CCJ from Old Address - Seeking Advice on Draft Order and WS

Troublesum1

Good evening all!

I think I may have found something very positive in the Claimant's WS but would like to run it by you all, this is an exert from my WS draft:

The Claimant avers to have the right to engage drivers in contract for parking in the material parking area given by the agreement shown in Claimant WS, Exhibit GS1. Exhibit GS1 shows this is an agreement between XXX and the Claimant. As the Claimant has stated in their WS, Claimant Exhibit GS7 states, “the Tenant shall not grant to any third party any rights of any nature over the premises” in this case the Tenant is XXX, however, Exhibit GS7 also states on page 4 of the document “1.2.7 any covenant by the Tenant not to do any act or thing includes a covenant not to permit or allow the doing of that act or thing” which means XXX do not have the right to bestow upon another company the right to permit parking in the material area, thus the Claimant's agreement is invalid

So along the lines of what you thought might be in the head lease @Coupon-mad, let me know if I'm on the right track.

Outside of this, I've used the blueberry WS as a starting point and essentially copied the first 8 points. The 8th point goes on to say: 

It remains uncertain whether the claim pertains to my alleged parking outside of a designated bay, failure to remain on the premises, incorrect bay parking, overstaying the allotted time, or perhaps a technicality associated with the entry process at the kiosk.

Can I still use this despite the Claimant making it very clear in their WS that the alleged breach is the lack of windscreen permit? Or should I remove this part?

Lastly, rather desperately, I've thrown together a few points about poor signage - something to fall back on if all else fails, please let me know your thoughts:

1.      On revisiting the site, I note that there is no signage that you are entering or exiting a parking area that is separate from the residential complex. This parking area is geographically located in the same spot as the apartment. It is a very reasonable assumption to make that these are operated by the same operators. The Claimant would like to argue that the Defendant’s Landlord had no ability to grant parking rights to the Defendant but without making the Head lease readily available to residents there is no reasonable way for the residents, the group to which the Defendant belongs, to know that parking area is not part of the residential complex.

2.      Additionally the signage that is on site I believe to be unclear and illegible from a reasonable distance. The signs closest to where the vehicle was parked at all material times are all fixed up high on a pole which makes them difficult to read. Also the print of the terms and conditions is very small again making reading difficult, the Defendant argues too difficult to constitute a contract

Many thanks all

Coupon-mad

That's all good.  And going through the head lease to turn their argument on its head is exactly the right thing to do.

Outside of this, I've used the blueberry WS as a starting point and essentially copied the first 8 points. The 8th point goes on to say: 

It remains uncertain whether the claim pertains to my alleged parking outside of a designated bay, failure to remain on the premises, incorrect bay parking, overstaying the allotted time, or perhaps a technicality associated with the entry process at the kiosk.

Can I still use this despite the Claimant making it very clear in their WS that the alleged breach is the lack of windscreen permit? Or should I remove this part?

No, remove it as you know what it's about.

Troublesum1

Good evening all,

I'm just at the stage of collating everything for my witness statement. I believe I must submit by the 26th Oct but ideally I will submit tomorrow. So as aforementioned, I have copied points 1-8 from blueberry WS (with obvious ammendments) which is then followed by:

Facts of events

1.      Date and Time of the Incident is inferred from claimant documents as events occurred on unremarkable days

2.      Alleged breach of contract occurred at parking area of Defendant’s place of residence at the time, XXX on both 1st June and 6th June 2019

3.      The Defendant, at all material times, accessed the parking area via front gate with code provided to authorised persons as they would have on a regular basis as is allowed by tenancy agreement with Landlord.

4.      The Defendant would also like to remark that the Parking Charge Notices, hereafter referred to as PCNs, were not windscreen PCNs. As such they were issued as Notice to Keepers, hereafter referred to as NtKs, that were delivered after the date of the Defendant moving to another residence. Therefore, the Defendant knew nothing about the PCNs and had no opportunity to appeal them at the time.

5.      Furthermore, the Claimant has shown no reasonable effort to ascertain any new address after receiving no response from the address held on their system. The Claimant has also previously admitted a simple search produced a new address.

6.      On revisiting the site, Defendant notes that there is no signage that alerts you are entering or exiting a parking area that is separate from the residential complex. The appartment complex is erected from the same land the parking area as shown on many of the Claimant's exhibits. It is a very reasonable assumption to make that these are operated by the same operators. The Claimant would like to argue that the Defendant’s Landlord had no ability to grant parking rights to the Defendant but without making the Head lease readily available to residents there is no reasonable way for the residents, the group to which the Defendant belongs, to know that parking area is not part of the residential complex.

7.      Additionally the signage that is on site, the Defendant believes to be unclear and illegible from a reasonable distance. The signs closest to where the vehicle was parked at all material times are all fixed up high on poles which makes them difficult to read. Also the print of the terms and conditions is very small again making reading difficult, the Defendant argues too difficult to constitute a contract

8.      The Claimant avers to have the right to engage drivers in contract for parking in the material parking area given by the agreement shown in Claimant WS, Exhibit GS1. Exhibit GS1 shows this is an agreement between XXX and the Claimant. As the Claimant has stated in their WS, Claimant Exhibit GS7 states, “the Tenant shall not grant to any third party any rights of any nature over the premises” in this case the Tenant is XXX, however, Exhibit GS7 also states on page 4 of the document “1.2.7 any covenant by the Tenant not to do any act or thing includes a covenant not to permit or allow the doing of that act or thing” which means XXX do not have the right to bestow upon another company the right to permit parking in the material area

A question I have here is, should I save some of these points for a conclusion/defence section of the WS or are they fine to be in the "Facts of events" ?

After that the next section is:

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently examined by the Government
...  I have seen no evidence that the added damages/fees are genuine.

... This is revealed in the Government's analysis, found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

This seems a fairly standard addition to the WS but I noticed in both blueberry and the other WS they begin to talk in first person rather than third, is that ok? Or even optimal? Also in both WS hyperlinks are used, is this ok? Do I not need to add the contents of these links as an exhibit?

After a summary of key points in conclusion I end with my requests:

In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) The previously reserved costs of £275, and

(b) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(c) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

I dont believe there is any other costs I can ask for here? I'm also unsure about how to go about working (b) and (c) out but I can figure that out later as long as this is the correct way to write it into the WS

A few other questions:

1. JOPSON-V-HOMEGUARD, is it still worth referencing?
2. The Beavis case, should I keep this in my WS to support my (shaky) poor signage claims?
3. I'm assuming the exhibit number needs to be preceeded by your initials is that correct?

Really long post, I apologise, appreciate any help. I'm feeling quite good about this now just need to dot the eyes and cross the tees. Many thanks all.

Coupon-mad

Three yeses to your last 3 questions.

Change it all to "I" instead of the Defendant, e.g.

The Defendant, at all material times, accessed the parking area

should be written in the first person and simply:

I drove in...

Troublesum1

Coupon-mad said:

Three yeses to your last 3 questions.

Change it all to "I" instead of the Defendant, e.g.

The Defendant, at all material times, accessed the parking area

should be written in the first person and simply:

I drove in...

Thank you coupon!

Is this a good way to add Jopson v Homeguard?

Jopson v Homeguard is against this claim

1.    The notices and signs the Claimant have erected in the parking area make no reference to any rights which the occupiers of the premises may have had by virtue of their leases

The Defendant maintains, as shown in Exhibit X, there is no mention in the Tenancy Agreement about requiring a permit to park or having to adhere to any third party parking regulations

Should I keep my "Facts of Events" section purely as a chronological sequence of events and have a seperate section for Defence arguments or is it ok to mix defence into the "Facts of Events" section?

Not too much to sort now! Thanks all.

Coupon-mad

Write it as you think flows best. Use extra sub-headings to help.  Show us the whole draft!

Troublesum1

Good Evening All,

So here is a first full draft of my WS. Just the obvious missing, I will tidy up the Exhibit numbering after too.

1.      I am Mr xxxxxx, ( Address:....) and I am the defendant against whom this claim is made. The facts below are true to the best of my belief and my account has been prepared based upon my own knowledge.

 

2.      In my statement I shall refer to (Exhibits 1-16) within the evidence supplied with this statement, referring to page and reference numbers where appropriate. My defence is repeated and I will say as follows:

 

Preliminary matter: The claim should be struck out

3.      The Defendant draws to the attention of the court that there is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on Appeal).  The Defendant believes that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.

 

4.      A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the POC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 and Practice Direction Part 16.  On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4 (Exhibit xx-01).

 

5.      Similarly, at the Wakefield County Court on 8th September 2023, District Judge Robinson considered mirror image POC in claim K3GF9183 (Parallel Parking v anon) and struck the Claim out without a hearing. (See Exhibit xx-02)

 

6.      Likewise, in January 2023 (also without a hearing) District Judge Sprague, sitting at the County Court at Luton, struck out a similarly badly-pleaded parking claim with a full explanation of his reasoning. (See Exhibit xx-03)

 

7.      Furthermore, at Manchester District Judge McMurtrie and District Judge Ranson also struck out a claim (again without a hearing) on the grounds of POC’s lacking clarity, detail, and precision. As stated in the final image below, the Claimant’s solicitors confirmed they would not file an amended POC, demonstrating again the reliance of a number of firms on robo-letters and illegitimate practices. (See Exhibit xx-04)

 

8.      The Defendant believes the Claim should be struck out and should not have been accepted by the CNBC due to a represented parking firm Claimant knowingly breaching basic CPRs.  The specifics of this case lack clarity, as no explicit statement has been provided to indicate which specific term of the alleged contract was purportedly breached.

 

Facts of events

9.      Date and Time of the Incident is inferred from claimant documents as events occurred on unremarkable days

 

10.   Alleged breach of contract occurred at the parking area of my place of residence at the time, XXX on both 1st June and 6th June 2019

 

11.   I, at all material times, accessed the parking area via front gate with code provided to authorised persons as I would have on a regular basis as is allowed by my tenancy agreement with my Landlord.

 

12.   I would also like to remark that the Parking Charge Notices, hereafter referred to as PCNs, were not windscreen PCNs. As such they were issued as Notice to Keepers, hereafter referred to as NtKs, that were delivered after the date I moved to another residence. Therefore, I knew nothing about the PCNs and had no opportunity to appeal them at the time.

 

13.   Furthermore, the Claimant has shown no reasonable effort to ascertain any new address after receiving no response from the address they had on their system. The Claimant has also previously admitted a simple search produced a new address.

Inadequate Signage

14.   On revisiting the site, I note that there is no signage that you are entering or exiting a parking area that is separate from the residential complex. This parking area is geographically located in the same spot as the apartment. It is a very reasonable assumption to make that these are operated by the same operators. The Claimant would like to argue that the Defendant’s Landlord had no ability to grant parking rights to the Defendant but without making the Head lease readily available to residents there is no reasonable way for the residents, the group to which I belong, to know that parking area is not part of the residential complex.

 

15.   Additionally, the signage that is on site I believe to be unclear and illegible from a reasonable distance. The signs closest to where the vehicle was parked at all material times are all fixed up high on a pole which makes them difficult to read. Also the print of the terms and conditions is very small again making reading difficult, I would argue, too difficult to constitute a contract

 

Claimant Parking Contract Agreement is Invalid

 

16.   The Claimant avers to have the right to engage drivers in contract for parking in the material parking area given by the agreement shown in Claimant WS, Exhibit GS1. Exhibit GS1 shows this is an agreement between Miflats Basildon Ltd and the Claimant. As the Claimant has stated in their WS, Claimant Exhibit GS7 states, “the Tenant shall not grant to any third party any rights of any nature over the premises” in this case the Tenant is XXX, however, Exhibit GS7 also states on page 4 of the document “1.2.7 any covenant by the Tenant not to do any act or thing includes a covenant not to permit or allow the doing of that act or thing” which means XXX do not have the right to bestow upon another company the right to permit parking in the material area

 

17.   I would argue my right to enjoy the parking area of my residence via the terms and conditions of my tenancy agreement takes primacy over this invalid agreement that allows the claimant to engage in these poorly presented contracts. (See Exhibit TA for Tenancy Agreement)

Exaggerated Claim and 'market failure' currently examined by the Government

18.   The alleged 'core debt' from any parking charge cannot have exceeded £100 (the industry cap set out in the applicable Code of Practice at the time). I have seen no evidence that the added damages/fees are genuine.

 

19.   I say that fees were not paid out or incurred by this Claimant, who is to put strict proof of:

(i) the alleged breach, and

(ii)  a breakdown of how they arrived at the enhanced quantum claimed, including how interest has been calculated, which appears to have been applied improperly on the entire inflated sum, as if that figure was immediately overdue on the day of an alleged parking event.

20.   This Claimant routinely pursues a disproportionate additional fixed sum(inexplicably added per PCN) despite knowing that the will of Parliament is to ban or substantially reduce the disproportionate 'Debt Fees'. This case is a classic example where the unjust enrichment of exaggerated fees encourages the 'numbers game' of inappropriate and out of control bulk litigation of weak/archive parking cases. No pre-action checks and balances are likely to have been made to ensure facts, merit, position of signs/the vehicle, or a proper cause of action.

21.   The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (the DLUHC) first published its statutory Parking Code of Practice on 7thFebruary 2022, here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

"Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists."

22.     Despite legal challenges delaying the Code's implementation (marking it as temporarily 'withdrawn' as shown in the link above) a draft Impact Assessment (IA) to finalise the DLUHC Code was recently published on 30th July 2023, which has exposed some industry-gleaned facts about supposed 'Debt Fees'. This is revealed in the Government's analysis, found here: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1171438/Draft_IA_-_Private_Parking_Code_of_Practice_.pdf

 

23.   Paragraphs 4.31 and 5.19 reveal that the parking industry has informed the DLUHC that the true minor cost of what the parking industry likes to call debt recovery or 'enforcement' (pre-action) stage totals a mere £8.42 per recovery case.

 

24.   With that sum in mind, it is clear that the extant claim has been enhanced by an excessive amount, disingenuously added as an extra 'fee'. This is believed to be routinely retained by the litigating legal team and has been claimed in addition to the intended 'legal representatives fees' cap set within the small claims track rules. This conduct has been examined and found - including in a notably detailed judgment by Her Honour Judge Jackson, now a specialist Civil High Court Judge on the Leeds/Bradford circuit - to constitute 'double recovery' and the Defendant takes that position.

 

25.   The new draft IA now demonstrates that the unnecessarily intimidating stage of pre-action letter-chains actually costs 'eight times less' (says the DLUHC analysis) than the price-fixed £70 per PCN routinely added. This has caused consumer harm in the form of hundreds of thousands of inflated CCJs each year that District Judges have been powerless to prevent. This abusively enhanced 'industry standard' Debt Fee was enabled only by virtue of the self- serving Codes of Practice of the rival parking Trade Bodies, influenced by a Board of parking operators and debt firms who stood to gain from it.

 

26.   In support of my contention that the sum sought is unconscionably exaggerated and thus unrecoverable, attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67 ('the Beavis case'). Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment. Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (decision later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating a parking charge to £135 was not a true reflection of the cost of a template letter and 'would appear to be penal.

 

27.   This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs because the full parking charge (after expiry of discount) is already high and more than covers what the Supreme Court called an 'automated letter-chain' business model that generates a healthy profit. In Beavis, there were 4 or 5 letters in total, including pre-action phase reminders. The £85 parking charge was held to cover the 'costs of the operation' and the DLUHC's IA suggests it should still be the case that the parking charge itself more than covers the minor costs of pre-action stage, even if and when the Government reduces the level of parking charges.

 

28.   Whilst the new Code is not retrospective, the majority of the clauses went unchallenged by the parking industry and it stands to become a creature of statute due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes. The DLUHC's Secretary of State mentions they are addressing 'market failure' more than once in the draft IA, a phrase which should be a clear steer for Courts in 2023 to scrutinise every aspect of claims like this one.

 

29.   In addition, pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable. It is also disproportionate and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA).

CRA Breaches

30.   Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the CRA which introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'. In a parking context, this includes a test of fairness and clarity of signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

 

31.   Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well-placed (and lit in hours of darkness/dusk) and all terms must be unambiguous and contractual obligations clear.

 

32.   The CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair/open dealing and good faith (NB: this does not necessarily mean there has to be a finding of bad faith).

 

33.   Now for the first time, the DLUHC's draft IA exposes that template 'debt chaser' stage costs less than £9. This shows that HHJ Jackson was right all along in Excel v Wilkinson. (See Exhibit  xx-14)

Troublesum1

CONTINUED

The Beavis case is against this claim

1.      The Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must be determined on their own facts. That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, given the location and clear signs with the charges in the largest/boldest text. Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, that case, in particular, the brief, conspicuous yellow & black warning signs - (See Exhibit xx-15) - set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

 

2.      Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a 'legitimate interest' in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach. The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor 'concealed pitfalls or traps'. (See Exhibit xx-16) for paragraphs from ParkingEye v Beavis).

 

3.      In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. There are two main issues that render this parking charge to be purely penal (i.e. no legitimate interest saves it) and thus, it is unenforceable:

(i). Concealed pitfall or trap:

The signage in this case required customers to enter their vehicle registration number at a kiosk inside the store. Unfortunately, this kiosk was inaccessible to me as the store was closed, rendering compliance impossible.  I also wish to highlight the presence of a sign in the parking area that mentioned clamping. The use of clamping as a penalty for parking violations was made illegal under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The inclusion of such outdated language on a parking sign raises questions about the relevance and validity of the signage in the parking area.  This sign, which suggested that 'Others will be clamped,' directly contradicts current parking regulations and creates further confusion regarding the penalties associated with parking violations. It is reasonable to assume that the parking operators responsible for the signage failed to update their notices to reflect the changes in the law.  Given this discrepancy and the fact that clamping is no longer a legally permissible penalty, it further underscores the uncertainty surrounding the parking terms at the location in question. I believe this is another critical factor that should be considered by the court when evaluating the legitimacy of this case.

 

(ii). Hidden Terms:

The £100 penalty clause is positively buried in small print, as seen on the signs in evidence.  The purported added (false) 'costs' are even more hidden and are also unspecified as a sum.  Their (unlawful, due to the CRA Schedule 2 grey list of unfair terms) suggestion is that they can hide a vague sentence within a wordy sign, in the smallest possible print, then add whatever their trade body lets them, until the DLUHC bans it in 2024. And the driver has no idea about any risk nor even how much they might layer on top.  None of this was agreed by me, let alone known or even seen as I attempted to gain entry to the store. Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a charge, include:

(i)            Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

 

(ii)           Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

 

(iii)          Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space".

 

 

Jopson v Homeguard is against this claim

 

4.    The notices and signs the Claimant have erected in the parking area make no reference to any rights which the occupiers of the premises may have had by virtue of their leases

 

5.    The Defendant maintains, as shown in Exhibit TA, there is no mention to requiring a permit to park or having to adhere to any third party parking regulations

 

6.    Jopson v Homeguard (See Exhibit JvH) reinforces the primacy of contract of a Tenancy Agreement or Lease in the case of residential parking

 

Conclusion

 

7.      The claim is entirely without merit and the Claimant is urged to discontinue now, to avoid incurring costs and wasting the court's time and that of the Defendant.

 

8.      The Defendant asks the judge to read the persuasive Judgment from His Honour Judge Murch (August 2023) in the Civil Enforcement v Chan case, and deliver the same outcome given this Claimant has submitted a similarly vague POC.  It is worth noting that in the Civil Enforcement v Chan case the POC, while still ambiguous, did contain a subtle indication of the alleged contravention, specifically regarding the duration of the defendant's parking on the premises. In contrast, the POC in this case lacks even a minimal effort to hint at the nature of the alleged violation.  In the Civil Enforcement v Chan case, full costs were awarded to the motorist and the claim was struck out.

 

9.      There is now ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims. The July 2023 DLUHC IA analysis surely makes that clear because it is now a matter of record that the industry has told the Government that 'debt recovery' costs eight times less than they have been claiming in almost every case.

 

10.   With the DLUHC's ban on the false 'costs' there is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of the intimidating pre-action demands. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

 

11.   The Claimant has provided what one would assume would be the best pictures of their signage at the material times of the events and I would argue these show that the signage was inadequate on both the account to explain the alleged (and invalid) change of operator between residential apartment complex and parking area and outline to driver the terms of any proposed contract

 

12.   Therefore, I maintain that no contractual agreement existed between myself and UK Car Park Management Ltd, and the Claimant will concede that no financial loss has arisen.  The charge imposed, in all the circumstances is a penalty (not saved by the ParkingEye v Beavis case, which is fully distinguished).  In addition to the fact that the sum claimed under purported 'contract' is disproportionately exaggerated, additionally the interest is inflated as interest appears to be miscalculated on the whole enhanced sum from day one as if £160 or £170 was 'overdue' on the day of parking;

 

13.   Gladstones indisputably issue tens of thousands of inflated parking claims every year and the unconscionably enhanced £60 or £70 (per PCN) which can add hundreds to some claims.  Given that the MoJ's quarterly statistics show that 90% of small claims go to default CCJs, this is clearly an abuse, and it appears to be for the profit of Gladstones and nothing to do with the Claimant's alleged £100 PCN.  I hope the Judge addresses this in the final judgment, at the very least to warn or sanction Gladstones as the court sees fit.

 

14.   In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) The previously reserved costs of £275, and

(b) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(c) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

 

15.   Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."

 

Statement of truth:

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Coupon-mad

Sort out the (bad English) split infinitive here:

11.   I, at all material times, accessed

Apart from that it's all good but I'd bring in Jopson much higher up where you talk about your lease.  Thera's also better wording on the forum about Jopson.  You haven't even told your Judge it's a persuasive appeal case and it's buried right at the end.

And I didn't see the usual wording objecting to Gladstones trying to add 10.25% interest. Search the forum for it, assuming your POC tries to add more than the usual max 8%.

Troublesum1

Coupon-mad said:

Sort out the (bad English) split infinitive here:

11.   I, at all material times, accessed

Apart from that it's all good but I'd bring in Jopson much higher up where you talk about your lease.  Thera's also better wording on the forum about Jopson.  You haven't even told your Judge it's a persuasive appeal case and it's buried right at the end.

And I didn't see the usual wording objecting to Gladstones trying to add 10.25% interest. Search the forum for it, assuming your POC tries to add more than the usual max 8%.

Thank you coupon! I tried to have a look for some wording on Jopson but they mostly seem to pertain to situations where the defendant isn't a resident in the area. I will continue to look. I'll also raise it to follow point 17.

I didn't add any wording on the interest as the witness statement I have received from the claimant and also the POC state they are requesting 8%.

EDIT:

I have amended my Jopson v Homeguard reference to follow on directly after the tenacy agreement points and say the following:

Jopson v Homeguard is against this claim

 

1.    Jopson v Homeguard (See Exhibit JvH) is a persuasive appeal case that reinforces the primacy of contract of a Tenancy Agreement or Lease in the case of residential parking

 

2.    The notices and signs the Claimant have erected in the parking area make no reference to any rights which the occupiers of the premises may have had by virtue of their Tenancy Agreements or Leases

 

3.    The Defendant maintains, as shown in Exhibit TA, there is no mention to requiring a permit to park or having to adhere to any third party parking regulations