Court of Appeal Case VCS (Permission to appeal)

Coupon-mad

Umkomaas said:

Le_Kirk said:

Ye Gods, that was excruciating to listen to!

If you've never heard one before, the sound of a drowning man!

He sounded like someone was strangling him!

The writing was on the wall as soon as the CoA only wanted to hear from Mr Craggs. VCS were going to lose. He knew it, we knew it, Jackson Yamba knew it.

ParkingMad

Link to the Carr v VCS Court of Appeal judgment posted earlier by @ChirpyChicken and @doubledotcom

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2025/713

ParkingMad

Here is an analysis of the VCS v Carr judgment-

https://www.casemine.com/commentary/uk/“reason-to-believe”-and-appellate-deference-under-cpr-6.9:-a-commentary-on-carr-v-vehicle-control-services-ltd-2025-ewca-civ-713/view

Date: June 12 2025

“Reason to Believe” and Appellate Deference under CPR 6.9: A Commentary on Carr v Vehicle Control Services Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 713

1. Introduction

Carr v Vehicle Control Services Ltd (“Carr”) confronts two perennial problems in civil procedure: (i) when a claimant may safely serve a claim form at an address provided by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (“DVLA”) and (ii) the extremely limited circumstances in which an appellate court may overturn a trial judge’s factual findings.

The dispute arises from private-parking penalties issued to Mr Philip Carr by Vehicle Control Services Ltd (“VCS”). VCS issued proceedings in 2019 and obtained default judgment at the DVLA address. Four years later, Mr Carr succeeded before District Judge (“DJ”) Iyer in having the judgment set aside and the claim struck out, on the basis that the claim form was not properly served because VCS had reason to believe Mr Carr no longer lived at the DVLA address yet failed to take “reasonable steps” to ascertain his current address, as mandated by CPR 6.9(3). Her Honour Judge (“HHJ”) Evans reversed that ruling, finding that the DJ had misunderstood the evidence.

The Court of Appeal (Moylan, Phillips and Bean LJJ) restored DJ Iyer’s order. The judgment lays down a clear principle:

New Principle: Where there is any evidential basis on which a first-instance judge could reasonably conclude that CPR 6.9(3) was engaged, an appellate court must not interfere with that finding unless it discloses a Henderson-type error (no evidential foundation, misdirection, or perverse conclusion). Telephone calls suggesting the defendant’s tenancy at a different address can constitute “reason to believe” under CPR 6.9(3), and claimants who do not then take reasonable steps risk invalid service and expiry of the claim form under CPR 7.5.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court of Appeal allowed Mr Carr’s second appeal, setting aside HHJ Evans’ order and reinstating DJ Iyer’s decision.
• Key holding: HHJ Evans misapplied the Henderson v Foxworth test by re-evaluating primary facts that were open to the DJ on the evidence.
• Crucial facts: Two recorded phone calls in 2018 from Mr Carr to VCS indicated he was a tenant at the parking site (“the Premises”), implying residence there, not at the DVLA address. Non-response to correspondence further put VCS “on notice.”
• Legal consequence: CPR 6.9(3) triggered—VCS had to take reasonable steps to discover Mr Carr’s current residence. They did not. Service was invalid; the claim form expired; default judgment was rightly set aside and the claim struck out.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

a) Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600

• Sets out the modern test: an appellate court may interfere with factual findings only where there is a material error of law, no evidential basis, or a plainly unreasonable conclusion.
• Adopted by Moylan LJ as the governing standard. The DJ’s finding that the calls gave VCS reason to believe the address was wrong had an evidential foundation, so Henderson barred interference.

b) Re R (Children) [2016] AC 76

• Supreme Court emphasised respect for trial judges’ evaluations where correct legal principles applied.
• Cited to underscore that a fact-sensitive evaluation (here, “reason to believe”) is not generally revisitable.

c) CPR 6.9 & CPR 7.5 — Statutory Framework

• Rule 6.9(3): once a claimant has reason to believe a defendant no longer lives at the last known address, they must take reasonable steps to ascertain the current address.
• Rule 7.5: claim form must be validly served within four months of issue.

While not strictly “precedents,” these rules function as the primary legal yardsticks.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Identification of the true appeal point. The CoA confined itself to whether HHJ Evans respected the Henderson restraint. She did not; she recast factual findings without a permissible basis.
2. Assessment of the DJ’s factual findings. Moylan LJ read DJ Iyer’s judgment as:
   • Finding that at least one phone call expressly asserted tenancy at the Premises;
   • Reading the second call, which referenced a letter from the “client,” as necessarily implying tenancy;
   • Adding the complete absence of response to correspondence to form a composite basis for “reason to believe.”
   The Court thought these were rational; the evidence “plainly supportable.”
3. No material misdirection. HHJ Evans inferred DJ Iyer believed tenancy had been mentioned in both calls. The transcript did not prove that misapprehension. Even if it had, the first call alone sufficed.
4. Consequential application of CPR 6.9(3). Once notice arose, VCS had to take “reasonable steps,” such as a simple inquiry to the landlord/managing agent. Failure to do so rendered service invalid. The claim form therefore expired automatically by virtue of CPR 7.5(1).
5. Disposal. HHJ Evans’ order reversed; DJ Iyer’s struck-out claim and set-aside default judgment restored.

3.3 Potential Impact

The decision’s ramifications are two-fold.

(i) Civil Procedure — Service of Process

• Low evidential threshold for CPR 6.9(3): Even informal, unsworn communications (phone calls, emails, social-media messages) can trigger a duty to investigate further.
• Higher diligence for volume litigants: Parking companies, debt-collection agencies and other mass claimants can no longer rely solely on DVLA or credit-file addresses when faced with contradictory information.
• Expiry risk emphasised: Once service is defective, the claim form’s four-month life continues to run; if it expires there is no second bite without a fresh claim or relief under CPR 7.6 (which may be unavailable).

(ii) Appellate Practice

• Re-affirmation of Henderson:The Court of Appeal’s warning is unequivocal—appellate interference with factual findings remains exceptional. Even a first-instance judge’s terse judgment that lacks exhaustive detail is immune so long as the critical conclusion was open on the evidence.
• Scope for second appeals: Andrews LJ’s grant of permission under s.13(6) Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 shows that “compelling reason” can turn on fairness where a party loses a just victory due to appellate overreach.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Default Judgment: A binding judgment entered when a defendant fails to file an acknowledgment of service or a defence within prescribed time limits.
• Service of the Claim Form:The formal delivery of court proceedings to the defendant, starting the litigation timetable. Service must comply strictly with CPR Part 6.
• “Last Known Residence” vs “Current Residence”: Under CPR 6.9, a claimant may serve at the defendant’s “usual or last known” address, unless they have reason to believe that the defendant no longer lives there.
• “Reason to Believe”: Not certainty, but any information that would cause a reasonable person to doubt the accuracy of the address (e.g., phone call, returned letters, social-media posts).
• Reasonable Steps: Proportionate efforts—writing to known contacts, landlord inquiries, electronic searches—to find the defendant’s current address or to seek alternative service under CPR 6.15.
• Henderson Principle: An appellate court will not reevaluate factual findings unless no reasonable judge could have reached them, or the judge made a demonstrable error in law or fact.
• Strike-Out on Expiry (CPR 7.5): If service is invalid and four months elapse from issue, the claim form lapses automatically; the court has no jurisdiction unless special relief is obtained.

5. Conclusion

Carr v Vehicle Control Services Ltd cements two propositions. First, CPR 6.9 imposes a genuine investigative burden once the claimant possesses any evidence that the defendant may have moved. Second, appellate courts must resist the temptation to recast factual determinations absent a Henderson-level error. For mass-litigation claimants, the case is a stark reminder: procedural shortcuts may jeopardise entire claims. For appellate judges, it re-asserts disciplined deference to first-instance fact-finding. The judgment therefore serves as an authoritative roadmap both for serving proceedings and for navigating the narrow straits of appellate review.

Umkomaas

Thanks for that @ParkingMad - clearly sets out how things should be (although I suspect SRS won't believe it applies to him!).