Text from Empira Ltd (Gladstones) - CCJ

Coupon-mad · 24 May 2024 at 1:23AM

Nononono.

Your CCJ won't be set aside if you put in what you have in para 2, 4 and 5. Eeek! No. Bin them.

Remove ALL admissions and instead say it was dark and no contractual signs were seen nor prominent. If they had been, the Defendant would not have parked there and would not have repeated that in August.

State whether windscreen PCNs were affixed to the car or not? I assume not, which is another reason why you parked there 4 times because no 'consumer notices' (neither in the form of clear signs nor windscreen PCNs) were fairly drawn to your attention until it was too late.

tunm153 · 24 May 2024 at 11:41AM

Thanks, will it be an issue that I haven't received the PoC, but I'm still sending in the defence? Also given how I admitted to parking there in the hearing, will the defence still be valid, I'm guessing so as the judge wouldn't have allowed me to submit a defence otherwise?

Updated:

The facts known to the Defendant:

1. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief. Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The Particulars of Claim (POC) appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s), and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver.

2. The parking incidents occurred at night when visibility of any signage was significantly reduced. The Defendant asserts that no contractual signs were seen nor were they prominent. If clear and illuminated signs had been present, the Defendant would not have parked there and would not have repeated this in August.

3. The Defendant did not receive any correspondence from the Claimant regarding the Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) or subsequent legal actions because they were sent to the previous address. Consequently, the Defendant was unaware of the Default Judgment until receiving a text from Empira Ltd on xx January 2024. Upon checking his credit report, the Defendant noticed the CCJ.

4. The Defendant did not receive any windscreen PCNs affixed to the car on any of the occasions in question. This lack of consumer notices, both in the form of clear signs and windscreen PCNs, means that the alleged parking restrictions were not fairly drawn to the Defendant's attention until it was too late.

5. The Claimant has not provided evidence that the signage met the requirements set out in the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice or the International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice for nighttime visibility. Proper illumination and clear placement of signs are essential for informing motorists of parking terms, especially at night.

tunm153 · 24 May 2024 at 6:41PM

Received a letter today saying I needed to submit it by 4pm today, though during the hearing the judge said within 14 days, I think I should still be ok if I mention that. How does the above update look?

tunm153 · 24 May 2024 at 10:29PM

I'm thinking of adding this to it?

I am the Defendant in the above-referenced matter. Following the hearing on [date], the judge ordered that the default judgment be set aside on the condition that I submit a fully particularised defence to the court and the Claimant by 4pm 24/05/2024. As of now, I have not received the Particulars of Claim from the Claimant, which are necessary for me to provide a fully particularised defence. This lack of essential information has prevented me from meeting the 4pm deadline set by the court. I am submitting my defence with this letter, but I respectfully request that the court direct the Claimant to serve the Particulars of Claim and grant an extension for the submission of any further necessary particulars until after I have received these particulars. I apologize for the delay and assure the court that I am committed to complying with all court orders and deadlines as soon as I have the necessary information.

With the defence:
1. On [date], the Court ordered that the default judgment against the Defendant be set aside on the condition that the Defendant submits a fully particularised defence by 4pm 24/05/202. 2. The Defendant has not received the Particulars of Claim from the Claimant, which are necessary to provide a fully particularised defence. This lack of necessary information has prevented the Defendant from meeting the 4pm deadline set by the court. 3. The Defendant contends that the Claimant's failure to serve the Particulars of Claim constitutes a breach of Civil Procedure Rules and denies the Defendant the opportunity to understand the case against them fully.

Coupon-mad · 25 May 2024 at 12:36AM

Yes that's good. But worrying.

Maybe you've sent it already but if not, you could add these to the defence (needs paragraph numbers):

- The Defendant asks for relief from sanctions because the court's Order (which only arrived today) following the application hearing is mistaken and prejudices the defendant. This is an almost impossible defence to write and the claim has expired unserved (and already had, at the time of the hearing).

- In the absence of being served with any Particulars of Claim, the clock has still not started to defend the claim, and thus this time cannot have have expired, either.

- The Claim Form was not served during its 4 month period of validity. In consequence, the Court had, and continues to have, no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim because it has expired.

- In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so.

- CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired.

- As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied.

- In Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016): “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a)."

"I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable."

"This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.”

- Tests were established by Lord Sumption’s analysis in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and are summarised as follows:

Did the claimant take reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules?

Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?

What, if any, prejudice would the defendants suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what the defendants knew about its contents?

- The answer to the first two questions in the extant case is "no", and re the third question, the Defendant is clearly prejudiced by being expected to defend an unserved (expired) claim of which they have no knowledge. The Defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond to allegations they have not seen.

tunm153 · 25 May 2024 at 6:04PM

Draft, including all parts, a bit too long, or all good?

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.: xxxxxx

Between

[UK parking control limited]

(Claimant)

and -

*name*

(Defendant)

DEFENCE

1. On [date], the Court ordered that the default judgment against the Defendant be set aside on the condition that the Defendant submits a fully particularised defence by 4pm 24/05/2024. 2. The Defendant has not received the Particulars of Claim from the Claimant, which are necessary to provide a fully particularised defence. This lack of necessary information has prevented the Defendant from meeting the 4pm deadline set by the court. 3. The Defendant contends that the Claimant's failure to serve the Particulars of Claim constitutes a breach of Civil Procedure Rules and denies the Defendant the opportunity to understand the case against them fully.

2. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all. It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term. Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability'.

The facts known to the Defendant:

3. The parking incidents occurred at night when visibility of any signage was significantly reduced. The Defendant asserts that no contractual signs were seen nor were they prominent. If clear and illuminated signs had been present, the Defendant would not have parked there and would not have repeated this in August.

4. The Defendant did not receive any correspondence from the Claimant regarding the Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) or subsequent legal actions because they were sent to the previous address. Consequently, the Defendant was unaware of the Default Judgment until receiving a text from Empira Ltd on xx January 2024. Upon checking his credit report, the Defendant noticed the CCJ.

5. The Defendant did not receive any windscreen PCNs affixed to the car on any of the occasions in question. This lack of consumer notices, both in the form of clear signs and windscreen PCNs, means that the alleged parking restrictions were not fairly drawn to the Defendant's attention until it was too late.

6. The Claimant has not provided evidence that the signage met the requirements set out in the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice or the International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice for nighttime visibility. Proper illumination and clear placement of signs are essential for informing motorists of parking terms, especially at night.

Particulars of Claim:

7. The Defendant asks for relief from sanctions because the court's Order (which only arrived yesterday) following the application hearing is mistaken and prejudices the defendant. This is an almost impossible defence to write and the claim has expired unserved (and already had, at the time of the hearing).

8. In the absence of being served with any Particulars of Claim, the clock has still not started to defend the claim, and thus this time cannot have have expired, either.

Service of Claim and CPR Compliance

9. The claim form was not served at the Defendant's current address, in breach of CPR 6.9(3). As a result, the Defendant was unaware of the Default Judgment, constituting a breach of CPR 13.2(a). The judgment was wrongly entered as the Defendant was unable to submit an acknowledgment of service.

10. Under CPR 13.2, the court must set aside a judgment entered under part 12 if it was wrongly entered. Given the breach of CPR 6.9(3), CPR 13.2 applies, and the CCJ must be set aside. Alternatively, CPR 13.3 applies due to the circumstances, which represent good reasons to set the CCJ aside, considering that the Defendant acted within a reasonable time period and has good prospects of defending the claim.

11. The Claimant's failure to conduct a proper address search before filing the claim, as required by the International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice version 9 - Clause 22.1, raises concerns about the thoroughness of any address search performed before filing the claim. The ease with which DCBL traced the Defendant's curr

12. The Claim Form was not served during its 4 month period of validity. In consequence, the Court had, and continues to have, no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim because it has expired.

13. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so.

14. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired

15.- As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied.

16.- In Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016): “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a)."

17."I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable."

"This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” -

18. -Tests were established by Lord Sumption’s analysis in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and are summarised as follows:

Did the claimant take reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules?

Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?

What, if any, prejudice would the defendants suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what the defendants knew about its contents?

-The answer to the first two questions in the extant case is "no", and re the third question, the Defendant is clearly prejudiced by being expected to defend an unserved (expired) claim of which they have no knowledge. The Defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond to allegations they have not seen.ent address immediately after the County Court Judgment was issued underscores this neglect.

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

19.The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap). It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred.

20. This claim is unfair and inflated, and it is denied that any sum is due in debt or damages. This Claimant routinely pursues an unconscionable fixed sum added per PCN, despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban it.

21. This is a classic example where adding exaggerated fees funds bulk litigation of weak and/or archive parking cases. No checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit or a cause of action (given away by the woefully inadequate POC)

22. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('the DLUHC') published a statutory Parking Code of Practice in February 2022: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice. The Ministerial Foreword is damning: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists.

23. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code (temporarily withdrawn), it is now 'live' after a draft Impact Assessment (IA) was published on 30th July 2023. The Government's analysis is found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

24.Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 state that the parking industry has shown the DLUHC that the true minor cost of pre-action stage totals a mere £8.42 per case (not per PCN).

25. This claim has been enhanced by a disproportionate sum, believed to enrich the litigating legal team. It appears to be double recovery, duplicating the intended 'legal fees' cap set by small claims track rules.

26. The draft IA shows that the intimidating letter-chains endured by Defendants cost 'eight times less' than the fixed +£70 per PCN. This causes immense consumer harm in the form of some half a million wrongly-enhanced CCJs each year, that Judges are powerless to prevent. Ministry of Justice statistics reveal several hundred thousand parking claims per annum, with approximately 90% causing default CCJs totalling hundreds of millions of pounds. The false fee was enabled by the self-serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies who aligned in 2021 to allow +£70, each led by a Board comprising the parking and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

27. It is denied that the added damages/fee sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis. Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision ratified by the Court of Appeal) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs' inflating a PCN to £135 exaggerated the cost of template letters and 'would appear to be penal'.

28.This Claimant has not incurred costs. A PCN model already includes what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' and it generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 pre-action letters/reminders and £85 was held to more than cover the minor costs of the operation (NB: debt collectors charge nothing in failed collection cases).

29.Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, all non-monetary clauses went unchallenged. It will replace the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes, which are not regulation and carry limited weight. It is surely a clear steer for the Courts that the DLUHC said in 2023 that it is addressing 'market failure'.

30.At last, the DLUHC's analysis overrides plainly wrong findings by Circuit Judges steered by Counsel in weak appeal cases that the parking industry steamrollered through. In Vehicle Control Services v Percy, HHJ Saffman took a diametrically opposed position to that taken by DJ Hickinbottom, DJ Jackson (as Her Honour Judge Jackson then was), and other District Judges on the North Eastern Circuit, including DJ Skalskyj-Reynolds and DJ Wright (Skipton) all of whom have consistently dismissed extortionate added 'fees/damages'. District Judges deal with private parking claims on a daily basis, whereas cases of this nature come before Circuit Judges infrequently. The Judgments of HHJ Parkes in Britannia v Semark-Jullien, and HHJ Simpkiss in One Parking Solution v Wilshaw were flawed. These supposedly persuasive judgments included a universal failure to consider the court's duty under s71 of the CRA 2015 and factual errors. In Wilshaw: a badly outdated reliance on 'ticket cases' which allowed poor signage to escape fair scrutiny and a wrong presumption that landowner authority 'is not required' (DVLA rules make it mandatory). In Percy, HHJ Saffman made an incorrect assumption about pre-action costs and even sought out the wrong Code of Practice of his own volition after the hearing, and used it to inform his judgment.

31.In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA'), the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper. The Claimant is put to strict proof of POFA compliance if seeking 'keeper liability'.

32.The Defendant avers that there was no agreement to pay a parking charge or added 'damages' which were not even incurred, let alone quantified in bold, prominent text. This Claimant's lack of large, readable signs are nothing like the yellow and black warnings seen in Beavis, nor do they meet the signage requirements in the DLUHC Code which reflects the already statutory requirement for 'prominence' (Consumer Rights Act 2015 - the 'CRA').

CRA breaches

33.Section 71 CRA creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the test of fairness whether a party raises it or not. Further, claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3):

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf

34.The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both terms and 'consumer notices'. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of 'signs and lines' and all communications (written or otherwise). Signs must be prominent (lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear

tunm153 · 25 May 2024 at 6:04PM

35.The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14, and 18 of Schedule 2 and the duties of fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

36.Unlike in Beavis, the penalty rule remains engaged. The CRA covers disproportionate sums, which are not exempt from being assessed for fairness because a 'fee' is not the core price term and neither was it prominently proclaimed on the signs.

37.The Supreme Court held that deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms or cumbersome obligations ('concealed pitfalls or traps'). This Claimant has failed those tests, with small signs, hidden terms and minuscule small print that is incapable of binding a driver. Court of Appeal authorities about a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (Lord Denning's ‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ 2,

both leading authorities that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space".

38.Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the DLUHC Code and these clauses are supported by the BPA & IPC. In the official publication 'Parking Review', the IPC's CEO observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t."

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

39.DVLA data is only supplied if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules). It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority to form contracts at this site in their name. The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to litigate.

40.The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The DLUHC Code shows that genuine disputes such as this should see PCNs cancelled, had a fair ADR existed. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject most disputes: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (ref: Annual Report). This consumer blame culture and reliance upon their own 'appeals service' (described by MPs as a kangaroo court and about to be replaced by the Government) should satisfy Judges that a fair appeal was never on offer.

Conclusion

41.There is now evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims that are causing consumer harm. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis shows that the usual letter-chain costs eight times less than the sum claimed for it. The claim is entirely without merit and the POC embarrassing. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that poorly pleaded claims like this should be struck out.

42.In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

(a) Standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) A finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

43.Attention is drawn to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)), this does not 'normally' apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signature:

Date:

1505grandad · 25 May 2024 at 6:21PM

Are you stating the correct claimant?

Coupon-mad · 25 May 2024 at 8:29PM

EDIT:

It's a District Enforcement Ltd case.. make sure you don't type the wrong claim number otherwise the court will think you haven't defended at all.

YOU ARE A DAY LATE.

That's bad because you are in breach of a Court order right now.

Get it emailed to the local hearing court and Gladstones now - tonight without fail - but get the right Claimant & claim number at the top.

BUT:

Your numbering is all over the place because within paragraph 1 you also have a 2 and 3, then after that, you start again at 2. Makes no sense.

Sort that out and DON'T show us another draft.

Don't wait till tomorrow.

Get it in NOW.

You've cut off paragraph 11- mid-sentence. I think it's ended up at the end of paragraph 18.

Move ALL this up to come immediately after "Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability'" (so your facts heading then comes AFTER all this:

(Will need all paragraph numbers corrected):

Particulars of Claim have expired:

7. The Defendant asks for relief from sanctions because the court's Order (which only arrived yesterday) following the application hearing is mistaken and prejudices the defendant. This is an almost impossible defence to write and the claim has expired unserved (and already had, at the time of the hearing).