Bristol Airport NTK - 104) Stopping to Pick-Up/Drop Off In a Restricted Zone

RRTechie

- My defence Part 2 -

Hi Everyone...

Please see below for my full Defence split across two posts due to the character length maxing out the limits of a single post.

My deadline is perceivably Tuesday early evening but I'd rather email it out during business hours today if at all possible. Thank you in advance for checking it over.

Part 2 is provided below which includes the bottom section from 17 onwards with item 17 being the last of my bespoke items outside the template...

17    The VCS camera van that took images of the vehicle at the material time bears the legend, Safety Camera Unit. Since this vehicle is used to take candid images, it is required to display for what reason the images will be used, but it does not. This is a breach of the CCTV code of practice, and the relevant Data Protection Act (DPA), and General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) because the images are not being used for the purpose advertised on the vehicle.

 

18    The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(ii). 'adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

19    The Defendant denies (i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'), which is fully distinguished.

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

20    The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred.

21    This claim is unfair and inflated and it is denied that any sum is due in debt or damages. This Claimant routinely pursues an unconscionable fixed sum added per PCN, despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban it.

22    This is a classic example where adding exaggerated fees funds bulk litigation of weak and/or archive parking cases. No checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit or a cause of action (given away by the woefully inadequate POC).

23    The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('the DLUHC') published a statutory Parking Code of Practice in February 2022: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice.

24    The Ministerial Foreword is damning: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

25    Despite legal challenges delaying the Code (temporarily withdrawn) it is now 'live' after a draft Impact Assessment (IA) was published on 30th July 2023. The Government's analysis is found here:  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

26    Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 state that the parking industry has shown the DLUHC that the true minor cost of pre-action stage totals a mere £8.42 per case (not per PCN).

27    This claim has been enhanced by a disproportionate sum, believed to enrich the litigating legal team. It appears to be double recovery, duplicating the intended 'legal fees' cap set by small claims track rules.

28    The draft IA shows that the intimidating letter-chains endured by Defendants cost 'eight times less' than the fixed +£70 per PCN. This causes immense consumer harm in the form of some half a million wrongly-enhanced CCJs each year, that Judges are powerless to prevent.  MoJ statistics reveal several hundred thousand parking claims per annum, with c90% causing default CCJs totalling hundreds of millions of pounds. The false fee was enabled by the self-serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies who aligned in 2021 to allow +£70, each led by a Board comprising the parking and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

29    It is denied that the added damages/fee sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs' inflating a PCN to £135 exaggerated the cost of template letters and 'would appear to be penal'.

30    This Claimant has not incurred costs. A PCN model already includes what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' and it generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 pre-action letters/reminders and £85 was held to more than cover the minor costs of the operation (NB: debt collectors charge nothing in failed collection cases).

31    Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, all non-monetary clauses went unchallenged. It will replace the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes, which are not regulation and carry limited weight.  It is surely a clear steer for the Courts that the DLUHC said in 2023 that it is addressing 'market failure'.

32    At last, the DLUHC's analysis overrides plainly wrong findings by Circuit Judges steered by Counsel in weak appeal cases that the parking industry steamrollered through. In Vehicle Control Services v Percy, HHJ Saffman took a diametrically opposed position to that taken by DJ Hickinbottom, DJ Jackson (as Her Honour Judge Jackson then was), and other District Judges on the North Eastern Circuit, including DJ Skalskyj-Reynolds and DJ Wright (Skipton) all of whom have consistently dismissed extortionate added 'fees/damages'. District Judges deal with private parking claims on a daily basis, whereas cases of this nature come before Circuit Judges infrequently. The Judgments of HHJ Parkes in Britannia v Semark-Jullien, and HHJ Simpkiss in One Parking Solution v Wilshaw were flawed. These supposedly persuasive judgments included a universal failure to consider the court's duty under s71 of the CRA 2015 and factual errors. In Wilshaw: a badly outdated reliance on 'ticket cases' which allowed poor signage to escape fair scrutiny and a wrong presumption that landowner authority 'is not required' (DVLA rules make it mandatory). In Percy, HHJ Saffman made an incorrect assumption about pre-action costs and even sought out the wrong Code of Practice of his own volition after the hearing, and used it to inform his judgment.

33    In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper. The Claimant is put to strict proof of POFA compliance if seeking 'keeper liability'.

34    The Defendant avers that there was no agreement to pay a parking charge or added 'damages' which were not even incurred, let alone quantified in bold, prominent text. This Claimant's lack of large, readable signs are nothing like the yellow & black warnings seen in Beavis, nor do they meet the signage requirements in the DLUHC Code which reflects the already statutory requirement for 'prominence' (Consumer Rights Act 2015 - the 'CRA').

 

CRA breaches

35    Section 71 CRA creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the test of fairness whether a party raises it or not. Further, claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3):

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf

36    The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both terms and 'consumer notices'.  In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of 'signs & lines' and all communications (written or otherwise). Signs must be prominent (lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

37    The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the duties of fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

38    Unlike in Beavis, the penalty rule remains engaged. The CRA covers disproportionate sums, which are not exempt from being assessed for fairness because a 'fee' is not the core price term and neither was it prominently proclaimed on the signs.

39    The Supreme Court held that deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms or cumbersome obligations ('concealed pitfalls or traps').  This Claimant has failed those tests, with small signs, hidden terms and minuscule small print that is incapable of binding a driver. Court of Appeal authorities about a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge include:

(i)             Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (Lord Denning's ‘red hand rule’) and

(ii)            Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space''.

40    Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the DLUHC Code and these clauses are supported by the BPA & IPC. In the official publication 'Parking Review' the IPC's CEO observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t." 

 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

41    DVLA data is only supplied if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules). It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority to form contracts at this site in their name. The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to litigate.

42    The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The DLUHC Code shows that genuine disputes such as this should see PCNs cancelled, had a fair ADR existed. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject most disputes: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (ref: Annual Report).  This consumer blame culture and reliance upon their own 'appeals service' (described by MPs as a kangaroo court and about to be replaced by the Government) should satisfy Judges that a fair appeal was never on offer.

Conclusion

43    There is now evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims that are causing consumer harm.  The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis shows that the usual letter-chain costs eight times less than the sum claimed for it.  The claim is entirely without merit and the POC embarrassing.  The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that poorly pleaded claims like this should be struck out.

44    In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

(a)   standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b)   a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

45    Attention is drawn to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

 

Signature:

 

 

Date:

 

RRTechie

Coupon-mad said:

But don't show us paragraph 5 onwards of the Template words please. Certainly not the whole thing up to para 30. We only need to see your bit (para 2 and 3 and maybe another paragraph if you needed more). 

Thanks but unfortunately I missed this while I was re-posting.

I have now managed to re-post across two posts. At least this provides the ability to check coherent numbering and correct ordering of items.

Le_Kirk

RRTechie said:

- My defence Part 1 -

Hi Everyone...

Please see below for my full Defence split across two posts due to the character length maxing out the limits of a single post.................

Coupon-mad said:

But don't show us paragraph 5 onwards of the Template words please. Certainly not the whole thing up to para 30. We only need to see your bit (para 2 and 3 and maybe another paragraph if you needed more). 

Didn't you see @Coupon-mad's post asking you not to post the whole 30 odd paragraphs?   You are now expecting the regulars to read it all and check what you have changed or added!

RRTechie

Le_Kirk said:

RRTechie said:

- My defence Part 1 -

Hi Everyone...

Please see below for my full Defence split across two posts due to the character length maxing out the limits of a single post.................

Coupon-mad said:

But don't show us paragraph 5 onwards of the Template words please. Certainly not the whole thing up to para 30. We only need to see your bit (para 2 and 3 and maybe another paragraph if you needed more). 

Didn't you see @Coupon-mad's post asking you not to post the whole 30 odd paragraphs?   You are now expecting the regulars to read it all and check what you have changed or added!

Yes I did see and I responded...I did not receive another reply so assumed the format was okay.

I detailed at the beginning of each post for the two Defence posts that the actual changes only appear in items 3-17 with 1-16 occurring on the first post therefore only item 17 needing reviewing on the second post.

RRTechie

Hi everyone,

Please see below for the cut down version of my defence only including the items that I have added to the pre-existing template.

Thank you in advance for your time assessing for me.

The facts known to the Defendant:

2.     The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper.

3.     VCS are not the landowner. The Bristol Airport website details the following Ownership hierarchy…
“Bristol Airport is owned by Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP).
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan owns the largest number of shares and has been an investor in our airport since 2001. They are Canada's largest single-profession pension plan with over C$200 billion in net assets and represent around 333,000 working and retired teachers.

OTPP have their headquarters in Toronto with a number of regional offices, including in the UK. It has holdings in five freehold airports in Europe: Copenhagen Airports, Brussels Airport, Bristol Airport, Birmingham Airport and London City Airport.

In addition to OTPP, Australia’s New South Wales Treasury Corporation ("TCorp"), the Australian Retirement Trust (“ART”) and StepStone own a minority interest in the airport.”

The airport is managed by a sub-contractor to the landowner, Bristol Airport limited, and Vehicle Control Services Limited are sub-contractors to this management company, not the landowner.

4.     The Particulars of Claim is inadequate by failing to define a cause of action because it does not state whether the charge was issued for dropping off, or for picking up. The car was at the airport being driven to the Drop and Go Car Park. The claim is for "Stopping to Pick Up/Drop Off in a restricted zone" but the claimant has failed to specify whether it was for Stopping to Pick Up, or Stopping to Drop Off. In addition, the claimant has failed to specify the location of the "Restricted Zone."

A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment (transcript below) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. 

5.     It is averred that no contract to manage or enforce parking on this land exists between the Landowner and the Claimant or flows from the Landowner to the Claimant. Further, it is averred that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents of a sub-contractor) has no standing to sue or form contracts in their own name.

The claimant has failed to produce any proof that such contract with or flowing from the landowner exists. If such a contract did exist, it is reasonable to assume that a copy, or a copy of the relevant parts would have been provided by the claimant. The fact that no such contract has been produced by the claimant would suggest that on the balance of probabilities that no such contract exists. The claimant is put to strict proof that the contrary is true.

6.     In order to pursue the Defendant as Keeper of the vehicle in question, the Claimant (VCS) is relying on Schedule 4 of the POFA. However, para. 1 of this schedule states that “This Schedule applies where— (a) the driver of a vehicle is required by virtue of a relevant obligation to pay parking charges in respect of the parking of the vehicle on relevant land”. Firstly, it is to be noted that this is an event of stopping but not parking. No parking event has, nor is alleged to have occurred in relation to this claim and so Schedule 4 of the POFA does not apply.

7.     The site is not relevant land since airport byelaws apply as defined by Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012, therefore the vehicle keeper cannot be held liable.

Schedule 4 of the POFA Para. 3 goes on to clarify: “In this Schedule “relevant land” means any land (including land above or below ground level) other than—… (b) a parking place which is provided or controlled by a traffic authority. (c) any land (not falling within paragraph (a) or (b)) on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control.” However, Bristol Airport is under the statutory control of Bristol Airport Byelaws 2012 section 6 “Prohibited Acts on private airport roads and other parts of the airport to which traffic enactments do not apply”. Therefore, the airport is not ‘Relevant Land’ and therefore the vehicle keeper (the defendant) cannot be held liable. The case should be struck out accordingly.

8.     In reference to an email PDF letter the Defendant received dated 03/01/2024 from Excel Parking Services in response to their appeal sent to VCS…
Bristol Airport Bylaws:
In the letter received as the registered keeper dated 03/01/2024 Excel/VCS stated the following…
“Byelaws are not currently in use as the last set of byelaws published relate to the old airport site and are now regarded as obsolete by the Airport Company.”

This statement is not true, the Bristol Airport Bylaws are not Obsolete…Bylaws apply to land under statutory control and do not just become "obsolete". The airport land is still the airport land and if it's airport land then it is not Relevant Land and the vehicle keeper cannot be held liable.

The Right Honourable John Penrose MP wrote to Bristol Airport detailing that VCS had stated that Bylaws were obsolete and he (Mister Penrose) received the following response on 21/09/2023…
“Firstly, our Byelaws are definitely in place and are not obsolete. We have of course contacted our third-party parking enforcement provider who have identified an issue with the wording used in the response to the constituent, which does not align with their usual communication standards. The operative used incorrect phrasing with regards to Byelaws in this particular response. Excel Parking Services have assured us that this wording anomaly is not consistent  with the response typically used in other communications.”

Please note that the response received from Bristol Airport clearly states that Bylaws ‘are definitely in place and are not obsolete’ and that Excel Parking Services had assured Bristol Airport that ‘this wording anomaly is not consistent with the response typically used in other communications’ however, clearly this is not the case because Excel recited the same mistruth to the Defendant!

9.     According to VCS’ own photographs, the vehicle was stopped at Traffic Lights with a Pedestrian Crossing; Stopping (in a queue) at a Pedestrian crossing is a mandatory byelaw requirement therefore there is no breach of parking contract. Additionally, stopping at a traffic light is required by UK law and as per Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, "road, in relation to England and Wales, means any highway and any other road to which the public has access, and includes bridges over which a road passes". The roads on Bristol Airport's land are publicly accessible and therefore UK legislation applies.

As evidenced by the still images provided on both charge notices, it is unequivocally clear that multiple pedestrians, are using the crossing. Additionally, the pedestrian traffic control light is green, indicating that pedestrians are crossing and the road traffic light is red, requiring vehicles to stop. It therefore appears that VCS are condoning both breaking the law and placing pedestrians and other road users in grave danger, and are attempting to penalise any driver who refuses to do both of these.

Bristol Airport Byelaws 2012 state the following: -
6. PROHIBITED ACTS ON PRIVATE AIRPORT ROADS AND OTHER PARTS OF THE AIRPORT TO WHICH ROAD TRAFFIC ENACTMENTS DO NOT APPLY On any private Airport roads or other parts of the Airport to which the Road Traffic Enactments do not apply no person shall:

-       6.7 Road Traffic Enactments
drive or cause or permit to be driven any vehicle which fails to comply with any braking, steering, lighting, tyre or electrical requirements which apply to that type of vehicle if it were to be operated on a road to which the Road Traffic Enactments apply.

Failing to stop as required would have caused the driver to commit a prohibited act.

10.  VCS issued a parking charge notice for a non parking event. At the material time, the driver stopped at a red traffic light at a pedestrian crossing a mandatory requirement of airport byelaws.
Stopping is not parking as determined in the persuasive appeal case of Laura Jopson v Honeguard Services, case number B9GF0A9E. Here His Honour Judge Harris QC stated that, "coping with some vicissitude of short duration" is not parking. Stopping as required at a red traffic light at a pedestrian crossing for a few seconds must surely constitute a vicissitude of some short duration. The claimant should not therefore have issued a parking charge notice for a non-parking event.

11.  The defendant is not the person against whom any claim can be made on non-relevant land. In the persuasive appeal case of VCS v Edward, case number H0KF6C9C, it was determined by His Honour judge Mark Gargan that it is not appropriate to draw any inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion. His Honour also stated that the evidential effect of establishing that the defendant was the relevant keeper, does not produce any inference, rebuttable or otherwise, that the defendant was driving on this particular occasion. Therefore there is no material inference for the defendant to rebut.
In other words, the defendant has no reason to respond to any assertion that the keeper was the driver, and no inference can be assumed for the keeper's silence on this matter. VCS are fully aware of this case of course, since they were the claimant when the judge found against them.
Were it a requirement of the PoFA to name the driver, their Lordships would surely have included it in the Act.

12.  In the case of Excel Parking Services Ltd v Anthony Smith at Manchester Court, on appeal re claim number C0DP9C4E in June 2017, His Honour Judge Smith overturned an error by a District Judge and pointed out that, where the registered keeper was not shown to have been driving (or was not driving) such a Defendant cannot be held liable outwith the POFA. Nor is there any merit in a twisted interpretation of the law of agency (if that was a remedy then the POFA Schedule 4 legislation would not have been needed at all). HHJ Smith admonished Excel for attempting to rely on a bare assumption that the Defendant was driving or that the driver was acting 'on behalf of' the keeper, which was without merit. Mr Smith's appeal was allowed and Excel's claim was dismissed.

13.  DPA/GDPR infringement: The response the Defendant received to their appeal was not from VCS but was from a separate company named Excel Parking Services Ltd. This company is a totally different company in respect to Companies House; the register of companies retained by Companies House clearly shows that VCS and Excel have different company numbers and are therefore completely separate accounting companies therefore Excel Parking Services is not the same company that Bristol Airport has a contractual agreement with to provide parking enforcement and has a separate incorporation ID and separate accounting. VCS have broken GDPR rules by passing on my personal data to Excel Parking Services, a separate accounting company. The Defendant has complained to their member of parliament and the airport landowners.

14.  The Particulars of Claim indicate that the Claimant wishes the courts to believe that a contract was agreed by the Driver of the vehicle by the act of entering the land of Bristol Airport. However, it is not possible to read, consider and accept the terms of the signage which the Claimant relies upon from a moving car and indeed stopping to read a sign constitutes the very contravention for which this charge has arisen – ‘No Stopping’. Therefore, this supposed contract is paradoxically impossible to accept without breaking. In addition this is unfair contract terms as defined by Consumer Rights Act 2015 para 71.

15.  Part B2 of VCS's KADOE contract allows VCS to obtain data only for purposes related to trespassing, abandonment and parking charges, not for "stopping", and especially not for stopping  at a traffic lights/pedestrian crossings. VCS are therefore in breach of contract, and a complaint will be made to the DVLA in due course. An overview of valid reasons for obtaining data using the KADOE service can be found here: (https://kadoe.co.uk/dvlaimportantinfo/) and a summary is provided below:

"You are reminded of the conditions of the KADOE (Keeper At Date Of Event) agreement signed between DVLA and your company, and the contract signed between your company and VALCON."
"Cars parking on private property
Releasing vehicle information to landowners or their agents helps to find the keeper of a vehicle that has:

⁃       obstructed access to land or property

⁃       been abandoned on private property

⁃       been parked without payment of the relevant fees

⁃       been parked without the right to do so, eg in a space reserved for disabled motorists"

"Information cannot be released for any other reason
DVLA will monitor your use of KADOE and conduct periodic audits to confirm compliance with the regulations.
DVLA must meet the requirements of the Data Protection Act, and false declarations may be referred to the Data Protection Registrar as a suspected breach.

WARNING - UNAUTHORISED USE OF DATA CAN RESULT IN PROSECUTION"

16.  Furthermore, the term “No Stopping”, as written on the signs, is forbidding and therefore not an offer to stop and pay a charge. Therefore, no contract to pay a charge in the event of stopping was agreed to by the Driver and so no charge can be brought about by doing so. Precedence in Case Law can be found in CS036 PCMUK v Bull et al B4GF26K6.

17.     The VCS camera van that took images of the vehicle at the material time bears the legend, Safety Camera Unit. Since this vehicle is used to take candid images, it is required to display for what reason the images will be used, but it does not. This is a breach of the CCTV code of practice, and the relevant Data Protection Act (DPA), and General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) because the images are not being used for the purpose advertised on the vehicle.

LDast

Le_Kirk said:

Didn't you see @Coupon-mad's post asking you not to post the whole 30 odd paragraphs?   You are now expecting the regulars to read it all and check what you have changed or added!

Most judges are not going to bother reading iIt either. All paragraphs need numbering sequentially, which they aren’t. The profile about the owners is extraneous waffle. Imagine you have not received any prior correspondence about this event. Now re-read the PoC and answer the allegation on that basis. This is perfect for the short defence and draft order.

After querying the applicability of the short defence and draft order regarding the obvious resistance to using it on this forum, the judge has come to the conclusion that the regulars on here seem to be institutionally distrustful. The problem is, “they” don’t know how judges think. “They” don’t know how judges work. And people are naturally “suspicious” of something they don’t know anything about.

RRTechie

LDast said:

Le_Kirk said:

Didn't you see @Coupon-mad's post asking you not to post the whole 30 odd paragraphs?   You are now expecting the regulars to read it all and check what you have changed or added!

Most judges are not going to bother reading iIt either. All paragraphs need numbering sequentially, which they aren’t. The profile about the owners is extraneous waffle. Imagine you have not received any prior correspondence about this event. Now re-read the PoC and answer the allegation on that basis. This is perfect for the short defence and draft order.

After querying the applicability of the short defence and draft order regarding the obvious resistance to using it on this forum, the judge has come to the conclusion that the regulars on here seem to be institutionally distrustful. The problem is, “they” don’t know how judges think. “They” don’t know how judges work. And people are naturally “suspicious” of something they don’t know anything about.

Which paragraphs are not numbered sequentially please?

KeithP

RRTechie said:
Which paragraphs are not numbered sequentially please?

Here are just eight that I noted.
Those paragraphs starting...

"The airport is managed..."
"A recent persuasive appeal..."
"The claimant has failed..."
"Schedule 4 of the POFA..."
"This statement is not true..."
"The Right Honourable..."
"Please note that the..."
"As evidenced by the still..."

All need a number.
There are more.

RRTechie

KeithP said:

RRTechie said:
Which paragraphs are not numbered sequentially please?

Here are just eight that I noted.
Those paragraphs starting...

"The airport is managed..."
"A recent persuasive appeal..."
"The claimant has failed..."
"Schedule 4 of the POFA..."
"This statement is not true..."
"The Right Honourable..."
"Please note that the..."
"As evidenced by the still..."

All need a number.
There are more.

Hi Keith,

Those sections are related to the previously documented numbered item and are purely segregated into a separate paragraph for legibility.

Is there a rule for writing this document that states that each actual paragraph, irrespective of associated context, has to be individually numbered please? If this is indeed the case then I will have to reformat so that there are no gaps to ensure that related information is kept to each related numbered item but this will reduce legibility.

KeithP

It's nothing to do with grammar.
Every paragraph needs a number so that parties can refer each other to specific points.