VCS - Southend Airport No Stopping - RK - Not Driver - Costs Awarded - Another One Bites the Dust

stop_this_nonsense

The Notice of Allocation to the Small Claims Track states that case will be heard on 17 December 2024 and documents to be delivered no later than 14 days before.

stop_this_nonsense

So, just to clarify @KeithP's question - claim will be heard on 17 December 20204 and:

stop_this_nonsense

Witness Statement as follows.

As reminder: not the driver, wasn't in the car at the time, haven't named the driver!

Apologies in advance for the formatting. I promise that it looks nice and neat in Word! Just can't get it to render here correctly. I will also add the exhibit references in the right order in the finished version:

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out
3.	I bring to the court’s attention compelling Appeal judgments that support the striking out of the claim (exhibits … and … ). These circumstances align with the typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the existing Particulars of Claim (“POC”) in this case are even worse than the ones seen on Appeal. I firmly believe that dismissing this baseless claim is the appropriate course of action, in line with the Overriding Objective. Bulk litigators (legal firms) should be well aware of their obligation to comply with the Practice Direction. Persistently using generic, auto-filled and vague language in their case pleadings, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts reject their claims based on the persuasive authority cited.
4.	The POC breach numerous Civil Practice Rules with the Overriding Objective in mind: (i)            The POC fails to identify whether I am being pursued as the driver or the registered keeper and instead relies on an attempt to ‘cover all the bases’ by stating that I am “the driver and / or registered keeper” (exhibit …). As such, it is not possible for me to identify a basis on how to defend the claim. (ii)         The amount of interest charged, the principal amount on which interest is being charged and the date on which interest starts to accrue have not been stated. (iii)       The amount being claimed is far in excess of the originally alleged debt of £100. (iv)        The POC alleges a breach of contract for failing to comply with a prohibition (exhibit iv – “Stopping in a zone where stopping is prohibited”). It is trite law that a contract must have offer, acceptance and consideration. The prohibition offers nothing and so can never be a contractual term. Hence, the POC fail to state an actionable breach and is a clear and mendacious abuse of practice direction by VCS, not saved by the passing references to ‘parking’. (v)          The POC references a “Parking Charge Notice” document and I deny that any such document has been issued to me. No such document was referred to prior to the issuance of the claim by VCS via their legal representative ELMS Legal and the reference to this non-existent document in the POC is a breach of practice directions.

Sequence of events
5	I confirm that the vehicle was used to transport a relative to Southend Airport at approximately … and that I was the registered keeper of the vehicle with the registration mark … (“the vehicle”) at the time.
6	I was not driving and was not in the vehicle at the time alleged by VCS. I was at home at the time. On the day in question there would have been four people permitted to drive the vehicle, giving VCS’s ‘reasonable assumption’ that I was the driver a mere 1 in 4 chance of being correct. It is noted that the POC makes a broad and imprecise claim that “At all material times the Defendant was the registered keeper and/or driver”. I categorically deny being the driver and VCS is put to strict proof otherwise.
7	I have been able to ascertain that the driver of the vehicle at the time drove into the airport access road, turned around and then stopped adjacent to the area marked by zig-zags leading away from the zebra crossing. I understand that when the vehicle stopped the passenger opened the car door and stepped out of the vehicle. At no point did the driver leave the vehicle and neither did the driver park, in the sense of leaving the vehicle for a period of time. The entire event lasted only 46 seconds. The persuasive case of Jopson v Homeguard (exhibit …) confirmed that stopping is not parking.
8	On … I received a “CHARGE NOTICE FINAL DEMAND” (exhibit …) referencing a previously sent demand. I categorically deny that any previous communication on this matter was received.
9	I appealed against this ‘Charge Notice’ using VCS’s online form stating as follows: (i)           that VCS are unable to use Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“POFA”) to transfer liability to me, the registered keeper; (ii)        that I was unable to name the driver at the time and that I was under no legal obligation to do so; (iii)      for VCS to refrain from unlawfully processing my personal data; and, (iv)       for VCS to refrain from further communication with me on the matter, other than to confirm compliance with my instructions.
10	VCS responded to my appeal via email (exhibit … , dated …), acknowledging my statement that I was not the driver, averring that they are not relying on the provisions in POFA and that they are not pursuing me as registered keeper (exhibit …).
11	I noted that further appeal via the Alternative Dispute Resolution scheme (“ADR”) was only for the driver. As I was not the driver any further appeal process was denied to me.
12	At no point have VCS provided evidence regarding the identity of the driver. It is my honest belief that no evidence exists, it being well within VCS’s interest to provide this evidence if it existed.
13	VCS issued numerous follow-up letters including a fake add-on debt collection cost of £70 to cover recovery costs. Each follow-up letter included increasing levels of threatening language and tone that, even the man on the Clapham omnibus would recognise, intended to intimidate and scare me into giving in to VCS’s unfounded demand for payment, e.g. by references to CCJs. I did not pay and I did not respond to these letters.
14	VCS issued a Letter Before Claim (“LBC”) (exhibit …, dated …) referencing the ‘Charge Notice’ and alleging a “Principle [sic] Debt” of £170 (comprising the original £100 demand + £70 add-on debt recovery costs).
15	I responded to VCS’s LBC, reiterating that: (i)           there is no keeper liability; (ii)        there is no legal obligation on me, the registered keeper, to name the driver; (iii)      there is no application of agency; (iv)       airport bylaws apply; and, (v)         continued processing of my personal data is in breach of the UK Data Protection Act 2018 due to a lack of lawful basis.
16	VCS’s legal representative, ELMs Legal, issued a Notification of Instruction to recover the sum of £170 for the alleged debt and referencing a “Parking Charge Notice” for the first time.
17	At all times and in all correspondence received from VCS, only the term “Charge Notice” was used and the industry standard term “Parking Charge Notice” was not used once.

No keeper liability
18	The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“POFA”) provides a statutory tool to enable private parking companies, such as VCS, to transfer liability for parking charge notices to the registered keeper of the vehicle.
19	VCS have averred that they are not relying on keeper liability and are relying on the, completely baseless, “reasonable assumption” that I was the driver.
20	Notwithstanding that VCS have averred that they are not relying on POFA, the land on which the vehicle was photographed is land subject to statutory control and so is not relevant land within the scope of POFA.
21	Further, the vehicle keeper is not obliged to name the driver to a private parking company. Had this been the intention of Parliament, they would have made such requirements part of POFA, which makes no such provision. In the alternative, an amendment could have been made to s.172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The 1988 Act continues to oblige the identification of drivers only in strictly limited circumstances, where a criminal offence has been committed. Those provisions do not apply to this matter and this has been tested on appeal more than once in private parking cases.
22	In the Middlesbrough County Court (sitting at Teesside Combined Court) in April 2023, His Honour Judge Mark Gargan in the case of Vehicle Control Services Limited v. Ian Mark Edward allowed an appeal and overturning the decision of District Judge Lalas from the trial in July of 2022. The case involved a dispute over a parking charge issued for a white Peugeot van parked in a car park operated by the claimant. The appeal judge, Judge Gargan, analysed the evidence and the defendant’s lack of assertion regarding who was driving the vehicle at the time of the incident. The judge concluded that the district judge erred in inferring that the defendant was the driver based solely on his status as the registered keeper. The appeal was successful, leading to the dismissal of the claim and the overturning of the previous judgment, emphasising that being a registered keeper does not automatically infer liability as the driver at the specific time of the parking incident.
23	In the Manchester Crown Court the appeal by Mr. Anthony Smith against Excel Parking Services Limited was allowed, overturning the previous decision. The case involved a dispute over a parking contract on private premises, with the identity of the driver being a central issue. The judgment referenced the Court of Appeal decision in Combined Parking Solutions Limited v AJH Films Limited, but found it was not directly applicable to this case. The judge considered the law of agency, specifically whether Mr. Smith’s granddaughter had the authority to enter into a contract on his behalf, concluding that she did not. The judge’s decision resulted in the dismissal of the claims by Excel Parking Services Limited.

Impossibility of contract
24	The PoC claim is for “breach of "contract" for breaching terms and conditions”. It is trite law that, for a contract to exist, there must be an offer, an acceptance and a consideration. The prohibition offers nothing and so can never be a contractual term.
25	All VCS signage at the airport is prohibitive and it is impossible for VCS to conclude any contract at London Southend Airport, there being no areas within the Airport boundary where VCS offer parking for a price. Only the airport owners offer parking (exhibit …).

Primacy of statutory powers
26	The London Southend Airport Bylaws 1997 (“LSA Bylaws”) are in force and the statute has primacy in this matter. The vehicle was within the red boundary (indicated in exhibit …) that constitutes the land subject to statutory control (Southend … laws etc exhibit …). Were it within the airport’s genuine interest to control traffic within this area then a clear, legally enforceable option is available that is directly enforceable by the airport owners. VCS have no standing (as a bare license holder) to prosecute alleged breaches of the in-force statutory laws. For the avoidance of doubt, the bylaws are statutory, not advisory.
27	In a similar case heard (and claim dismissed) at Leicester County Court on 7 January 2022, Deputy District Judge Wigham asked VCS’s solicitor if they were aware of the statutory bylaws in force at the East Midlands Airport (“EMA”), especially condition 4 (4) on page 5 of the East Midlands Airport Bylaws 2001 booklet. VCS’s legal representative’s reply was “I am instructed that the bylaws are advisory”.  The learned Judge disagreed, pointing out that the airport byelaws carry statutory weight and remain in force at EMA by order of the Secretary of State, reportedly telling VCS’s solicitor: “these bylaws are there to protect the public from firms like you”.  She dismissed the case and permission to appeal was refused.
28	Furthermore, and by way of alternative defence, airport approach roads are subject to road traffic enactments (public highway).  Even if VCS are able to overcome the difficulties they face in showing that: (i)               they have locus to sue in their own name regarding this location, and that (ii)            they offered a parking space with value, and a licence to park there, and that (iii)          the driver (which I am not) was afforded the opportunity to accept contractual terms, and that (iv)           these terms were prominently displayed and well lit, and that (v)             their charge notice can override statutory bylaws and has sufficient contractual, commercial and ‘legitimate interest’ to save it from falling foul of the penalty rule, and that (vi)           the driver (which I am not) was in breach, and that (vii)        there is some way that, despite the two persuasive appeal judgments against this very firm and their sister company Excel, they can hold the Defendant liable outwith the POFA; VCS are also put to strict proof that: (viii)      this access road is not part of the public highway. A ‘public highway’ is any road maintained by public expense where the public would normally have a right to drive a mechanically propelled vehicle. It is averred that the Airport approach road is ‘public highway’ and VCS is put to strict proof to the contrary.
29	Signage within the lease boundary at the area where the vehicle is shown in the video still displays the message “No dropping off” and is different to the other signs that adjoin it which display the message “No stopping”, and so is wholly inconsistent with the claimed POC breach (see exhibit …)

cont'd ...

stop_this_nonsense

cont'd

VCS’s unreasonable behaviour
30	I am appending with this bundle, a fully detailed costs assessment which also covers my proportionate but unavoidable costs and I invite the court to consider making an award to include these, pursuant to the court's powers in relation to misconduct (CPR 44.11). In support of that argument, I remind the court that VCS did not have reasonable cause to issue the charge notice, knowingly doing so with no discernible evidence and clearly intending to take this matter to court come what may. I have at all times provided VCS with all information required to reach the sensible and entirely obvious conclusion that this is a baseless claim and which should have been dropped. There is no clear cause of action and this claim is a waste of mine and the court’s time. However, VCS have ‘doubled down’ by vexatiously pursuing recovery of an inflated sum that includes double recovery.
31	As a litigant-in-person I have had to learn relevant law from the ground up and I have spent a considerable time researching the law online, processing and preparing my defence plus this witness statement. I ask for my fixed witness costs. I am advised that costs on the Small Claims track are governed by rule 27.14 of the CPR and (unless a finding of 'wholly unreasonable conduct' is made against the Claimant) the Court may not order a party to pay another party’s costs, except fixed costs such as witness expenses which a party has reasonably incurred in travelling to and from the hearing (including fares and/or parking fees) plus the court may award a set amount allowable for loss of earnings or loss of leave.
32	The fixed sum for loss of earnings / loss of leave apply to any hearing format and are fixed costs at PD 27, 7.3(1) ''The amounts which a party may be ordered to pay under rule 27.14(3)(c) (loss of earnings)... are: (1) for the loss of earnings or loss of leave of each party or witness due to attending a hearing ... a sum not exceeding £95 per day for each person.''
33	I have made it clear to VCS that I was not the driving, but VCS have instead decided to pursue this claim on a “reasonable assumption” that I was the driver. VCS have not once offered a single piece of evidence to substantiate this assumption, it being well within their gift to do so.
34	It is my honest belief that no previous demand was sent by VCS before the “CHARGE NOTICE FINAL DEMAND” letter. I believe this is common practice among private parking companies and is part of the tactics employed to scare a recipient of their speculative invoice into paying
35	VCS’s have never once used the term “Parking Charge Notice”, only ever referring to a “Charge Notice”. VCS have waited until the claim stage to use this very distinct phrase in the POC. This late introduction of the industry standard term “Parking Charge Notice” is clearly a ‘bait and switch’ tactic and an attempt to dress-up their claim as valid.
36	VCS unreasonably rejected the appeal without any evidence to back-up their reasonable assumption and no chance of a fair, further appeal using an ADR was offered to me as registered keeper.

 

Breach of codes of practice and lack of fair resolution service
37	Nothing in the applicable ICS Code of Practice (“COP”) (exhibit …) to which this operator signs up to and which was in force on the date in question allows for a “Charge Notice”. The COP only provides a definition for, and references, the complete term “Parking Charge Notice”. The term “Charge Notice” never appears in the COP without the qualifying verb ‘parking’. Therefore, issuance of a “Charge Notice" puts VCS outside the scope of the COP.
38	It is my honest belief that VCS are well aware of this deficiency and this is evidenced by the inclusion of the complete phrase “Parking Charge Notice” in the issued POC and is clearly an attempt to retrospectively bring the claim within the scope of the COP.
39	VCS’s appeal service is widely considered a kangaroo court (exhibit …) and no reasonable appeal process was ever offered. In fact, the appeal expressly excludes the registered keeper from the appeal process as  / “What you should do next” / “the driver is entitled to appeal” (exhibit …). No serious appeal was genuinely on offer and no effective resolution was available.

 

Unlawful processing of my personal data
40	The initial act of obtaining my personal data was unlawful, as was the continued use of my personal data to harass and intimidate me having been informed that I was not the driver and clearly not being in possession of proof to the contrary.
41	On reviewing the Code of Practice for the IPC, the applicable Accredited Trade Association (“ATA”) in this instance, I note that the phrase “Parking Charge Notice” appears a total of 12 times and that the phrase “Charge Notice” never appears without the qualifying verb. It is clear that the two phrases refer to two very different documents, only one of which is covered by the COP meaning that VCS are in clear breach of the terms of their industry COP.
42	DVLA allow a private car parking company (“PPC”), such as VCS, to access registered keeper details for a fee. DVLA set out the terms and conditions of access in the Keeper … (“KADOE”) contract with the PPC. PPCs may only access keeper details under KADOE if the adhere to their industry codes of practice (“IPC”).
43	Breaching KADOE would render the lawful basis for processing personal data invalid. Processing of personal data is regulated by the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”). Personal data can only be processed for specific lawful bases (exhibit … s … of the DPA). The ICO have confirmed that PPCs can access personal data held by DVLA for this specific lawful basis (exhibit …). However, obtaining personal data in breach of the KADOE terms and conditions would make processing of that personal data unlawful.
44	Issuing a ‘Charge Notice’ is clearly a breach of the industry COP, meaning that VCS are also in breach of the KADOE terms to which they are bound and which govern their access to personal data held by the DVLA.
45	As VCS are in breach of the industry COP by issuing a ‘Charge Notice’, the lawful basis for processing my data flowing from adhering to the KADOE terms does not apply. It therefore follows that VCS are in breach of the DPA by continuing to process my personal data.
46	Notwithstanding VCS’s obvious breach of KADOE to obtain personal data, it is obviously reasonable for a PPC to obtain and process such data to establish the facts. However, the continued processing of personal data is dependent on the outcome of that initial investigation. It is unreasonable for VCS to make a blanket claim that they can continue to process my personal data using a ‘reasonable assumption’ as a pillar to support legitimate interest as a lawful basis.
47	Neither can VCS use the establishment of legal claims when they would be well aware (mens rea) of the lack of a valid claim. If VCS had hard proof that I was the driver then they would have been duty bound to present it. Without the proof the data processing must stop. This is exactly the type of egregious data processing that the GDPR (DPA 2018 ) would have had in mind.

 

Exaggerated claim and ‘market failure’
48	The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot have exceeded £100 (the industry cap set out in the applicable Code of Practice at the time). I have seen no evidence that the added damages / fees are genuine.
49	VCS will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be: (i)        a strong ‘legitimate interest’ extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and (ii)     ‘adequate notice’ of the ‘penalty clause’ charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines. (iii)   Interest appears to be miscalculated on the whole enhanced sum from day one as if
50	VCS routinely pursues a disproportionate additional fixed sum (inexplicably added per PCN) despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban or substantially reduce the disproportionate 'Debt Fees'. This case is a classic example where the unjust enrichment of exaggerated fees encourages the 'numbers game' of inappropriate and out of control bulk litigation of weak / archive parking cases. No pre-action checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit, position of signs / the vehicle, or a proper cause of action.
51	The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (the DLUHC as it was then, now the DHCLG) first published its statutory Parking Code of Practice on 7th February 2022, here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."
52	Despite legal challenges delaying the Code's implementation (marking it as temporarily 'withdrawn' as shown in the link above) a draft Impact Assessment (“IA”) to finalise the DLUHC Code was recently published on 30th July 2023, which has exposed some industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'Debt Fees'. This is revealed in the Government's analysis, found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf
53	Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 reveal that the parking industry has informed the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the parking industry likes to call debt recovery or ‘enforcement’ (pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per recovery case.
54	With that sum in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an excessive amount, disingenuously added as an extra ‘fee’. This is believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team and has been claimed in addition to the intended ‘legal representatives fees’ cap set within the small claims track rules. This conduct has been examined and found - including in a notably detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds / Bradford circuit - to constitute ‘double recovery’ and the I take this position.
55	The new draft IA now demonstrates that the unnecessarily intimidating stage of pre-action letter-chains actually costs ‘eight times less’ (says the DLUHC analysis) than the price-fixed £70 per PCN routinely added. This has caused consumer harm in the form of hundreds of thousands of inflated CCJs each year that District Judges have been powerless to prevent. This abusively enhanced ‘industry standard’ Debt Fee was enabled only by virtue of the self- serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies, influenced by a Board of parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it.
56	In support of my contention that the sum sought is unconscionably exaggerated and thus unrecoverable, attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 (‘the Beavis case’). Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified ‘admin costs’ inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of a template letter and ‘would appear to be penal.
57	VCS have not incurred any additional costs because the full parking charge (after expiry of discount) is already high and more than covers what the Supreme Court called an ‘automated letter-chain’ business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters in total, including pre-action phase reminders. The £85 parking charge was held to cover the ‘costs of the operation’ and the DLUHC’s IA suggests it should still be the case that the parking charge itself more than covers the minor costs of pre-action stage, even if and when the Government reduces the level of parking charges.
58	Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry and it stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes. The DLUHC’s Secretary of State mentions they are addressing ‘market failure’ more than once in the draft IA, a phrase which should be a clear steer for Courts in 2024 to scrutinise every aspect of claims like this one.
59	In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of POFA the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable. It is also disproportionate and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (“CRA”).

 

CRA Breaches
60	Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the CRA which introduced new requirements for ‘prominence’ of both contract terms and ‘consumer notices’. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.
61	Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well-placed (and lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.
62	The CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).
63	Now for the first time, the DLUHC’s draft IA exposes that template ‘debt chaser’ stage costs less than £9. This shows that HHJ Jackson was right all along in Excel v Wilkinson. (exhibit …)

 cont'd

stop_this_nonsense

cont'd

The Beavis case is against this claim
64	The Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must be determined on their own facts. That ‘unique’ case met a commercial justification test, given the location and clear signs with the charges in the largest/boldest text. Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, that case, in particular, the brief, conspicuous yellow & black warning signs - (exhibit …) - set a high bar that VCS has failed to reach.
65	Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a ‘legitimate interest’ in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor ‘concealed pitfalls or traps’. (exhibit …) for paragraphs from ParkingEye v Beavis).
66	In the present case, VCS has fallen foul of those tests. There are two main issues that render this parking charge to be purely penal (i.e. no legitimate interest saves it) and thus, it is unenforceable as it constitutes a concealed pitfall or trap: (i)       all VCS signage at the airport is prohibitive, and; the signage to the approach road is materially different to the signage used on land subject to statutory control, and (ii)    the position, prominence and wording of the signage on the land subject to statutory control is materially different.

 

Conclusion
67	The claim is entirely without merit and VCS is urged to discontinue now, to avoid incurring costs and wasting the court’s time and that of the Defendant.
68	There is now ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis surely makes that clear because it is now a matter of record that the industry has told the Government that ‘debt recovery’ costs eight times less than they have been claiming in almost every case.
69	The DLUHC’s potential ban (still at review stage) on the false ‘costs’, there is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of the intimidating pre-action demands. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.
70	In the matter of costs, I ask: (i)       standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14; (ii)    a finding of unreasonable conduct by VCS, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5; and, (iii)  a finding of unlawful processing of personal data.
71	Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant’s costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): “Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg)).”

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. 

Coupon-mad

Looks good at first glance.  What are paragraphs 1 and 2?

KeithP

stop_this_nonsense said:

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. 

That statement of truth is several years out of date.

stop_this_nonsense

Thanks @Coupon-madand @KeithP

KeithP said:

stop_this_nonsense said:

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. 

That statement of truth is several years out of date.

I think we need to speak to HMCTS then!  

Verbatim, from the N157:

@Coupon-mad
Paras 1 & 2 are the usual blurb:

Nellymoser

 Noticed typo in 5.1  DHCLG  should be  MHCLG.  It's now Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government

Good luck

stop_this_nonsense

Nellymoser said:

 Noticed typo in 5.1  DHCLG  should be  MHCLG.  It's now Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government

Good luck

Thanks @N@Nellymoser

Now updated.