I have received a Court Claim Form and am looking for help with my defence. Link Parking & BW Legal.

dittopee

I, the owner of the car, live in a block of flats in a relatively new estate (5 years) which has recently moved its parking enforcement over to a private company. I do not park on the estate as it on an allocation basis and I rent a parking space at a local supermarket.
The driver of the car had stopped in what had always assumed to have been a visitor bay while it was loaded up for a journey back up to our home town. The reason for this unplanned journey was because the driver of the car's mother was dying and the driver needed to go and provide palliative care for them as they are a nurse.  When we came back down to the car with what was being loaded, we found that we had been issued a PCN. We attempted to appeal the PCN with Link Parking on their web portal but each time we pressed submit it gave a 'couldn't process request' error message. We tried to appeal again when we had a letter from their legal representatives BW Legal but they didn't reply and have now been served a Court Claim Form. We are proposing the following defence and would appreciate any help or feedback;



I am putting forward a defence against this claim as I believe it is predatory and without merit.

The claimant is asserting that the car which I am the registered owner of was parked in breach of contract. I am denying that a contract existed between the claimant and myself for the following reasons;

1. As the evidential photographs provided by the claimants themselves shows, the lack of adequate signage at the site resulted in no contractual agreement being formed. Furthermore, there is an  absence of entrance signage, which is required by the IPC code of practice part E schedule 1. I believe this to be an example of predatory tactics as outlined in the IPC code of conduct 14.1, meaning that it would be very easy to not have been aware of any contractual terms. In contrast to the case of ‘Beavis V Parking Eye’, where an undisputed contract was established through entrance signs and prominently displayed signage with large lettering, the charge claimed against me lacks clear prominence and fails to meet the requirements set forth by the consumer rights act 2015. I believe it is important to also highlight that the time at which the car was stopped for loading (22:35) would have made it even harder to notice this parking sign, and near impossible to read. 

It is essential to note that the provision of "adequate notice of the parking charge" is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the IPC Code of Practice. However, the signs in question fail to clearly indicate the parking charge, as it is concealed in small print. Furthermore, in the photographic evidence supplied by the claimant the signage has sections missing from it due to damage, meaning it is illegible. I would suggest that no contract can be made if the terms and conditions of the contract is not complete. According to Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the notice should have been unmistakable, featuring "red letters with a red hand pointing to it," signifying a high level of clarity and prominence, similar to what was established in the 'Beavis' car park case. Taking into account a reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the IPC Code of Practice, the parking charge and the terms should have been displayed in a much more transparent manner, utilising significantly larger lettering. Furthermore, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 includes a requirement for transparency.

I dispute that the driver would have agreed to pay the initial demand of £100 to enter into the alleged contract if the terms and conditions had been properly displayed and easily accessible.

2. I believe the absence of a contract is asserted further due to forbidding signage. The Parking Charge Notice (PCN) claims that it was issued because I failed to "display a valid permit." However, the wording on the signage, stating that "parking is for those displaying a valid permit," unequivocally indicates that parking is authorised only for permit holders. A fair interpretation can only conclude that non-permit holders are not authorised to park. The terms on the sign do not offer an opportunity for any defendant to obtain a valid permit, hence no contract can be considered to have been formed, as no offer to park has been extended to unauthorised vehicles. An offer and subsequent agreement are fundamental aspects of a legally binding contract. The act of the driver of an unauthorised vehicle paying a parking charge cannot be deemed as granting authorisation to park. Signage that permits parking solely for authorised vehicles cannot be interpreted as offering a contract to unauthorised drivers by introducing terms that require a driver to violate the clear contractual requirement of the initial term. Essentially, the claimant argues that a contract has been formed by breaching one, which I believe is legally nonsensical.

I see that this point was recently tested in the County Court at High Wycombe in the case of Parking Control Management (UK) Ltd v Bull & 2 Others (B4GF26K6, 21 April 2016), where District Judge Glen dismissed all three claims, concluding that the wording on the sign, similar to that used in this claim, did not constitute a contract.

I believe that the claimant has intentionally created ambiguity through selective wording on the signage. This is unfair according to the terms of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which states that "where a term in a consumer contract is ambiguous and capable of being interpreted in different ways, the meaning that is most favourable to the consumer should prevail." I feel that this is further supported by the 'contra proferentum' rule, which broadly states that "where there is doubt about the meaning of a contract, the words will be construed against the person who presented them." It is evident from the wording on the signage in this case that the terms with the largest font should take precedence.

The absence of a legally binding contract would therefore render this as a claim of trespass against unauthorised vehicles, a claim that can only be made by the landowner, which I would also deny as the vehicle did not stop in a manner that can be considered as parking.

3. I would also suggest that no contract was formed due to the failure to provide sufficient grace periods, which are intended to allow individuals enough time to read and decide whether they agree to the contract terms. Adequate grace periods typically range from 5 to 15 minutes.

It's worth noting that the British Parking Association (BPA) and the International Parking Community (IPC), which are trade associations representing private parking companies, have established guidelines that recommend providing a short grace period for permit-related parking. These guidelines suggest a grace period of at least 10 minutes for vehicles without a valid permit.

These guidelines are considered best practices. If a private parking company is a member of the BPA or IPC, which the claimants client claims to be, they are expected to follow their respective Code of Practice, which includes these grace period recommendations. 

The defendant would like to emphasise that the vehicle was stopped for a mere five minutes while the driver loaded the car. This brief duration was necessary as the driver needed to quickly return home to care for their terminally ill mother. The circumstances surrounding the driver’s mother's health condition demanded urgent attention, and it was paramount for them to expedite their departure. Given the short duration and the extenuating circumstances, it is reasonable to argue that the driver’s actions should be seen as within the scope of reasonable behaviour rather than a violation of any parking regulations.

According to a recent appeal case that I read, ‘B9GF0A9E’ in Oxford County Court, ‘JOPSON V HOME GUARD SERVICES’, Senior Circuit Judge Charles Harris QC clarified the definition of parking. He distinguished between brief stopping for loading, and parking, which he defined as a more long-term arrangement. This aligns with Lord Neuberger's view in Moncrieff and Another v Jamieson and others, where he stated that parking vehicles refers to stationing them on a longer term basis, while the coming and going of vehicles for various purposes, including loading and unloading, falls outside that definition.

In this particular case, the conduct cannot be considered as parking but rather as the normal act of loading a vehicle. It appears to be a private parking site with inadequate signage and lack of clear indication as a no-stopping zone, which I believe makes this a potentially predatory situation. 

I think it is also worth noting at this point that I pay £125 per month for a parking space in [REDACTED] and have done so since [REDACTED]. I can provide payment proof of this if needed. I suggest that this shows that there would be no need for my car to be ‘parked’ at this location and reinforces my assertion that the car was stopped there only temporarily for loading.

4. Following on from my argument that a contract had not been entered into, I believe that even if a contract were to exist, it would be non-binding, as it fails to meet the informational requirements for contracts outlined in the ‘Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation, and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013’, enacted on 13 June 2014. Clause 13(1) of that act states that before the consumer is bound by a distance contract, the trader;

“must give or make available to the consumer the information listed in Schedule 2 in a clear and comprehensible manner, and in a way appropriate to the means of distance communication used.”

The reasons provided by the claimant for the issued charge, as evidenced by the PCN and NTK, demonstrate that the charge is a penalty rather than a mere invoice, as would be expected in an agreed contract. Therefore, the alleged charge cannot be justified by the case law established in ‘ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67’, which confirmed that the penalty rule is applicable in any private parking charge case and was only exempted due to the unique circumstances of that specific case, which involved prominent lettering on the signs, unlike the situation presented in this claim.

The government has acknowledged the issue of predatory practices by parking companies and has expressed its intention to address the matter. In a press release titled 'New measures to protect consumers from debt claims,' parking companies have been specifically mentioned, with promises to assess their role and improve how drivers are informed about fines. The Department for Communities and Local Government is also committed to taking further actions to tackle poor practices by private parking companies.

I am also offering a defence to this claim due to what I believe to be an unfair appeal process. 

I attempted to appeal the PCN using the Link Parking appeals portal but due a technical issue with their website the appeal would not submit. Again, I have photo evidence of this if required.

I also attempted to appeal the PCN by replying to the claimant’s emails and despite getting an acknowledgement email, I did not receive any reply. 

Paragraph 8 of the Ministry of Justice practice directions states that “litigation should be the last resort” but this certainly cannot be argued in this case.

I believe that BW Legal, as a solicitor firm experienced in handling private parking matters on a daily basis, should have no excuse for their inadequate pre-action conduct and the submission of deficient particulars of claim. I would argue that these failures have resulted in a violation of the following practice direction sections;

3a (understanding each other's position) 

3c (attempting to settle the issues without litigation) 

3f (minimising costs by avoiding unnecessary engagement of solicitors).

I believe that the claimant's solicitors have repeatedly abused the court process. The initial provision of inadequate particulars exemplifies BW Legal's habit of employing a "Cut and Paste" approach to proceedings, displaying a lack of respect for the court's dignity and a disregard for the claimant's obligations in upholding the court's overriding objectives.

The claimant and their associated solicitors' poor information exchanges not only directly violate pre-conduct protocols that require all measures to be taken to resolve the matter, but also indicate their unreasonable conduct and an unwillingness to pursue a mediated resolution, which is incompatible with the role of a party seeking such a resolution.

Finally, for some additional background context, I have lived at this address for 5 years and the road on which the car was being loaded was always visitor parking. I was aware that there had been a recent change to the parking allocation on the estate as we were offered the opportunity to enter into a ballot for a parking space, and I had noticed that the bays directly outside my block had been clearly delineated and marked. In comparison, the bays on the section of road in which my car was stopped are not clearly marked and I had assumed that these continued to be for visitors and temporary loading.

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

This concludes my defence against the claim put forward. I would like to thank you for your time and consideration in this matter. 

Coupon-mad

Not recommended that you write a defence from scratch.  It looks like you haven't stopped to read any sticky threads yet.

We do defences and win parking court cases every day here. Just copy & adapt our template defence that has far more to it.  In the Template Defence sticky Announcement thread.

And search the forum for Jopson HHJ Harris defence to find suitable words for paragraph 3 in the template defence. Loads like yours to copy from, already written about loading/unloading at a residential site.

Only look at NEWEST results (change the search from 'best match').

What's the date of issue of the claim form?

And on what date does MCOL show you did the AOS, as shown in pictures in the NEWBIES FAQS sticky thread second post.

(Both sticky threads are where my words below - my forum 'signature' - tell everyone to click so you don't need another link, there are two hyperlinks back to the first page of the forum already on this page and one is right under the reply box below).

dittopee

Thank you for replying. 

I have been looking at the newbie threat but I don’t realise there was a defence template.
My bad. 

I will look at that now. 

The claim form was issues on the 16th June. 

The acknowledgment was sent and received on the 23rd June. 

KeithP

dittopee said:

The claim form was issues on the 16th June. 

The acknowledgment was sent and received on the 23rd June. 

With a Claim Issue Date of 16th June, and having filed an Acknowledgment of Service in a timely manner, you have until 4pm on Wednesday 19th July 2023 to file your Defence.

That's over two weeks away. Plenty of time to produce a Defence, but please don't leave it to the last minute.

To create a Defence, and then file a Defence by email, look at the second post in the NEWBIES thread.

Don't miss the deadline for filing a Defence.

Do not try and file a Defence via the MoneyClaimOnline website. Once an Acknowledgment of Service has been filed, the MCOL website should be treated as 'read only'.

dittopee

Thank you for all this info. 
This forum is bloody brilliant. 
I might get a bit of time to do my defence again later today but if not I'll have it complete by next Thursday. 
Once again thank you, I really do appreciate your help with this. 

dittopee

Good afternoon all. I have rewritten my defence using the template on the forum. 
I would really appreciate it if you could check it over to see if it's ok before I submit it. 
Thank you. 

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  xxxxxx

Between

*********

(Claimant) 

- and -  

*********                      

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE

 

1. The parking charges referred to in this claim did not arise from any agreement of terms. The charge and the claim was an unexpected shock. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was a breach of any prominent term and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the Particulars.

 

The facts as known to the Defendant:

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle but not the driver.

3. The defendant is putting forward a defence against this claim as they believe it is predatory and without merit.

The claimant is asserting that the car which the defendant is the registered owner of was parked in breach of contract. The defendant is denying that a contract existed between the claimant and themselves for the following reasons;

1. As the evidential photographs provided by the claimants themselves shows, the lack of adequate signage at the site resulted in no contractual agreement being formed. Furthermore, there is an absence of entrance signage, which is required by the IPC code of practice part E schedule 1. The defendant believes it is important to also highlight that the time at which the car was stopped for loading (22:35) would have made it even harder to notice this parking sign, and near impossible to read. 

2. The defendant believes the absence of a contract is asserted further due to forbidding signage. The Parking Charge Notice (PCN) claims that it was issued because there was a failure to "display a valid permit." However, the wording on the signage, stating that "parking is for those displaying a valid permit," unequivocally indicates that parking is authorised only for permit holders. A fair interpretation can only conclude that non-permit holders are not authorised to park. The terms on the sign do not offer an opportunity for any defendant to obtain a valid permit, hence no contract can be considered to have been formed, as no offer to park has been extended to unauthorised vehicles. An offer and subsequent agreement are fundamental aspects of a legally binding contract. The act of the driver of an unauthorised vehicle paying a parking charge cannot be deemed as granting authorisation to park. Signage that permits parking solely for authorised vehicles cannot be interpreted as offering a contract to unauthorised drivers by introducing terms that require a driver to violate the clear contractual requirement of the initial term. Essentially, the claimant argues that a contract has been formed by breaching one, which the defendant believes is legally nonsensical.

This point was recently tested in the County Court at High Wycombe in the case of Parking Control Management (UK) Ltd v Bull & 2 Others (B4GF26K6, 21 April 2016), where District Judge Glen dismissed all three claims, concluding that the wording on the sign, similar to that used in this claim, did not constitute a contract.

The defendant strongly believes that the claimant has intentionally created ambiguity through selective wording on the signage. This is unfair according to the terms of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which states that "where a term in a consumer contract is ambiguous and capable of being interpreted in different ways, the meaning that is most favourable to the consumer should prevail." This is further supported by the 'contra proferentum' rule, which broadly states that "where there is doubt about the meaning of a contract, the words will be construed against the person who presented them." It is evident from the wording on the signage in this case that the terms with the largest font should take precedence.

3. The defendant would also suggest that no contract was formed due to the failure to provide sufficient grace periods, which are intended to allow individuals enough time to read and decide whether they agree to the contract terms. Adequate grace periods typically range from 5 to 15 minutes.

The defendant would like to emphasise that the vehicle was stopped for a mere five minutes while the driver loaded the car. This brief duration was necessary as the driver needed to quickly return home to care for their terminally ill mother. The circumstances surrounding the driver’s mother's health condition demanded urgent attention, and it was paramount for them to expedite their departure. Given the short duration and the extenuating circumstances, it is reasonable to argue that the driver’s actions should be seen as within the scope of reasonable behaviour rather than a violation of any parking regulations.

The defendant would also believe it worth noting at this point that they pay £125 per month for a parking space in [REDACTED] and have done so since [REDACTED]. Proof of payment proof of this is available if needed. The defendant suggests that this shows that there would be no need for their car to be ‘parked’ at this location and reinforces their assertion that the car was stopped there only temporarily for loading.

The defendant is also offering a defence to this claim due to what they believe to be an unfair appeal process. 

The defendant attempted to appeal the PCN using the Link Parking appeals portal but due a technical issue with their website the appeal would not submit. Again, photo evidence of this is available if required.

The defendant also attempted to appeal the PCN by replying to the emails BWlegal sent and despite getting an acknowledgement email. A reply was not received.

Finally, for some additional background context, the defendant has lived at this address for 5 years and the road on which the car was being loaded was always visitor parking. They were aware that there had been a recent change to the parking allocation on the estate as they were offered the opportunity to enter into a ballot for a parking space, and they had noticed that the bays directly outside their block had been clearly delineated and marked. In comparison, the bays on the section of road in which their car was stopped are not clearly marked hence the assumption that these continued to be for visitors and temporary loading.

4. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  To pre-empt the usual template responses from this serial litigator: the court process is outside of the Defendant's life experience and they cannot be criticised for using, in part, pre-written wording suggested by a reliable online help resource. The Claimant is urged not to patronise the Defendant with (ironically template) unfounded accusations of not understanding their defence. 

5. With regard to template statements, the Defendant observes after researching other parking claims, that the Particulars of Claim ('POC') set out a cut-and-paste incoherent statement of case.  In breach of the pre-action protocol for 'Debt' Claims, no copy of the contract (sign) accompanied any Letter of Claim.  The POC is sparse on facts and specific breach allegations, which makes it difficult to respond in depth at this time; however this claim is unfair, generic and inflated.  

6.  This Claimant continues to pursue a disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that this is now likely to be confirmed as banned by the Government this year. It is denied that the purported 'damages' or 'debt fee' sought was incurred or is recoverable. Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal'.

7. This finding is underpinned by the Government, who stated in 2022 that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here:

8. Whilst the new Code is temporarily stalled for a final Impact Assessment, it is anticipated that adding false costs/damages or 'fees' to enhance a parking charge claim is likely to remain banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the (stalled but incoming in 2023) statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued." 

9. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as this claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

10. The DLUHC consulted for over two years, considering evidence from a wide range of stakeholders.  Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers.  Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt/robo-claim firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis, seeking to inflate these claims with 'costs/damages' in addition to the strictly capped legal fees the small claims track allows.  

11. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit.  In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters including reminders.  The parking charge was held to cover that work.

12. The driver did not agree to pay a parking charge, let alone these unknown costs, which were not quantified in prominent text on signage.

13. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice.  The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'.  A clear steer for the Courts which it is hoped overrides mistakes made in a few appeal cases that the parking industry desperately rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy).

dittopee

14.  Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals saw Circuit Judges led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and the litigant-in-person consumers lacked the wherewithal to appeal. In case this Claimant tries to rely upon these, the Defendant avers that errors were made in every case.  Evidence was either overlooked (including signage discrepancies in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the BPA Code of Practice and the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority) or the Judge inexplicably sought out and quoted from the wrong Code altogether (Percy).  In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was unfairly aligned with the admitted parking contract in Beavis. Those learned Judges were not in possession of the same level of information as the DLUHC, whose incoming statutory Code of Practice now clarifies such matters as a definition of 'parking' as well as consideration and grace periods and minor matters such as 'keying errors' or 'fluttering tickets/permits' where a PCN should not have been issued at all, or should have been cancelled in the pre-action dispute phase.

 

POFA and CRA breaches

15. Pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a firm may have complied with other POFA requirements (adequate signage, Notice to Keeper wording/dates, and a properly communicated 'relevant contract/relevant obligation').  If seeking keeper/hirer liability - unclear from the POC - the Claimant is put to strict proof of full compliance and liability transferred. 

16. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA').  The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'.  In a parking context, this includes signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

17. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer.  Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well placed and lit, and all terms unambiguous and obligations clear. The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith. 

 

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished (lack of legitimate interest/prominence of terms)

18. ParkingEye overcame the possibility of their £85 charge being dismissed as punitive, however the Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must each be determined on their own facts.  That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, and took into account the prominent yellow/black uncluttered signs with £85 in the largest/boldest text.  Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, the Beavis case facts set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

19. Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor 'concealed pitfalls or traps'.

20.  In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. The Claimant’s small signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, and are considered incapable of binding a driver.  Consequently, it remains the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous 'penalty' was seen or agreed.  Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge, include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space'' (NB: when parking operator Claimants cite Vine, they often mislead courts by quoting out of context, Roch LJ's words about the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio).  

21. Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the statutory Code and this is supported by the BPA & IPC Trade Bodies.  In November 2020's Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike." 

 

Lack of standing or landowner authority, and lack of ADR

22. DVLA data is only supplied to pursue parking charges if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that this Claimant (an agent of a principal) has authority from the landowner to issue charges in this place in their own name.  The Claimant is put to strict proof that they have standing to make contracts with drivers and litigate in their own name.

23.  The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The Appeals Annex in the new incoming statutory Code shows that genuine disputes such as this would see the charge cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  Whether or not a person engaged with it, the Claimant's consumer blame culture and reliance upon the industry's own 'appeals service' should not sway the court into a belief that a fair appeal was ever on offer. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and reject almost any dispute: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (IPC's 2020 Annual Report).  

 

Conclusion

24. The claim is entirely without merit. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

25. There is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of intimidating pre-action threats.

26. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

27.  Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) distinct possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Date:

dittopee

Ive taken the links out as im not allowed to post links being a newbie. 

B789

Too much "War & Peace" in your added paragraphs. That will all be put in your WS at a later date. Your defence paragraphs should be short and punchy, hooks that your WS will hang on.

Search for some other defences where you can see how to format your paras #2 and #3.

Coupon-mad

You only need to show us the words you have added, and it needs to be more concise.  You will be able to elaborate later and provide evidence, at Witness Statement stage.

Numbering needs to be sequential, with every paragraph having a separate number.

dittopee

Thank you so much for your ongoing help - I have taken note of your previous reply and made some amendments;

The facts as known to the Defendant:

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle but not the driver.

3. The defendant is putting forward a defence against this claim as they believe it is predatory and without merit. The claimant is asserting that the car which the defendant is the registered owner of was parked in breach of contract. The defendant is denying that a contract existed between the claimant and themselves for the following reasons;

3.1. As the evidential photographs provided by the claimants themselves shows, the lack of adequate signage at the site resulted in no contractual agreement being formed. Furthermore, there is an absence of entrance signage, 

3.2. The defendant believes the absence of a contract is asserted further due to forbidding signage. The Parking Charge Notice (PCN) claims that it was issued because there was a failure to "display a valid permit." However, the wording on the signage, stating that "parking is for those displaying a valid permit," unequivocally indicates that parking is authorised only for permit holders. Essentially, the claimant argues that a contract has been formed by breaching one, which the defendant believes is legally nonsensical.

3.3. The defendant strongly believes that the claimant has intentionally created ambiguity through selective wording on the signage. 3. The defendant would also suggest that no contract was formed due to the failure to provide sufficient grace periods, which are intended to allow individuals enough time to read and decide whether they agree to the contract terms. Adequate grace periods typically range from 5 to 15 minutes.

3.4. The defendant would like to emphasise that the vehicle was stopped for a mere five minutes while the driver loaded the car, on a section of road that was believed to be unmarked. This brief duration was necessary as the driver needed to quickly return home to care for their terminally ill mother. 

3.5. The defendant is also offering a defence to this claim due to what they believe to be an unfair appeal process.