>
NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PLC
</DIR>
Respondent
_________________________________________
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
_________________________________________
<DIR>The Claimant, Thomas Brennan, seeks leave to appeal against the order of His Honour Judge Simpson dated 30 July 2007.In that order of HHJ Simpson ordered that:
<DIR><DIR><DIR>a. Permission to re-amend the Claimant’s particulars of claim be refused;
b. Permission for the Claimant to call Professors Molyneux and Struthers as expert witnesses be refused; and
c. The remainder of the Claimant’s claim be struck out and summary judgment be granted in favour of the Defendant.
</DIR></DIR></DIR>In that order HHJ Simpson also refused permission to appeal.
The Claimant appeals against each part of that order on the basis that HHJ Simpson made an error on a finding of fact and, further, misdirected himself on the applicable law.
</DIR>Background
<DIR>This appeal centres on the lawfulness of charges imposed by the Defendant bank on the Claimant’s bank account for breaches of an overdraft facility. The issue of the lawfulness of bank penalty charges has been widely reported in the national press and has generated a great number of claims, including a test case by the Office of Fair Trading on this issue. To date, no case involving the lawfulness of bank penalty charges has been heard by either the High Court or the Court of Appeal. There have, however, been a number of conflicting decisions on this issue by a number of District Judges.
This particular case has been followed by the national press, and is undoubtedly of great public interest. It raises a number of legal issues in respect of the extent of the liability of a bank to a customer if it has imposed disproportionate penalty charges. The issues raised in this case will undoubtedly be applicable to a great number of similar claims that have been issued against a variety of banks.
In his particulars of claim, the Claimant claimed that the charges imposed by the Defendant were disproportionate and therefore ‘unfair’ by virtue of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (“the Regulations). The Claimant brought an action in tort (specifically tortious interference with goods) claiming, inter alia, damages for: all charges imposed on the account, the punitive interest levied on those charges, the adverse affect on his credit rating, aggravated damages for stress and inconvenience caused by the charges, and a claim for exemplary damages.
In the process of the claim, it became apparent that the pleaded tort was inappropriate as interference with goods does not apply to money. The Claimant applied to amend his particulars of claim to plead the tort of Intentional Infliction of Harm by Unlawful Means. Meanwhile the Defendant brought an application to strike out the Claimant’s claim, and sought summary judgment on the basis of specific payments that had been forced into the Claimant’s account (against his express wishes) and on the basis that the account had been closed by the Defendant.
Part way through the hearing, the House of Lords changed the law relating to the tort of Unlawful Means, and the Claimant sought permission for further amendments to the particulars of claim to include the tort of breach of statutory duty, a claim for breach of contract, and a claim for restitution and an account of profits.
During the course of proceedings, the Claimant qualified as a barrister having completed a pupillage in a specialist planning and environmental law chambers. The Claimant was a litigant in person with no experience of consumer protection law, banking law, exemplary damages or restitutionary remedies. This was the Claimant’s first appearance before a Circuit Judge. In contrast, the Defendant is a multi-billion-pound multi-national corporation with the benefit of full legal representation. At least three different barristers have appeared on behalf of the Defendant in the proceedings to date. There was undoubtedly a great imbalance between the parties.
</DIR>Grounds of Appeal
I) The Claim has been Satisfied in Full
<DIR>HHJ Simpson ruled as a matter of fact and law that the claim had been satisfied in full through payments forced into the Claimant’s account. HHJ Simpson ruled that “the claimant's maximum claim is £2,802.98, but the bank has repaid £3,013.90”. These amounts are incorrect. As of 18 May 2007, the claimant’s claim was for £2,844.60 (including £220 paid in court fees), whilst the Defendant had forced £2,580.40 into the Claimant’s account (which included £200 in court fees). The Claimant’s claim was therefore not satisfied, and certainly not overcompensated. HHJ Simpson made a wrong finding of fact on the figures before him, a finding that went against the evidence tendered by both parties, and was therefore wrong to strike out the claim and grant summary judgment.
In any event, the payments forced into the account had been expressly rejected by the Claimant in settlement of the claim. HHJ Simpson, when applying the overriding objective and the applicable law, was wrong to take such payments into account during the proceedings. Those payments are properly considered an unsolicited gift. The consequences of allowing sellers or suppliers to avoid a legal test as to the fairness of their terms and conditions by forcing payments into a claimant’s account would undermine both the English legal system and the Regulations.
II) Refusal of permission to call Expert Witnesses
The Claimant, a litigant in person, has no experience relating to banking procedure or efficiency, and has no way of establishing through his own evidence the true cost to the Defendant of any breaches of the overdraft facility. As such, the Claimant’s case will depend entirely on expert evidence (unless the Office of Fair Trading reports on the issue of bank charges in the meantime). HHJ Simpson was wrong to refuse the tendered experts. Both professors have investigated the central issue of this case and both professors have the necessary academic expertise on the subject.
It is a breach of the Claimant’s Article 6 Convention right, the right to a fair trial, to refuse the Claimant the opportunity to adduce the only evidence that will support his case, and then to strike out his case as a result of refusing such evidence.
III) Refusal of Permission to Amend
HHJ Simpson was wrong to refuse permission to the Claimant to amend his particulars of claim. The substitution of one tort for another, in circumstances where no trial date had been set down, did not cause any prejudice to the Defendant. Refusing permission for the Claimant to amend the particulars of claim to reflect his true case was prejudicial to the Claimant’s case, and went against the Overriding Objective.
In circumstances where the claimant is a litigant in person, and where the legal issues involved are both numerous, complex, and previously untested, HHJ Simpson was wrong to refuse permission to amend the particulars of claim.
IV) No Damages for Adverse Effects on a Consumer’s credit rating
HHJ Simpson’s ruling that only trading customers can claim damages for adverse effects on their credit rating was wrong. This decision went against the only authority put before HHJ Simpson.
</DIR>V) Incomplete pleadings
<DIR>HHJ Simpson was wrong to apply strict procedural drafting points to a litigant-in-person, particularly where the pleadings raised a serious issue to be addressed. An adverse effect on the Claimant’s credit rating was specifically pleaded, and the extent of that effect is a properly a matter for evidence. If HHJ Simpson had genuine concerns that the Defendant would be prejudiced by a lack of specifics in the particulars of claim, the appropriate remedy would be to require further and better particulars to be submitted, rather than use of the extreme measure of striking out that part of the claim.
VI) Refusal of a Declaration
HHJ Simpson was wrong to rule out the remedy of a Declaration. HHJ Simpson was wrong to conclude that a declaration would not effect other consumers; the specific clause that was alleged to be unfair in this case was a standard term and condition, and applied equally to all of the Defendant’s customers. As a matter of common sense, a ruling that a standard term in a consumer contract is unfair would apply to all consumer contracts in which that terms was used. If HHJ Simpson was correct in his ruling, then the Office of Fair Trading would have to bring injunctive action against the use of unfair terms on a contract by contract basis, which is a manifestly absurd conclusion.
</DIR>VII) No Breach of Statutory Duty
<DIR>HHJ Simpson was wrong to find that there was no basis for a claim of breach of statutory duty. Authority from the House of Lords and the European Court of Justice indicates that the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, and the Directive that spawned them, are capable of creating a statutory duty. The European Court of Justice stated that the Directive establishes a “trader's non-contractual obligation to refrain in his dealings with consumers from certain behaviour deemed unacceptable by the legislature”. In light of this ruling, there is at least some prospect of success for a claim of breach of statutory duty.
The Claimant’s claim for aggravated damages and exemplary damages relied on a tortious cause of action. If there is some realistic prospect of success that there is a valid claim for breach of statutory duty, then it follows that the claim for aggravated and exemplary damages should also be considered by the trial judge.
There has been no legal ruling as to whether the 1999 Regulations create a statutory duty, and as an area of uncertain or developing jurisprudence, HHJ Simpson was wrong to refuse permission to amend the particulars of claim to include this cause of action.
VIII) Part of the Claim Statute-Barred by the Statute of Limitations
HHJ Simpson was wrong to rule that the six-year limitation under the Statute of Limitations applies to this claim. Where a Defendant has breached a duty to the Claimant, in circumstances where the Defendant knew such a breach would not be discovered for some time, the limitation period under the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until that breach has been discovered by the Claimant. Only recent investigations have established that
IX) Strike out and Summary Judgment
This claim raises a number of serious legal issues, and those issues will also to be raised in a great number of cases involving bank penalty charges. In circumstances where there is great uncertainty on this issue, conflicting decisions from various District Judges, and where members of the judiciary are making public calls for a test case, HHJ Simpson was wrong to strike out this case and/or grant summary judgment for the defendant.
The issues raised by this case surround the consequences of such penalty charges being ruled as unlawful, namely whether – and to what extent – damages are recoverable for: the charges imposed; interest on those charges; effect on credit rating; consequential loss; aggravated damages; exemplary damages; and the appropriate level of interest to be awarded. All these issues amount to strong and compelling reasons for the case to continue, and HHJ Simpson was wrong, as a matter of law and procedure, to exercise his powers to strike out the claim and grant summary judgment.
HHJ Simpson’s decision to strike out and grant summary judgment was particularly harsh where the Defendant had not even satisfied the value of the claim, and where the Defendant had breached the CPR in serving the application for summary judgment with only 3 days notice, rather than giving the requisite two-weeks notice.
X) OFT has jurisdiction over the Issues Raised in this Claim
HHJ Simpson was wrong to take into account the upcoming test case being brought by the OFT. That case will only govern whether such bank penalty charges can be imposed in future. What that case will not do is determine what the consequences are of such penalty charges being ruled as unlawful. The issues of appropriate level of damages, effect on credit rating, consequential loss, aggravated damages, exemplary damages, and the appropriate level of interest to be awarded, will all still need to be determined. Those are the precise issues which are raised in this case.
</DIR>Conclusion
<DIR>This appeal has reasonable prospects of success, and raises important issues of law that could potentially affect thousands of claims currently in the court system, and permission to appeal should therefore be granted.
<DIR>Furthermore, given the potential impact of any ruling in this case, the important points of principle and practice that are being raised, and the number of claims that it could potentially effect, the appeal Court considering the application for permission to appeal is invited to use its power under CPR Part 52.14 to refer this appeal to Court of Appeal.
</DIR></DIR>
Tom Brennan
20 August 2007
20 August 2007
0
Comments
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I would raise only one quibble if Mr Brennan is supposed to be a qualified barrister how comes he has inccorrectly cited a statute in his pleadings not something to inspire confidence.As I am not the Pope or legally qualified I may be wrong so feel free to get a second opinion from a qualified person0
-
Just the one quibble then is it? Remarkably generous of you.
I'm sure if Mr Brennan needs any legal advice, he'll ask a proffesional.0 -
I'm very impressed not with the hearing per se, but with the judiciary showing sum b*lls in being prepared to take on the banks. However, I still have my reservations that this will set a binding precedent.
“If you read my posts you should understand that the instrument known as the UTCCR, until such time, as it has had applied, the great seal of state by the Queen sitting under the crown, it has not been properly incorporated into the body of our laws, and therefore can not be used to set a precedent which is binding on anyone. That, of course, is my opinion”.Any posts by myself are my opinion ONLY. They should never be taken as correct or factual without confirmation from a legal professional. All information is given without prejudice or liability.0 -
Nathan_Spleen wrote: »Just the one quibble then is it? Remarkably generous of you.
I'm sure if Mr Brennan needs any legal advice, he'll ask a proffesional.
I could not help but notice that the court reference on the dcoument is the Mayors and City Case No and not a High Court Appeals Office number and the judgment from Mayors and City and the Appeal Notice do not appear to be on Mr Brennan's Website which does not appear to have been updated since 26 July 2007As I am not the Pope or legally qualified I may be wrong so feel free to get a second opinion from a qualified person0 -
“If you read my posts you should understand that the instrument known as the UTCCR, until such time, as it has had applied, the great seal of state by the Queen sitting under the crown, it has not been properly incorporated into the body of our laws, and therefore can not be used to set a precedent which is binding on anyone. That, of course, is my opinion”.
Deary If I may respectfully take issue with you on this point the UTCCR gives effect to an EU Directive and therefore the legal principle that you are refering to that an International Treaty is not binding on English Courts unless incorporated into English Law by an Act of Parliament does not apply. It is incorporated into English Law and is fully part of our law by virtuue of s.2 of the European Communities Act 1972.As I am not the Pope or legally qualified I may be wrong so feel free to get a second opinion from a qualified person0 -
I could not help but notice that the court reference on the dcoument is the Mayors and City Case No and not a High Court Appeals Office number and the judgment from Mayors and City and the Appeal Notice do not appear to be on Mr Brennan's Website which does not appear to have been updated since 26 July 2007
I don't understand your point. Is it a legal requirement for him to post these
on his site?0 -
As I have said before, just as the HRA had to be incorporated into the body of are laws so also does UTCCR in order to be binding.This my opinion.This is the disturbance of a contract that way.Any posts by myself are my opinion ONLY. They should never be taken as correct or factual without confirmation from a legal professional. All information is given without prejudice or liability.0
-
Nathan_Spleen wrote: »I don't understand your point. Is it a legal requirement for him to post these
on his site?
No it is not a legal requirement but it does mean that caution may be needed if relying on the document as it is not clear that whether it is an earlier draft of a document that was to be lodged or the final version as lodged with High Court but before it was lodged.As I am not the Pope or legally qualified I may be wrong so feel free to get a second opinion from a qualified person0 -
As I have said before, just as the HRA had to be incorporated into the body of are laws so also does UTCCR in order to be binding.This my opinion.This is the disturbance of a contract that way.
The HRA was in fact the Act that bought the relevant treaty into English Law. The Treaty was the European Convention of Human Rights 1950. My point and where we disagree is that I do not accept that a separate Act was or is needed to bring the UTCCR into English Law because it was not giving effect to a Treaty.As I am not the Pope or legally qualified I may be wrong so feel free to get a second opinion from a qualified person0 -
They are the grounds of appeal as lodged with the high court. I assume the
Mayors & City case No appears as it's the case he's appealing against.0
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