CCJ dispute - need your help please !!

IMANK

The statement of trurth in the old witness statement is old. I thought I could add the statement of truth again at the bottom on the new WS? I have also added new defensive points in the new WS which were not covered in the old one, especailly those on Protection of Freedoms Act,  Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, CPR rules as I was not as clear as enough in old one. 

Is this not needed? 

KeithP

IMANK said:

The statement of trurth in the old witness statement is old. I thought I could add the statement of truth again at the bottom on the new WS? 

Post deleted - not up to the standard demanded by @Coupon-mad.

Coupon-mad

But the old SOT doesn't matter, like I said.

IMANK

I found the sekelton argument posted in Brokenchief. There is overlap in some of the points so added / edited where it is relevant.  I am not sure if I have got the logic and the order of the arguments correct? 

Does this look fine to send to the court? I am really nervous as I have never been involved in legals and disputes.

Thank you so much for your help. I really apprecaite it. 

SKELETON ARGUMENT

I am -------- of Flat 17 Raffles House, 67 Brampton Grove, Hendon NW4 4BU and I am the Defendant in this matter.

This is to support of my application dated 01/12/2022 to 

1. Set aside the Default Judgment dated 12/08/2022 as it was not properly served at my current address;

2. Order for the original claim to be dismissed as it was not served within 4 months of the issue, pursuant to CPR 7.5 and the Claimant having failed to apply for an extension, pursuant to CPR 7.6.

3. Order for the claimant to pay the defendant £275 as reimbursement for the set aside fee. In addition £190 due to Defendant’s time in preparation (10 hours as a litigant in person at a rate of £19 per hour) 

1.1 This Claim was served at an old address;151 Bradstowe House, Harrow, HA1 1EL. where the Defendant had moved out on 16/03/2020, more than two years before this claim was made on 22 April 2022. In support of this I have provided a copy of my council tax statements, showing change of address confirmation from Harrow and Barnet councils (Evidence A), and V5C copy from the DVLA (Evidence showing the change to my new current address, Flat 17 Raffles House, 67 Brampton Grove, Hendon NW4 4BU on 12/03/2020.

1.2. Defendant lived in the old address;151 Bradstowe House, Harrow, HA1 1EL for a year paying rent for a parking slot under the building. During that time, the Defendant received a few tickets from CPM which were dealt with and canceled immediately by the landlord. This particular ticket was never sent to the Defendant. Defendant was at that address for 6 months after the issue date of this ticket, but did not receive any parking charge notices.

1.3. A requirement of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is that any Notice to Keeper served by the Claimant must be served within 14 days of the date of the alleged incident. Within 14 days of the incident in question, I was still residing at: OLD ADDRESS 151 Bradstowe House, Harrow, HA1 1EL, i.e., the address used by the Claimant. During this time, or at any time before my departure on 16/03/2020, I have not received any documentation from the Claimant at said address. I submit the Claimant has not complied with the requirements of the Act and thus cannot claim this charge against me as the Registered Keeper in any case.

1.4. DVLA address data may not be accurate. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the keeper to name the driver or to pay, or to inform the keeper they will be liable if not, and about their right to appeal.

1.4.1 The system is called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event) because it is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updated a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA failed to note a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out.

1.4.2. The DVLA keeper data may be outdated (i.e. the keeper cannot be reached at that address) for millions of motorists as reported in Birmingham Live on 3 November 2021. The parking industry knows this, hence Codes of Practice direct that further address checks must be made. This is further evidence that DVLA address data should not be solely relied upon, especially with DVLA processing delays.

1.4.3.  The KADOE address is not provided by the DVLA as a 'court claim service address' and cannot be relied upon, because it's an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it's where the car was reported 'kept' last time the DVLA heard).

1.4.4  There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is or was a valid address where a Defendant can be served, especially months or years later, especially where there is reason to believe letters are not being received. Silence after sending a Notice to Keeper, a reminder and then a Letter before Claim is a clear indicator that the keeper may not live there.

1.4.5. A claim sent to an old DVLA address with no soft trace checks (costing as low as 29 pence and offered free by debt collectors connected to the parking industry) fails to meet the BPA Code of Practice and fails to satisfy the specific 'pre-action Protocol for debt claims' and is in breach of the CPRs about the obligation to take 'reasonable steps' to check a Defendant's address so that service is effective.

1.5.  The Right Honourable Sir Oliver Heald on 23 December 2016 "announced a crackdown on unresolved debts which can damage people’s credit ratings without them knowing. The action comes after concerns were raised that companies were issuing claims to consumers using incorrect addresses." The Minister added "It cannot be right that people who are unaware of debts can see their lives and finances ruined by county court judgments. That in the digital age, we must ensure companies pursuing unpaid debts make every reasonable effort to contact individuals, rather than simply relying on a letter to an old address.”

1.6. Claimant has behaved unreasonably in pursuing a claim against the defendant without ensuring they held the correct contact details at the time of the claim. As a residential parking site operator acting on behalf of the landlord (ie. as agents), they did not even email the landlord to check if the tenant is still living in the building. This is a failure to make even the most basic checks prior to commencing proceedings.

1.7.  On that basis, Defendant believes the Claimant has not adhered to CPR 6.9 (3) where they had failed to show due diligence in using an address at which the Defendant no longer resides. The claimant did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of my current residence despite having 25 months to establish an address. This has led to a defective service and an irregular judgment.

1.8. Under CPR 13.2 The court must set aside a judgment entered under part 12 if judgment was wrongly entered.  Given that CPR 6.9 (3) was not met, CPR 13.2 applies and the CCJ should be set aside. As the defendant did not give an address to the claimant at which the claim could be served at (because the defendant was not asked), CPR 6.9 applies. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."

1.9. Given that more than 4 months had passed from issue of proceedings and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served) the Defendant submits that this particular claim is dead and the period for service cannot be extended by this application process.  The Defendant had no details of this claim, therefore, if the Claimant believes there is a cause of action then the correct procedure would be to file a claim afresh and to the right address, after furnishing the Defendant with the information required under the pre-action protocol for debt claims, issued this time to the correct address for service for this Defendant, which is Flat 17 Raffles House, 67 Brampton Grove, Hendon, NW4 4BU

2.9.1 There are several authorities for this, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC) (please see attached Boxwood.pdf)  , which is a reminder of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6(3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.

2.9.2. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784 (please see attached Vinos.pdf)  the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have power to do so.

2.9.3. In judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch)  (please see attached Croke.pdf) the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial (which is attached) Deputy Master Marsh stated “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out." 

2.9.4. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB) (please see attached Pipenbrock.pdf) the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity.

“Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules…Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form…I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side…

In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired…

Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20].”

Mr Justice Nicklin concluded, “The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.”

1.10.  The Claimant, or their legal representatives, has added an additional sum of £215 to the original £100 parking charge. The Claimant is not complying  with Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 with the sum that it has sought through this claim. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper which is £100 in this instance. It is submitted that this is an attempt at double recovery by the Claimant, which the Court should not uphold, even in the event that Judgment for Claimant is awarded.

1.11.Defendant was in her 40th week of pregnancy on the date of the alleged offense.  I had strong contractions on the date of offense as well as the last weeks of the pregnancy which prevented fitting the car perfectly in the bay. In support of this I have provided a copy of my son’s birth certificate (Evidence C). 

1.12. This CCJ has caused undue hardships for the Defendant, whose credit rating have been debunked to near useless values, resulting in her mortgage application being declined and not being able to provide a home for her child. Defendant has a three year old son who is vulnerable and is put at risk by the actions of the Claimant.

 

1.13.For all or any of the reasons stated above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly. I ask the court of its own volition to strike out this claim and to order the Claimant to refund the Defendant's costs for attending, namely the £275 Court fee in bringing this set aside case, despite not being shown to be liable for any parking charge at all.

I believe that the facts stated in this defense are true

Le_Kirk

You don't need a statement of truth after a skeleton argument.

Fruitcake

You still need the longer statement of truth. Just remember that this isn't a defence when you write the statement.

Coupon-mad

Nor do you need this intro in a skelly:

I am -------- of Flat xx xxxxxxxx House, xx Bxxxxxxx Gxxxxand I am the Defendant in this matter.

Nor this (it should have been in your WS):

"I had strong contractions on the date of offense as well as the last weeks of the pregnancy which prevented fitting the car perfectly in the bay. In support of this I have provided a copy of my son’s birth certificate (Evidence C).
1.12. This CCJ has caused undue hardships for the Defendant, whose credit rating have been debunked to near useless values, resulting in her mortgage application being declined and not being able to provide a home for her child. Defendant has a three year old son who is vulnerable and is put at risk by the actions of the Claimant.
1.13.For all or any of the reasons stated above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly. I ask the court of its own volition to strike out this claim and to order the Claimant to refund the Defendant's costs for attending, namely the £275 Court fee in bringing this set aside case, despite not being shown to be liable for any parking charge at all."


The skelly is not the place for personal testimony.  The skelly is ONLY the legal argument and attaches the 4 authorities and the right Code of Practice. Nothing else.

Maybe you do need a second WS as well, if the previous one missed out evidence you want to rely on.  Did the previous WS attach proof of your move/ address and not much else?

IMANK

in the previous WS, I did not attach any evidence, even no proof on moving address. 

I am worrried that I would confuse the judge on multipule documetns and how I would manage to go through them all in the court. 

Thanks 

Coupon-mad

You do need a supplementary WS then.

IMANK

Thank you, that's very helpful. 

I am going to submit:

1- Skeleton Argument as it is from Brokenchief including 4 court cases 
2- Supplementary WS in order to attach evidence and proof of moving home

BETWEEN:

Car Park Management Limited - CPM (Claimant)

v

--------------------(Defendant)

________________________________

SKELETON ARGUMENT

1. Under CPR 13.2 The court must set aside a judgment entered under part 12 if judgment was wrongly entered.  Given that CPR 6.9 (3) was not met, CPR 13.2 applies and the CCJ should be set aside. As the defendant did not give an address to the claimant at which the claim could be served at (because the defendant was not asked), CPR 6.9 applies. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."

2. Given that more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served) the Defendant submits that this particular claim is dead and the period for service cannot be extended by this application process.  If the Claimant believes there is a cause of action then the correct procedure would be to file a claim afresh and to the right address, after furnishing the Defendant with the information required under the pre-action protocol for debt claims, issued this time to the correct address for service for this Defendant, which is Flat 17 Raffles House, 67 Brampton Grove, Hendon NW4 4BU

2.2 There are several authorities for this, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which is a reminder of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6(3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.

2.3 In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784 , the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have power to do so.

2.4 In judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial (which is attached) Deputy Master Marsh stated “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out." 

2.5 In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB) the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity.

“Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules…Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form…I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side…

In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired…

Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20].”

Mr Justice Nicklin concluded, “The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.”

4. DVLA address data may not be accurate. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the keeper to name the driver or to pay, or to inform the keeper they will be liable if not, and about their right to appeal.

4.2. The system is called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date of Event) because it is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updated a VC5 logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA failed to note a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out).

4.3. The DVLA keeper data may be outdated (i.e. the keeper cannot be reached at that address) for millions of motorists as reported in Birmingham Live on 3 November 2021. The parking industry knows this, hence Codes of Practice direct that further address checks must be made. This is further evidence that DVLA address data should not be solely relied upon, especially with DVLA processing delays.

4.4  The KADOE address is not provided by the DVLA as a 'court claim service address' and cannot be relied upon, because it's an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it's where the car was reported 'kept' last time the DVLA heard).

4.5  There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is or was a valid address where a Defendant can be served, especially months or years later, especially where there is reason to believe letters are not being received. Silence after sending a Notice to Keeper, a reminder and then a Letter before Claim is a clear indicator that the keeper may not live there.

4.6 A claim sent to an old DVLA address with no soft trace checks (costing as low as 29 pence and offered free by debt collectors connected to the parking industry) fails to meet the BPA Code of Practice and fails to satisfy the specific 'pre-action Protocol for debt claims' and is in breach of the CPRs about the obligation to take 'reasonable steps' to check a Defendant's address so that service is effective.

5.  The Right Honourable Sir Oliver Heald on 23 December 2016 "announced a crackdown on unresolved debts which can damage people’s credit ratings without them knowing. The action comes after concerns were raised that companies were issuing claims to consumers using incorrect addresses." The Minister added "It cannot be right that people who are unaware of debts can see their lives and finances ruined by county court judgments. That in the digital age, we must ensure companies pursuing unpaid debts make every reasonable effort to contact individuals, rather than simply relying on a letter to an old address.”

BETWEEN:

Car Park Management Limited (Claimant)

v

-----------------------(Defendant)

________________________________

Supplementary Witness Statement

________________________________

 

I am----------------- of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and I am the Defendant in this matter.

This is an addition to support of my application dated 01/12/2022 to 

1. Set aside the Default Judgment dated 12/08/2022 as it was not properly served at my current address;

2. Order for the original claim to be dismissed as it was not served within 4 months of the issue, pursuant to CPR 7.5 and the Claimant having failed to apply for an extension, pursuant to CPR 7.6.

3. Order for the claimant to pay the defendant £275 as reimbursement for the set aside fee. In addition £190 due to Defendant’s time in preparation (10 hours as a litigant in person at a rate of £19 per hour) 

1.1 This Claim was served at an old address;151 Bradstowe House, Harrow, HA1 1EL. where the Defendant had moved out on 16/03/2020, more than two years before this claim was made on 22 April 2022. In support of this I have provided a copy of my council tax statements, showing change of address from Harrow and Barnet councils (Evidence A), and V5C copy from the DVLA (Evidence showing the change to my new current address, xxxxxxxx on 12/03/2020.

1.2. Defendant lived in the old address;151 Bradstowe House, Harrow, HA1 1EL for a year paying rent for a parking slot under the building. During that time, the Defendant received a few tickets from CPM which were dealt with and canceled immediately by the landlord. This particular ticket was never sent to the Defendant. Defendant was at that address for 6 months after the issue date of this ticket, but did not receive any parking charge notices.

1.3. A requirement of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is that any Notice to Keeper served by the Claimant must be served within 14 days of the date of the alleged incident. Within 14 days of the incident in question, I was still residing at: OLD ADDRESS 151 Bradstowe House, Harrow, HA1 1EL, i.e., the address used by the Claimant. During this time, or at any time before my departure on 16/03/2020, I have not received any documentation from the Claimant at said address. I submit the Claimant has not complied with the requirements of the Act and thus cannot claim this charge against me as the Registered Keeper in any case.

1.4. Claimant has behaved unreasonably in pursuing a claim against the defendant without ensuring they held the correct contact details at the time of the claim. As a residential parking site operator acting on behalf of the landlord (ie. as agents), they did not even email the landlord to check if the tenant is still living in the building. This is a failure to make even the most basic checks prior to commencing proceedings.

1.7.  On that basis, Defendant believes the Claimant has not adhered to CPR 6.9 (3) where they had failed to show due diligence in using an address at which the Defendant no longer resides. The claimant did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of my current residence despite having 25 months to establish an address. This has led to a defective service and an irregular judgment.

1.8. This CCJ has caused undue hardships for the Defendant, whose credit rating have been debunked to near useless values, resulting in not being able to get a mortgage and provide a home for her child. Defendant has a three year old boy who is vulnerable and is put at risk by the actions of the Claimant. (Evidence C).

1.9.  The Claimant, or their legal representatives, has added an additional sum of £215 to the original £100 parking charge. The Claimant is not complying  with Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 with the sum that it has sought through this claim. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, at Section 4(5) states that the maximum sum that may be recovered from the keeper is the charge stated on the Notice to Keeper which is £100 in this instance. It is submitted that this is an attempt at double recovery by the Claimant, which the Court should not uphold, even in the event that Judgment for Claimant is awarded.

1.10.For all or any of the reasons stated above, I ask the court of its own volition to strike out this claim and to order the Claimant to refund the Defendant's costs for attending, namely the £275 Court fee in bringing this set aside case, despite not being shown to be liable for any parking charge at all.

Statement of Truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.