Ncp

Walaboobah

Does this appear to constitute adequate signage?

Walaboobah

Is anyone able to give my POPLA appeal post above the once over as I need to submit it tomorrow? Thanks

Coupon-mad

Walaboobah wrote: »

Does this appear to constitute adequate signage?

No because the terms and the sum in £ of the parking charge cannot be read (not in the 'large lettering' of the Beavis case). So you are right to say the contract was not clear from signage before parking.


Add some quotes from para 8 of Schedule 4 to your point #1 because POPLA have got this spectacularly wrong recently. So, spell out what should have happened so POPLA cannot miss the point:

''Right to claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle

4(1)The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

(2)The right under this paragraph applies only if—

(a)the conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 12 (so far as applicable) are met

Conditions that must be met for purposes of paragraph 4

6(1)The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor)—

(a)has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8...

(2)If a notice to driver has been given, any subsequent notice to keeper must be given in accordance with paragraph 8.

8(1)A notice which is to be relied on as a notice to keeper for the purposes of paragraph 6(1)(a) is given in accordance with this paragraph if the following requirements are met.

(4)The notice must be given by—

(a)handing it to the keeper, or leaving it at a current address for service for the keeper, within the relevant period; or

(b)sending it by post to a current address for service for the keeper so that it is delivered to that address within the relevant period.

(5)The relevant period for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) is the period of 28 days following the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice to driver was given.''

I would add more to your 'not relevant land' point #2:

2. Railway Land is Not ‘Relevant Land’
Since byelaws apply to railway land, the land is not relevant land within the meaning of PoFA and so is specifically excluded from 'keeper liability' under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. As I am the registered keeper I am not legally liable as this Act does not apply on this land. I ask the Operator for strict proof otherwise if they disagree with this point and would require them to show evidence including documentary proof from the Rail authorities that this land is not already covered by bylaws.

In a 'bylaws land' POPLA decision in the public domain, code 0513085036 on 07/03/2016, Assessor Lauren Bailey found as fact:

Assessor supporting rational for decision
''For the purposes of this appeal, I am not satisfied that the driver of the appellant’s vehicle has been identified. As a result, the appellant is being pursued as the keeper of the vehicle. The appellant has stated that they believe the PoFA 2012 cannot be used, in relation to a parking event that has taken place on this land, to transfer liability for unpaid parking charges from the driver of the vehicle, to the keeper of the vehicle, as there are Byelaws applicable to the land in question.

Under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012, section 1, it states that:

“(1) This schedule applies where –
(a) The driver of a vehicle is required by virtue of a relevant obligation to pay parking charges in respect of the parking of the vehicle on relevant land”. Following from this, in section 3, PoFA 2012 states that: “(1) In this schedule “relevant land” means any land (including land above or below ground level) other than - … (b) any land … on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control”. And that: “(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) (c) the parking of a vehicle on land is “subject to statutory control” if any statutory provision imposes a liability (whether criminal or civil, and whether in the form of a fee or charge or a penalty of any kind) in respect of the parking on that land of vehicles generally or of vehicles of a description that includes the vehicle in question”.

It is from my reading of these sections of PoFA 2012 that I conclude, if statutory provision exists that imposes a liability in respect of parking on the land, PoFA 2012 cannot be used to transfer liability for any charges incurred from the driver of the vehicle, to the keeper of the vehicle. ...I do not consider that any other person than the driver of the vehicle can be pursued for the parking charges currently outstanding in relation to this parking event. This appeal is allowed.''.

I would replace this bit from the landowner authority point #3:

In POPLA case reference 1771073004, POPLA ruled that a witness statement was 'not valid evidence'. This witness statement concerned evidence which could have been produced but was not. So if the operator produces a witness statement mentioning the contract, but does not produce the actual un-redacted contract document, then POPLA should be consistent and rule any such statement invalid.

With this instead as the second and subsequent paragraphs of that point:

Section 7 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice requires parking operators to have the written authority from the landowner to operate on the land. Section 7.1 states:

“If you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you the authority to carry out all the aspects of car park management for the site that you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges”.

Section 7.3 states: “The written authorisation must also set out:

a the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.''

I do not believe that this operator's mere site agreement as a contractor issuing PCNs and letters 'on behalf of' a TOC gives the parking firm any rights to sue in their own name. This is insufficient to comply with the BPA Code of Practice and not enough to hold me liable in law to pay NCP (not that a keeper can be liable anyway on non relevant land and NCP cannot enforce bylaws themselves, only the Train Operating Company (TOC) or site landowners can, by requiring the driver ONLY, to answer to a real fine at a Magistrates Court). NCP have no standing to enforce 'parking charges' or penalties of any description in any court.

I put NCP to strict proof of compliance with all of the above requirements.

And change your top summary point #5 name from:

5. No genuine pre-estimate of loss.

to match what you have in the actual appeal:

5) Neither irrelevant case law (ParkingEye v Beavis, which is not applicable) nor the remedy under the Railway byelaws can support or provide a rationale for this disproportionate private parking charge.

I would remove all of this (where crossed out) from 5(b) because this isn't about not paying a tariff, it's about being outside of a bay, and add the bit I have put in red:

The Beavis decision is not a silver bullet and it cannot be twisted to strike out the majority of private parking ticket appeals. [STRIKE]and certainly not those which are regarding a Pay and Display site where the alleged loss (tariff) begins as a tangible sum.[/STRIKE]

[STRIKE]This is clearly a 'standard' monetary dispute over an alleged unpaid tariff.

In a standard economic dispute over a financial transaction between a consumer and a trader, like this one, the loss is easily calculable.

By stark contrast, the contract offered to Mr Beavis in the Chelmsford car park in the Beavis case was described by the Judges as a 'complex' contract which Moore-Bick LJ at the Court of Appeal remarked was 'entirely different' from this sort of financial contract flowing from alleged non-payment of a quantifiable sum to NCP.[/STRIKE]

As regards the Beavis case, it was made plain that in more complex contracts (in that case, a free car park with no monetary sum paid per hour) the trader must demonstrate a 'legitimate interest' in enforcing a disproportionately high charge, to avoid such a charge in each individual case from being an unenforceable penalty.

But this case can easily be distinguished from Parking Eye v Beavis because this case is not a 'complex' contractual arrangement at all, so the same leap cannot be made to disengage the penalty rule by arguing 'legitimate interest'.

There is no commercial justification for a TOC's agent to fine genuine, paying railway users who have paid and displayed, for parking in unmarked, clear areas which are certainly not clearly marked to communicate 'no parking'. The ParkingEye v Beavis judgment makes clear that the Court of Appeal would have considered the disproportionate charge in this case (but not the more complex Beavis case or cases 'of its kind') a clear penalty because it is just that, punitive, with no other compelling commercial rationale.

In ParkingEye v Beavis at 32, it was made clear that a test has to be considered in every case and an interest will RARELY extend beyond the usual penalty rule (Lord Dunedin's four tests):

''The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the [...parking company...] in the enforcement of the primary obligation. The innocent party can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.''


Lord Mance at 152 added: ''What is necessary in each case is to consider, first, whether any (and if so what) legitimate business interest is served and protected by the clause, and, second, whether, assuming such an interest to exist, the provision made for the interest is nevertheless in the circumstances extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable. In judging what is extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable, I consider (despite contrary expressions of view) that the extent to which the parties were negotiating at arm’s length on the basis of legal advice and had every opportunity to appreciate what they were agreeing must at least be a relevant factor.’’

POPLA must consider the rationale and reasoning behind a parking charge in each case, as well as the signage, because the Beavis decision depended upon both. If an operator fails to show both apply, then the ParkingEye v Beavis case CANNOT be applied and POPLA cannot just roll out a standard paragraph about it, every time. The penalty rule remains engaged and parking charges are not 'properly given' if they are merely punishing a breach but remain unjustified by way of any other legitimate commercial interests.

[STRIKE]If that was the case, then every alleged underpayment of a quantifiable sum between any trader and consumer could be escalated x 60. If you underpay your paper bill by £1 - the amount due remains at £1, same as in this case - it cannot escalate to £60 because the Beavis case rationale does not apply to standard contracts.

In Beavis, the difference was there was no small sum owed and so, to reach their decision, the Judges had to consider other interests and the value of the free licence to park at that location made it a far more complex contract than this one. None of the reasons that gave Parking Eye a legitimate interest which disengaged the 'penalty rule' in their case against Mr Beavis are present in this material case, in which the penalty rule remains firmly engaged and where there is a quantified tariff in play.

The appellant respectfully submits that the assessor carefully reads the Supreme Court judgment and the preceding Court of Appeal judgment from the same case. The Judges set apart the Beavis contract from this type of 'simple financial contract'. This is one the Judges had seen many times before, where there is a quantified small sum at stake in the first instance as a result of a primary obligation.

This sort of contract was not under discussion in the Beavis case. In fact, the Supreme Court considered that Lord Dunedin's four tests to identify an unenforceable penalty were still a "useful tool" in deciding whether a simple damages clause in a standard contract was 'unconscionable' or 'extravagant'.

The penalty rule is clearly engaged in this case of a standard contract with a quantified tariff, but unlike in Parking Eye v Beavis it is not disengaged by NCP merely pointing to the Beavis case as if it has blanket relevance (otherwise your local paper shop could point to the Beavis case regarding that £1 underpaid paper bill, as could any trader over any small sum owed). Clearly the 'tweet' from the Supreme Court on the day that their decision was handed down, made it clear that was not the intention of the judgment which turned on its own facts regarding a complex set of circumstances, relevant to a complex contract of its kind only.

At the Court of Appeal stage, when addressing the issue of pre-estimate of loss versus commercial justification, Lord Justice Moore-Bick agreed with HHJ Moloney QC’s findings, and opined at paragraph 27 that: “The application in a case of this kind of a rule based on a simple comparison between the amount of the payment and the direct loss [...] is inappropriate.”

In agreement with Moore-Bick LJ, and distinguishing the contract formed between ParkingEye and the motorist from a commercial contract, Sir Timothy Lloyd stated at paragraph 47 that, “[...] the principles underlying the doctrine of penalty ought not to strike down a provision of this kind, in relation to a contract such as we are concerned with,...”.

The Judges were only discussing ''a contract such as we are concerned with'' which was a far more complex one than ''all the previous cases shown to us {which} have concerned contracts of a financial or at least an economic nature.''

Here, this is one of those cases Courts have seen many times before, a simple contract of a 'financial/economic nature' and the only interest NCP has in enforcing their £60 charge (or indeed instead of the TOC enforcing the penalty arguably arising under the byelaws) is NCP's profit alone.

This position is reinforced in the earlier judgment from the Court of Appeal, where the judgment states:

"44. All the previous cases shown to us have concerned contracts of a financial or at least an economic nature, where the transaction between the contracting parties can be assessed in monetary terms, as can the effects of a breach of the contract...

45. The contract in the present case is entirely different. There is no economic transaction between the car park operator and the driver who uses the car park, if he or she stays no longer than two hours; there is no more than (for that time) a gratuitous licence to use the land...''

47. ...When the court is considering an ordinary financial or commercial contract, then it is understandable that the law, which lays down its own rules as to the compensation due from a contract breaker...should prohibit terms which require the payment of compensation going far beyond that which the law allows in the absence of any contract provision governing this outcome.

The classic and simple case is that referred to by Tindal CJ in Kemble v Farren (1829)6 Bing. 141 at 148:

“But that a very large sum should become immediately payable, in consequence of the non-payment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered a penalty, appears to be a contradiction in terms, the case being precisely that in which courts of equity have always relieved, and against which courts of law have, in modern times, endeavoured to relieve, by directing juries to assess the real damages sustained by the breach of the agreement.”

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 includes the fact that a consumer cannot lawfully be expected to pay a disproportionate sum in compensation for a small sum owed and is the fundamental legislation relating to standard contracts between traders and consumers. It is applicable to this case.

The ParkingEye v Beavis judgment makes clear that the Court of Appeal would have considered the disproportionate charge in this case (but not the more complex Beavis case or cases 'of its kind') a clear penalty. They found the contract in Beavis 'entirely different' from simple, commercial 'monetary transaction' cases such as they had seen before.[/STRIKE]

Walaboobah

]Thanks CM, does this look better below:

Also which section of the POPLA appeal should I complete as it doesn't appear obvious which Option to Select?

Dear POPLA,
PCN Number: xxx
POPLA Verification Code: xxx
I write to you as the registered keeper of the vehicle xxxx, I wish to appeal the £60 parking charge notice (PCN) issued by NCP.
I submit the reasons below to show that I am not liable for the parking charge:
1. The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 – no keeper liability.
2. Railway Land is Not ‘Relevant Land’
3. No standing or authority to neither pursue charges nor form contracts with drivers.
4. Unclear and non-compliant signage, forming no contract with drivers.
5. Irrelevant Case Law
6. No genuine pre-estimate of loss.

1. The Notice to Keeper is not compliant with the POFA 2012 – no keeper liability.
To date I have not been issued a Notice to Keeper (NTK) by NCP. As a notice to driver was provided on the vehicle, an NTK is required to be issued no sooner than 28 days after, or no later than 56 days after the service of that notice. This stipulation is laid out in Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA).

The alleged infringement occurred on xx/02/2016 and from my understanding the NTK was required to reach me by xx/03/2016 . As none of the mandatory information set out by Schedule 4 paragraphs 8 and 9 of the PoFA has been made available to me as Registered Keeper the conditions set out by paragraph 6 of Schedule 4 has not been complied with. Therefore, there can be no keeper liability.

The keeper liability requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 must be complied with, where the appellant is the registered keeper, as in this case. One of these requirements is the issue of a NTK compliant with certain provisions. This operator failed to serve any NTK at all. As there has been no admission as to who may have parked the car and no evidence of this person has been produced by the operator, it has been held by POPLA multiple times in 2015 that a parking charge with no NTK cannot be enforced against the registered keeper.

2. Railway Land is Not ‘Relevant Land’
Since byelaws apply to railway land, the land is not relevant land within the meaning of PoFA and so is specifically excluded from 'keeper liability' under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. As I am the registered keeper I am not legally liable as this Act does not apply on this land. I ask the Operator for strict proof otherwise if they disagree with this point and would require them to show evidence including documentary proof from the Rail authorities that this land is not already covered by bylaws.

3. No standing or authority to pursue charges nor form contracts with drivers
I believe that this Operator has no proprietary interest in the land, so they have no standing to make contracts with drivers in their own right, nor to pursue charges for breach in their own name. In the absence of such title, NCP must have assignment of rights from the landowner to pursue charges for breach in their own right, including at court level. A commercial site agent for the true landholder has neither automatic standing nor authority in their own right which would meet the strict requirements of section 7 of the BPA Code of Practice. I therefore put NCP to strict proof to provide POPLA and myself with an unredacted, contemporaneous copy of the contract between NCP and the landowner, not just another agent or retailer or other non-landholder, because it will still not be clear that the landowner has authorised the necessary rights to NCP.

Section 7 of the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice requires parking operators to have the written authority from the landowner to operate on the land. Section 7.1 states:

“If you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you the authority to carry out all the aspects of car park management for the site that you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges”.

Section 7.3 states: “The written authorisation must also set out:

a the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.''

I do not believe that this operator's mere site agreement as a contractor issuing PCNs and letters 'on behalf of' a TOC gives the parking firm any rights to sue in their own name. This is insufficient to comply with the BPA Code of Practice and not enough to hold me liable in law to pay NCP (not that a keeper can be liable anyway on non-relevant land and NCP cannot enforce bylaws themselves, only the Train Operating Company (TOC) or site landowners can, by requiring the driver ONLY, to answer to a real fine at a Magistrates Court). NCP have no standing to enforce 'parking charges' or penalties of any description in any court.

I put NCP to strict proof of compliance with all of the above requirements

4. Unclear and non-compliant signage, forming no contract with drivers.
The signs do not meet the minimum requirements in part 18 of the BPA code of practice. They were not clear and intelligible as required.
The BPA Code of Practice states under appendix B, entrance signage:
“The sign must be readable from far enough away so that drivers can take in all the essential text without needing to look more than 10 degrees away from the road ahead.”
For a contract to be formed, one of the many considerations is that there must be adequate signage on entering the car park and throughout the car park. I contend that there is not.
When with reference to the BPA Code of Practice, it actually states:
"There must be enough colour contrast between the text and its background, each of which should be a single solid colour. The best way to achieve this is to have black text on a white background, or white text on a black background. Combinations such as blue on yellow are not easy to read and may cause problems for drivers with impaired colour vision". After inspecting the signs after the driver received the charge, I noted that the signs have a turquoise background and text is black and light blue, making the small text difficult to read. The small print of the signs are impossible to read unless you are up close. If the driver was intending to pay via the DASH Parking app, there are no terms and conditions whatsoever listed in the app, making it impossible for the driver to know they weren’t allowed to park where they did. They would, therefore, only see the signs by the entrance to the carpark which are impossible to read when driving, particularly if it was dark when arriving

There were no signs or road markings to indicate that the area was private property or in any way restricted, and no signage indicating the area was private before entering the road.
Furthermore, the signage states a PCN "may" be issued. That is not a clear unambiguous warning.
The requirement to pay £60 is not clear and prominent as the Supreme Court commented on in Beavis. Such an onerous obligation should be the most prominent part of the sign, as is stated in Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule.
5) Neither irrelevant case law (ParkingEye v Beavis, which is not applicable) nor the remedy under the Railway byelaws can support or provide a rationale for this disproportionate private parking charge.

(a) It is believed that this land is covered by Railway Byelaws and I put NCP to strict proof to the contrary. As such, the remedy for any breach is an actual 'penalty' as defined in those byelaws. Prescribed statutory rules (not the BPA CoP) apply to penalties and the offer of parking is made by the Train Operating Company (TOC) or landowner, only by virtue of the byelaws, in the same way that any offence can only flow from defined restrictions within those byelaws. A parking offence can only be pursued in the Magistrates Court by the landowner/TOC themselves which is the only true legitimate interest on this land which is under statutory control.

The car park is already offered/controlled by the TOC which has the lawful remedy of a byelaws penalty open to them. There is no 'legitimate' interest in NCP re-offering the spaces under wholly different terms and charging £60 for their own profit. Two separate sets of terms, obligations and remedies relating to the same parking behaviour cannot co-exist; the land falls under byelaws so there is no scope for what seems to be potentially, a bribe: 'pay us £60 and we won't tell the TOC to pursue the matter under the applicable byelaws'.

Where there is any ambiguity regarding duplication or confusion in contractual or statutory terms/charges or obligations, the interpretation which most favours a consumer must prevail. In this case the interpretation which most favours a registered keeper appellant, is that NCP have no 'legitimate interest' in imposing their own 'charge' instead of a byelaws penalty, which only applies to an established driver.

NCP or the TOC should have identified the alleged offender and the TOC should then have followed their own byelaws procedures; their only legitimate interest in the matter, if they believed there was a case against the driver that day.



(b) NCP seem to be under the misapprehension that POPLA Assessors will swallow the BPA line that the Supreme Court judgment was a green light legitimising all frivolous parking charges. Yet there is no comparison between this case and that one; the only similarity is both operators (NCP and ParkingEye) described the sum as a 'parking charge'.

There the similarities end. The Beavis case has no application here, except in favour of my case as appellant.

That decision related to those specific facts and unusual 'free parking licence' & 'complex' contractual arrangement flowing from specific landowner interests and reliant upon that 'prominent and clear' Riverside Retail Park signage only. The Supreme Court Judges tweeted on the day of the decision, to clarify that decision turned on those facts, that free car park in that case only.

The Beavis decision is not a silver bullet and it cannot be twisted to strike out the majority of private parking ticket appeals

As regards the Beavis case, it was made plain that in more complex contracts (in that case, a free car park with no monetary sum paid per hour) the trader must demonstrate a 'legitimate interest' in enforcing a disproportionately high charge, to avoid such a charge in each individual case from being an unenforceable penalty.

But this case can easily be distinguished from Parking Eye v Beavis because this case is not a 'complex' contractual arrangement at all, so the same leap cannot be made to disengage the penalty rule by arguing 'legitimate interest'.
There is no commercial justification for a TOC's agent to fine genuine, paying railway users who have paid and displayed, for parking in unmarked, clear areas which are certainly not clearly marked to communicate 'no parking'. The ParkingEye v Beavis judgment makes clear that the Court of Appeal would have considered the disproportionate charge in this case (but not the more complex Beavis case or cases 'of its kind') a clear penalty because it is just that, punitive, with no other compelling commercial rationale.

In ParkingEye v Beavis at 32, it was made clear that a test has to be considered in every case and an interest will RARELY extend beyond the usual penalty rule (Lord Dunedin's four tests):

''The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the [...parking company...] in the enforcement of the primary obligation. The innocent party can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity.''


Lord Mance at 152 added: ''What is necessary in each case is to consider, first, whether any (and if so what) legitimate business interest is served and protected by the clause, and, second, whether, assuming such an interest to exist, the provision made for the interest is nevertheless in the circumstances extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable. In judging what is extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable, I consider (despite contrary expressions of view) that the extent to which the parties were negotiating at arm’s length on the basis of legal advice and had every opportunity to appreciate what they were agreeing must at least be a relevant factor.’’

POPLA must consider the rationale and reasoning behind a parking charge in each case, as well as the signage, because the Beavis decision depended upon both. If an operator fails to show both apply, then the ParkingEye v Beavis case CANNOT be applied and POPLA cannot just roll out a standard paragraph about it, every time. The penalty rule remains engaged and parking charges are not 'properly given' if they are merely punishing a breach but remain unjustified by way of any other legitimate commercial interests.

Coupon-mad

As per the NEWBIES thread advice in post #3 of that sticky, you choose 'other' and attach the PDF full appeal and any photos as well (only those which do not show the terms legibly!).

This bit is wrong in your numbering near the top:

5. Irrelevant Case Law
6. No genuine pre-estimate of loss.

You only need #5 but headed the same as in the main body of the appeal. DO NOT HAVE 'no GPEOL'.

You need a couple of lines gap between each point of appeal, especially #5 which is buried there with no gap above it.

And you need to add the stuff to point #1 and point #2 as suggested. Reason being some of the new POPLA Assessors need it spelt out like a Janet & John book* in words of one syllable, so they can follow what the POFA says.



* how to give away a lady's age with one phrase!

bod1467

I never realised that NCP stood for Not Correctly Parked.

Walaboobah

Thanks for that CM, have now submitted the appeal having made the amendments you suggested

Walaboobah

bod1467 wrote: »

I never realised that NCP stood for Not Correctly Parked.

Boom Boom! :T:T

Walaboobah

NCP have informed POPLA they do not wish to contest the appeal so job done on that one.

However, I have now received a rejection from NCP for my appeal against the NTK with a different Parking ticket number on it and a 2nd POPLA code. It's the same incident, I'm assuming someone had removed the ticket from my windscreen, therefore NCP issued a 2nd ticket two days later. The car had not moved from the spot it was parked in.

Should I appeal using the same points as outlined above for the previous POPLA Appeal and then add a bit about the duplicate ticket or not bother mentioning that?

pappa_golf

did the signage say £100 per 24 hrs etc ?


you have appealed the FIRST correspondence from them , they have withdrawn


finished , full stop