Urgent!This Friday 16/09/26 Defence for PCN CCJ Set Aside

peanutbutterjamjam

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82167267#Comment_82167267

VCS Limited DCBL Legal.

What didn't it say its 114 pages long. 95 of those pages are exhibit.

Not sure how I can go in to to much detail on here without giving to much away to the Claimant.

Thanks for your help

Coupon-mad

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82166394#Comment_82166394

I don't think they are late, if their WS was emailed to you and the court, 14 days before this hearing. Unless this hearing order set an earlier deadline?

My other questions are:

• did you get your set aside fee back already or was it 'costs reserved' and thus to be ordered at this hearing?
• did you submit a full WS & exhibits after the first hearing as well as the defence, and costs assessment as I advised?
• did you attach any authorities, actual court transcripts? Which?
• did you also exhibit your lease? What exactly does it say about parking or using your allocated or demised space?
• What are VCS saying about your right to park? Show us Jake's WS!

peanutbutterjamjam

Please see answers below:

• did you get your set aside fee back already or was it 'costs reserved' and thus to be ordered at this hearing? Cost Reserved
• did you submit a full WS & exhibits after the first hearing as well as the defence, and costs assessment as I advised? Yes id id to all
• did you attach any authorities, actual court transcripts? Which? I did not
• did you also exhibit your lease? What exactly does it say about parking or using your allocated or demised space? I exhibited the lease for the parking space.
• What are VCS saying about your right to park? Show us Jake's WS!

Since I submitted the above I noticed that the parking sign at the entrance has been added "detailing " valid permit holders only" and "refer cosigns within the car park for details" which was never their before. I submitted a picture of the entrance gate without the signage as it was when I submitted my defence and WS. Is it likely that the court will let me submit a picture of the entrance gate now displaying the signage installed?

Jakes Witness statement:

I, Jake Burgess, of 7 Europa View, Sheffield Business Park, Sheffield, S9 1XH, state as follows: -

 

1. I am the Head of Legal, employed by Vehicle Control Services Limited (“my Company”). I am duly

authorised to make this Statement on my Company’s behalf.

 

2. I make this Statement in support of the Claimant’s Claim and in response to the Defence, Witness

Statement and Cost Sheet, 

 

3. The facts and matters set out in this Statement are within my own knowledge unless I state otherwise.

I believe them to be true. Where I refer to information supplied by others, the source is identified.

Facts and matters derived from other sources are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

 

1

 

Parties

 

4. My Company provides private car park management services to private landowners, to manage the

way motorists are permitted to park on their private land. My Company does so by issuing parking

charges to any vehicle parked in a way the landowner does not permit.

 

5. The Defendant is the recipient of multiple parking charge (“Charges”) issued by my Company. The

details are set out herein.

 

6. At all material times, my Company was accredited by the Accredited Trade Association (“ATA”)

known as the International Parking Community (“IPC”). The IPC has a Code of Practice (“Code”)

that its members are expected to adhere to or otherwise face potential sanctions. My Company

operates in accordance with the Code.

 

7. In order to obtain Registered Keeper details from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency

(“DVLA”) my Company must be a member of an ATA. It is therefore essential for my Company to

comply with the Code.

 

Background

 

8. My Company issued Charges to the Vehicle 

(“the Land”) with details listed below:

 

Table 1

 

9. At the time of issue, my Company was instructed by the owner of the Land (“Landowner”) to

manage parking on the Land. A copy of my Company’s agreement with the Landowner (“Landowner

Agreement”) is exhibited to this Statement at “

 

10. I refer to the decision in One Parking Solution Ltd v Wilshaw [2021] (Wilshaw) whereby it was

found that it is not necessary for the Claimant to prove the Landowner’s authority to constitute a

valid cause of action to recover the Parking Charge, what is required is proof that there is a binding

contract between the Claimant and the Defendant. Further, it was found in Wilshaw that the contract

between the Claimant and the Freeholder (Landowner) does not affect the validity of any contract

between the Claimant and the Defendant.

Contract

 

11. At the time of issue, my Company was prominently displaying signs on the Land setting out the

terms and conditions (“Terms”) of parking. A copy of the content of the signs is exhibited to this

Statement at “The signs formed the basis of the Contract with the driver (“Contract”).

 

12. The following were terms of the Contract: -

 

“Valid Parking Permits Only

Park only within your allocated bay”

 

“Permit holders must clearly display a valid permit inside the windscreen of the vehicle with all

details clearly visible at all times”

 

“PARKING CHARGE £100 Per Day or Part Day

Payable within 28 days of the Parking Charge issue date”

 

13. In parking the Vehicle on the Land, the driver accepted the Contract, with the license to park being

the Consideration. It is evident from the photographic evidence exhibited to this Statement at

“EXHIBIT 3” that the driver failed to display a valid permit in accordance with the Terms of the

Contract on each occasion, thus breaching the Contract.

 

3

 

14. The Contract provides that a charge is payable by the driver upon breach, with payment falling due

within 28 days.

 

15. A plan of the Land (“Plan”) showing the positioning of the signs is exhibited to this Statement at

“EXHIBIT 4”.

 

16. Copies of the Notices to Keeper are exhibited to this Witness Statement at “EXHIBIT 5”.

 

Defendant’s Liability

 

17. Pursuant to the Contract, the Driver was liable to pay the Charge within 28 days of issue.

 

18. On each occasion, to make the Driver aware, a Privacy Notice was affixed to the Vehicle. The

Privacy Notice made the Driver aware of how their personal data may be used and collected. The

data collected includes, but is not limited to, specifically recording the details of vehicle’s registration

mark (VRM) or number and may also include images of any person in or exiting from the vehicle.

The Notice confirms my Company’s reasons are for using their data and how my Company ensures

that the secure and appropriate steps are taken to protect the data. This policy is also designed to

inform the Driver of their specific rights under the current Data Protection Legislation. Exhibited to

this statement at “is photographic evidence of the Privacy Notice affixed to the

Vehicle.

 

19. In order to issue the Charges, my Company applied to the DVLA for the details of the Registered

Keeper and sent a Notice to the Keeper compliant with Section 8 of POFA (see “EXHIBIT 5”).

Paragraph 1 of POFA states that the Registered Keeper is presumed to be the ‘Keeper’ unless proven

otherwise. Paragraph 4 of POFA gives my Company the right to recover from the ‘Keeper’.

20. On each occasion, the Defendant failed to submit an appeal or make payment of the Charge and so

my Company issued further reminder notices, which can be seen at “EXHIBIT 5”.

21. The Defendant was afforded a 28-day period in which they could appeal and I am instructed they did

not. The potential next step was clearly communicated to the Defendant in notices. It is respectfully

submitted that if the Defendant genuinely believed the Charges had been issued incorrectly, they

would have engaged with the appeals process further.

 

22. The Defendant does not dispute being the Driver or Keeper of the Vehicle. My Company reasonably

believes that the Defendant was the Driver, because they would otherwise have nominated a driver,

4

 

and therefore the Defendant is pursued on that basis. My Company has complied with POFA and can

pursue the Defendant as Keeper in the alternative.

 

Defence

 

peanutbutterjamjam

23. The Defendant has filed a Defence, Witness Statement and Costs Sheet and I will respond to each

one herein by way of headings and where there is an overlap, I will respond once only.

Notwithstanding the above, I respond to the issues raised in the Defence as follows: -

 

i. The Defendant alleges that my Company’s “sparse case” fails to comply with the CPR

and does not state all of the necessary facts to formulate a “cause of action”.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Particulars of Claim clearly do provide a cause of action

against the Defendant, I would take this opportunity to highlight to the Court that the

Claim was issued via the Civil National Business Centre and therefore is governed by

Practice Direction 7C. I raise this due to the fact that, as the Court will be aware, any

Claimant issuing proceedings via this method has a restricted number of characters that

can be used, namely 1080. This character count includes not only the description of the

Claim but also the prayer. The following sections of the Practice Direction are pertinent:-

5.2(1) provides a limited character count for the Particulars of Claim; and

 

5.2A stipulates that the requirement in paragraph 7.3 of Practice Direction 16 for

documents to be attached to the Particulars of Contract claims does not apply to

the Claims started using an online Claim Form.

 

ii. I would also submit that this reflects the comments of Lord Woolf in the first appeal of

McPhilemy v. Time Newspapers Ltd [1999] 3 All ER 775 at 792-3 wherein he stated that:

 

“The need for extensive pleadings including particulars should be reduced by the

Requirement that witness statements are now exchanged. In the majority of

proceedings identification of the documents upon which a party relies, together

with copies of that party's witness statements will make the detail of the nature of

the case the other side has to meet obvious . . . Pleadings are still required to mark

out the parameters of the case that is being advanced by each party. In particular

they are still critical to identify the issues and the extent of the dispute between the

parties. What is important is that the pleadings should make clear the general

5

 

nature of the case of the pleader. This is true both under the old rules and the new

rules”

 

iii. Contrary to the Defendant’s assertion, the Particulars of Claim plead a breach of Contract.

The Particulars of Claim clearly outline my Company’s case, in which the Defendant is

pursued for breach of Contract following the Defendant’s failure to display a valid permit

on each occasion. The Defendant’s Vehicle was recorded in breach of the Terms on the

Land on each occasion, as per the images of the Vehicle at “

 

iv. Further, it is respectfully submitted that, given the documentation already served on the

Defendant prior to the issue of legal proceedings, the Defendant was well-versed in my

Company’s case against them and is aware of what case they are being asked to answer. In

any event, the Defendant has failed to provide any such reasons as to why they breached

the Terms on the material date.

v. The Defendant avers that the “added costs/damages are an attempt at double recovery”.

This is wholly denied. My Company is not seeking more than £100.00 as the core debt in

respect of each Charge, which is in line with the ATA, as detailed below at paragraphs 27-

28 of this Statement. Further, the debt recovery costs are claimed pursuant to the Contract

as detailed below at paragraphs 29-32 of this Statement.

vi. The Defendant seeks strike out of the Claim, pursuant to CPR 3.4. My Company will state

the Claim has reasonable grounds, and is not an abuse of process. The Charges issued to

the Defendant remain unpaid.

vii. The Defendant denies liability for the amount claimed. The Defendant entered the Land

and remained in breach of the Terms therein by failing to display a valid permit on each

occasion. The Contract outlined that in the event the Terms were breached that a Charge

would be issued. It is my Company’s position that the Defendant was on notice of the

Terms on the Land, yet remained on the Land in breach of the same. My Company

correctly issued the Charges, and the same remain outstanding, for which the Defendant is

liable.

 

viii. The Defendant avers interest should not be allowed, due to the time taken to bring the

Claim. They further allege that they have little recollection of the events, due to the time

passed since the dates of contravention. The limitation period for bringing this Claim is 6

years from the date the cause of action arose pursuant to Section 5 of the Limitation Act

6

 

1980. No adverse inferences can be drawn from the time taken for my Company to bring

this Claim, because court proceedings should only be instigated as a last resort, and my

Company has exhausted all other avenues by attempting to communicate with the

Defendant.

ix. The Defendant seeks costs pursuant to CPR 27.14 and further CPR 46.5. My Company

will state they have not acted unreasonably, and the high threshold for costs to be assessed

under CPR 27.14 has not been met. Further, the Defendant ought not to be entitled to costs

under CPR 46.5. My Company issued Charges to the Defendant, and the Defendant failed

to appeal, or make payment. The Charges remain due and owing, in which the Defendant

is liable. Had the Defendant made payment upon receipt of the Charges, there would have

been no need for legal proceedings to have been initiated.

x. It is noted that the Defendant accepts being the Registered Keeper of the Vehicle. My

Company has complied with POFA and pursues the Defendant as the Registered Keeper of

the Vehicle in respect of each Charge.

xi. The Defendant states that they were not parked in breach of the terms on the Land as they

had express permission to park, with an absolute right to park on the Land by way of their

lease. Further, the Defendant states they will provide a copy of the leaseholder agreement

to the Court. My Company will state it is wholly unreasonable to withhold evidence that is

necessary to matters at hand. The Defendant was able to appeal each Charge whereby any

necessary evidence of their position should have been provided. The Defendant has failed

to provide the same and has acted unreasonably in the circumstances.

xii. Notwithstanding the above, the Terms on the Land make it clear that a valid permit needs

to be displayed in the windscreen. This was the same regardless of whether the Driver was

a resident. Parking management was put in place by the Freeholder for the benefit of all of

the residents. The Defendant, if they were a resident, therefore benefited from the parking

management service. They could not reasonably expect to accept the benefit of the service,

but at the same time refuse to comply with the requirements of it.

xiii. The Defendant refers to Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and K-Sultana Saeed v

Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011, in that my Company’s Terms on the Land cannot

supersede the existing rights and easements provided by their lease.

xiv. Any lease or Tenancy Agreement between residents and the Landowner does not conflict

with my Company’s ability to enforce the Terms and Conditions on the Land. My

7

 

Company’s contract with the Landowner was orchestrated to work alongside the

conditions of such an agreement. It is in the Landowner’s interest to ensure that there is no

conflict between the contract with my Company and the leases or Tenancy Agreements

with the residents themselves. It is important to note that each Term that my Company

enforce on the Land has been agreed to by the Landowner.

xv. The Defendant alleges that entry signs to the Land are insufficient and not compliant with

the IPC COP as the signs at the entrance to the Land state no parking. My Company refers

to the Plan and will state that the Terms on the signs were adequate in respect of overall

size, font size, plain English, location and content. The Plan at “”

demonstrates where the signs were located and it is submitted they are adequate to

constitute notice of the Terms to the Driver. If the Defendant did not understand the Terms

on the signs, they should have exited the Land and found alternative parking.

xvi. The Defendant alleges that there is no contract on the above basis. My Company will state

the Contract was formed by offer, consideration and acceptance. The Terms on the Land

created the offer, in which the Defendant considered and accepted by remaining on the

Land on each occasion. The Defendant accepted that where the Terms on the Land are

breached, a Charge would be issued. The Defendant failed to display a valid permit on

each occasion, and was correctly issued with the Charges. It remains my Company’s

position that there are valid Contracts, the details of which are set out above. ParkingEye

Ltd -v- Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 established that this form of contract is perfectly workable.

xvii. The Defendant avers that you must have a key fob to enter the Land, and on this basis the

Defendant was therefore authorised on the Land “since 23/03/2025”. The Defendant may

have been authorised on the Land, but the Defendant failed to comply with the Terms

therein and was correctly issued with the Charges. My Company will repeat paragraph

23xii herein. Further, my Company refers to Table 1 as to the contravention and issue

dates of the Charges. For the avoidance of doubt, the Charges were all issued in August

2023. The Defendant’s statement therefore bears no relevance to the matters at hand.

xviii. The Defendant refers to the Consumer Rights Act 2015, and the terms therein as the Terms

on the Land being fair and open. In respect of the ‘terms’, as per Schedule 2 of the

Consumer Rights Act 2015, specifically referred to: -

 

Term 6 – It is submitted the sum is not disproportionate for the reasons set out within the

‘amount claimed’ section of this Statement, nor is it ‘compensation’.

 

8

 

Term 10 – As is evident from the Plan, signs were displayed throughout the Land. The

Driver was aware of the fact that parking was managed from the point of entering the Land

and could leave if they did not agree to the Terms. It is not unreasonable for the Driver to

need to potentially walk no more than 10 meters to fully familiarise themselves with the

full Terms. This would have all happened before the conclusion of the contract.

 

Term 14 – The price is stated on the sign.

 

Term 18 – The fact the Driver was able to park means my Company fulfilled its obligation.

 

xix. The Defendant states that DVLA keeper data is only supplied on the basis of written

landowner authority and puts my Company to strict proof of the same. My Company refer

to “EXHIBIT 1” where the relevant landowner authority is exhibited.

 

xx. The Defendant avers there must be a “legitimate interest” on the Land. My Company’s

legitimate interest is to fulfil its obligations to the Landowner. The Landowner’s legitimate

interest in managing the Land is because it is their Land to manage. Because there is a

clear legitimate interest/commercial justification, the same as that established in

ParkingEye -v- Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, this case does not fall foul of the penalty rules

established in that case. The issue of ‘loss’ is further dealt with in the ‘amount claimed’

section below.

xxi. The Defendant refers to ParkingEye -v- Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, the Parking Code of

Practice and POFA, as to the amount of each Charge being “disproportionate” and

“unrecoverable”. My Company will repeat paragraph 23v herein.

xxii. It is wholly denied that the Claim is an “utter waste of court resources” and a “systematic

abuse of process”. The Defendant was issued with multiple Charges and has failed to

discharge the same. My Company have made various attempts to recover the Charges from

the Defendant and have been unsuccessful on each occasion. Legal proceedings were

commenced as a last resort, in respect of the Defendant’s failure to make payment of the

outstanding Charges.

xxiii. The Defendant refers to a “late discontinuance” and that they reserve their right to seek

costs in this respect. My Company does not intend to discontinue the Claim and as such no

further comment will be passed.

 

9

 

xxiv. Further, the Court will note that the Statement of Truth within the Defendant’s Defence is

not correct, and therefore non-compliant with the CPR. My Company will aver the

Defence has not been verified by a valid Statement of Truth, and ought to be struck out.

 

Defendant Witness Statement

 

24. The contents of the Defence and Witness Statement overlap, and as outlined I will respond to each

one only once. Nonetheless, I respond to the contents of the Witness Statement as follows:

i. The Defendant details that they have rented bay

, and that they pay a monthly rental fee for the same. My Company notes

that the Defendant pays a regular fee, by way of the exhibits provided to their Witness

Statement. Nonetheless, the Defendant has not evidenced an exclusive right to park and

further failed to comply with the Terms on the Land. My Company will repeat paragraphs

23xi, xiii and xiv herein. Attention is drawn to the images of the Vehicle, wherein no

permit was displayed at any of the material times. Simply, the Defendant failed to comply

with the Terms on the Land.

 

ii. The Defendant avers that a covering letter was provided from the leaseholder, 

which outlines the Defendant has been occupying the bay as a renter and has

been provided with the appropriate permit. The letter further confirms that the Defendant

has been displayed in the Vehicle since the start of the renting period. Attention is drawn

to “wherein the images of the Vehicle are exhibited. It can be directly seen

therein that a permit was not displayed at any of the material times. By the Defendant’s

own evidence, they were aware of the requirement to display a permit, and had been

furnished with the same, yet disregarded the Terms on the Land and parked in breach on

each occasion. My Company will state the Charges were correctly issued.

iii. The Defendant alleges that there are no terms within the lease requiring the display of

permits. My Company has not had sight of the lease, and as such cannot comment on the

same. The simple fact of the matter is the Defendant was aware of the requirement to

display a permit, yet failed to do so on each occasion as set out.

iv. My Company notes that the Defendant has provided a copy of the title from HM Land

Registry. The Defendant is not a party to the lease, and my Company has not been

provided with the Defendant’s tenancy agreement, to evidence their exclusive right to

park. On this basis, the Defendant is put to strict proof that the right to park on the Land in

exemption from the Terms has been made, by way of their tenancy agreement. The Court 10

 

will note that the party with which the Landowner Agreement was made, is a party to the

original lease, this being Altius One (Hackney) Management Company Limited. My

Company would state that this supports their position in that the Contract was entered into

between my Company and the Landowner to work alongside any tenancy agreements in

place on the Land.

v. The Defendant avers that there are no signs on the Land, at the gates. This is denied. The

Terms on the signs were adequate in respect of overall size, font size, plain English,

location and content. The Plan demonstrates where the signs were located and it is

submitted they are adequate to constitute notice of the Terms to the Driver. If the

Defendant did not understand the Terms on the signs, they should have exited the land and

found alternative parking.

vi. The Defendant alleges they have tried to communicate with my Company and mediate, but

this has been refused on each occasion and “the Claimant only wished to communicate

with bombardments for payment demands”. The Defendant was afforded the opportunity

to appeal each Charge, yet failed to do so. The time frame for the Defendant to appeal was

set out within each Notice to Keeper issued, yet the Defendant disregarded the same. In

any event, the Defendant is put to strict proof of their attempts to communicate with my

Company.

vii. The Defendant denies an agreement was entered. The Defendant entered the Land on each

occasion, and was on notice of the Terms on the Land by way of the prominently displayed

Terms on the Land. The Defendant was able to consider the contract, and leave the Land in

the event they could not comply or accept the issue of a Charge. The Defendant remained

on the Land on each occasion in breach of the Terms, and was correctly issued with a

Charge. The Defendant entered into the Contract, yet failed to comply with the Terms

therein.

viii. The Defendant alleges that “the Claimant has suffered no loss”. As detailed further in this

Statement, the sum added is a nominal contribution to the actual costs incurred by my

Company as a result of the Defendant’s non-payment, and capped at the amount permitted

under the ATA Code. My Company’s employees spent time and resource attempting to

recover the debt, as well as instructing external debt recovery providers, all at a cost to the

Company. This is not my Company’s usual business and, but for the Defendant’s refusal to

pay, would not have been necessary.

 

11

 

ix. Further, the Court will note that the Statement of Truth verifying the Defendant’s Witness

Statement is correct, yet the Statement of Truth verifying the Defence is not. As such, my

Company will aver the Defence has not been verified by a valid Statement of Truth, and as

such the same ought to be struck out.

Cost Sheet

 

peanutbutterjamjam

25. The Defendant seeks costs in the sum of £. The Court will note that costs have been

reserved from the previous Application to set aside Judgment hearing, and as such I respond as

follows:

 

i. The Defendant seeks the below costs sought in respect of their Application;

 

i. “Setting aside CCJ fee” in the sum of;

 

ii. 2an hour for submitting N244 Application, 

iii. Attendance at Court including travel, for hour, totalling

;

iv. Travel to Court at 

 

ii. For the avoidance of doubt, the Claim Form was correctly served at the Defendant’s last

known address pursuant to CPR 6.9. Further, in accordance with CPR 6.9(3), my

Company’s legal representative took all reasonable steps to ascertain the Defendant’s

current address by conducting a trace and this result provided them with ‘knowledge’ of

the Defendant’s address. Furthermore, my Company were not made aware by the Court

that the Claim Form has been returned as undelivered or “gone away”.

iii. On this basis, my Company denies that the Defendant is entitled to the costs set out at

paragraph 25i.

 

iv. Insofar as the Court wishes to consider the above, prior to issuing a Claim, my Company’s

legal representative served a Letter of Claim, compliant with the Pre-Action Protocol for

Debt Claims, on the Defendant. It is important to note that the Letter of Claim was served

to, “28 Park Road, Colliers Wood, London, SW19 2HS”, which is the same address as the

Defendant has confirmed as their serviceable address within their N244 Application, and

their Witness Statement dated 13/10/2025.

 

12

 

v. Whilst my Company notes the Defendant’s allegation within their Application that they

were out of the country at the time the Claim Form was served, the Defendant failed to

provide any evidence to support their allegation, and the Defendant has still failed to

provide any evidence to support this.

vi. All correspondence was sent to the address that the Defendant confirmed as their

serviceable address in their N244 Application. All correspondence has been sent to “28

Park Road, Colliers Wood, London, SW19 2HS”. It is my Company’s position that all

correspondence was served on the Defendant correctly, and my Company should not have

to bear the costs of their Application to set aside, when all reasonable steps have been

taken, prior to the issue of the Claim and further in compliance with CPR 6.9(3).

vii. The Claim Form and response pack clearly outlined the consequences of failure to

respond. The Defendant was made aware of the consequences, however failed to respond

despite being placed on notice of the consequences. Therefore, it is my Company’s

position that they are not liable for costs occasioned by the Defendant’s Application. The

Defendant was placed on notice of the consequences and still, failed to respond to the

Claim.

viii. The costs sought in respect of “producing defence” f

s noted by my Company, however denied. My Company

will state that the time spent is excessive, given the templated nature of the Defence. My

Company will state, given the nature of the Defence, that no more than 2 hours would be

deemed reasonable, insofar as the Court wishes to consider this element. In any event, the

Defendant is put to strict proof that the costs sought are true and have been incurred.

ix. The costs sought in respect of “producing Witness Statement

is wholly unreasonable. My Company will

aver that the Defence and Witness Statement overlap and it is highly unlikely that the

Witness Statement in its current format would have taken 11 hours to compile. Again, my

Company will state that no more than 2 hours would be deemed reasonable, insofar as the

Court wishes to consider this element. In any event, the Defendant is put to strict proof that

the costs sought are true and have been incurred.

x. The costs sought in respect of “producing Cost Sheet” for

0 is noted, yet again denied. My Company will state that

the cost sheet as provided, is minimal and lacks detail. Again, my Company will state that

no more than 0.5 hours would be deemed reasonable, insofar as the Court wishes to

13

 

consider this element. In any event, the Defendant is put to strict proof that the costs

sought are true and have been incurred.

xi. Notwithstanding the above, the Defendant has failed to evidence the alleged costs incurred

and has further failed to particularise each amount as pleaded. The Defendant is put to

strict proof of the same.

 

26. In view of the above, it is my Company’s position that the Defendant breached the Contract as set

out in this Statement and as such the Defendant is liable.

 

Amount Claimed

 

The Charge Amount

 

27. The amount of the parking charge falls within the “between £50 to £100” bracket quoted at paragraph

111 of Parking Eye -v- Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. It is also in keeping with the guidelines given by the

ATA: -

 

“Part E, Schedule 5 of the IPC COP states “Parking charges must not exceed £100 unless agreed

in advance with the IPC”.

 

28. The amount charged is set at a rate that covers the operational costs of the parking management

scheme and acts as a deterrent, as was found to be appropriate in Parking Eye -v- Beavis [2015]

UKSC 67.

 

Contractual Costs

 

29. As payment was not made within the prescribed time, or indeed at all, the additional sum is claimed

as a contractual cost pursuant to the Contract which states: -

 

“If payment of the Parking Charge is not made in accordance with the payment terms detailed on

the parking, Vehicle Control Services Ltd will be entitled to charge a collection fee of £70.00 on

an indemnity basis for costs incurred as a result of debt and/or legal recovery. This collection fee

is in addition to the Parking Charge payable by the driver and/or registered keeper under the

terms of the contract. Vehicle Control Services Ltd will be entitled to take legal proceedings to

recover outstanding charges and any interest and costs incurred as a result, also on an indemnity

basis”

 

14

 

30. As set out above, the charge amount is intended to include the ‘operational costs’. It is submitted that

debt recovery action is not an operational cost and as such claiming the costs of doing so would not

fall foul of the 2015 decision.

 

31. The sum added is a nominal contribution to the actual costs incurred by my Company as a result of

the Defendant’s non-payment, and capped at the amount permitted under the ATA Code. My

Company’s employees spent time and resource attempting to recover the debt, as well as instructing

external debt recovery providers, all at a cost to the Company. This is not my Company’s usual

business and, but for the Defendant’s refusal to pay, would not have been necessary.

 

32. When considering the recoverability of this element of the claim, I respectfully draw the Court’s

attention to paragraph 45 of Chaplair Limited v Kumari [2015] EWCA Civ 798 whereby, when

considering contractual indemnity costs, it was stated: -

 

“There is nothing ... which enable[s] the rules to exclude or override that contractual entitlement

and I therefore agree with Arden LJ that the judge had the jurisdiction to assess the costs free

from any restraints imposed by CPR 27.14.”

 

CPR Costs

 

33. My Company claims the claim issue fee, fixed costs pursuant to CPR 45, and the hearing fee in any

event.

 

34. In the alternative to the contractual costs set out above, my Company reserves the right to claim

additional costs pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g). This claim was issued as a last resort, and given the

robust appeals procedure in place, should not have been necessary. It is my Company’s position that

this is unreasonable behaviour and it is respectfully requested that the Court considers whether they

conclude the same.

 

Conclusion

 

35. It is my respectful submission that the Defence is entirely without merit and as such it is requested

that the Defence is struck out and Judgment awarded in favour of my Company, payable forthwith.

 

36. I may not be able to attend the forthcoming hearing. Should this be so, an advocate will attend on my

behalf. I ask that the Court accepts this as written notice pursuant to CPR 27.9(1). If I am unable to

15

 

attend, please decide the claim in my absence, taking into account the advocate’s submissions, this

Statement, and any other evidence filed. This paragraph demonstrates my compliance with CPR

27.9(1)(a)-(b).

 

37. In the event an advocate does attend the hearing, I request their fee be added to the amount sought.

Coupon-mad

You haven't exhibited any case law at all, despite relying on it in your WS?

Eeeek, you need case law urgently!

Quick: I'd do a quick skeleton argument tonight and email it to Jake and the court, first thing in the morning.

Firstly you need to debunk Chaplair v Kumari.

You can say the below; it needs some paragraph numbers added and the Claim Number at the top, and your name and date at the bottom (but not a statement of truth):

Skeleton Argument of the Defendant

Insofar as the Claimants are citing Chaplair Limited -v- Kumari [2015] in order to try to justify imaginary costs dressed up as 'debt collection', that case has no relevance because the contract was a signed contract in writing and there was evidence of actual costs actually being incurred, billed and paid. In parking, the debt collection agents work on a no collection, no fee basis so if a consumer doesn't pay prior to litigation, no money has ever changed hands.

Further, even if the supposed £70 was specified on all signage (denied by the Defendant) it was only, at best, in the small print which means it is not part of any agreed 'contract'. Non-prominent, unspecified or small-print costs must always be tested for proportionality and fairness by the court, which is a statutory duty in s71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which must be applied whether a party raises the matter of fairness or not.

Under the heading “What are the general rules about fairness of contract terms and notices?” ss. 62 to 69 contain the substantive provisions of Part 2. The provisions relevant to the present case are ss. 62 to 64 and 67 which provide, so far as relevant, as follows:

“62 Requirement for contract terms and notices to be fair

(1)

An unfair term of a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer.

…

(4)

A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.

(5)

Whether a term is fair is to be determined—

(a)

taking into account the nature of the subject matter of the contract, and

(b)

by reference to all the circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the other terms of the contract or of any other contract on which it depends.

…

63

Contract terms which may or must be regarded as unfair

(1)

Part 1 of Schedule 2 contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms of consumer contracts that may be regarded as unfair for the purposes of this Part.

(2)

Part 1 of Schedule 2 is subject to Part 2 of that Schedule; but a term listed in Part 2 of that Schedule may nevertheless be assessed for fairness under section 62 unless section 64 or 73 applies to it.

…

64

Exclusion from assessment of fairness

(1)

A term of a consumer contract may not be assessed for fairness under section 62 to the extent that—

(a)

it specifies the main subject matter of the contract, or

(b)

the assessment is of the appropriateness of the price payable under the contract by comparison with the goods, digital content or services supplied under it.

(2)

Subsection (1) excludes a term from an assessment under section 62 only if it is transparent and prominent.

(3)

A term is transparent for the purposes of this Part if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and (in the case of a written term) is legible.

(4)

A term is prominent for the purposes of this section if it is brought to the consumer’s attention in such a way that an average consumer would be aware of the term.

(5)

In subsection (4) “average consumer” means a consumer who is reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect.

As appears above, s. 63(1) and (2) and s. 64(4) each refer to Schedule 2 to the Act. Schedule 2 is headed “Consumer contract terms which may be regarded as unfair” and Part 1 of the Schedule is headed “List of terms”.

This is commonly known as the “grey list” because a term on the list is not automatically to be regarded as unfair but may be. For present purposes the relevant part of Part 1 are as follows:

“5 - A term which has the object or effect of requiring that, where the consumer decides not to conclude or perform the contract, the consumer must pay the trader a disproportionately high sum in compensation.

6 - A term which has the object or effect of requiring a consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations under the contract to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation.

10 - A term which has the object or effect of irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which the consumer has had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract.

The Beavis case does not assist the Claimant because that centred on the need to encourage shoppers to vacate spaces within a fixed time limit at a retail park. Here, the Claimant has no such legitimate interest and is operating in a far more sensitive environment. In plain sight, VCS is attempting to punish residents for not displaying a permit that they do not need, because there is no such obligation in the lease.

In relation to the £100 PCN, the question of whether this charge for 'breach' was within the exception in s. 64(1) (such that the assessment of fairness is excluded) is overridden if it fell within the grey list in Part 1 of Schedule 2, because if it did, s. 64(6) has the effect of displacing s. 64(1). See Glaser v Atay [2024] EWCA Civ 1111 as a relevant authority where the Consumer Rights Act 2015 was recently tested in this way, regarding costs in a trader-consumer contract.

The £100 PCN itself will fail the fairness test, if the court is persuaded that the term was not sufficiently prominent and/or it is out of all proportion or is otherwise plainly unfair to residents, causing a derogation from grant, given all the circumstances.

The Defendant, an authorised resident, already enjoyed an implied or specified right or grant in their lease, which supersedes any purported contract on VCS' sparse (and wordy) cardboard signs of faded small print.

The binding authority of DUCHESS OF BEDFORD HOUSE RTM COMPANY LIMITED & ORS V CAMPDEN HILL GATE LTD [2023] EWCA Civ 1470 assists. It reaffirms residential parking rights using not only a fair interpretation of the lease but also section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925. This is It's a Court of Appeal authority and the Supreme Court refused an application to appeal it.

That case reaffirmed leaseholders' rights under section 62 to use 'first come first served' bays in a car parking area at their estate: "The residents of Duchess of Bedford House are relieved and delighted at this decision. After having had their right to park restricted by parking tickets and even clamping for periods over the last 30 years, they can park in the road outside their flats with full confidence in their right to do so."

See relevant legal summaries here:

https://www.edwincoe.com/blogs/main/the-supreme-court-has-effectively-confirmed-the-approach-of-the-court-of-appeal-in-applying-the-rule-in-newman-v-jones-and-on-how-to-interpret-lease-clauses/

and

https://www.shma.co.uk/our-thoughts/duchess-of-bedford-house-case-have-we-gone-parking-mad/

The Defendant's case is that - as in the above binding case - they were not being given anything of value by VCS that they did not already have granted in their lease, thus the elements of a contract were not met.

Regarding the added £70 sum (that the last Government called 'extorting money from motorists' in the Foreword to the statutory Code of Practice which is to be imminently re-laid before Parliament) that certainly fails the test of fairness and doesn't get off the ground.

It is plainly double recovery of the same heads of cost (the 'enforcement' letter chain, up to and including the LBC) that HHJ Moloney spelt out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the first instance judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. This is binding authority because the Supreme Court did not interfere with any of HHJ Moloney's findings. It is also worth noting that HHJ Moloney noted with approval the only other private parking case law (ParkingEye v Somerfield) where at the High Court stage, HHJ Hegarty had already held that adding 'admin fees' on top of a PCN was 'likely to be penal', and thus unenforceable.

************************************

You'll also need these transcripts and some words summarising them:

Duchess of Bedford House:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/6576d76952aae60ac079d0bd

ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2011] EWHC 4023 (QB): i https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/qb/2011/4023  ; https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2011/4023.html

Glaser v Atay [2024] EWCA Civ 1111:  https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2024/1111  ; https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2024/1111.html

HHJ Moloney's judgment in Beavis. The transcript showing that the operational costs ARE the minor costs of debt demands and the LBC because he listed them:

https://www.parkingcowboys.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Judgment_1905-OCRD_2.pdf

And take with you to the hearing, printed copies of everything you have already submitted, plus proof that you were abroad when the claim arrived (because you haven't evidenced that, says Jake).

It might prove important for your costs which - regardless of outcome - you must push for, by asking the judge for them at the end.

Do not be told by a dismissive judge that you can't have your application fee cost "because this is the small claims track" because that is incorrect. Disagree with that and be heard in this: at the point of the first hearing the case had never been allocated to track. And there are costs in the case because the first judge reserved them.

Take proof of paying the fee, was it £303? Bring the receipt, printed out.

peanutbutterjamjam

Thank you so much for your help!

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82169179#Comment_82169179

Have submitted skeleton defence to the court and the claimant.

Will let you know how I get on after tomorrow.

Thank you so much again

Le_Kirk

Have submitted skeleton defence to the court and the claimant.

Did you mean Skeleton Argument?

peanutbutterjamjam

Thank you to all for your help.

Unfortunately the judge found in VCS favour.

His judgement was that as I had been provided with key fobs from the tenant and parking permits, he was satisfied that I knowingly entered into a contract with VCS and it didn't matter that parking signage wasn't present at entry it was prominent within the secure car park.

The fact that I had be presented with a parking permit that wasn't displayed meant that I knew VCS was providing me with a service.

So just a case of paying the money now and closing a chapter on it really.

Again thank you very much for everything.