Horizon/Gladstone Witness Statement (Case Dismissed)

Coupon-mad

"Coupon-mad You are absolutely spot on! It is (Removed by Forum Team) indeed."

That's not what I asked…I also added:

(if so, look carefully … tell me … DOES THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LOOK LIKE 'DAVIES'?).

Your WS wording looks fine.

Make sure you add what I suggested and where you talk about the NTK being non-POFA, state that Horizon opted never to use the POFA 2012 until 2025. Their notices were always 'driver liability only', as Horizon were one of a few parking firms which chose not to be constricted by the wording and timeline requirements of Schedule 4. Which is allowed by the DVLA but it does not ever give such an operator the right to pursue the keeper. As such, (Removed by Forum Team) has misled the court.

JackR1

Many thanks! I will make sure to include it.

Apologies regarding the signature. I did not fully comprehend the question (not sure if I do now either 😊). This is the signature on the bottom of the Witness Statement, I guess it very well could say (Removed by Forum Team)?!

[Image removed by Forum Team]

Coupon-mad

Yes it is.

I was just checking because I heard that Gladstones had a case in court 2 days ago that just cost them nearly £7000 in costs - all of which went to charity - which I will post about separately when I see the whole story written down.

It included shenanigans with a supposed (Removed by Forum Team) new WS which was in fact an old WS with an older date and a paralegal assistant's signature. Gs tried the excuse that it was an admin error. Tip for Gladstones: discontinue next time you slip up. Don't try games like that when up against a solicitor!

😃

JackR1

Full Witness Statement Draft below. Between my inexperience and me trying to rewrite some parts in my own words, it took me a lot longer than anticipated. :(

I am XXX of XXX, and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

2. In my statement I shall refer to exhibits within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. I am a litigant in person with no formal legal training. I have done my best to present my case and evidence clearly and truthfully, and I respectfully ask the court to take this into account. My defence is repeated, and I will say as follows:

Defective Particulars of Claim

3. The Claimant’s case is vague, lacking the detail required under Civil Procedure Rule (CPR) 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, which require a claimant to set out all facts necessary to establish a complete cause of action. The Particulars of Claim (POC) simply allege that “the driver of the vehicle with registration XXX parked in breach of the terms of parking stipulated on the signage”. However, the Claimant provides no information on the specific terms said to have been breached, the conduct that allegedly broke those terms, or how any contract was formed. This absence of essential detail fails to justify the claim and has also made it difficult for me to respond to it effectively.

4. I draw to the attention of the Judge that there are numerous recent and persuasive Appeal judgments to support dismissing or striking out this claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims. The POC seen here are far worse than the one seen on the below Appeals).

5. The first persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POCs fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that “the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract”. (Exhibit OW-01)

6. The second recent persuasive appeal judgment in Car Park Management Services (CPMS) Ltd. v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) would also indicate the POCs fail to comply with Part 16. On 10th May 2024, in the cited case, HHJ Evans held that “Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim”. (Exhibit OW-02)

7. Taking the above paragraphs 3 to 6 into consideration, I find the Claimant’s accusation in paragraph 25 of their Witness Statement baffling, stating that the Defendant "…does not positively deny that the vehicle was parked at the Site for longer than the clearly advertised maximum stay, and advances no coherent alternative explanation consistent with the contemporaneous photographic and ANPR evidence of the overstay."

8. Given that the driver has never been identified, AND the fact that the deliberate vague/generic wording in the POC is not actually pleading ‘overstay’, how can I possibly be criticised for not responding to a new allegation that has only now been brought forward by the Claimant in their Witness Statement.

The Claimants Authority to Issue Parking Charges

9. DVLA keeper data is only supplied on the basis of prior written landowner authority. The Claimant (an agent) is put to strict proof of their standing to sue and the terms, scope and dates of the landowner agreement, including the contract, updates, schedules and a map of the site boundary set by the landowner (not an unverified Google Maps aerial view). The Claimant has provided no evidence to prove landowner authority.

No Valid Contract Formed

10. It is neither admitted nor denied that any contract term was breached. However, for a valid contract to be formed, there must be an offer, acceptance, and something of value given in return — which was not present here. Under section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Court must apply a 'test of fairness' and this requires contract terms and any “consumer notices” to be clear and prominent.

Looking at Schedule 2 (examples 6, 10, 14, and 18) and section 62, which require fair, open dealing and good faith, the Defendant notes that this Claimant is known to use unclear and potentially unfair terms and notices. Based on the limited information provided in this case, the situation appears to be similar. The Claimant is therefore required to strictly prove their case with contemporaneous photographs. (Exhibit OW‑03)

11. None of the Claimant’s site photographs (Exhibit GS-1) display readable terms and conditions, preventing the court from verifying what contractual terms were offered to motorists. Instead, the Claimant relies on a digital stock image of a sign, which does not evidence that this version of the sign—or the specific terms and conditions shown on that stock image—were displayed at the site on 6 April 2024.

12. I would also like to draw the attention of the Judge to the Claimant’s photographs on page 11 and page 13 of their Witness Statement (Exhibit GS-1). These pictures clearly show that two different sign versions are erected on the site. No evidence has been supplied regarding the second sign or its contractual wording. This omission is fatal to the Claimant’s assertion that unambiguous terms were available and capable of forming a contract.

13. The Claimant has provided a Signage Location Plan (Exhibit GS-2) purporting to show all signage locations on site. However, this plan is demonstrably both inaccurate and misleading.

14. The map indicates signage in two particular locations where the Claimant's own photographic evidence on page 13 (Exhibit GS-1) show no signs present at those locations. One of these signs is at the site entry point used by the driver of the defendant’s vehicle as seen on the images in Exhibit GS-3. I revisited the site and my photographs of the site’s approach and entrance (Exhibit OW-04) corroborate that the sign shown on the Claimant’s map as being at that entrance remains absent. I have also included a screenshot from Google Maps Streetview dated July 2024 which shows the same site entry point and the absence of any signage at that location (Exhibit OW-05).

15. Conversely, the sign visible on the right-hand side of the image on page 11 and both signs shown in the image on page 13 (Exhibit GS‑1) do not appear anywhere on the Claimant’s Signage Location Plan. These inconsistencies call into question the reliability and accuracy of the entire site plan (Exhibit GS‑3) submitted by the Claimant.

16. The absence of any signage at the site approach and entrance used by the driver of the Defendant’s vehicle is particularly significant. Under Sections 62–68 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (Exhibit OW-06), contractual terms must be fair, transparent, and prominently displayed. Additionally, as a member of the British Parking Association (BPA), the Claimant is contractually obliged to comply with the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice (BPA/IPC Joint Code). Paragraph 3.1.1 of this Code states: “An entrance sign must be displayed and maintained at the entrance to controlled land to inform drivers as appropriate whether parking is permitted subject to terms and conditions, including payment, or is prohibited…” (Exhibit OW‑07).

17.Not only has the Claimant failed to comply with the applicable Code of Practice, but they have also misled the court by asserting that an entrance sign was present when it was not.

18. The misleading and inaccurate signage location plan (Exhibit GS‑3) raises serious concerns regarding the reliability of the Claimant’s evidence and their adherence to the required standards. Without clear, accurate, and consistent evidence demonstrating the location and visibility of contractual signage, the Claimant cannot prove that the terms were effectively communicated. As such, no contract could have been formed with the driver.

Keeper Liability and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA)

19. I confirm that I am the registered keeper of the vehicle with registration number XXX and deny any liability.

20. The Claimant states in paragraph 26 of their witness statement that they are pursuing the Defendant as “the contracting party and, in the alternative, on the evidential basis that, on the balance of probabilities, the Defendant was the driver." This assertion is both incorrect and unsupported.

21. Furthermore, this contradicts the claimant’s statement in paragraph 21 of their own Witness Statement that “The defendant is therefore pursued as the Registered Keeper of the Vehicle”.

22. The Defendant has never been identified as the driver, nor has any other person. The Claimant has provided no evidence whatsoever that the Defendant was driving at the time of the alleged breach. Only the driver—as the person who could have potentially seen and accepted any terms on the signage—could possibly be the contracting party.

23. The Claimant relies only on an assumption, claiming that an inference should be drawn because the Defendant has not nominated another driver. However, there is no legal requirement for a registered keeper to name a driver in a private parking matter, and no such presumption exists in law.

24. If the Claimant wishes to pursue the Defendant as the driver, the burden rests entirely on them to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Defendant was in fact driving. Mere speculation or assumption is not enough.

25. In April 2023, HHJ Gargan sitting at Teesside Combined Court (on appeal re-claim H0KF6C9C) held in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward (Exhibit OW-08) that a registered keeper cannot be assumed to have been driving. Nor could any adverse inference be drawn if a keeper is unable or unwilling (or indeed too late, post litigation) to nominate the driver, because the POFA does not invoke any such obligation. HHJ Gargan concluded at 35.2 and 35.3. "my decision preserves and respects the important general freedom from being required to give information, absent a legal duty upon you to do so; and it is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on the balance of probability they were driving on this occasion..." Mr Edward's appeal succeeded and the Claim was dismissed.

26. If, instead, the Claimant seeks to pursue the Defendant as the keeper, then they must meet the strict requirements of POFA 2012 (Schedule 4) to transfer liability from the unknown driver to me as the keeper. (Exhibit OW-09)

27. However, the Notice to Keeper (NTK) issued by the Claimant on 12th April 2024 (Exhibits GS-4 and OW-10) fails to comply with several mandatory requirements under Schedule 4 of the POFA 2012 (Exhibit OW-09): - The notice fails to provide any warning as stated in Paragraph 9(2)(f) regarding the transfer of liability to the keeper.
- The notice fails to comply with Paragraph 9(2)(i) that dictates that the date on which the notice is sent is specified (where it is sent by post).
- The notice also fails to state the date from which the mandatory 28-day period in Paragraph 9(2)(f) begins (or ends). This omission makes the legal timeframe indeterminate.

28. Accordingly, the Claimant has failed to comply with POFA and cannot transfer liability to me as keeper. There is therefore no lawful basis for this claim against me.

29. The fact that parking firms cannot invoke ‘keeper liability in case of non-compliance with POFA, has been tested on appeal in private parking cases including in the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court (Exhibit OW-11), on appeal re-claim number C0DP9C4E, HHJ Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable without the POFA. Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all). HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Excel could have used the POFA but did not. Excel's claim was dismissed.

30. The Claimant’s failure to comply with POFA 2012 is unsurprising, as it stems from their own longstanding decision not to adopt the requirements of Schedule 4 before early 2025. At the time of the alleged contravention, Horizon Parking’s notices—including the NTK issued to me (Exhibit OW‑10)—were deliberately issued on a driver‑liability‑only basis. The Claimant was among the small number of parking companies that chose not to use the statutory wording or follow the strict timelines required to establish keeper liability under Schedule 4. (Exhibit OW‑09)

31. In preparing my defence, I have conducted extensive research and identified dozens of Horizon Parking NTKs from publicly available sources, spanning many years. Without exception, all such notices were non‑POFA and asserted liability against the driver only (see examples in Exhibit OW-12). The earliest publicly identifiable example of Horizon issuing a POFA‑compliant Notice to Keeper appears to date from March 2025 (Exhibit OW-13)

32. Taken together, this body of evidence demonstrates the Claimant operated exclusively on a driver‑liability‑only model until at least early 2025. Their adoption of POFA‑compliant documentation appears to have begun only at some point during early 2025.

33. It is entirely the Claimant’s prerogative—and permitted by the DVLA—to choose not to comply with POFA 2012. However, a consequence of choosing not to be bound by the statutory wording and timescales of Schedule 4 is that keeper liability cannot arise. Where POFA is not complied with, liability (if any) remains solely with the unidentified driver. In this case, the Claimant has nevertheless suggested to the court that keeper liability applies, despite purposely issuing a non‑POFA notice. This is misleading and wholly inconsistent with their own established operating model at the time, and with the legal requirements of Schedule 4.

Inflated and Unlawful Charges

34. In accordance with Schedule 4, paragraph 4(5) of the POFA 2012, the Claimant is prohibited from recovering from the keeper any sum greater than the amount of the unpaid parking charges as they existed at the time the Notice to Driver was issued. The sum claimed in these proceedings exceeds that statutory maximum and is therefore unrecoverable from the keeper under POFA. (Exhibit OW-09)

35. Explanatory Note 221 to Schedule 4 confirms that a creditor “may not make a claim against the keeper of a vehicle for more than the amount of the unpaid parking related charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued.” Any added sums—such as “debt recovery fees”, “late fees”, or other invented add‑ons—are not “parking related charges” within the meaning of POFA. These additional amounts do not appear on signage, are not part of any contractual parking charge, and are created solely by third‑party debt recovery agents. POFA provides no legal basis to impose keeper liability for such DRA‑fabricated fees, even if (which is denied) the Claimant had otherwise complied with POFA’s conditions.

36. Also, the PCN on the Claimant’s own signage was £85 (Exhibit GS-1), whereas the Claimant claims £95 for the PCN in the POC. I understand that the Claimant now admits in their Witness Statement that this was an administrative error and has amended their claim to the initial amount of £85.

37. To impose a PC, as well as a breach, the Claimant most show two things: (i) a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond compensation for loss, and (ii) 'adequate notice' (prominence) of the PC and any relevant obligation(s). None of which have been demonstrated. This PC is a penalty arising as a result of a 'concealed pitfall or trap', poor signs and covert surveillance, thus it is fully distinguished from ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.

38. This Claimant continues to pursue a hugely disproportionate sum; it is denied that the quantum sought is recoverable, indeed it represents a penalty. Attention is drawn to paragraphs 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis (an £85 PC comfortably covered all letter chain costs and generated a profit shared with the landowner); the court should also read paragraph 3.4 of the original judgment by HHJ Moloney in Beavis, confirming what that authority means by 'costs of the operation'. (Exhibit OW-14)

39. The binding judgment in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) which remains unaffected by Beavis and stands as the only parking case law that deals with costs abuse. HHJ Hegarty held in paras 419-428 (High Court, later ratified by the CoA) that 'admin costs' inflating a £75 PC (already increased from £37.50) to £135 were disproportionate to the minor cost of an automated letter-chain and 'would appear to be penal'. (Exhibit OW-14) The court should note that HHJ Moloney referenced this case in Beavis.

40. In addition to this, the ‘additional charges’ constitutes a double recovery of capped legal fees (already listed in the claim) and are not monies genuinely owed to, or incurred by, this Claimant. The court is invited to find the quantum claimed is false and an abuse of process as found by HHJ Jackson in Excel v Wilkinson in which £60 had been added to a parking charge. (Exhibit OW-15)

41. Exaggerated claims for impermissible sums are good reason for the court to intervene. Following the beforementioned exaggerated costs and charges, the court is invited to strike out or dismiss the claim using its powers under CPR 3.4.

Conclusion

42. For all the reasons set out in this statement, the Claimant has failed to establish a valid cause of action. The Particulars of Claim do not meet the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules, fail to specify which contractual terms were allegedly breached, provide no details of the conduct said to amount to a breach, and give no explanation of how any contract was formed. This lack of essential information mirrors the defective pleadings repeatedly criticised and struck out in persuasive appeal authorities and has made it difficult to effectively and properly respond in one’s defence.

43. The Claimant has also failed to demonstrate that any contractual terms were prominently displayed, consistent, or capable of forming a binding agreement with the driver. The Claimant’s own evidence shows inconsistent signage, missing entrance signs, and an inaccurate or misleading site plan. Without clear, reliable, and contemporaneous evidence of the terms allegedly relied upon, no contract could have been accepted and no liability could arise.

44. Moreover, the Claimant has neither identified the driver nor complied with the strict statutory requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 necessary to pursue the registered keeper. The Claimant’s attempt to imply keeper liability despite issuing a non‑POFA Notice to Keeper is both legally unsound and inconsistent with their own operating model at the time.

45. The Claimant also seeks an inflated sum that includes unlawful and unrecoverable additions. These extra charges have been widely condemned in higher court decisions as disproportionate, penal, and an abuse of process. Such exaggeration further undermines the credibility and validity of the claim.

46. In light of the defective pleadings, non‑compliant notices, unreliable and misleading evidence, and exaggerated charges, I respectfully submit that this claim is without merit. I therefore invite the court to strike out or dismiss the claim in its entirety.

Unreasonable Conduct by Claimant(CPR 27.14(2)(g))

47. In the alternative to striking out the claim, I respectfully invite the Court to determine that the Claimant has behaved unreasonably within the meaning of CPR 27.14(2)(g). This Claimant is professionally represented by solicitors specialising in private parking litigation and therefore cannot claim ignorance of the statutory requirements governing their own industry. Despite knowing that their Notice to Keeper was expressly non‑POFA and incapable of creating keeper liability — consistent with their long‑standing driver‑liability‑only operating model — the Claimant nevertheless pursued keeper liability in their pleadings and witness statement. I also highlighted the non-POFA compliancy in both my defence and during the mandatory mediation This was a legally hopeless position that no reasonable litigant, let alone a professional parking operator with specialist legal representation, could have genuinely believed to be viable.

48. Further, the Claimant has submitted misleading evidence, including an inaccurate and demonstrably false “Signage Location Plan” purporting to show signage at the site entrance where no such sign existed. My contemporaneous photographs, site visit, and Google Street View imagery all confirm this omission. The Claimant’s own photographs also expose inconsistencies between the signage displayed on site and the signage relied upon in their evidence bundle. Such defects undermine the reliability of the Claimant’s entire evidential foundation and amount to conduct no reasonable claimant should display.

49. Additionally, the Claimant has advanced vague and defective Particulars of Claim that fail to disclose the alleged contractual terms, the conduct said to amount to a breach, or any cogent explanation of how a contract was formed. They have also inflated the claim with unlawful and unrecoverable additional sums, including a £70 “debt recovery” add‑on that has been repeatedly condemned in higher court authority as abusive and penal. The persistence in claiming such invented sums, contrary to POFA and contrary to binding authority, further demonstrates unreasonable conduct.

50. Taken collectively, the pursuit of a claim with no legal basis, reliance on contradictory and misleading evidence, failure to plead a coherent cause of action, and continued inflation of the claim with unlawful charges amount to conduct that “transcends mere negligence” and meets the high bar of unreasonableness established in CPR 27.14(2)(g). Should the Court agree, I seek my Litigant‑in‑Person costs for time reasonably spent researching, drafting and preparing my defence and witness evidence, in accordance with the applicable LiP rate.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Coupon-mad

Very good but that - with exhibits - will exceed 50 pages (court limit for emailed submissions), so the court will only accept it as a printed bundle.

Don't exhibit the 2024 applicable BPA CoP. Link it instead. Can you get this under 50 pages? Don't exhibit their images, for example, or the NTK if they already have.

Where you talk about the NTK being non-POFA, make it far more simple for the judge! Never mind the (arguably) missing dates, tell the court that it includes none of the mandatory wording from Sch 4 para 9, the most notable omission being 9(2)f.

Finally, given they have sent a WS, this can't be right, can it?

The Claimant has provided no evidence to prove landowner authority.

Something will be exhibited by them.

JackR1

Including the Exhibits it is currently 78 pages, so I might need to submit it as a printed bundle as will struggle to get it under 50 pages. It is the transcripts of the various judgments that is taking up the bulk of the pages… I have also included the various sections of the Consumer Rights Act 2025 I am referencing in WS. Do I really need to include those?

I have simplified the paragraph about the NTK being non-POFA as per your suggestion.

Regarding the Claimant's Landowner Authority, below are the paragraphs they included in their Witness Statement. They do indeed claim to act under a Landowner Agreement. However, as they claim it is not necessary to prove landowner's Authority in para 6, I kept the statement that they provided no evidence in…

The Claimants Authority to Issue Parking Charges

4. The Claimant is and was at all relevant times engaged in the management and enforcement of parking on private land, operating through various methods including warden patrols and ANPR systems

.5. The Claimant acts under the authority of a Landholder Agreement, which permits it to manage and enforce parking on the land and to issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) to vehicles parked in breach of the displayed Terms and Conditions. The agreement confirms the Claimant’s legitimate commercial interest and authority to issue PCNs and pursue proceedings in its own name.

6. The Claimant relies on One Parking Solution Ltd v Wilshaw [2021], which confirms that it is not necessary to prove the landowner’s authority to establish a valid cause of action, provided there is a binding contract between the Claimant and the Defendant through the site’s signage.

7. The Claimant is and was at all material times a member of an Accredited Trade Association (ATA), as evidenced by the ATA logo displayed on site signage and correspondence.

8. The Claimant is also a signatory to the DVLA’s Keeper at Date of Event (KADOE) agreement, allowing it to obtain registered keeper details under reasonable cause provisions when parking terms are breached.

JackR1

These are the exhibits I have included. Please do let me know what sections (if any) I can cut out… My schedule of losses (1 page) is also included in the bundle, so might be able to submit that separately if I am getting close to the 50 pages.

OW -01: Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan

OW -02: Car Park Management Services (CPMS) Ltd. v Akande

OW -03: Consumer Rights Act 2015, Section 62 and Section 71

OW -04: Defendant’s Photographs of Site Approach and Entrance

OW -05: Google Maps Street View Screenshot of Site Approach and Entrance

OW -06: Consumer Rights Act 2015, Section 62-68

OW -07: BPA Approved Operator Scheme Code of Practice Version 9 - February 2024

OW -08: Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Ian Edward

OW -09: Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA) – Schedule 4

OW -10: Initial Notice to Keeper (NTK) issued by Horizon on 12th April 2024

OW -11: Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith

OW -12: Numerous examples of NTKs issued by Horizon

OW -13: Horizon Parking Limited updated NTK from early 2025

OW -14: ParkingEye v Beavis

OW -15: ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores

OW - 16: Excel v Wilkinson

Coupon-mad

I have also included the various sections of the Consumer Rights Act 2025 I am referencing in WS. Do I really need to include those?

Nope. Just a single URL to the Act.

Also remove the BPA CoP and POFA and ParkingEye v Somerfeld; replace those with URLs.

Remove ALL the images of NTKs including the one in your case because they will have exhibited it already.

Are you sure there is no Exhibited Landowner Agreement?

The OPS v Wilshaw judge was very, poorly wrong, knew nothing about contract law (criminal law background only) and he was led up the garden path by a slick barrister. The decision was wrong on all counts. It was one of mine that I'd won at first instance but then I had very bad cataracts by the time it reached appeal hearing stage, so I couldn't help and their barrister walked all over a sound original decision.

HHJ Simpkiss ignored the BPA CoP and the KADOE rules, where the DVLA certainly require written landowner authority in every case.

The small claims process is embarrassing sometimes. That one was hopelessly incorrect but she couldn't afford the risk of taking her case to the Court of Appeal.

JackR1

Those adjustments to the Exhibits will certainly get me a long way towards the 50 page maximum.

There is no Exhibited Landowner agreement whatsoever. Gladstones' WS only includes the following Exhibits:

GS-1: Signage Photographs
GS-2: Signage Location Plan
GS-3: ANPR screenshots of vehicle entering and exiting the site
GS-4: Initial NTK from 12th April 2024
GS-5: Reminder notice from 12th May 2024

However, I only just noticed that the last two paragraphs regarding the landowner agreement did not copy in my earlier post (see below). It appears that they rely on the OPS v Wilshaw judgement and also claim that the landowner deems the agreement to be confidential and they are therefore not authorised to disclose it…

9. The Claimant provides, manages and enforces private parking at the land located at Rontec, Harlington, UB3 5AY (the ‘Site’).

10. The agreement between the landowner and the Claimant sets out, inter alia, the Claimant’s standing and rights to manage and enforce the regulations in situ at the site. The landowner is a well-established corporation who deem the agreement with the Claimant to be confidential and wish to avoid inadvertent wider circulation of the landowner agreement and/or the same being made available within the public domain. On this basis, the Claimant is not authorised to disclose the landowner agreement but confirms that such an agreement exists.

Not sure how to best respond / challenge this, in particular the OPS v Wilshaw judgement part. It's why I just left the statement that they did not provide any evidence to prove the landowner authority in my WS.

JackR1

Was just thinking of the following: GS does claim in para 6 that OPS v Wishaw states there is no need to provide the landowner agreement "provided there is a binding contract between the Claimant and the Defendant through the site’s signage."

However, as I already pointed out in para 12 of my WS, GS has not provided a single picture on which the terms and conditions offered on the signage is readable (other than a digital stock image which cannot be verified to have been on site on the date of the alleged offence). Would this not prevent the court from verifying the terms offered, also preventing them to verify landowner authority as per OPS v Wishaw?

Not sure if this reasoning makes any legal sense?