Britannia PCN

Coupon-mad wrote: »

Why not just find a Britannia one someone wrote earlier, by searching Britannia POPLA and changing the default to SHOW POSTS?

Search the forum is how to see the huge iceberg underneath the tiny snippets you've seen. The information here is VAST and just waiting for you to search & find one.

Just don't bother to read the one by doubled whatsisname who lost at POPLA and now thinks he *must pay* (depressing when people think that, they are WRONG).

What makes you think that is not compliant? Was there a windscreen PCN?

No - there was no windscreen PCN

I'll research the Britannia POPLA as advised

Right – this is what I have managed to draft so far.

I think it covers pretty much everything – any amendments/suggestions?



Date of Notice: XXX January 2018
Date of contravention: XXX December 2017

Dear POPLA Adjudicator,

I am the registered keeper of vehicle xxxxx and am appealing a parking charge from Britannia Parking.

PCN: xxxxx
POPLA verification code: xxxxx

For the avoidance of doubt, as the registered keeper, I wish to refute these charges.

On the xx/xx/2018, Britannia Parking issued a Final Reminder highlighting the above mentioned vehicle, with a specific date of an alleged contravention (xx/xx/2017) and a location - this was received on (xx/xx/2018). It does not specify what the alleged contravention is, and states the Parking Charge Notice is now overdue. No such Parking Charge was ever received.

I now ask that strict proof be provided that any such Parking Charge Notice was ever issued.

In my first appeal to Britannia directly I quite clearly requested that they provide me:
· Please provide dated photos of the signs that you say were on site, which you contend formed a contract.
· Please provide all photographs taken of this vehicle

I can confirm that no such photos were received. I was sent some undated photos of signage that does not verify neither the date/time, neither weather conditions, nor light conditions of the alleged contravention.

No photos of the vehicle were proffered despite my request.

Both these omissions by Britannia can only be viewed as an attempt to hinder any appeal of the alleged contravention and as such put me at an unfair disadvantage when trying to appeal this alleged contravention.

Another point which I would like to put before entering into greater detail of my legal standing with this alleged contravention is the following regarding the signage. On the photos that were received by Britannia, it quite clearly states “Parking Charge Notice may be issued to all vehicles which:”.

Now that phrase alone is completely ambiguous, as the use of the word ”may” would indicate that there are times when a Parking Charge Notice “may not” be issued.
If a Parking Charge Notice is a definite outcome of a parking contravention, then the word “WILL” should replace the word “MAY”.

As such the signage is ambiguous and misleading. It would then seem to be a very subjective decision making process – can Britannia provide their rationale for this?

Can Britannia provide a clear and comprehensive list of circumstances of when a Parking Charge Notice “may not” be issued?

I have also serious concerns about the validity of the alleged Parking Charge Notice, as so far the only two items received Britannia Parking seem inconsistent and just plain incorrect, especially when looking at the dates and of the alleged contravention on both documents:

Final Reminder (received xx/02/2018):
date of notice (xx/01/2018)
date of contravention (xx/12/2017)

Appeal Response from Britannia issuing POPLA code (received xx/03/2018)
It states issue date: xx/01/2018
However, under point 3 of the same letter, it states the original PCN was issued (xx/02/2018)

So which is the correct date?

On this fact alone you must find in my favour and uphold my appeal.


If after all of the above you still wish to uphold the alleged contravention, I shall now expand on various areas:

As the registered keeper I wish to refute these charges on the following grounds:

1) The Notice to Keeper does not comply with sub-paragraph 9 (2)(f) POFA 2012
2) The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact liable for the charge
3) Britannia Parking lacks proprietary interest in the land and does not have the capacity to offer contracts or to bring a claim for trespass
4) Signage does not comply with the BPA Code of Practice and was not prominent enough to form any contract with a driver
5) Grace Period: BPA Code of Practice – non-compliance


1) The Notice to Keeper does not comply with sub-paragraph 9 (2)(f) POFA 2012

The notice must “warn the keeper that if, after the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice is given”

(i) the amount of the unpaid parking charges specified under paragraph (d) has not been paid in full, and
(ii) the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver,
the creditor will (if all the applicable conditions under this Schedule are met) have the right to recover from the keeper so much of that amount as remains unpaid;

Upon reviewing the present Final Reminder and Appeal Response, Britannia Parking have omitted any mention of the conditions as outlined in sub-paragraph 9 (2) (f). The appellant feels that the operator has failed to adhere to the conditions outlined under POFA 2012 and therefore breaches the documented legislation and is therefore unable to recover from the keeper.



2) The operator has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact liable for the charge.

In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no POFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the Assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. A vehicle can be driven by any person (with the consent of the owner) as long as the driver is insured. There is no dispute that the driver was entitled to drive the car and I can confirm that they were, but I am exercising my right not to name that person.

In this case, no other party apart from an evidenced driver can be told to pay. I am the appellant throughout (as I am entitled to be), and as there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid NTK.

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be lawfully held liable if an operator is not using or complying with Schedule 4. This applies regardless of when the first appeal was made and regardless of whether a purported 'NTK' was served or not, because the fact remains I am only appealing as the keeper and ONLY Schedule 4 of the POFA (or evidence of who was driving) can cause a keeper appellant to be deemed to be the liable party.

The burden of proof rests with the Operator to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. They cannot.

Furthermore, the vital matter of full compliance with the POFA was confirmed by parking law expert barrister, Henry Greenslade, the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator, in 2015:

Understanding keeper liability

There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.

There is no 'reasonable presumption' in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If {POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is} not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.'

Therefore, no lawful right exists to pursue unpaid parking charges from myself as keeper of the vehicle, where an operator cannot transfer the liability for the charge using the POFA.

This exact finding was made in 6061796103 against ParkingEye in September 2016, where POPLA Assessor Carly Law found:

''I note the operator advises that it is not attempting to transfer the liability for the charge using the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and so in mind, the operator continues to hold the driver responsible. As such, I must first consider whether I am confident that I know who the driver is, based on the evidence received. After considering the evidence, I am unable to confirm that the appellant is in fact the driver. As such, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. As I am allowing the appeal on this basis, I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.''




3) Britannia Parking lacks proprietary interest in the land and does not have the capacity to offer contracts or to bring a claim for trespassing

It is suggested that Britannia Parking does not have proprietary interest in the land and merely acting as agents for the owner/occupier. Therefore, I ask that Britannia Parking be asked to provide strict proof that they have the necessary authorisation at this location in the form of a signed and dated contract with the landowner, which specifically grants them the standing to make contracts with drivers and to pursue charges in their own name in the courts. Documentary evidence must pre-date the parking event in question and be in the form of genuine copy of the actual site agreement/contract with the landowner/occupier and not just a signed witness statement slip of paper saying it exists.

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:
7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.
7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:
a. the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined
b. any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation
c. any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement
d. who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs
e. the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement


4) Signage does not comply with the BPA Code of Practice and were not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces to form any contract with a driver. The signs detailing charges and terms and conditions were not clear consequently there was no 'offer' for the driver to accept, and so no contract formed.

The BPA Code of Practice clearly states that:

A driver who uses your private car park with your permission does so under a licence or contract with you. In all cases, the driver’s use of your land will be governed by your terms and conditions, which the driver should be made aware of from the start.

Bearing this paragraph in mind, there was categorically no contract established between the driver and Britannia Parking. To draw on the basic guidelines of contract law for a contract to be effective the offer must be communicated. Therefore, there can be no acceptance of an agreement if the other person is without knowledge of the offer.


There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry.



This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility widely agreed to follow these guidelines (Signazon.com):

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2' letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3' or even larger.''

Which is also corroborated by industry professional at “Affordable 3D Signs” who state: ''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.


Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.




This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.


Based on these points, it is believed that Britannia Parking are not complying with the BPA Code of Practice with regard to position, clarity of terms and conditions and driver safety. Therefore, without clear, compliant signs there was no contract established and therefore no breach of that alleged contract either. Therefore, request that Britannia Parking be required to provide strict proof of exactly where the car was parked (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) and how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I request that they show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up, also on the date, time and lighting condition of the alleged event. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read safely from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this. In addition to this, it is requested that any neighbouring signs to the entrance and vehicle parking location to demonstrate the consistency of signage and how terms and conditions could not be misinterpreted or the driver misinformed.


5. Grace Period: BPA Code of Practice – non-compliance

The BPA’s Code of Practice states (13) that there are two grace periods: one at the end (of a minimum of 10 minutes) and one at the start.

BPA’s Code of Practice (13.1) states that:

“Your approach to parking management must allow a driver who enters your car park but decides not to park, to leave the car park within a reasonable period without having their vehicle issued with a parking charge notice.”

BPA’s Code of Practice (13.2) states that:

“You should allow the driver a reasonable ‘grace period’ in which to decide if they are going to stay or go. If the driver is on your land without permission you should still allow them a grace period to read your signs and leave before you take enforcement action.”

BPA’s Code of Practice (13.4) states that:

“You should allow the driver a reasonable period to leave the private car park after the parking contract has ended, before you take enforcement action. If the location is one where parking is normally permitted, the Grace Period at the end of the parking period should be a minimum of 10 minutes.”

BPA’s Code of Practice (18.5) states that:

“If a driver is parking with your permission, they must have the chance to read the terms and conditions before they enter into the contract with you. If, having had that opportunity, they decide not to park but choose to leave the car park, you must provide them with a reasonable grace period to leave, as they will not be bound by your parking contract.”




The BPA Code of Practice (13.4) clearly states that the Grace Period to leave the car park should be a minimum of 10 minutes. Whilst 13.4 does not apply in this case (it should be made clear - a contract was never entered in to), it is reasonable to suggest that the minimum of 10 minutes grace period stipulated in 13.4 is also a “reasonable grace period” to apply to 13.1 and 13.2 of the BPA’s Code of Practice.


Kelvin Reynolds, Head of Public Affairs and Policy at the British Parking Association (BPA):

“The BPA’s guidance specifically says that there must be sufficient time for the motorist to park their car, observe the signs, decide whether they want to comply with the operator’s conditions and either drive away or pay for a ticket.” “No time limit is specified. This is because it might take one person five minutes, but another person 10 minutes depending on various factors, not limited to disability.”

Recently (late November 2017) there was a not dissimilar POPLA Appeal (versus ParkingEye – Tower Road, Newquay) which was successful on the grounds that the assessor believed 11 minutes was a “reasonable grace period” and that “by seeking alternate parking arrangements, the appellant has demonstrated that he did not accept the conditions of the parking contract.”


Finally, some 3 years ago years ago, on 30th July 2015, the minutes of the Professional Development & Standards Board meeting show that it was formally agreed by the Board (of BPA members and stakeholders) that the minimum grace period would be changed in 13.4 of the BPA Code of Practice to read 'a minimum of eleven minutes':

“Implications of the 10 minute grace period were discussed and the Board agreed with suggestion by AH that the clause should comply with DfT guidelines in the English book of by-laws to encourage a single standard. Board agreed that as the guidelines state that grace periods need to exceed 10 minutes clause 13.4 should be amended to reflect a mandatory 11 minute grace period.”


The recommendation reads:

“Reword Clause 13.4 to ‘If the location is one where parking is normally permitted, the Grace Period at the end of the parking period should be a minimum of 11 minutes.”

(Source: http://www.britishparking.co.uk/write/Documents/Meeting%20Notes/Governance/20150730_PDandS_Board_Action_Notes.pdf)

This shows that the intention of stating vaguely: 'a minimum of ten minutes' in the current BPA CoP (not a maximum - a minimum requirement) means to any reasonable interpretation that seconds are de minimis and therefore not taken into account – certainly an allegation of under eleven minutes is perfectly reasonable.

As stated earlier in this section, whilst 13.4 does not apply in this case (as a contract was never entered in to), it is not unreasonable to suggest that clarification of this time period in relation to 13.4 also goes some way to clarifying the terms “reasonable period” and “reasonable grace period” stated in 13.1 and 13.2 respectively of the BPA’s Code of Practice.
If the BPA feel “a minimum of 11 minutes” is a reasonable time period to leave a car park after a period of parking, it stands to reason that at least the same period of time is reasonable to also enter a car park, locate (and read) terms and conditions (in this case in the dark with no lighting), decide not to enter into a contract and then leave the car park.



Finally, I would like to add, there is no evidence provided by the operator that the contravention occurred at all, and if it did, what the actual contravention was and where it occurred.

The operator is put to strict proof of all aspects mentioned above.

In summary, these points demonstrate the claim by Britannia Parking is invalid and should the claim continue, further action and evidence requested in this appeal is required from Britannia Parking.

Family members just had a response back from POPLA:

"Britannia Parking Group have told us they do not wish to contest the Appeal. This means that your Appeal is successful and you do not need to pay the parking charge."

THANK YOU SO MUCH!!!!

THEY WERE SO WORRIED!!

With all you help this has been put exactly where it should have stayed in the first place.

I hope everyone who comes on here follows your guidance and also gets a successful outcome.

It is a bit daunting, and takes a lot of time, but the results speak for themselves!!

Keep up the awesome work