VCS Airport Court Claim

Draft Defence:

Claim Number: ***

BETWEEN:
Vehicle Control Services Ltd
Claimant
vs

***
Defendant

Defence

1. It is admitted that the Defendant was the driver on the material date.

2. The Defendant denies entering into any contract with the Claimant.

2.1. The claim is denied in its entirety except where explicitly admitted here. The Defendant asserts that they have no liability to the Claimant for the sum claimed, or any amount at all.

No agreement of terms/no contract

3. The Claimant is pursuing the Defendant for a breach of contract, however not at any point in material time was any contract agreed.

3.1. If the signage is attempting to make a contractual offer, then as it is forbidding it does not fulfil the basic requirement of a contract, which is that each party to the contract must offer valuable consideration to the other party, on clear terms capable of acceptance. In this case neither the Claimant, nor their principal the landowner, is offering anything to the defendant. The notices cannot, therefore, reasonably be construed as having created a contractual relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.
The aforementioned point was recently tested in the County Court at High Wycombe, in the case of Parking Control Management (UK) Ltd v Bull & 2 Others (B4GF26K6, 21 April 2016), where District Judge Glen dismissed all three claims on these grounds.
3.2. Furthermore, signage is inadequate and thus incapable of binding the driver:
3.2a. The signage is unlit at this location and is are hidden by other, far larger and more prominent 'welcome' and directional signs/flags/banners just off a busy roundabout.
3.2b. The font size is too small and the words too many.

3.3 These inadequacies in signage render any motorist attempting to safely travel through the site at 30mph, whilst navigating traffic and traversing roundabouts, wholly incapable of even reading/understanding any alleged terms offered by said signage. It then follows that the formation of any contract based upon these terms is impossible. It is an ironic fact that the only way any sign could be read, would be to stop.

3.4. The Claimant is put to strict proof at the time of the alleged event they had both advertisement consent and the permission from the site owner to display the signs.

ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis[2015] UKSC 67 is distinguished

4. This predatory 'charge' is a penalty and an unfair consumer term, given the circumstances and facts of this case. ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 (the Beavis case) is the leading authority and the Supreme Court judgment makes it clear that charges cannot exist merely to penalise a driver.

4.1. It was stated that the penalty rule was 'engaged' in all private parking ticket cases and that what would be required in every case, would be to consider all of the facts to decide whether a specific charge is unconscionable, excessive or unjustified.

4.2. The Beavis case was said at the Court of Appeal stage to be 'completely different' and the Supreme Court agreed, uniquely disengaging the penalty rule after considering the rare facts at that retail park, the parking licence terms offered and the clarity and prominence of simply worded, large font and plentiful signs. In Beavis, there was a meeting of minds; a licence to park was offered and accepted by Mr Beavis by performance (the act of parking in a well-signed location where the retail parking spaces had value) and this saved the £85 charge in that unique case alone, from being struck out as an unenforceable penalty.


Trespass is a matter for a landowner only - the Claimant has no locus

5. The Defendant has cause to believe that the Claimant has no cause of action, given that the Claimant does not own the land in question.

5.1. If it is the Claimant's case that the area is intended as a 'no stopping zone' then they cannot also offer parking at a price if the landowner (Airport) in fact intends to prohibit stopping. If cars are never authorised to stop under any circumstances, then any breach would be a matter that falls firmly under the tort of trespass.

5.2. In the Beavis case it was reiterated that only a landowner can sue for damages/loss for alleged trespass, and ParkingEye could not have recovered monies for unauthorised parking/trespass. It was only because they were able to offer something of value (a parking space) and that the charge was part of that contractual licence, that ParkingEye could charge more than any nominal loss that a landowner could have recovered under tort.

5.3. If it is the Claimant's case that they were offering a parking licence or a space that had value, then they have produced no evidence to this effect and will be in difficulty if (as suspected) the signage in fact attempts to create a 'no stopping zone'. This would void any credible legal argument relying upon a 'legitimate interest' supporting the intentions of the landowner, because in a 'no-stopping zone' the landowner intends 'no stopping at all' on the one hand, and any driver conduct in breach of that rule could not on the other hand be allowed by a private company offering the prohibited behaviour under a pseudo contract.

5.4. It is believed that the contract this Claimant has with the Airport limits the parking firm to act as agent of the Airport who remain the (known) principal, in which case only the Airport can sue, not the agent in their own name.

5.5. The Claimant is put to strict proof of their locus and cause and right of action in their own name, and to disclose the unredacted contract with the Airport, before any hearing.



Airport approach roads are subject to road traffic enactments (public highway)

6. Even if the Claimant is able to overcome the difficulties they face in showing that:

(a) they have locus to sue in their own name regarding this location, and that
(b) they offered a parking space with value, and a licence to park there, and that
(c) the Defendant was afforded the opportunity to accept contractual terms and that
(d) these terms were prominently displayed, and that
(e) this charge (described by the Airport as a 'fine') is somehow saved from the penalty rule,

the Claimant is also put to strict proof that:

(f) this access road is not part of the public highway. A 'public highway' is any road maintained by public expense where the public would normally have a right to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle. It is averred that the Airport approach road is public highway and the Claimant is put to strict proof to the contrary.

6.1. The road is not clearly demarcated as private land, nor is it a private car park and thus, any parking/traffic contraventions would be a matter for the local authority. Such roads are subject to the rules of the Road Traffic Act and statutory instrument and any 'PCN' must be a proper penalty charge notice issued under the Traffic Management Act 2004.

6.2. The claimant is put to strict proof that this approach road is a part of 'the Airport' site where road traffic enactments do not apply.

Added costs have not been incurred - attempt at double recovery

7. In addition to the original parking charge, for which liability is denied, the Claimant has artificially inflated the value of the Claim by adding purported costs which the Defendant submits have never actually been incurred.

8. The added costs are in fact artificially invented figures, which represent a cynical attempt to circumvent the Small Claims costs rules and achieve double recovery. In Beavis, only the parking charge itself (£85) was pursued and the 'charge' was scrutinised by the Supreme Court and held to mainly represent a significant sum in profit; being a pre-set, deliberately high deterrent 'charge'. This was already significantly over and above the very minimal costs of operating an automated ticketing regime and no damages/loss/debt collection costs could have been claimed on top, because none existed.

9. The defendant denies the claim in its entirety voiding any liability to the claimant for all amounts claimed due to the aforementioned reasons. The Court is invited to dismiss the Claim, and to allow such Defendant's costs as are permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14.

I believe the facts contained in this Defence Statement are true.

18/07/2018

Thanks all,

@Coupon-mad - i've edited my defence thankyou

@Umkomaas - is this hard and dirty enough?

I write regarding a recent legal matter whereby an agent claiming to be operating on behalf of Robin Hood Airport, Vehicle Control Services Ltd (VCS), has issued county court proceedings against myself following an alleged parking contravention. VCS suggests that it has the authority to serve such claims based upon a contract between itself and the landowner of the site. It is presumed that said landowner is Peel Holdings and in this capacity Peel Holdings is jointly and severally liable for the actions of their agent. It is this liability which I shall be pressing the court to pursue.

As such I write to enquire as to whom of the senior management (if not your good self) shall be representing Peel Holdings at the coming court hearing, as I intend to cross-examine it on its arrangements with VCS. Areas of investigation shall include but are not limited to:
!!!8226; How and when this arrangement was negotiated/agreed
!!!8226; Which parties agreed to which particular terms
!!!8226; The extent of Peel Holdings!!!8217; knowledge of how VCS operates on its site
!!!8226; Why Peel Holding is not pursuing myself for trespass in the current matter
(need more ammo here not quite thought of it yet)

Furthermore, I would request a series of dates clarifying when the representing individual will be unavailable to attend court proceedings. This is in order to notify the court in a prompt manner as to which dates would be suitable for a hearing.

I thank you for your time and consideration and look forward to a timely response.
Sincerely yours,
***