KBT Cornwall t/a Armtrac Security Services PCN

Flynn9197

IN THE COUNTY COURT

Claim No.:  xxxxxx

Between

KBT Cornwall LTD t/a Armtrac Security Services

(Claimant) 

- and -  

C

 (Defendant)

_________________

DEFENCE

 

1.     The parking charges referred to in this claim did not arise from any agreement of terms. The charge and the claim was an unexpected shock. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  It is denied that any conduct by the driver was a breach of any prominent term and it is denied that this Claimant (understood to have a bare licence as managers) has standing to sue or form contracts in their own name. Liability is denied, whether or not the Claimant is claiming 'keeper liability', which is unclear from the Particulars.

The Claim is tainted by an abuse of process and should not proceed to trial

2.     It is an abuse of process for a Claimant to issue an inflated claim for a sum which it is not entitled to recover. The above authorities could not be clearer. Parking firms must choose between a ‘Beavis-level’ charge calculation or loss-based damages. A parking firm cannot seek to plead their claim in both but this Claimant routinely does - and has done in this case.

 

3.     Where it is clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a Claimant were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks, a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and money, and the Defendant submits that it is proper that this action should be taken out of court as soon as possible.

 

4.     When considering the Claimant’s case to the extent that is necessary at allocation or local directions stage, the court is invited to determine as a matter of law that the Claimant is not entitled to the remedy sought. An exaggerated claim such as this will always constitute an abuse of process that can be determined by a glance at the Particulars (before any facts and evidence are even scrutinised) and by applying the court’s duty under s71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (‘the CRA’) at the earliest opportunity. For the avoidance of doubt and to demonstrate that this claim is unfair from the outset, the official CMA Guidance on the CRA clarifies under ‘Disproportionate financial sanctions ’ and ‘Indemnities against risk’

 

 

‘ ‘Other kinds of penal provisions which may be unfair are clauses saying that the business can:

•  claim all its costs and expenses, not just its net costs resulting directly from the breach;

•    claim both its costs and its loss of profit where this would lead to being compensated twice over for the same loss; and

•    claim its legal costs on an ‘indemnity ’ basis, that is all costs, not just costs reasonably incurred. The words ‘indemntty ’ and ‘indemnify ’ are also objectionable as legal jargon - see the section on transparency in part 2 of the guidance... ” (p87 - 5.14.3);

‘ ‘Terms under which the trader must be ‘indemnified’ for costs which could arise through no fault of the consumer are open to comparable objections, particularly where the business could itself be at fault. The word ‘indemnify’ itself is legal jargon which, if understood at all by a consumer, is liable to be taken as a threat to pass on legal and other costs incurred without regard to reasonableness. ’ ’ (p119 - 5.31.7).

5.     The Claimant’s claim is entirely tainted by their ‘forum-shopping’ business model which relies on routine abuse of process and disregard for the protections in the CRA. The Defendant avers that parking firm claims which add a duplicitous ‘costs’ sum to the private PCN are easily identified to be unlawful from the outset, without any need for a hearing to determine where the truth lies in terms of evidence. The Court is, therefore, invited to strike out the claim ab initio as an abuse of process, using its case management powers pursuant to CPR 3.4 and also give serious consideration to Practice Direction 3C, as to whether the level of similar abusive (and thus, wholly without merit) claims cluttering up the courts may provide grounds for issuing an Extended Civil Restraint Order to protect consumers in future from this Claimant and to save the courts time and money.

6.     The Claimant’s notices/demands vaguely allude to unidentified sums being claimed ‘on an indemnity basis ’. Such imprecise terms would be considered incapable of binding any person reading them under common contract law, and would also be considered void pursuant to Schedule 2 of the CRA. Claims pleaded on this basis by multiple parking firms have routinely been struck out ab initio in various County Court areas. Recent examples include multiple Orders from District Judge Fay Wright sitting at Skipton County Court, with similar Orders seen in the public domain from Deputy District Judge Josephs sitting at Warwick County Court, District Judge Taylor at the Isle of Wight and Deputy District Judge Colquhoun sitting at Luton County court in March 2020. All were summarily struck out, solely due to parking firms falsely adding £60 to inflate the claim.

7.     This matter was recently determined by District Judge Grand, sitting at Southampton County Court on 11 November 2019, where the Claimants sought to have multiple strike out Orders set aside. The application was dismissed, and a copy of the Approved Judgment is appended to this defence. No appeal was made in that case, where the learned Judge found that £160 parking claims represented an abuse of process that ‘tainted’ each case. It was not in the public interest for courts to allow exaggerated claims to proceed and merely disallow the added £60 at trial on a case-by-case basis. To continue to do so would restrict the proper protections only to those relatively few consumers robust enough to reach hearing stage.

8.     That hearing was attended by BW Legal’s barrister, acting for an AOS member of the British Parking Association (‘the BPA’) but in February 2020, Skipton County Court refused a similar application from a barrister for Excel Parking Services Ltd (members of the rival Trade Body, the International Parking Community -‘the IPC’). Whilst these cases are not precedents, it is only right that Defendants should use them and expect no less protection and proactive sanctions against parking firms whose claims happen to fall to other courts.

9.     In this situation, it ought not to be left to hardy individuals to raise this issue time and again at trial, yet other disputing consumers are being so intimidated by the threats in a barrage of debt demands and the possibility of facing court, that they pay a legally unrecoverable sum to make it go away. Such conduct has no proper function in the recovery of alleged consumer debt. To use the words of HHJ Chambers QC [ref: Harrison v Link Financial Ltd [2011] EWHC B3 (Mercantile) - 

‘ ‘Whatever the strength of the suggestion that the courts should only be a last resort, there can be no excuse for conduct of which the sole purpose must have been to make [...] life so difficult that they would come to heel. In a society that is otherwise so sensitive of a consumer’s position, this is surely conduct that should not be countenanced ’ ’

 

10.  The quantum claimed is unconscionable and the falsely added sum not there at all (or was buried in small print) on the sparsely-placed car park signs. As such, the Defendant avers that the charge offends against Schedule 2 of the CRA, where s71(2) creates a duty on the Court to consider the fairness of a consumer contract. The court’s attention is drawn (but not limited to) parts 6, 10, 14 and 18 of the list of terms that are likely to be unfair and the CMA Guidance linked earlier, and the Defendant invites the court to find this Claimant in breach.

 

Flynn9197

11.  Even if the Claimant had shown the global sum claimed in the largest font on clear and prominent signs - which is denied - they are attempting double recovery of costs. The sum also exceeds the maximum amount which can be recovered from a registered keeper as prescribed in Schedule 4, Section 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (‘the POFA’). It is worth noting that in the Beavis case, even though the driver was known, the Supreme Court considered and referred more than once to the POFA because it was only right that the intentions of Parliament regarding private PCNs were considered.

 

The part played by the (non-regulatory) two conflicting Accredited Trade Associations

12.  Should this claim continue, the Claimant will no doubt try to mislead the court by pointing to their Trade Association ‘ATA’ Code of Practice (‘CoP’) that now includes a clause 'allowing' added costs/damages. The CoP is a self-serving document, written in the parking firms’ interests. Further, the ‘admin fee’ model was reportedly the proud invention of a member of the BPA Board, Gary Osner, owner of ZZPS and whose previous firm, Roxburghe (UK) Limited, folded after being declared ‘unfit’ by the Office of Fair Trading who refused to renew their consumer credit licence due to ‘unfair and misleading’ business practices.

 

13.  The BPA’s Mr Osner states in an article in the public domain since 2018: "I created the model of ‘admin fees’ for debt recovery because ticket value was so low that nobody would make any money. Parking is business and business is about money, after all." The Defendant avers that it is clear that the competing ‘race to the bottom’ ATAs are sanctioning double recovery and both the BPA and the IPC/Gladstones (who had shared Directors) have engineered a veil of legitimacy to protect this industry for years. The ATAs operate more like a cartel, not ‘regulators’ and the conflicting CoPs have failed consumers so badly that the Secretary of State is overseeing a new regulatory Code, following the enactment of the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019. In contrast to the BPA Board member’s mindset, the will of Parliament as set out in the new 2019 Act is very much consumer-focussed, aiming for: "goodpractice...in the operation or management ofprivate parking facilities as appears to the Secretary of State to be desirable having regard to the interests of persons using such facilities."

 

The facts as known to the Defendant:

 

14.  It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question.

After finding a parking place, the Defendant initially stayed inside their car on arrival to the Claimant’s car park to attend to the children. The car was not vacated at this stage. On exiting the car the Defendant had to walk back to the entrance of the car park and tried to understand the confusing terms and conditions on the signage. The total number of words needed to be read to understand the full terms and conditions comes to 378. At the average reading speed of 200 words per minute, this takes a minimum of 90 seconds just to read the words, not counting walking back and forth to the car and struggling to read the small print.

The Defendant then joined the queue for the PDT machine and realised payment was only by cash or mobile app. The Defendant then had to walk back to their car to search for the correct amount of cash to pay. The Defendant didn’t hold any cash in his vehicle due to health and safety because of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. The Defendant tried to download the mobile app but wasn’t able to because of the poor signal in the area. It’s also noted that the claimant doesn’t provide WiFi services to help customers pay.

The Defendant then had to join a queue at the PDT machine again. On arriving, the PDT machine instructions were confusing as In the case of 3JD08399 ParkingEye v Ms X (Altrincham 17/03/2014), where the defendant spent 31 minutes waiting to park, the judge ruled against ParkingEye saying the ANPR data recorded time in the car park and not the time parked. Additionally, in National Car Parks v HMRC [2019] EWCA Civ 854 (20/05/19) the Court of Appeal found that the parking contract was brought into being from the pressing of the button on the PDT machine to issue the ticket.

The Defendant returned to his car to exit the car park to find alternative parking. The total time recorded from the images supplied by the claimant in the request of a SAR showed the car was only occupying a space for no more than two minutes and thirty-nine seconds, with 90 seconds of that time being used to read the terms and agreement.

The Defendant notices a NTD attached to the car with the issue time at 13:25. It’s shown that the car was only recorded being in that space from 13.23. The claimant issued the PCN without giving The Defendant time to read and completely understand the terms and conditions.

 

The PCN was issued due to not complying with the terms and conditions of the site. However The Claimant  did not give enough time for The Defendant to read or even to agree before issuing a PCN.

 

15. The facts in this defence come from the Defendant's own knowledge and honest belief.  To pre-empt the usual template responses from this serial litigator: the court process is outside of the Defendant's life experience and they cannot be criticised for adapting some pre-written wording from a reliable advice resource. The Claimant is urged not to patronise the Defendant with (ironically template) unfounded accusations of not understanding their defence. 

Flynn9197

16. With regard to template statements, the Defendant observes after researching other parking claims, that the Particulars of Claim ('POC') set out a cut-and-paste incoherent statement of case.  Prior to this - and in breach of the pre-action protocol for 'Debt' Claims - no copy of the contract (sign) accompanied any Letter of Claim.  The POC is sparse on facts about the allegation which makes it difficult to respond in depth at this time; however the claim is unfair, objectionable, generic and inflated.  

17.  This Claimant continues to pursue a hugely disproportionate fixed sum (routinely added per PCN) despite knowing that this is now banned. It is denied that the quantum sought is recoverable (authorities: two well-known ParkingEye cases where modern penalty law rationale was applied).  Attention is drawn to paras 98, 100, 193, 198 of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC67.  Also ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd ChD [2011] EWHC 4023(QB) where the parking charge was £75, discounted to £37.50 for prompt payment.  Whilst £75 was reasonable, HHJ Hegarty (sitting at the High Court; later ratified by the CoA) held in paras 419-428 that unspecified 'admin costs' inflating it to £135 'would appear to be penal'.

18. This finding is underpinned by the Government, who have now stated that attempts to gild the lily by adding 'debt recovery costs' were 'extorting money'.  The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities ('DLUHC') published in February 2022, a statutory Code of Practice, found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-parking-code-of-practice

19. Adding costs/damages/fees (however described) onto a parking charge is now banned. In a section called 'Escalation of costs' the incoming statutory Code of Practice says: "The parking operator must not levy additional costs over and above the level of a parking charge or parking tariff as originally issued." 

20. The Code's Ministerial Foreword is unequivocal about abusive existing cases such as the present claim: "Private firms issue roughly 22,000 parking tickets every day, often adopting a labyrinthine system of misleading and confusing signage, opaque appeals services, aggressive debt collection and unreasonable fees designed to extort money from motorists." 

21. The DLUHC consulted for over two years and considered evidence from a wide range of stakeholders.  Almost a fifth of all respondents to the 2021 Technical Consultation called for false fees to be scrapped altogether; this despite the parking industry flooding both public consultations, some even masquerading as consumers. The DLUHC saw through this and in a published Response, they identified that some respondents were 'parking firms posing as motorists'.  Genuine consumer replies pointed out that successful debt recovery does not trigger court proceedings and the debt recovery/robo-claim law firms operate on a 'no win, no fee' basis, seeking to inflate the sum of the parking charge, which in itself is already sufficiently enhanced.  

22. This Claimant has not incurred any additional costs (not even for reminder letters) because the (already high) parking charge more than covers what the Supreme Court in Beavis called an automated letter-chain business model that generates a healthy profit.

23. The driver did not agree to pay a parking charge, let alone unknown costs, which were not quantified in prominent text on signage. It comes too late when purported debt recovery fees are only quantified after the event. 

24. Whilst the new Code and Act is not retrospective, it was enacted due to the failure of the self-serving BPA & IPC Codes of Practice.  The Minister is indisputably talking about existing (not future) cases when declaring that 'recovery' fees were 'designed to extort money'.  A clear steer for the Courts.

25. This overrides mistakes made in the appeal cases that the parking industry try to rely upon (Britannia v Semark-Jullien, One Parking Solution v Wilshaw, Vehicle Control Services v Ward and Vehicle Control Services v Percy).  Far from being persuasive, regrettably these one-sided appeals were findings by Circuit Judges who appeared to be inexperienced in the nuances of private parking law and were led in one direction by Counsel for parking firms, and the litigant-in-person consumers lacked the wherewithal to appeal further.  In case this Claimant tries to rely upon those cases, the Defendant avers that significant errors were made.  Evidence was either overlooked (including inconspicuous signage in Wilshaw, where the Judge was also oblivious to the BPA Code of Practice, including rules for surveillance cameras and the DVLA KADOE requirement for landowner authority) or the Judge inexplicably sought out and quoted from the wrong Code altogether (Percy).  In Ward, a few seconds' emergency stop out of the control of the driver was unfairly aligned with the admitted contract in Beavis. Those learned Judges were not in possession of the same level of facts and evidence as the DLUHC, whose Code now clarifies all such matters.

 

POFA and CRA breaches

26. Pursuant to Schedule 4 paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ('the POFA') the sum claimed exceeds the maximum potentially recoverable from a registered keeper, even in cases where a firm may have complied with other POFA requirements (adequate signage, Notice to Keeper wording/dates, and a properly communicated 'relevant contract/relevant obligation').  If seeking keeper/hirer liability - unclear from the POC - the Claimant is put to strict proof of full compliance and liability transferred. 

27. Claiming costs on an indemnity basis is unfair, per the Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (CMA37, para 5.14.3), the Government guidance on the Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('CRA').  The CRA introduced new requirements for 'prominence' of both contract terms and 'consumer notices'.  In a parking context, this includes signage and all notices, letters and other communications intended to be read by the consumer.

28. Section 71 creates a duty upon courts to consider the test of fairness, including (but not limited to) whether all terms/notices were unambiguously and conspicuously brought to the attention of a consumer.  In the case of a 'PCN', this must have been served to the driver whilst the vehicle was stationary or, at sites remotely monitored by ANPR/CCTV, served to the keeper so that the motorist learns about it quickly. Signage must be prominent, plentiful, well placed and lit, and all terms unambiguous and obligations clear. The Defendant avers that the CRA has been breached due to unfair/unclear terms and notices, pursuant to s62 and paying due regard to examples 6, 10, 14 & 18 of Schedule 2 and the requirements for fair dealing and good faith. 

 

ParkingEye v Beavis is distinguished (lack of legitimate interest/prominence of terms)

29. ParkingEye overcame the possibility of their £85 charge being dismissed as punitive, however the Supreme Court clarified that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in parking cases, which must be determined on their own facts.  That 'unique' case met a commercial justification test, given the location and clear signs with the parking charge in the largest/boldest text.  Rather than causing other parking charges to be automatically justified, the Beavis case facts (in particular, the brief, conspicuous yellow & black warning signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.

30. Without the Beavis case to support the claim and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of a legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a driver, nor to present them with hidden terms, unexpected/cumbersome obligations nor any 'concealed pitfalls or traps'.

31.  In the present case, the Claimant has fallen foul of those tests. The Claimant’s small signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, and are considered incapable of binding a driver.  Consequently, it remains the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was seen or agreed.  Binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of a parking charge, include:

(i) Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 (‘red hand rule’) and

(ii) Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ2,

both leading authorities confirming that a clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(ii) Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where Ms Vine won because it was held that she had not seen the terms by which she would later be bound.  It was unsurprising that she did not see the sign, due to "the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the parking space'' (NB: when parking operator Claimants cite Vine, they often mislead courts by quoting out of context, Roch LJ's words about the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the ratio).  

21. Fairness and clarity of terms and notices are paramount in the statutory Code and this is supported by the BPA & IPC Trade Bodies.  In November 2020's Parking Review, solicitor Will Hurley, CEO of the IPC, observed: "Any regulation or instruction either has clarity or it doesn’t. If it’s clear to one person but not another, there is no clarity. The same is true for fairness. Something that is fair, by definition, has to be all-inclusive of all parties involved – it’s either fair or it isn’t. The introduction of a new ‘Code of Practice for Parking’ provides a wonderful opportunity to provide clarity and fairness for motorists and landowners alike." 

 

Lack of landowner authority evidence and lack of ADR

22. DVLA data is only supplied to pursue parking charges if there is an agreement flowing from the landholder (ref: KADOE rules).  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to a defined enforcement boundary, grace period or exemptions (whatever the landowner's definitions were) nor that this Claimant has authority from the landowner to issue charges in this specific area.  The Claimant is put to strict proof of all of this, and that they have standing to make contracts with drivers and litigate in their own name, rather than merely acting as agents.

23.  The Claimant failed to offer a genuinely independent Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The Appeals Annex in the new Code shows that genuine disputes such as this - even if the facts were narrowed later - would have seen the charge cancelled, had a fair ADR existed.  Whether or not a person engaged with it, the Claimant's consumer blame culture and reliance upon the industry's own 'appeals service' should not sway the court into a belief that a fair ADR was ever on offer. The rival Trade Bodies' time-limited and opaque 'appeals' services fail to properly consider facts or rules of law and would have rejected almost any dispute: e.g. the IAS upheld appeals in a woeful 4% of decided cases (IPC's 2020 Annual Report).  

 

 

 

Conclusion

24. The claim is entirely without merit and the Claimant is urged to discontinue now, to avoid incurring costs and wasting the court's time and that of the Defendant. 

25. With the DLUHC's ban on the false 'costs' there is ample evidence to support the view - long held by many District Judges - that these are knowingly exaggerated claims.  For HMCTS to only disallow those costs in the tiny percentage of cases that reach hearings whilst other claims to continue to flood the courts unabated, is to fail hundreds of thousands of consumers who suffer CCJs or pay inflated amounts, in fear of the intimidating pre-action demands. The Defendant believes that it is in the public interest that claims like this should be struck out because knowingly enhanced parking claims like this one cause consumer harm on a grand scale.

 

26. In the matter of costs, the Defendant asks:

(a) at the very least, for standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and

(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5. 

27.  Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."   

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Defendant’s signature:

Date:

Flynn9197

Fruitcake said:

I have only skim read your defence, but I can't find where you said a NTD was left, (was anyone in the car at the time?) nor how long after arrival. nor the reason for the PCN being issued.

I can't see where you have mentioned grace periods or quoted the relevant parts of the IPC CoP.

Hi,
Thank you for taking the time to read and comment,

I have added what I had missed from the first draft

Coupon-mad

That is not a defence.

Start all over again; bin everything and just add your facts to the new template. Nothing about abuse of process.  The facts about what happened.

Flynn9197

Coupon-mad said:

That is not a defence.

Start all over shag in, bin everything and just add your facts to the new template. Nothing about abuse of process.  The facts about what happened.

Thank you for comment,

Will scrap and start again

1505grandad

And please only post the paragraphs you have written/amended  -  not the whole template.

Flynn9197

The facts as known to the Defendant:

2. It is admitted that the Defendant was the registered keeper of the vehicle in question.

After finding a parking place, the Defendant initially stayed inside their car on arrival to the Claimant’s car park to attend to the children. The car was not vacated at this stage. On exiting the car the Defendant had to walk back to the entrance of the car park and tried to understand the confusing terms and conditions on the signage. The total number of words needed to be read to understand the full terms and conditions comes to 378. At the average reading speed of 200 words per minute, this takes a minimum of 90 seconds just to read the words, not counting walking back and forth to the car and struggling to read the small print.

The Defendant then joined the queue for the PDT machine and realised payment was only by cash or mobile app. The Defendant then had to walk back to their car to search for the correct amount of cash to pay. The Defendant didn’t hold any cash in his vehicle due to health and safety because of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. The Defendant tried to download the mobile app but wasn’t able to because of the poor signal in the area. It’s also noted that the claimant doesn’t provide WiFi services to help customers pay.

The Defendant then had to join a queue at the PDT machine again. On arriving, the PDT machine instructions were confusing as In the case of 3JD08399 ParkingEye v Ms X (Altrincham 17/03/2014), where the defendant spent 31 minutes waiting to park, the judge ruled against ParkingEye saying the ANPR data recorded time in the car park and not the time parked. Additionally, in National Car Parks v HMRC [2019] EWCA Civ 854 (20/05/19) the Court of Appeal found that the parking contract was brought into being from the pressing of the button on the PDT machine to issue the ticket.

The Defendant returned to his car to exit the car park to find alternative parking. The total time recorded from the images supplied by the claimant in the request of a SAR showed the car was only occupying a space for no more than two minutes and thirty-nine seconds, with 90 seconds of that time being used to read the terms and agreement.

The Defendant notices a NTD attached to the car with the issue time at 13:25. It’s shown that the car was only recorded being in that space from 13.23. The claimant issued the PCN without giving The Defendant time to read and completely understand the terms and conditions.

 

The PCN was issued due to not complying with the terms and conditions of the site. However The Claimant  did not give enough time for The Defendant to read or even to agree before issuing a PCN.

Le_Kirk

That reads more like a witness statement (WS) than a defence, which should be short, punchy and comprised only of legal/technical arguments.  Save the story of the day for the WS.

Coupon-mad

You have not added 'and driver' to #2 like the template defence explains. Add that.

I'd get rid of this then number all the other paragraphs (and of course re-number the template below it:

The Defendant then had to join a queue at the PDT machine again. On arriving, the PDT machine instructions were confusing as In the case of 3JD08399 ParkingEye v Ms X (Altrincham 17/03/2014), where the defendant spent 31 minutes waiting to park, the judge ruled against ParkingEye saying the ANPR data recorded time in the car park and not the time parked. Additionally, in National Car Parks v HMRC [2019] EWCA Civ 854 (20/05/19) the Court of Appeal found that the parking contract was brought into being from the pressing of the button on the PDT machine to issue the ticket.

Save that for WS stage. Also the bit about staying in the car to attend to children. Remove that completely.

I'd move this up higher, to be paragraph 3 and with the additions shown:

The PCN was issued due to allegedly 'not complying with the terms and conditions of the site'. However, the Claimant  did not give enough time for the Defendant to read or even to agree before issuing a PCN, and thus they failed to comply with the 'consideration period' rule in their binding Code of Practice and should never have issued a parking charge.