Parking Eye LTD Witness Statement - Another one bites the dust

Coupon-mad

What happened? The proper email address is there to be copied & pasted (not free typed which is asking for trouble).

Just complain that you did send it to the right email address and act dumb.  Let them work it out.

YoungDriver123

Hello Everyone, 
Quick update - I had the the Court set aside by sending the email back to them and they took a while to have this set aside. I now been giving a quick court date. I submitted a defence however never received a defence from the solicitors which i complained about to the Court. I'm now going to send an updated defence letter because it's only now the claimant Parking Control Management are saying i paid for a period of the stay but i didn't pay for the entire time which is BS they never mentioned prior in any of the letters! 

I'd like to give my heartfelt thanks for everyone that helped out previously! Also, please spread the word that you can have your no defence sent set aside if you send them proof of the acknowledgement letter with the date you received this. Judge was able to set aside! Not sure if that helps fellow people here.

Gr1pr

Claimants do not send defences,  defendants do  !

What exact stage are you at now  ?

Is your local civil court involved now  ?

Presumably you have submitted or will be submitting a defence to the CNBC   (or is it now with your local civil court  ?  )

Do you have a court date   ?

YoungDriver123

Hello, 

The claimant sent a witness statement which i only received this week. My court date is first week of April 2025 (is it okay to mention this on here) so not far at all and it contains information that is new to me. 
I submitted a defence to the CNBC and want to send an updated one based on the facts. I'm sending this through shortly. 

Gr1pr

You failed to answer all of the questions 

If your local civil court is involved then the CNBC lost interest in it last year,  months ago, they are no longer involved 

The court order with the hearing date on it tells both parties the deadline for submitting the witness statement plus Exhibits bundle to both parties,  solicitors and local court,  so if you have received the witness statement bundle from the solicitors then your deadline is imminent or already passed  (only you submitted your defence last year, they dont   )

I suggest that you answer the questions,  get your WS bundle done and emailed to both parties ASAP 

The WS stage deadline is typically 2 weeks before the hearing,  but check your court order  ( the letter with the venue and hearing date on it  )

You cannot submit a new defence 

Hint, if you require good advice,  helping us to help you is extremely important,  so better information,  not cagey replies 

Thank you 

Coupon-mad

YoungDriver123 said:

Hello, 

The claimant sent a witness statement which i only received this week. My court date is first week of April 2025 (is it okay to mention this on here) so not far at all and it contains information that is new to me. 
I submitted a defence to the CNBC and want to send an updated one based on the facts. I'm sending this through shortly. 

No you don't!

You are at witness Statement and evidence stage. Both parties had the same deadline in the hearing order to supply WS & evidence.

They've complied. You haven't yet.

Read examples in threads by: 

@Harry77

@imulsion

And did you miss that the NEWBIES thread (2nd post) tells you all about WS stage and I list your (likely) exhibits for you there?  It's all explained.

YoungDriver123

Hello, Apologises if i offended GR1PR and Coupon- Mad! 
I've done extensive research of various case laws and threads and found some references in case law. Please forgive me in advance if i made a mistake i spent all day trying to put this together so would appreciate any feedback. I'm going to the location of the alleged contravention around midnight which is similar to the time of the event to showcase the sparse signage and lack of light for the evidence. 
My friend will also write a confirmation that he was present during this event and agrees to the events. 

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

1. I am XXXXX, and I am the Defendant against whom this Claim is made. The facts

below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based on my

own knowledge.

2. In my Statement I shall refer to Exhibits 01-05 within the evidence supplied with this

Statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My Defence is

repeated, and I will say as follows:

Preliminary matter: 

The Claim should be struck out

3. I draw to the attention of the Judge that there are two very recent and persuasive

Appeal judgements to support dismissing or striking out the Claim. I believe that

dismissing this meritless Claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in

mind. Bulk litigators should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply

with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic, auto-fill,

unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike

out their claims using powers pursuant to CPR 3.4., based on the following persuasive

authorities (I append transcripts of both – plus multiple area court ‘strike outs’ of

parking claims that reflect those authorities – in Exhibits 01-03).

4. The first recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan

(Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the Particulars of Claim fails to comply with Civil

Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th of August

2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that “the particulars of the claim as filed and

served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon

which the Claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract”. (See

Exhibit 01.)

5. The second recent persuasive appeal judgment in Car Park Management Service Ltd.

v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) would also indicate the POC fails to comply with Part 16.

On the 10th of May 2024, in the cited case, HHJ Evans held that “Particulars of Claim

have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her

claim”. (See Exhibit 02.)

6. I believe the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the

CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs.

The specifics of this case lack clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to

indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached.

Facts and Sequence of events.

1. The defendant visited the Crowne Plaza London Docklands car park on 14th of October 2023, the purpose of arriving at this area was to aid the defendants friend in moving flat pack furniture, and suitcases to their newly rented apartment.  I entered the car park around 00:00 AM. 

2. The defendant notes that the signage was inadequate around the venue with no lights near the sparsely located signs. Causing the defendant especially during the late night to struggle to read the signage 

3. At the time of the alleged breaches, the Defendant briefly entered and I approached a parking attendant. I informed him that the parking lot was far from our destination. The attendant advised that I could pay for my parking immediately, then move my car and come back. I specifically asked if my parking time would start upon my return, and he confirmed that it would. I relied on this clear verbal instruction in proceeding with the payment and subsequent actions. Relying on his clear instruction—and under the principle of estoppel—I proceeded with the payment and acted in accordance with his directions. 

4. Following driving out of the parking lot the defendant drove out the parking lot to the apartment in order to aid in moving the vehicle right after paying. Once finished packing and moving, which amounted to roughly 1hr and 30 minutes the defendant drove back to the parking as agreed with the attendant.

Poor signage and no consent

1. The Claimant pursues a claim for non-payment of parking charges. However, The Defendant paid £6 believing, in good faith, that the posted signage offering "1–4 hours for £6" meant they had paid correctly for their stay. The signage was tall, difficult to interpret in the dark, and lacked any clear reference to an hourly structure that would imply a need to top-up. The sign actually stated "1-4 hours for £6 per hour" which the Defendant could not interpretate clearly

2. (Exhibit 3) is proof of payment from the Defendant.

3. The Defendant did not receive any correspondence indicating underpayment until 10 March 2025, three years after the alleged event and shortly before the scheduled hearing. The long silence, followed by sudden escalation, is procedurally unfair and prejudicial to the Defendant’s ability to defend the claim.

4. The clarity and prominence of parking signage are crucial in establishing a contract between the driver and the parking operator. In Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106, the Court of Appeal held that a motorist is not deemed to have consented to the risk of clamping (or, by extension, parking charges) if the signage was not sufficiently clear and prominent to have been seen and understood. ​

5. In Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106, it was held that a motorist cannot be bound by terms they did not see or understand. The signage was ambiguous, high up, and did not provide clear notice of a £100 penalty or hourly escalation. The Defendant's payment of £6 confirms a clear attempt to comply with displayed terms as they were understood.

6. The Defendant was only made aware that the Claimant is allegeding underpayment when reading the Witness Statement on the 7th of March 2025.

7. The alleged terms were not prominent and failed the test of transparency and fairness as required by the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Section 62 prohibits unfair terms, and Section 71 obliges the Court to consider this even if not raised by the Defendant.

Doctrine of estoppel: 

1. The Defendant sought and received verbal confirmation from an on-site parking officer or staff member during the visit, who confirmed that parking was allowed. The Claimant is estopped from enforcing this charge based on the doctrine of estoppel by representation, having given an assurance upon which the Defendant relied to their detriment. 

2. Assurance from an Officer: If a parking attendant or official gave you permission to park, the principle of estoppel could prevent the parking operator from enforcing the charge. This principle was discussed in the Arthur v Anker case (Exhibit 4), where consent played a pivotal role. ​

Hearsay Evidence

1. The facts in this WS come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief. Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste and sparse witness statement of the case. The PoC is devoid of any detail and even lacks specific breach allegations, making it very difficult to respond. 

2. The Claimants 'witness' is a legal assistant employed by the claimant’s solicitors and has no direct knowledge of the actual events that form the basis of the claim. Any evidence provided by this individual is second-hand, supposedly relying entirely on information supplied by the claimant, and thus cannot carry the same weight as testimony from someone who witnessed or was directly involved in the incident.

3. While the Civil Evidence Act 1995 allows hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, it is required to be given less weight, especially when it comes from someone with no firsthand knowledge. Furthermore, under CPR 32.2, the court has the discretion to exclude hearsay evidence when it is of limited probative value. In this case, the witness provides only second-hand information from the claimant and cannot be considered reliable or probative.

4.  The claimant's Witness Statement (WS) fails to comply with CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.2, as it does not clearly distinguish between what the witness knows firsthand and what has been provided to them by others. It is evident that the individual providing the statement, being a legal assistant with no direct involvement in the events, relies on information provided by their client and lacks personal knowledge of the facts. As a result, this statement amounts to hearsay, which weakens its credibility. Further, the claimant's witness has failed to indicate the source of any information and belief, as required under PD 32.18.2.

5. The paralegal 'witness' does not work for the Claimants company and therefore has no role in the operations, policies, or specific events regarding the parking charge or this case. This distance from the Claimants company further undermines their ability to give a credible account of the facts.

6. The claimant's WS is written in the third person, which is inappropriate for a witness statement. A WS should represent the personal account of the witness and should be written in the first person, as per CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.1, which requires a witness to state their evidence clearly, in their own words.

YoungDriver123

Excessive Charges and Distinguishing Beavis 

1. The £297 sum is excessive and punitive. In ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, the charge (£85) was upheld because it was prominent and the court found a "legitimate interest". That is not the case here. There was no compelling interest served by this charge, especially where a fee was paid and no obstruction or overstay took place in bad faith.

2. Lack of Legitimate Interest - The parking operator must demonstrate a legitimate interest in enforcing the charge beyond mere compensation. Given that you paid £6, believing it covered the parking duration, and the charge is significantly higher than the original fee, the operator's legitimate interest could be questioned.​

3. In ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2011] EWHC 4023 (QB), a charge inflated to £135 for admin costs was found to be penal. The £297 in this claim—more than triple the original parking charge—exceeds any reasonable pre-estimate of loss and duplicates costs contrary to CPR rules.

4. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) Impact Assessment (2023) states that the actual pre-action costs per case are estimated at just £8.42. The additional £70–£100 "debt recovery" fee is not a genuine cost and should be struck out.

5. The Competition & Markets Authority’s guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3) also condemns inflated default charges and hidden terms as unfair contract terms.Despite legal challenges delay the Code’s implementation (marking it as temporarily, “withdrawn” as shown in the link above) a draft Impact Assessment (IA) to finalise the DLUHC Code was recently published on the 30th of July 2023, which has exposed some industry-gleaned facts about supposed “debt fees”. This is revealed in the Government’s analysis, found here:

6. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

7. The new draft IA now demonstrates that the unnecessarily intimidating stage of pre-action letter-chains costs “eight times less” (says the DLUHC analysis) than the price fixed £70 per PCN routinely added. This has caused consumer harm in the form of hundreds of thousands of inflated CCJs each year that District Judges have been powerless to prevent.  This abusively enhanced “industry standard” Debt Fee was enabled only by virtue of the self-serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies, influenced by a Board of parking operators and their debt firms who stood to gain from it.

8. In support of my contention that the sum sought is unconscionably exaggerated and thus unrecoverable, attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis. Also, ParkingEye Ltd. v Somerfield Stores Ltd. ChD [2011] EWHC4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified “admin costs” inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of a template letter and “would appear to be penal”.

9. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the full parking charge (after expiry of discount) is already high and more than covers what the Supreme Court called an “automated-letter-chain” business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters in total, including pre-action phase b reminders. The £85 parking charge was held to cover the “costs of the operation” and the DLUHC’s IA suggests it should still be the case that the parking charge itself more than covers the minor costs of pre-action stage, even if and when the Government reduces the level of parking charges.

10. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry, and it stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes. The DLUHC’s Secretary of State mentions they are addressing “market failure” more than once in the draft IA, a phrase which should be a clear steer for Courts in 2024 to scrutinise every aspect of claims like this one. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 Paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“the POFA”), the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable It is also disproportionate and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (the CRA).

CRA breaches

1. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the CRA which introduced new requirements for “prominence” of both contract terms and “consumer notices”. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of signage, and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer. 

2. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well- placed (and lit in hours of dusk/darkness) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear. 

3. The CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean that there has to be a finding of bad faith). 

4. Now for the first time, the DLUHC’s draft IA exposes that the template “debt chaser” stage costs less than £9. This shows that HHJ Jackson was right all along in Excel vWilkinson. (See Exhibit 05.)

ANPR Accuracy and Technological reliance  

1. The Defendant questions the reliability and accuracy of the Claimant’s ANPR system. Despite the claim that the system uses NTP server technology for time synchronization, the Defendant requests proof of the system’s calibration and maintenance records immediately preceding and following the date of the alleged infringement. This is to ensure that any technical malfunctions or inaccuracies did not misrepresent the duration the vehicle was parked. 

2. The Defendant raises concerns regarding the Claimant’s reliance on technological systems for enforcement actions. There is a need for evidence proving consistent compliance with the British Parking Association’s Code of Practice in terms of regular checks and maintenance of the ANPR technology. Failure to provide such evidence undermines the reliability of the data used to impose the parking charge.

3. The Claimant’s ANPR evidence does not distinguish between multiple entries and exits. It records only duration between first entry and final exit—thus misrepresenting the actual circumstances and mischaracterising the Defendant’s actions. The car was not parked continuously for the claimed period

No Standing / No contract with Claimant

1. The Claimant is put to strict proof of standing. The DVLA only provides keeper data on the condition that the private parking company holds written landowner authority. No such evidence has been provided.

2. In many similar cases, such as Excel Parking Services v Lamoureux (Skipton, 2018, unreported), the court found against the parking company where no landowner contract was produced.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the Claimant has failed to provide clear evidence that a contract was

formed, nor has it shown that the parking charge notices were validly issued. The lack

of adequate signage and the unlawful nature of the additional charges further

invalidate the Claim. The Claimant’s attempt to impose liability for these inflated

charges is unsupported by both statutory law and leading case precedents. I ask the

court to dismiss the Claim and award appropriate costs for the time and effort

expended in defending against these unjust claims.

33. I ask the Judge to read the persuasive Judgement from His Honour Judge Murch

(August 2023) in the Civil Enforcement Ltd. v Chan case, and deliver the same

outcome given this Claimant has submitted a similarly vague POC. It is worth noting

that in that case the POC, while still ambiguous, did contain a subtle indication of the

alleged contravention, specifically regarding the duration of the parking on the

premises. In contrast, the POC in this case lacks even a minimal effort to hint at the

nature of the alleged violation. In the Civil Enforcement Ltd. v Chan case, full costs

were awarded to the motorist and the claim was struck out.

34. There is now ample evidence to support the view – long held by many District Judges

– that these are knowingly inflated claims. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis surely

makes that clear, because it is now a matter of record that the industry has told the

Government that “debt recovery” costs eight times less than they have been claiming

in almost every case. For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage

of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims continue to flood the courts unabated,

is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of the intimidating pre-action demands. I strongly believe that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out, because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

35. Attention is drawn specifically to the (often seen from this industry) possibility of an

unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the

Claimant is liable for the Defendant’s costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does

not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However,

the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1) “Note that the normal rule as to costs does

not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a Notice of

Discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a

party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg)).”

Le_Kirk

You should write witness statements in the first person,  so "I" not "the defendant" 

Gr1pr

Plus the important standard statement of truth at the end too