Civil Enforcement Ltd claim form from back in summer of 2023

womble94

Le_Kirk said:

You need to embed the relevant judgments in your defence as per the defence by @hharry100

I was trying to copy and paste it previously but wasn't working, I've since quoted the post and copied and pasted that way. Thanks

womble94

UncleThomasCobley said:

The "Preliminary matter" should be your paras #2 and #3 then followed by "The facts known by the defendant".

Also, you do know that you need to embed the images of the CEL v Chan transcript after? You can't add the transcript as a pdf file. You must embed the images of the transcript as jpg images.

Thanks, I've done this part now and amended the order of preliminary matter.

womble94

Coupon-mad said:

You can't admit to being the driver on the one hand then say you haven't heard of Bellevue.  Look again at the words I typed. I didn't tell you to say YOU don't know where Bellevue is.

This bit also needs changing to my words because this isn't what I typed, either:

6. The Defendant would like to point out that the payment due date for the alleged event has been scheduled for the 30th of June 2022, this is incorrect. If the alleged event had taken place on the 1st of June 2022, the PCN would not have been received by the registered keeper on the same day.

And you haven't copied the example words on hharry's thread that the Template Defence leads newbies to copy verbatim.

How come no-one this week in their defences seems to be doing what the Template Defence tells everyone to do... is the link within the Comments that leads directly to hharry's thread in some way unclear?

What do I need to say to make it clearer to posters, please?

I wasn't sure if I was copying what you wrote word for word, or put it in my own words. I did state that I wasn't sure if what I had put was correct and was asking for some feedback.

I just realised I missed out from hharry's thread his paragraph 6 which reads:

6.  The claim has been issued via Money Claims Online and, as a result, is subject to a character limit for the Particulars of Claim section of the Claim Form.  The fact that generic wording appears to have been applied has obstructed any semblance of clarity.  The Defendant trusts that the court will agree that a claim pleaded in such generic terms lacks the required details and would have required proper particularisation in a detailed document within 14 days, per 16PD.3.  No such document has been served.

I have since added this and amended the paragraph numbers. I believe that was all that was missed?

womble94

I've just realised I missed out the Wakefield, Luton & Manchester paragraphs - in hharry's thread the pictures were missing so thought they were relating to his case only. I have since found these images in a different thread.

Would these paragraphs come straight after the ' Chan case' paragraph and before The facts known to the Defendant: section?

Coupon-mad

Yes they would.  Very good to add them all; gives you more chance of the case being struck out with no hearing.

womble94

Perfect, adding them on now.

womble94

Between

Full name of parking firm Ltd, not the solicitor!

(Claimant) 

- and -  

Defendant named on claim (can’t be changed to driver now)                        

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE

_________________

1.  The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was in breach of any term.  Further, it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as agents) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the boilerplate text in the Particulars of Claim ('the POC').

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

2. The Defendant draws to the attention of the allocating Judge that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on Appeal).  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

3. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment (transcript below) the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. 

4. Similarly, at the Wakefield County Court on 8th September 2023, District Judge Robinson considered mirror image POC in claim K3GF9183 (Parallel Parking v anon) and struck the Claim out without a hearing. See below.

5.  Likewise, in January 2023 (also without a hearing) District Judge Sprague, sitting at the County Court at Luton, struck out a similarly badly-pleaded parking claim with a full explanation of his reasoning. See below.

6. Furthermore, at Manchester District Judge McMurtrie and District Judge Ranson also struck out a claim (again without a hearing) on the grounds of POC’s lacking clarity, detail, and precision. As stated in the final image below, the Claimant’s solicitors confirmed they would not file an amended POC, demonstrating again the reliance of a number of firms on robo-letters and illegitimate practices, As stated in the final image below, the Claimant’s solicitors - DCBLegal - confirmed they would not file an amended POC

The facts known to the Defendant:

7. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  Conversely, the Claimant sets out a cut-and-paste incoherent and sparse statement of case. The POC appear to be in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". The Defendant is unable, on the basis of the POC, to understand with certainty what case, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond. However, the vehicle is recognised and it is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper and driver.

8. The Defendant had not noticed any signage close to the where he had parked his vehicle, showing the terms and conditions for use. Due to the age of the alleged breach of contract which is nearly 18 months old the Defendant is unable to recall the exact reason for the PCN(s).

9. The particulars of claim is insufficient, that even the location of where the (unidentified) alleged breach occurred is not identified!  'Bellevue' means nothing to the average person.

10. The PCN  - even if posted 1st class on Weds 1st June 2022 (the same day as the alleged event, which it won't have been) - would be deemed served on Friday 3rd June. Add a clear 28 days first, then the soonest that a keeper might be held liable would have been two days later than they state there.  In fact it's later in July because the PCN won't be dated the same day as the alleged event.

11.  The claim has been issued via Money Claims Online and, as a result, is subject to a character limit for the Particulars of Claim section of the Claim Form. The fact that generic wording appears to have been applied has obstructed any semblance of clarity.  The Defendant trusts that the court will agree that a claim pleaded in such generic terms lacks the required details and would have required proper particularisation in a detailed document within 14 days, per 16PD.3.  No such document has been served.

womble94

12. The Defendant believes the Claim should be struck out at Allocation stage and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs.

13. The Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen and that in order to impose an inflated parking charge, as well as proving a term was breached, there must be:

(i). a strong 'legitimate interest' extending beyond mere compensation for loss, and

(Ii). 'Adequate notice' of the 'penalty clause' charge which, in the case of a car park, requires prominent signs and lines.

14. The Defendant denies (i) or (ii) have been met. The charge imposed, in all the circumstances, is a penalty, not saved by ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'), which is fully distinguished.

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently being addressed by UK Government

15. The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot exceed £100 (the industry cap).  It is denied that any 'Debt Fees' or damages were actually paid or incurred by this Claimant, who is put to strict proof of:

(i). the alleged breach, which is not pleaded in the POC and requires further and better particulars, and

(ii). a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced sum in the POC, including how interest was calculated, which looks to be improperly applied on the entire inflated sum, as if that was all overdue on the day of the alleged event.

16. The Defendant avers that this claim is unfair and inflated and it is denied that any sum is due, whether in debt or damages. This Claimant routinely pursues an unconscionable fixed sum added per PCN, despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban it.

17. This case is a classic example where adding exaggerated fees funds the 'numbers game' of bulk litigation of weak and/or archive parking cases.  MoJ statistics of bulk litigators reveal that there are several hundred thousand parking claims per annum, with some 90% causing default CCJs totalling hundreds of millions of pounds.  No checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit or a proper cause of action (given away by the woefully inadequate POC).

18. The Department for Leveling Up, Housing and Communities ('the DLUHC') published a statutory Parking Code of Practice in February 2022, here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice.

The Ministerial Foreword is damning: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

19. Despite legal challenges delaying the Code - marked as temporarily withdrawn - it is thankfully 'live' after a draft Impact Assessment (IA) was published on 30th July 2023. The Government's analysis exposes what they say are industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'fees'. The analysis is found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

20. Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 state that the parking industry has shown the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the former calls debt recovery or 'enforcement' ( = pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per case (not per PCN).

21. With that in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an extreme sum, believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team, not the Claimant.  In this Claim it is additional to the intended 'legal representatives fees' cap set within small claims track rules.  This conduct has been examined and found - including in a detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute 'double recovery'. The Defendant takes that position.

22. The draft IA shows that the intimidating letter-chains actually cost 'eight times less' than the seemingly 'price-fixed' +£70 per PCN. This causes consumer harm in the form of almost half a million wrongly-enhanced CCJs each year, which District Judges are powerless to prevent.  This false fee was enabled by the self-serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies who suddenly aligned in 2021 re allowing +£70, each led by a Board of the very parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

23. It is denied that the purported damages/fee sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of Beavis.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that 'admin costs' inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of template letters and 'would appear to be penal'.

24. This Claimant has not incurred costs. A parking charge model already includes what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' and it is a model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 pre-action letters/reminders and the £85 'PCN' was held to more than cover the minor costs of the operation.  The DLUHC's IA confirms that the parking charge more than covers the minor costs of the letters (NB: the debt collectors do not charge anything in failed collection cases).

25. Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, all non-monetary clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry. The 2022 DLUHC Code will replace the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes, which are not regulated and carry limited weight.  In a clear steer for the Courts and for the avoidance of doubt: the DLUHC say they are addressing 'market failure'.

26. In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper.  Further, the Claimant is put to strict proof of POFA compliance.

27. The Defendant avers that the DLUHC's analysis now overrides plainly wrong assumptions made by Circuit Judges steered by Counsel in astonishingly weak appeal cases that the parking industry engineered their way: Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy. Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals cherry-picked litigant-in-person consumers without the wherewithal to appeal. Incorrect presumptions were made in every case; and there were major evidence discrepancies (e.g. in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority). One Judge inexplicably sought out for himself and quoted from the wrong Code of Practice (Percy). In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was wrongly aligned with the agreed contract in Beavis.

28. The Defendant avers that there was no agreement to pay a parking charge or added 'damages' which were not even incurred, let alone quantified in bold, prominent text. This Claimant failed to erect well-placed, large and readable signs on a par with the yellow & black warnings seen in Beavis, and unlike the signage requirements set out in the DLUHC Code which reflects the already statutory requirement for 'prominence' (Consumer Rights Act 2015 - the 'CRA'). 

CRA breaches

29. Section 71 CRA creates a statutory duty upon Courts to consider the test of fairness whether a party raises it or not. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3):

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450440/Unfair_Terms_Main_Guidance.pdf

30. The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both terms and 'consumer notices'.  In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of 'signs & lines' and all communications intended to be read by consumers. Signage must be prominent (lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

31.  The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the duties of fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished

32.  Unlike in Beavis, the penalty rule remains engaged, not least due to the unconscionable added 'Fee'.  The CRA covers disproportionate sums, which are not exempt from being assessed for fairness because a 'fee' is not the core price term and neither was it prominently proclaimed on the signs.

33. The Supreme Court held that deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms or cumbersome obligations ('concealed pitfalls or traps').  In the present case, the Claimant has failed those tests, with small signs, hidden terms and minuscule small print that is incapable of binding a driver.  Court of Appeal authorities about a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (Lord Denning's ‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space''.

34.  Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the DLUHC Code and these clauses are supported by the BPA & IPC. In Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t." 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

35. DVLA data is only supplied if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority to form contracts at this site in their name.  The Claimant is put to strict proof of their standing to litigate.

36. The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The DLUHC Code shows that genuine disputes such as this should see PCNs canceled, had a fair ADR existed.  The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject most disputes: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (2020 Annual Report).  This consumer blame culture and reliance upon their own 'appeals service' (described by MPs as a kangaroo court and about to be replaced by the Government) should lead Judges to know that a fair appeal was never on offer.

Conclusion

37. There is now evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims that are causing consumer harm.  The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis shows that the usual letter-chain costs eight times less than the sum claimed for it.  The claim is entirely without merit and the POC embarrassing.  The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out.

38. In the matter of costs, the Defendant seeks:

(a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, and further costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.

39.  Attention is drawn to the (often-seen) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not 'normally' apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."  

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signature:

Date:

womble94

the images are missing for the wakefield. luton and manchester but will be there when putting it into a PDF.

I believe I have covered everything..

Coupon-mad

Change 10 to:

10.  There is a further matter negating any cause of action, namely a likely defective Notice to Keeper (NTK) and incorrect 'payment due date' in the POC.  This point relies on Schedule 4 paragraph 8 or 9 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (the POFA) and the Defendant will raise various issues, including probable non-compliant NTK wording and an apparently incorrect statement in the POC regarding what appears to be the alleged date of keeper liability ('payment due date - 30th June 2022').  This has the object or effect of these pleadings attempting to allege keeper liability wrongfully, and/or earlier than the law would allow, even for a case with a compliant NTK. The Claimant's POC has unreasonably shortened the statutory 28 day period by several days or even weeks, which has had the additional unreasonable effect of backdating interest incorrectly.  Even if posted 1st class on Weds 1st June 2022 (the same day as the alleged event, which it cannot have been) a NTK would be deemed served on Friday 3rd June.  Adding the POFA's statutory 28 days starting with the day after service of the NTK, the soonest that the 'right to recover from the keeper' might exist would have been two days later than this Claimant states in their POC.  In fact, it would have been even later in July 2022 because it would have been impossible for a postal NTK (which the Defendant does not hold - the Claimant is put to strict proof) to have been dated/posted the same day as the parking event. Further, the generic POC omits whether or not a windscreen PCN was served first; a vital detail which affects liability dates by at least a month and would have clarified whether the Claimant seeks to rely on POFA paragraph 8 or paragraph 9.  The Defendant (and court) is reduced to guesswork.

Then swap para 9 and 10 because that will flow better, I think.

Remove 'and driver' from the end of your first facts paragraph.  Remove this from the start of your next paragraph:

The Defendant had not noticed any signage close to the where he had parked his vehicle, showing the terms and conditions for use. 

I don't think this defence should say who was driving.

Move 11 and 12 up to above your facts sub-heading and re-number.

And where you introduce CEL v Chan add a line pointing out that this is the same generic POC, and the same Claimant.