DCB LEGAL, GBP management case discontinued

Coupon-mad

"Sounds like they're willing to fight this though?"

Not at all.

Young, fresh faced turkey-teethed paralegals are paid to spout this crap! They still discontinue before hearings.

yellowbeatle00

Received this email along with a seperate letter from the courts giving a court date for the case. Is it worth giving them a call or?

(Image removed by Forum Team)

Coupon-mad

Obviously not! Sit on your hands and get on with real life.

You've read @Umkomaas' thread & surely you know this signals discontinuance?!

yellowbeatle00

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82057293#Comment_82057293

In preperation they've asked for any documents i wish to rely on to be sent to the court and the other party.

I couldn't find any particular guidance on this but is there any reccomendations on if/what i should submit. I dont particularly have anything such as witness statements etc anyway.

Umkomaas

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82078198#Comment_82078198

The primary ‘Witness Statement’ is that of your own. You’re the main ‘Witness’. The NEWBIES FAQ Announcement, post number TWO, and Template Defence Announcement - 8 steps - guides you through (with examples) producing your Witness Statement.

yellowbeatle00

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/comment/82078251#Comment_82078251

Thanks.

I've drafted the following wonder if anyone had any feedback or suggestions. Also the letter doesn't state how i need to send these to the court and claimant. Is via email to the relevant courts and claimaints email ok or is there a process to delivering/uploading these docs.

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.: [CLAIM NUMBER]

Between:

[CLAIMANT’S FULL NAME]

Claimant

-and-

[DEFENDANT’S FULL NAME]

Defendant

DEFENCE

1. Except where expressly admitted in this Defence, the Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in the Particulars of Claim. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to the sum claimed, or to any sum at all.

The Defendant’s position

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of vehicle registration [VEHICLE REGISTRATION] on the material date.

3. Owing to the substantial passage of time, the Defendant cannot now identify who was driving the vehicle on the material date. The Defendant does not admit that they were the driver. The Claimant is therefore required to prove either that the Defendant was driving or that the Claimant acquired a statutory right to recover the alleged parking charge from the Defendant as registered keeper pursuant to Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

4. The Defendant has little recollection of the alleged event, save that there was one occasion when a private parking charge notice was found attached to the vehicle at residential premises.

5. If the present claim relates to that occasion, the Defendant’s case is that the vehicle was not parked in the ordinary sense alleged by the Claimant. It had stopped temporarily while an unwieldy heater was collected from and loaded from an upstairs residential flat, with the express permission of the lawful resident.

6. The stop lasted only for the time reasonably required to enter the residential premises, collect the heater and load it into the vehicle. The vehicle was not left at the location for ordinary or prolonged parking and was not being used to obtain parking facilities.

7. The Defendant will rely upon evidence from the resident and any other available contemporaneous evidence at the witness-statement stage.

Inadequate Particulars of Claim

8. The Particulars of Claim are sparse, generic and lacking in material detail. They do not adequately identify:

a. the precise conduct said to constitute a contractual breach;

b. the wording of the contractual term allegedly breached;

c. whether the Claimant pursues the Defendant as driver, registered keeper or both;

d. how and when any alleged contract was formed;

e. the duration of the alleged parking event;

f. the legal and contractual basis for each additional sum claimed; or

g. how the total amount claimed has been calculated.

9. The Particulars therefore fail to provide a concise statement of the material facts upon which the Claimant relies, as required by CPR 16.4.

10. To the extent that the Claimant alleges that a contract was formed through conduct, paragraph 7.5 of Practice Direction 16 requires the Claimant to specify the conduct relied upon and to state by whom, when and where the relevant acts were performed. The Particulars do not adequately provide this information.

11. The Defendant has consequently been placed at a disadvantage in understanding the exact case that must be answered. The Court is respectfully invited to exercise its case-management powers under CPR 3.4 by striking out the claim where it discloses no reasonable grounds or, alternatively, by requiring the Claimant to provide properly particularised details of its case.

Brief loading was not parking

12. If this claim concerns the incident identified above, it is denied that the vehicle was parked in breach of any enforceable contractual term.

13. The Defendant relies upon the persuasive County Court appeal judgment in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd, case number B9GF0A9E, decided at Oxford County Court on 29 June 2016 by His Honour Judge Harris QC.

14. In Jopson, the Court distinguished ordinary parking from a vehicle stopping temporarily for the time reasonably required to load or unload items at residential premises. Whether a vehicle is parked or merely stopped for loading is a question of fact and degree.

15. The circumstances in the present case are materially similar. The vehicle stopped briefly to permit the collection and loading of a large heater from an upstairs residential flat. Such activity was an ordinary and necessary incident of access to residential premises.

16. The Claimant is required to produce its complete contemporaneous photographic record, including unedited photographs and timestamps, to establish the duration and nature of the stop.

17. A parking attendant taking photographs immediately upon arrival, without allowing a reasonable observation period to determine whether loading was taking place, would not establish that the vehicle was parked in the contractual sense alleged.

18. The Defendant’s position is that any photographs are likely to show no meaningful observation period or only the brief period reasonably required for the loading activity.

Permission and residential rights

19. The driver was present with the permission of a lawful resident of the premises.

20. The Claimant is put to strict proof of the nature and extent of its authority over the land, including whether it was authorised to impose contractual charges upon residents and their authorised visitors for brief and ordinary loading or unloading.

21. The Claimant is also required to establish whether the relevant lease or tenancy granted the resident rights of access, loading, unloading or use of the surrounding common areas.

22. Signage erected by a third-party parking contractor cannot, without sufficient landowner authority and a lawful variation of the resident’s existing rights, unilaterally remove or substantially interfere with rights already granted under a tenancy or lease.

23. The Defendant may rely upon the relevant tenancy, lease or evidence from the resident once those documents have been obtained and exchanged in accordance with the Court’s directions.

No enforceable contractual term

24. It is denied that the driver entered into a contract requiring payment of the sum claimed.

25. The Claimant is required to prove:

a. the location, number and wording of every sign in force on the material date;

b. that the relevant signs were visible and legible from the position where the vehicle stopped;

c. that the parking charge was clearly and prominently displayed;

d. that the signage clearly warned that a brief stop for authorised residential loading would attract the parking charge;

e. that the wording constituted an offer capable of acceptance rather than a prohibition; and

f. that there was sufficient time and opportunity for the driver to read and accept the alleged contractual terms before any charge arose.

26. The Defendant does not accept that the Claimant’s signage clearly or prominently communicated that the collection and loading of a heavy item from residential premises would be treated as chargeable parking.

27. Any unclear or ambiguous consumer term must be interpreted in the way most favourable to the consumer pursuant to section 69 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

28. Sections 62 and 68 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 require consumer contract terms and notices to be fair and transparent. Section 71 requires the Court to consider the fairness of a consumer term where sufficient legal and factual material is available.

29. Imposing a substantial parking charge for a brief and authorised residential loading activity would create a significant imbalance to the consumer’s detriment unless the Claimant establishes an exceptionally clear contractual term and a proportionate legitimate justification.

ParkingEye v Beavis distinguished

30. The Defendant anticipates that the Claimant may rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67.

31. That case concerned an £85 charge in a retail car park where prominent signage imposed a two-hour parking limit and where the parking operator and landowner had a legitimate commercial interest in ensuring the turnover of customer parking spaces.

32. The present circumstances are materially different. This claim concerns a brief stop for authorised loading at residential premises, not the prolonged occupation of a retail customer parking space.

33. There was no comparable commercial requirement to ensure rapid turnover of parking spaces and no comparable legitimate interest in penalising ordinary access and loading at residential premises.

34. The parking charge is therefore not automatically protected from the penalty rule by Beavis. The Claimant must establish a legitimate interest arising from the circumstances of this particular residential site and demonstrate that the charge was proportionate to that interest.

No established keeper liability

35. The Claimant has not established that the Defendant is liable as registered keeper.

36. Liability under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is not automatic. It arises only where the Claimant has complied with every applicable statutory condition.

37. The Defendant does not admit that a Notice to Keeper complying with Schedule 4 was properly served.

38. The Claimant is put to strict proof of:

a. the content and date of any Notice to Driver;

b. the full content of the Notice to Keeper;

c. the date and method by which the Notice to Keeper was issued;

d. the date upon which the Notice to Keeper is said to have been served;

e. compliance with the statutory timescales under paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of Schedule 4, as applicable;

f. inclusion of all mandatory information and statutory warnings;

g. identification of the creditor;

h. the period of parking, rather than merely a single observation time; and

i. that the location was “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4.

39. A presumption cannot properly be made that the registered keeper was also the driver. The Defendant has no obligation under Schedule 4 to identify the driver.

40. Unless the Claimant establishes full compliance with Schedule 4, it cannot transfer any liability that may have been owed by the unidentified driver to the Defendant as registered keeper.

41. Further, paragraph 4(5) of Schedule 4 provides that the maximum sum recoverable from a registered keeper by virtue of keeper liability is the amount specified in the Notice to Keeper, less any payments received.

Landowner authority

42. The Claimant is a third-party parking contractor and is put to strict proof that it held sufficient authority from the landowner on the material date to:

a. manage parking at the precise location concerned;

b. regulate temporary residential loading and access;

c. offer parking contracts in its own name;

d. issue parking charges in its own name;

e. recover each of the sums pleaded; and

f. commence and pursue court proceedings in its own name.

43. The Claimant is required to produce the contemporaneous landowner agreement, including its relevant schedules, site plan, commencement and expiry provisions and any amendments.

44. A generic witness statement, redacted document with the material terms obscured, or an unverified aerial image would not establish that the Claimant possessed the necessary authority over the precise location.

45. The Claimant must also establish that the vehicle was situated within the geographical boundary covered by the agreement and that the agreement authorised enforcement against authorised visitors engaged in loading.

Additional recovery sum

46. The Particulars of Claim appear to include an additional sum above the original parking charge. Liability for that additional amount is denied.

47. The Claimant is put to strict proof that the additional sum:

a. was stated clearly and prominently on the signage before any alleged contract was formed;

b. was quantified or objectively capable of calculation at that time;

c. was contractually payable to this Claimant;

d. was genuinely incurred;

e. does not duplicate the Claimant’s ordinary business expenditure;

f. does not duplicate legal representative costs already claimed separately; and

g. is fair and transparent under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

48. The original parking charge was intended to cover the operational costs of the parking-enforcement model, including routine correspondence and automated debt-recovery activity.

49. The Claimant cannot recover the same administrative or debt-recovery expenditure twice by describing it as a separate contractual sum.

50. A vague statement on signage or correspondence that unspecified further costs “may” be added does not establish that a fixed additional sum was properly incorporated into any contract.

51. An industry code or arrangement between a parking operator and a debt-recovery agent cannot, by itself, create contractual liability against a motorist.

52. To the extent that the Claimant pursues the Defendant as registered keeper, the Claimant must also address the statutory limit imposed by paragraph 4(5) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

Interest

53. The Defendant disputes the Claimant’s entitlement to the interest claimed, including the period over which it has been calculated.

54. The Claimant is required to explain any substantial delay between the alleged parking event and the commencement of proceedings.

55. The Defendant should not be prejudiced by interest accruing during a period of delay that was within the Claimant’s control. To the extent that interest is discretionary, the Court is respectfully invited to disallow or reduce it accordingly.

Conclusion

56. The Claimant has failed adequately to plead or establish:

a. the identity of the driver;

b. statutory keeper liability;

c. that the vehicle was parked rather than briefly stopped for loading;

d. that an enforceable contract was formed;

e. that any clear contractual term applied to temporary residential loading;

f. a proportionate legitimate interest justifying the parking charge;

g. sufficient landowner authority; or

h. entitlement to the additional sums claimed.

57. The Defendant respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the claim.

58. The Defendant will seek the ordinary costs permitted under CPR 27.14.

59. Should the Claimant continue the proceedings despite evidence showing that the vehicle was engaged only in brief and authorised loading, or despite being unable to establish keeper liability, the Defendant reserves the right to seek further costs pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g) on the basis of unreasonable conduct.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true.

I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed: ______________________________

Full name: [DEFENDANT’S FULL NAME]

Date: ______________________________

Gr1pr

Your Witness Statement of Truth is incorrect, because it says Defence

You should have a numbered list of exhibits, and possibly a costs statement too

It used to be the case that submissions were made by hard copies, on paper, called a bundle, so statements and pictures, dad's, usb sticks etc

But

Due to the pandemic, save the trees, etc, these days its normally by email, with pdf attachments, one email, 2 destinations, the attachment should be a pdf and under 50 pages in total

You should already have the email address for the lawyers, and Courtfinder gives you contact details for the court that sent you your court order, the one with the WS deadline and hearing date etc

See the WS by recent winner JackR1

Coupon-mad

Where's the bit about:

• HHJ Moloney's judgment in Beavis, as seen in good recent WS such as by @JackR1
• the CMA's clampdown on the parking industry last week? We have had a WS or defence that had a paragraph about that news the other day,

yellowbeatle00

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT [COURT NAME]

Claim No.: [CLAIM NUMBER]

Between:

[CLAIMANT PARKING COMPANY]

Claimant

-and-

[DEFENDANT]

Defendant

WITNESS STATEMENT OF [DEFENDANT]

On behalf of: The Defendant

Witness: [DEFENDANT]

Statement: First

Authority supplied: A1

Date: [DATE]

Introduction

1. I, [DEFENDANT], of [ADDRESS], am the Defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts stated in this witness statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

2. Where I refer to information that is not within my direct knowledge, I have identified the source of that information.

3. In this statement, I refer to the legal authorities relied upon where appropriate. For the Court’s convenience, I have included direct hyperlinks where possible to the full text of the judgments, legislation and official publications mentioned. I have also supplied a copy of the unreported judgment in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd as Authority A1.

4. I am a litigant in person with no formal legal training. I have done my best to present my evidence clearly, accurately and concisely, and I respectfully ask the Court to take this into account.

5. I repeat and rely upon my Defence. I will say as follows.

Background

6. I was the registered keeper of vehicle registration [VEHICLE REGISTRATION] on [DATE OF EVENT].

7. The alleged parking event took place at [SITE] on [DATE OF EVENT].

8. Nearly four years had passed between the alleged event and the preparation of this statement. Owing to that passage of time, I cannot now identify with certainty who was driving the vehicle.

9. I do not admit that I was the driver. No evidence identifying me as the driver has been provided to me.

10. On the material date, I attended the site in connection with the collection of a heater that I had purchased from a university student who was moving out of his accommodation.

11. The seller asked that the vehicle stop outside the building so that the heater could be carried from the property and loaded into the vehicle more easily.

12. The purpose of the vehicle stopping outside the building was therefore solely to facilitate the collection and loading of an unwieldy household item. The vehicle was not left there for ordinary or prolonged parking.

13. The vehicle remained only for the time reasonably required for the seller to bring the heater from the property and for it to be loaded into the vehicle. Due to the passage of time, I cannot now give an exact duration, but my recollection is that it was only a very short period of a few minutes.

14. The seller was an international university student who was in the process of moving out. I no longer have contact with him. He has left the United Kingdom and the telephone number I previously held for him is no longer active.

15. I have therefore been unable to obtain a separate witness statement from the seller. The facts in paragraphs 10 to 14 are based upon my own recollection of attending the collection and my communications with the seller at the time.

16. The vehicle did not prevent access to the building, block another vehicle, occupy an allocated residential bay or create any danger.

Passage of Time and Lack of Documents

17. I understand that a parking charge notice was issued on the material date. I no longer possess the original parking charge notice or any subsequent Notice to Keeper that may have been sent.

18. Given the passage of time, I cannot independently verify the precise allegation originally made, the wording of the notice, the alleged observation period or whether any Notice to Keeper contained the information required by law.

19. These are matters that should be proved through the Claimant’s own contemporaneous records.

20. The delay has also made it significantly more difficult to retrieve documents, locate the seller and obtain supporting evidence concerning an otherwise brief and ordinary event.

Lack of Particularisation of the Allegation

21. At the time of preparing this witness statement, I do not have a copy of the Particulars of Claim available to quote verbatim. I have therefore not attempted to reproduce or paraphrase wording that I cannot verify.

22. The correspondence currently available to me, including correspondence concerning the alleged parking charge, does not clearly identify the specific contravention said to have occurred.

23. In particular, the documents I have retained do not make clear whether the allegation concerns:

a. parking or stopping in a prohibited area;

b. failing to display a permit;

c. parking outside a marked bay;

d. exceeding a permitted period, with no observation period having been provided;

e. loading or unloading; or

f. some other alleged breach of the signage.

24. I am therefore unable to identify with certainty the precise contractual term that the Claimant alleges was breached or the particular conduct said to constitute that breach.

25. This lack of detail has made it difficult for me to understand and respond fully to the Claimant’s case, particularly given the significant passage of time.

26. "Civil Procedure Rule 16.4" (https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part16) requires Particulars of Claim to contain a concise statement of the facts upon which the Claimant relies. Where a contract is alleged to have arisen through conduct, "paragraph 7.5 of Practice Direction 16" (https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part16/pd_part16) requires the Claimant to specify the conduct relied upon and state by whom, when and where the relevant acts were done.

27. I respectfully submit that the Claimant must identify the precise alleged contravention, the contractual term relied upon and whether it pursues me as the alleged driver or as registered keeper.

28. The Claimant should not be permitted to introduce a materially different allegation for the first time in its witness statement or at the hearing where that allegation was not properly identified in the Particulars of Claim.

29. At the time of preparing this statement, I have not received the Claimant’s witness statement or evidence bundle. I am therefore unable to respond to any photographs, notices or new allegations that the Claimant may subsequently produce.

30. If the Claimant’s evidence introduces matters that were not properly identified previously, I respectfully ask the Court to take account of the prejudice caused to me and to permit me a fair opportunity to respond.

No Breach Established: Brief Loading Was Not Parking

31. I do not dispute that parking signs were present at the site. My case does not depend upon an argument that there was no signage or that the signs were generally concealed.

32. I also do not deny, as a general legal principle, that clear and prominent parking signage may constitute a unilateral offer capable of acceptance by a motorist’s conduct. The Supreme Court confirmed in "ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67" (https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/ukSC-2015-0116) that a parking scheme communicated through sufficiently clear signage may create a binding contract.

33. I accept that the period for which the vehicle was stopped was sufficient for the driver to read and understand the displayed terms and for a contract to be formed.

34. However, the Claimant must still prove the exact contractual terms displayed at the relevant location on the material date and demonstrate how the particular conduct in this case breached those terms.

35. The central issue is not whether signage could form a contract in principle. It is whether the vehicle’s brief stop for the collection and loading of an unwieldy heater amounted to “parking” or otherwise breached the precise contractual term relied upon by the Claimant.

36. As explained above, the vehicle attended for the limited purpose of facilitating the collection of a heater from a university student who was moving out of his accommodation.

37. The seller, who was the resident, specifically requested that the vehicle stop outside the building to make it easier for him to bring out and load the heater. The vehicle was not left at the site for general, recreational or prolonged parking.

38. I rely upon the persuasive County Court appeal judgment in "Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd, case number B9GF0A9E" (https://www.parkingcowboys.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/JOPSON-V-HOMEGUARD-2906J-Approved.pdf), decided at Oxford County Court on 29 June 2016. A copy of the approved judgment is supplied as Authority A1.

39. In Jopson, His Honour Judge Harris QC distinguished ordinary parking from a vehicle stopping temporarily for the time reasonably required to load or unload items at residential premises.

40. The judgment recognised that whether a vehicle is parked or merely stopped for loading is a question of fact and degree. A brief stop to enable the movement of an awkward or heavy item is materially different from leaving a vehicle for ordinary parking.

41. The circumstances of this case are materially similar. The heater had to be brought from inside the accommodation and safely placed into the vehicle. The stop was incidental to that loading activity.

42. If the relevant sign referred only to “parking”, the Claimant must explain why that wording extended to a brief and necessary loading activity of the type distinguished from parking in Jopson.

43. If the Claimant instead alleges that the relevant signage expressly prohibited stopping, waiting, loading or unloading, it must produce contemporaneous evidence of the exact wording displayed at the relevant location on the material date and identify that specific term as part of its pleaded case.

44. The Claimant is also required to produce its complete contemporaneous photographic evidence, including the original timestamps and the beginning and end of the alleged observation period.

45. Unless that evidence demonstrates that the vehicle remained at the location after the loading activity had concluded, the evidence would be consistent with a brief loading stop rather than ordinary parking.

ParkingEye v Beavis Distinguished

46. I anticipate that the Claimant may rely upon "ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67" (https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/ukSC-2015-0116).

47. That case concerned a motorist who was using a retail car park for ordinary parking and remained beyond a prominently stated maximum period. The Supreme Court considered the legitimate commercial interest in ensuring the turnover of customer parking spaces.

48. The present case is materially different. The vehicle was not being used to obtain ordinary parking facilities. It stopped temporarily to facilitate the collection and loading of an unwieldy household item from residential accommodation.

49. There was no comparable use of a retail parking space and no comparable commercial requirement to ensure the turnover of customer parking.

50. I recognise that the Claimant may have a legitimate interest in managing the site and keeping access routes clear. However, the Claimant must still prove that the particular brief loading activity amounted to a breach of the precise term relied upon and that imposing the parking charge in these circumstances was justified.

Keeper Liability and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012

51. I confirm that I was the registered keeper of the vehicle. However, registered keeper status does not, by itself, establish that I was driving.

52. If the Claimant seeks to pursue me as driver, it must prove on the balance of probabilities that I was driving. It cannot rely solely upon the fact that I was the registered keeper.

53. If the Claimant seeks to pursue me as registered keeper, it must demonstrate compliance with all applicable requirements of "Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012" (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/9/schedule/4).

54. I do not possess a copy of any Notice to Keeper and cannot admit that a compliant notice was issued or served.

55. The Claimant is therefore required to produce:

a. the original parking charge notice or Notice to Driver;

b. the complete Notice to Keeper;

c. the date on which each notice was issued;

d. evidence of the date and method of service;

e. the prescribed information and keeper-liability warning;

f. the period of parking and observation times relied upon;

g. identification of the creditor; and

h. evidence of compliance with the applicable statutory timescales.

56. Because a notice appears to have been issued on the date of the alleged event, the Claimant must clarify whether a Notice to Driver was placed on the vehicle and, consequently, which provisions of Schedule 4 it relies upon.

57. Until the relevant documents have been disclosed and examined, the Claimant has not established that liability was lawfully transferred from an unidentified driver to me as registered keeper.

58. Paragraph 4(5) of "Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012" (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/9/schedule/4) also limits the sum recoverable from a registered keeper through that statutory mechanism to the amount specified in the Notice to Keeper, less any payment received.

Landowner Authority

59. The Claimant is a third-party parking operator and is put to strict proof that it had sufficient authority from the relevant landowner on the material date.

60. The Claimant must establish that its authority extended to:

a. the precise part of the site where the vehicle stopped;

b. enforcement against residents and persons attending the site with their permission;

c. brief loading and unloading;

d. issuing parking charges in its own name;

e. recovering each of the sums claimed; and

f. commencing legal proceedings in its own name.

61. The Claimant should produce the contemporaneous landowner agreement, including the relevant dates, schedules and site boundary plan.

62. If the Claimant relies upon commercial confidentiality, the agreement could be appropriately redacted while retaining the information necessary to establish the parties, dates, geographic scope and enforcement authority.

63. A generic statement that authority existed would not allow the Court to determine whether the Claimant was authorised to enforce at the precise location or in relation to the brief loading activity alleged here.

Inflated and Unfair Additional Charges

64. The Claimant appears to seek an additional sum above the original parking charge. Liability for any such additional sum is denied.

65. The Claimant must prove that the additional sum:

a. was clearly and prominently stated as a contractual term on the signage in force on the material date;

b. was properly incorporated into any contract formed with the driver;

c. was quantified, or capable of being calculated, when the alleged contract was formed;

d. was contractually payable to the Claimant;

e. was genuinely incurred;

f. represents work or expenditure distinct from the ordinary operation and enforcement of the parking scheme; and

g. does not duplicate legal costs or administrative expenditure claimed elsewhere in these proceedings.

The Original Parking Charge Already Covered Enforcement Costs

66. Attention is drawn to the Supreme Court judgment in "ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67" (https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/ukSC-2015-0116).

67. At paragraph 98, the Supreme Court explained that one purpose of the £85 parking charge was to provide an income stream enabling ParkingEye to meet the costs of operating the parking scheme and make a profit. At paragraph 100, the Court also made clear that this did not permit an operator to charge whatever amount it wished.

68. Lord Hodge similarly considered the parking scheme as a whole at paragraphs 193 to 198. At paragraph 198, he explained that the £85 charge was set at a level that enabled the operator to recover the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit.

69. The meaning of those operating costs is clarified by the original first-instance judgment of His Honour Judge Moloney QC in "ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis and Wardley, claims 3JD05152 and 3JD05169" (https://www.parkingcowboys.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Judgment_1905-OCRD_2.pdf).

70. At paragraph 2.6 of that judgment, HHJ Moloney described the ordinary enforcement process following an unpaid parking charge. It included obtaining keeper information from the DVLA, issuing the parking charge notice, sending reminder and warning letters and, ultimately, issuing a letter before action.

71. At paragraph 3.4, HHJ Moloney recorded that ParkingEye’s income was derived from parking charges, less its “operating costs including the costs of enforcement”. The first-instance judgment therefore confirms that routine pre-action correspondence and enforcement activity were among the costs funded by the original parking charge.

72. I do not rely upon the first-instance judgment as establishing a separate binding rule. Rather, it provides relevant factual context to the meaning of the operating costs subsequently considered by the Supreme Court.

73. In those circumstances, the Claimant must establish that the additional sum now sought represents a genuinely separate contractual liability, rather than an attempt to recover a second time the routine enforcement expenditure already funded by the original parking charge.

CMA Intervention Concerning Additional Parking Fees

74. On 16 July 2026, the Competition and Markets Authority published an "open letter to the private parking sector" (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-letter-to-the-private-parking-sector) following its examination of practices within the sector. The CMA identified particular concerns about operators attempting to recover additional fees on top of unpaid parking charges.

75. At paragraphs 35 to 37 of its open letter, the CMA stated that some operators may be relying upon additional-fee terms that:

a. are unclear or insufficiently prominent;

b. were not properly incorporated into the consumer contract;

c. may be unfair under "section 62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015" (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/section/62); and/or

d. may fail the transparency requirement under "section 68 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015" (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/section/68).

76. The CMA confirmed that a term that is unfair is unenforceable against the consumer.

77. At paragraph 38, the CMA specifically addressed the provision in the industry Code of Practice allowing an operator to add a sum of up to £70 when a parking charge becomes overdue. The CMA explained that the Code does not itself:

a. provide a legal basis making a consumer liable for the additional fee;

b. automatically incorporate an additional-fee term into a contract; or

c. make such a contractual term fair.

78. Compliance with the industry Code is therefore not, by itself, sufficient to establish that the additional sum is legally recoverable.

79. At paragraphs 40 and 41, the CMA observed that additional fees imposed on top of a parking charge can result in consumers paying sums that an operator would not otherwise be entitled to recover under the Small Claims Track costs regime. Its concerns included terms which:

a. state merely that additional fees or costs “may” be incurred;

b. do not quantify the amount that may later be demanded;

c. are hidden in small print or are otherwise insufficiently prominent;

d. give the operator discretion to increase the sum after the contract has been formed; or

e. appear to allow a third-party debt collector, with whom the consumer has no contract, to impose a fee.

80. The CMA’s letter was published after the alleged event in this case and does not determine the individual facts before the Court. However, it addresses the fairness, incorporation and transparency requirements already contained in the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It is therefore relevant regulatory guidance when assessing whether the additional sum now claimed was contractually agreed, transparent and fair.

81. In the present case, the Claimant has not yet produced evidence demonstrating that the additional sum:

a. appeared prominently on the signage;

b. was quantified when the alleged contract was formed;

c. was accepted by the unknown driver;

d. was payable to this Claimant rather than imposed by a third-party debt-recovery company;

e. was genuinely incurred; or

f. represents expenditure distinct from the routine enforcement costs already funded by the original parking charge.

82. The existence of an industry Code allowing a sum of up to £70 does not cure those evidential and contractual deficiencies.

83. In the absence of clear evidence that the additional sum was prominently disclosed, properly incorporated, fair and genuinely incurred, I respectfully submit that it is unenforceable and should be disallowed.

Conclusion

84. The vehicle attended the site on the material date for the limited purpose of collecting and loading a heater from a university student who was moving out of his accommodation.

85. The seller specifically requested that the vehicle stop outside the building to make loading the item easier. The vehicle was not left at the location for ordinary or prolonged parking.

86. Due to the significant passage of time, I cannot now identify the driver, retrieve all relevant communications or obtain a statement from the seller, who has left the United Kingdom and whose previous telephone number is inactive.

87. The Claimant has not yet demonstrated:

a. the identity of the driver;

b. compliance with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012;

c. that the vehicle was parked rather than briefly and temporarily stopped for loading;

d. that the brief loading activity breached the precise contractual term relied upon;

e. the duration of any observation period;

f. sufficient landowner authority;

g. entitlement to any additional sum; or

h. that any additional fee was properly incorporated, fair and genuinely incurred.

88. For the reasons set out above, I respectfully invite the Court to dismiss the claim.

Unreasonable Conduct and Costs

89. I reserve my position concerning unreasonable conduct under "CPR 27.14(2)(g)" (https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part27).

90. Once the Claimant’s witness statement and evidence have been received, I will be able to assess whether it has continued to pursue me as registered keeper despite lacking the documents required to establish keeper liability, or whether it has introduced materially new allegations that were not included in the Particulars of Claim.

91. If the Court concludes that the Claimant has acted unreasonably, I respectfully seek the additional costs set out in my accompanying Defendant’s Costs Schedule.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed: ______________________________

Full name: [DEFENDANT]

Dated: ______________________________

Authority Supplied

Reference| Authority| Bundle pages

A1| "Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd, case number B9GF0A9E, Oxford County Court, 29 June 2016" (https://www.parkingcowboys.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/JOPSON-V-HOMEGUARD-2906J-Approved.pdf)| [ ]–[ ]

Defendant’s Costs Schedule

Ordinary Costs Under CPR 27.14

Item| Calculation| Amount

Loss of one day’s annual leave to attend the hearing| Subject to the applicable small-claims cap| £95.00

Parking required to attend the hearing| No amount claimed| £0.00

Total ordinary costs sought| | £95.00

Additional Costs if Unreasonable Conduct Is Found

If the Court finds that the Claimant behaved unreasonably within CPR 27.14(2)(g), the Defendant seeks the costs of time reasonably spent preparing and conducting the case at the applicable litigant-in-person rate.

Item| Calculation| Amount

Preparing the Defence| [HOURS] × applicable rate| £[ ]

Legal research| [HOURS] × applicable rate| £[ ]

Preparing the Witness Statement and bundle| [HOURS] × applicable rate| £[ ]

Total additional costs sought, if awarded| | £[ ]

Total ordinary costs sought: £95.00

Total including additional costs, if unreasonable conduct is found: £[ ]

Coupon-mad

It's very long. Go through it to remove repetition.

You only get 50 pages all told if you are emailing that bundle. Your court will refuse, if it's more.

Remove 65, 80 and 81 which are unnecessary blurb and you don't want the C to prove any of that!