Anchor, Moorside Legal court claim 2025

Coupon-mad

Yes, I'll repeat the advice:

.. you need to use the Moorside Defence specially in the Template Defence thread

...with info added as I posted above about the dates and interest, plus a paragraph about the tenants (leaseholders?) having prior rights & easements that trump cardboard signs but that the POC must be struck out as it talks about 'one or more locations'

IhateFines

Coupon-mad said:

Yes, I'll repeat the advice:

.. you need to use the Moorside Defence specially in the Template Defence thread

...with info added as I posted above about the dates and interest, plus a paragraph about the tenants (leaseholders?) having prior rights & easements that trump cardboard signs but that the POC must be struck out as it talks about 'one or more locations'

1. The Claimant’s sparse case lacks specificity and does not comply with CPR 16.4, 16PD3 or 16PD7, failing to 'state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action'. The added costs/damages are an attempt at double recovery of capped legal fees (already listed in the claim) and are not monies genuinely owed to, or incurred by, this Claimant. The claim also exceeds the Code of Practice (CoP) £100 parking charge ('PC') maximum. Exaggerated claims for impermissible sums are good reason for the court to intervene. Whilst the Defendant reserves the right to amend the defence if details of the contract are provided, the court is invited to strike out the claim using its powers under CPR 3.4.

2. The allegation(s) and heads of cost are vague and liability is denied for the sum claimed, or at all. At the very least, interest should be disallowed; the delay in bringing proceedings lies with the Claimant. This also makes retrieving material documents/evidence difficult, which is highly prejudicial. The Defendant seeks fixed costs (CPR 27.14) and a finding of unreasonable conduct and further costs (CPR 46.5). The Defendant has little recollection of events, save as set out below and to admit that they were the registered keeper.

3. With regards to the POC in question, two recent persuasive appeal judgments in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) and Car Park Management Service Ltd v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the Chan case, HHJ Murch held: 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and the Defendant trusts that the Court should strike out the extant claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. The second recent persuasive appeal judgment also held that typical private parking case POC (like this) fail to comply with Part 16. On the 10 May 2024, in CPMS v Akande, HHJ Evans held: 'Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim'."

(i) Paragraph 1 is denied the Defendant is not indebted to the Claimant;

(ii) Paragraph 2 does not specify an accurate or detailed location of parking. The POC does not state the postcode where the defendant’s vehicle was parked on DATE and DATE. The Defendant is not indebted to the Claimant. The Claimant is put to strict proof of all of their allegations in the event that the allocating Judge does not strike out the claim pursuant to the above two authorities. The POC must be struck out as it talks about one or more locations;

(iii) Paragraph 2 is so unclear as there is no specification as to the amount of PCN's which have been issued and the date of each PCN alongside the location, merely the POC vaguely states PCN's issued between 27/06/2024 and 01/07/2024, it would seem like 7 PCN's have been issued within a 5 day time frame which seems impossible. 

(iiii) Paragraph 3 is denied as the Claimant is put to strict proof that the vehicle "was parked in breach" of an unspecified term. The POC fails to specify any 'relevant obligation' or 'relevant contract', nor do they even state what the supposed 'term' was or how the driver allegedly breached it;

(iv) Paragraph 4 is denied; whilst the Defendant is the registered keeper, they were not the driver, who did not 'agree to pay within 28 days'. It is not accepted that any prominent term was capable of binding the driver to any charge or deadline to pay. The Defendant is not liable and the Claimant has not even stated whether or not they can rely on the optional 'keeper liability' provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 ('the POFA');

(v) It is denied that the 'total PCN sum' could ever be £170 on private land, given the industry PCN cap is £100. The quantum is hugely exaggerated (no PCN can be £170 on private land). The Claimant has failed to break down the heads of cost: in fact the added £70 is not part of the supposed PCN at all; it is a false 'fee' which was never paid to any third party, cannot attract interest and appears to be their solicitor's attempt at double recovery, being an abuse added in addition to the MoJ's intended 'capped' £50 legal fee. The Claimant is put to strict proof of all of their allegations (whatever they are) and the basis under which the Defendant vehicle keeper is being pursued for a sum which exceeds the 'maximum sum' set out in the POFA. The POC states the Claimant intends to claim interest from 26/06/2024 despite the POC stating PCN's were issued on the 27/06/2024.

Maintaining the residents' rights to peaceful enjoyment of the property does not include allowing everyone to be unfairly charged by a lurking ex-wheelclamper for attending to normal life necessities like parking to unload groceries or setting down passengers, etc.  Clearly there is no 'legitimate interest' supporting these enhanced parking charges in these circumstances.

It is denied that the Defendant or lawful users of his/her vehicle were in breach of any parking conditions or were not permitted to park in circumstances where an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant permitting the above mentioned vehicle to be parked by the current occupier and leaseholder of HOME ADDRESS, whose leaseholder agreement permits the parking of vehicle(s) on land. The Defendant avers that there was an absolute entitlement to park deriving from the terms of the lease, which cannot be fettered by any alleged parking terms. The lease terms provide the right to park a vehicle in the relevant parking area, without limitation as to type of vehicle, ownership of vehicle, the user of the vehicle. A copy of the leasehold agreement will be provided to the Court, together with witness evidence that prior permission to park had been given. As established in Kettel & Ors v Bloomfold Ltd [2012] EWHC 1422 (Ch), leaseholders are entitled to the quiet enjoyment of their demised premises, including allocated parking spaces. Any purported terms imposed by the Claimant are void as they attempt to override pre-existing superior rights.

The Defendant contacted the building management on 9 July 2024, who explicitly confirmed that the PCNs issued from 20/06/2024 to 09/07/2024 for vehicle registration xxx xxxx would be cancelled. The Defendant relied on this assurance and reasonably believed the matter was resolved. A copy of these emails will be provided to the court. Despite this, the Claimant had continued to issue further PCNs and has proceeded with this claim, which constitutes a breach of the UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. Under Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR, data processing must be necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller, unless overridden by the interests or rights of the data subject. Once building management had confirmed cancellation and withdrawal of consent or justification for further processing, any subsequent access, retention, or use of the Defendant’s personal data by the Claimant became unlawful. 

The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgments on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.

4. It is neither admitted nor denied that a term was breached but to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration (absent in this case). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (s71) mandates a 'test of fairness' duty on Courts and sets a high bar for prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Paying regard to Sch2 (examples 6, 10, 14 & 18), also s62 and the duties of fair, open dealing/good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant reportedly uses unclear (unfair) terms/notices. On the limited information given, this case looks no different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs.

5. DVLA keeper data is only supplied on the basis of prior written landowner authority. The Claimant (an agent) is put to strict proof of their standing to sue and the terms, scope and dates of the landowner agreement, including the contract, updates, schedules and a map of the site boundary set by the landowner (not an unverified Google Maps aerial view).

6. To impose a PC, as well as a breach, there must be: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.

7. Attention is drawn to (i) paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of  Beavis (an £85 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner) and also to (ii) the binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419-428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter-chain and 'would appear to be penal'.

8. The Parking (Code of Practice) Act will curb rogue conduct by operators and their debt recovery agents (DRAs). The Government recently launched a Public Consultation considered likely to bring in a ban on DRA fees, which a 2022 Minister called ‘extorting money from motorists’. They have identified in July 2025: 'profit being made by DRAs is significantly higher than ... by parking operators' and 'the high profits may be indicative of these firms having too much control over the market, thereby indicating that there is a market failure'.

9. Pursuant to Sch4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('POFA') the claim exceeds the maximum sum and is unrecoverable: see Explanatory Note 221: 'The creditor may not make a claim against the keeper ... for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued (para 4(5))'. Late fees (unknown to drivers, not specified on signs) are not 'unpaid parking related charges'. They are the invention of 'no win no fee' DRAs. Even in the (unlikely) event that the Claimant complied with the POFA and CoP, there is no keeper liability law for DRA fees.

10. This claim is an utter waste of court resources and it is an indication of systemic abuse that parking cases now make up a third of all small claims. False fees fuel bulk litigation that has overburdened HMCTS. The most common outcome of defended cases is late discontinuance, making Claimants liable for costs (r.38.6(1)). Whilst this does not 'normally' apply to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)) the White Book has this annotation: 'Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))'.

Apologises at being awful at this, if I have messed up again

Le_Kirk

You need to submit a defence before 16.00 today.  Have you checked that your text will fit in the MCOL box?  If it won't you can lose paragraph #10.

IhateFines

Le_Kirk said:

You need to submit a defence before 16.00 today.  Have you checked that your text will fit in the MCOL box?  If it won't you can lose paragraph #10.

Defence will be sent via email since MCOL login does not work, spoke to court staff who said MCOL is having issues and best to send defence via email.

IhateFines

1. The Claimant’s sparse case lacks specificity and does not comply with CPR 16.4, 16PD3 or 16PD7, failing to 'state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action'. The added costs/damages are an attempt at double recovery of capped legal fees (already listed in the claim) and are not monies genuinely owed to, or incurred by, this Claimant. The claim also exceeds the Code of Practice (CoP) £100 parking charge ('PC') maximum. Exaggerated claims for impermissible sums are good reason for the court to intervene. Whilst the Defendant reserves the right to amend the defence if details of the contract are provided, the court is invited to strike out the claim using its powers under CPR 3.4.

2. The allegation(s) and heads of cost are vague and liability is denied for the sum claimed, or at all. At the very least, interest should be disallowed; the delay in bringing proceedings lies with the Claimant. This also makes retrieving material documents/evidence difficult, which is highly prejudicial. The Defendant seeks fixed costs (CPR 27.14) and a finding of unreasonable conduct and further costs (CPR 46.5). The Defendant has little recollection of events, save as set out below and to admit that they were the registered keeper.

3. With regards to the POC in question, two recent persuasive appeal judgments in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) and Car Park Management Service Ltd v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the Chan case, HHJ Murch held: 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and the Defendant trusts that the Court should strike out the extant claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. The second recent persuasive appeal judgment also held that typical private parking case POC (like this) fail to comply with Part 16. On the 10 May 2024, in CPMS v Akande, HHJ Evans held: 'Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim'."

(i) The POC does not state the postcode or location where the defendant’s vehicle was parked on DATE and DATE. The Defendant is not indebted to the Claimant. The Claimant is put to strict proof of all of their allegations in the event that the allocating Judge does not strike out the claim pursuant to the above two authorities. The POC must be struck out as it talks about one or more locations;

(ii) The POC makes no specification as to the amount of PCN's which have been issued and the date of each PCN alongside the location, merely the POC vaguely states PCN's issued between 27/06/2024 and 01/07/2024, it would seem like 7 PCN's have been issued within a 5 day time frame which seems impossible. The POC states the Claimant intends to claim interest from 26/06/2024 despite the POC stating PCN's were issued on the 27/06/2024. 

(iii) The POC fails to specify any 'relevant obligation' or 'relevant contract', nor do they even state what the supposed 'term' was or how the driver allegedly breached it. The Defendant has residents' rights to peaceful enjoyment of the property does not include allowing everyone to be unfairly charged by a lurking ex-wheelclamper for attending to normal life necessities like parking to unload groceries or setting down passengers, etc.  Clearly there is no 'legitimate interest' supporting these enhanced parking charges in these circumstances, where an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant permitting the above mentioned vehicle to be parked by the current occupier as a leaseholder of HOME ADDRESS, whose leaseholder agreement permits the parking of vehicle(s) on land. Defendant has email dated 09/07/2024 from building management explicitly stating PCN's would be cancelled. 

(iv) The Defendant avers that there was an absolute entitlement to park deriving from the terms of the lease, which cannot be fettered by any alleged parking terms. The lease terms provide the right to park a vehicle in the relevant parking area, without limitation as to type of vehicle, ownership of vehicle, the user of the vehicle. A copy of the leasehold agreement will be provided to the Court, together with witness evidence that prior permission to park had been given. As established in Kettel & Ors v Bloomfold Ltd [2012] EWHC 1422 (Ch), leaseholders are entitled to the quiet enjoyment of their demised premises, including allocated parking spaces. Any purported terms imposed by the Claimant are void as they attempt to override pre-existing superior rights.

(v) The Defendant avers that the operator’s signs cannot (i) override the existing rights enjoyed by residents and their visitors and (ii) that parking easements cannot retrospectively and unilaterally be restricted where provided for within the lease. The Defendant will rely upon the judgments on appeal of HHJ Harris QC in Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (2016) and of Sir Christopher Slade in K-Sultana Saeed v Plustrade Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2011. The Court will be referred to further similar fact cases in the event that this matter proceeds to trial.

4. It is neither admitted nor denied that a term was breached but to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, and valuable consideration (absent in this case). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (s71) mandates a 'test of fairness' duty on Courts and sets a high bar for prominence of terms and 'consumer notices'. Paying regard to Sch2 (examples 6, 10, 14 & 18), also s62 and the duties of fair, open dealing/good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant reportedly uses unclear (unfair) terms/notices. On the limited information given, this case looks no different. The Claimant is put to strict proof with contemporaneous photographs.

5. DVLA keeper data is only supplied on the basis of prior written landowner authority. The Claimant (an agent) is put to strict proof of their standing to sue and the terms, scope and dates of the landowner agreement, including the contract, updates, schedules and a map of the site boundary set by the landowner (not an unverified Google Maps aerial view).

6. To impose a PC, as well as a breach, there must be: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.

7. Attention is drawn to (i) paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of  Beavis (an £85 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner) and also to (ii) the binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419-428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter-chain and 'would appear to be penal'.

8. The Parking (Code of Practice) Act will curb rogue conduct by operators and their debt recovery agents (DRAs). The Government recently launched a Public Consultation considered likely to bring in a ban on DRA fees, which a 2022 Minister called ‘extorting money from motorists’. They have identified in July 2025: 'profit being made by DRAs is significantly higher than ... by parking operators' and 'the high profits may be indicative of these firms having too much control over the market, thereby indicating that there is a market failure'.

9. Pursuant to Sch4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('POFA') the claim exceeds the maximum sum and is unrecoverable: see Explanatory Note 221: 'The creditor may not make a claim against the keeper ... for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued (para 4(5))'. Late fees (unknown to drivers, not specified on signs) are not 'unpaid parking related charges'. They are the invention of 'no win no fee' DRAs. Even in the (unlikely) event that the Claimant complied with the POFA and CoP, there is no keeper liability law for DRA fees.

10. This claim is an utter waste of court resources and it is an indication of systemic abuse that parking cases now make up a third of all small claims. False fees fuel bulk litigation that has overburdened HMCTS. The most common outcome of defended cases is late discontinuance, making Claimants liable for costs (r.38.6(1)). Whilst this does not 'normally' apply to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)) the White Book has this annotation: 'Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))'.

IhateFines

Since defence is being sent via email, would it need to be signed

Coupon-mad

IhateFines said:

Since defence is being sent via email, would it need to be signed

Yes signed & dated under a statement of truth. Did you do it today?