CEL set aside hearing... Help please!

Coupon-mad

No, I said remove EARLY POINTS NEAR THE START (I told you what to remove) and put the 'facts' right up near the top.

Coupon-mad

No, I told you in my reply, especially for your case, to remove the stuff near the start about the case not being listed for trial and that it should be struck out.  That's more than one para near the start and those sections have a heading and are written in plain English...easy to spot those parts and remove them.

Then show us the draft, please.

s1morgan

 

1.        The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.  

The points below are within the scope of the Defendant’s own knowledge and honest belief. Whilst parts of this defence may be familiar to the Claimant and/or their legal representatives, it would not be right for a litigant-in-person to be criticised for using all relevant resources available.  It is noted in any case, that these Claimants use third party pre-written templates as standard.  This statement was prepared by the Defendant specifically for this matter and unlike the Claimant’s case, it deals properly and individually with the facts, the alleged contract, and the quantum.  The contents of this defence represent hours of research by the Defendant, in order to grasp some knowledge of alien concepts of law, codes of practice and procedures relating to the specific area of Parking Charge Notices (‘private PCNs’).   

 

2.        In relation to parking on private land, it is settled law that for any penalty to escape being struck out under the penalty rule, it must be set at a level which already includes recovery of the costs of operating the scheme.  However, this Claimant routinely claims (as in this case) a global sum of £350 per alleged PCN.  This figure is a penalty, far exceeding the charge in the ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case and falling foul of the binding authority in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores [2012] EWCA Civ 1338.  In the 2012 case, the Court of Appeal held that £135 would be an unrecoverable penalty but a claim for the PCN itself would not [ref: para 419].   Thereafter, ParkingEye quietly dropped their ‘PCN plus indemnity costs’ double recovery business model and pursued £85 in the Beavis case, where it was determined by the Supreme Court that a significant justification for that private PCN was that it already included all operational costs [ref: paragraphs 98, 193 and 198].   

 

 

 

 

The part played by the (non-regulatory) two conflicting Accredited Trade Associations

 

3.       Should this claim continue, the Claimant will no doubt try to mislead the court by pointing to their Trade Association ‘ATA’ Code of Practice (‘CoP’) that now includes a clause 'allowing' added costs/damages.  The CoP is a self-serving document, written in the parking firms’ interests.  Further, the ‘admin fee’ model was reportedly the proud invention of a member of the BPA Board, Gary Osner, owner of ZZPS and whose previous firm, Roxburghe (UK) Limited, folded after being declared ‘unfit’ by the Office of Fair Trading who refused to renew their consumer credit licence due to ‘unfair and misleading’ business practices.  

 

4.       The BPA’s Mr Osner states in an article in the public domain since 2018:

https://parkmaven.com/news/gary-osner-zzps-interview ''I created the model of ‘admin fees’ for debt recovery because ticket value was so low that nobody would make any money. Parking is business and business is about money, after all.''  The Defendant avers that it is clear that the competing ‘race to the bottom’ ATAs are sanctioning double recovery and both the BPA and the

IPC/Gladstones (who had shared Directors) have engineered a veil of legitimacy to protect this industry for years.  The ATAs operate more like a cartel, not ‘regulators’ and the conflicting CoPs have failed consumers so badly that the Secretary of State is overseeing a new regulatory Code, following the enactment of the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019.   In contrast to the BPA Board member’s mindset, the will of Parliament as set out in the new 2019 Act is very much consumer-focussed, aiming for:  ''good practice...in the operation or management of private parking facilities as appears to the Secretary of State to be desirable having regard to the interests of persons using such facilities.''    

 

 

Pre-action protocol breach and nonsensical Particulars of Claim

 

5.        In the alternative, the defence is prejudiced and the court is invited to note that, contrary to the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the Letter Before Claim omitted evidence of any breach and failed to append the wording of the sign or consumer notice.  Further, the stylised Particulars of Claim are embarrassing and incoherent, lacking specificity re the status of the contracting parties and failing to detail any contract, conduct or liability that could give rise to a cause of action.  There is insufficient detail to ascertain the nature, basis and facts of the claim and even the exaggerated quantum has fluctuated, changing with each debt demand and/or letter of claim over the preceding months. 

  

 

The facts - lack of prominently displayed contract and no agreement on the charge

 

6.       Should this poorly pleaded claim not be summarily struck out for any/all of the reasons stated above, it is the Defendant’s position that no contract was entered into with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.  Therefore, as a matter of contract as well as consumer law, the Defendant cannot be held liable to the Claimant for any charge or damages arising from any alleged breach of the purported terms.  Whilst there is a lack of evidence from the Claimant, the Defendant sets out this defence as clearly as possible in the circumstances, insofar as the facts below are known.

 

 

7.       On the date XXXXX the Defendant was a member of XXXXX located at XXXXXXX and was entitled to free parking in the car park upon entering registration details. The defendant parked there on every occasion the Defendant used the gym (to which the Defendant can supply in photographic evidence), as was the case for all Gym members and customers to the establishment, the Defendant was not required to pay for parking for the total of 2 hours, to which the Defendant did not exceed. The Defendant was allowed the right to park without payment by the Gym membership agreement. Therefore, the Defendant was not in breach of any parking conditions as an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant by the Terms & Conditions when using the gym. (To which the Defendant can supply).

 

8.       The Claimant’s signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, such that they would be considered incapable of binding any person reading them under common contract law, and would also be considered void pursuant to Schedule 2 of the CRA.  Consequently, it is the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was agreed by the driver.

 

The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case is distinguished

 

9.       Unlike in this case, ParkingEye demonstrated a commercial justification for their £85 private PCN, which included all operational costs, and they were able to overcome the real possibility of the charge being struck out as punitive and unrecoverable.  However, their Lordships were very clear that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in such cases.  Their decision was specific to that ‘unique’ set of facts: the legitimate interest argued, the car park location, and the ‘brief and clear’ signs with the parking charge itself in bold and the largest text.  The unintended consequence is that, rather than persuade courts considering other cases that all private PCNs are automatically justified, the Beavis case facts and pleadings (and in particular, the brief and prominent signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach. 

 

10.   Due to the authority set by their earlier Somerfield case - mentioned at the start of this defence

- it is worth noting that ParkingEye no longer add ‘debt letter costs/damages’ to their private PCNs and their own claims have escaped any reports of being summarily struck out for abuse of process.  This Claimant has failed to plead their case or to set out their terms or construct their charges in the same way as in Beavis and the penalty rule remains firmly engaged.  

 

11.   Without the Beavis case to prop it up, and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of an overriding legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a motorist - nor to present them with concealed pitfalls, traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations - and nor can the operator claim an unconscionable sum. 

 

12.   Further, in its conduct and signage, this Claimant has failed to comply with the CoP that they are signed up for, such as it is.  Under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, it is an unfair/misleading business practice to state that a Trader complies with a Code of Practice, but in reality, does not.  This Claimant’s conduct is also significantly different from the Beavis case [para 111.] where even the Supreme Court were wrongly convinced that the CoP was some sort of regulatory framework:  

“And, while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA.  In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced.’’

 

13.   A more relevant list of binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of an onerous parking charge, would include:

 

(i)                 Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 and

(ii)               Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd  [1970] EWCA Civ 2, 

both leading examples of the ‘red hand’ rule, that an unseen/hidden clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and

(iii)             Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where the Court of Appeal held that it was unsurprising that the appellant did not see the sign ''in view of the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the southern parking space''.  In other cases where parking firm Claimants and/or their legal teams have cited Vine in their template witness statements, they have misled courts by quoting out of context from Roch LJ, whose words related to the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the decision.  In fact, Miss Vine won because it was held as a fact that she was not afforded a fair opportunity to learn of the terms by which she would be bound.

 

14.   The Claimant is also put to strict proof, by means of contemporaneous and unredacted evidence of a chain of authority flowing from the Landowner or Lessor of the relevant land to the Claimant.  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to the landholder's definitions, exemptions, grace period, hours of operation, etc. and any instructions to cancel charges due to complaints.  There is no evidence that the freeholder authorises this particular Claimant (Companies House lists their company number as 05645677) to issue private PCNs or what the land enforcement boundary and start/expiry dates are/were, and whether this Claimant has standing to enforce such charges by means of civil litigation in their own name rather than a bare licence to issue PCNs ‘on behalf of’ the landowner on an agency basis.   

 

 

In the matter of costs; if this claim is not struck out, the Defendant seeks:

15.   (a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and (b) that any hearing is not vacated but continues as a costs hearing, in the event of a typical Notice of Discontinuance.  The Defendant seeks a finding of unreasonable behaviour in the pre-and post-action phases, by this Claimant.  Pursuant to CPR 46.5, whilst indemnity costs cannot exceed two thirds of the applicable rate if using legal representation, the Defendant notes that LiP costs are not necessarily capped at £19 ph.  It is noted that a Defendant may ask in their Summary Costs Assessment for the court to award their usual hourly rate for the many hours spent on this case [ref: Spencer & anor v Paul Jones Financial Services Ltd].

 

16.   In summary, the Claimant's Particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and the abuse of process taints this Claim.  The Claimant knew, or should have known, that an exaggerated claim where the alleged ‘debt’ exceeds £100 (ATA Code of Practice ceiling for a private PCN) is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA.  The Defendant invites the court to find that this exaggerated claim is entirely without merit, and to bring an end to the case without a hearing.

 

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

 

Defendant’s signature:

XXXXXX

             

Defendant’s name:

XXXXX

 

Date: XXXXXXX

 

Approved Judgment from Southampton Court is appended to show why claims such as this are being summarily struck out

                         

Coupon-mad

OK, this can't be right 'per PCN', more likely to be £170 per PCN (or £182?  You have the claim form):

a global sum of £350 per alleged PCN.

Add to #8 something about the keypad inside the gym and whether it was faulty or just not conspicuous?  That's missing from this defence and CEL's case will be all about you not using a keypad to exempt your vehicle, so you need to cover what went wrong (their failure, not yours).

Also remove #10 as it makes no sense as it refers to an earlier part now deleted.  You could replace it with:

At the pre-Beavis High Court (endorsed by the Court of Appeal) case of ParkingEye v Somerfield (ref para 419), it was made clear by HHJ Hegarty that adding costs to enhance the parking charge is not recoverable: 
''It seems to me that, in the present case, it would be difficult for ParkingEye to justify, as against any motorist, a claim for payment of the enhanced sum of £135 if the motorist took the point that the additional £60 over and above the original figure of £75 constituted a penalty. It might be possible for ParkingEye to show that the additional administrative costs involved were substantial, though I very much doubt whether they would be able to justify this very large increase on that basis. On the face of it, it seems to me that the predominant contractual function of this additional payment must have been to deter the motorist from breaking his contractual obligation to pay the basic charge of £75 within the time specified, rather than to compensate ParkingEye for late payment. Applying the formula adopted by Colman J. in the Lordsvale case, therefore, the additional £60 would appear to be penal in nature; and it is well established that, in those circumstances, it cannot be recovered, though the other party would have at least a theoretical right to damages for breach of the primary obligation.'' 

s1morgan

1.        The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to relief in the sum claimed, or at all.   

The points below are within the scope of the Defendant’s own knowledge and honest belief. Whilst parts of this defence may be familiar to the Claimant and/or their legal representatives, it would not be right for a litigant-in-person to be criticised for using all relevant resources available.  It is noted in any case, that these Claimants use third party pre-written templates as standard.  This statement was prepared by the Defendant specifically for this matter and unlike the Claimant’s case, it deals properly and individually with the facts, the alleged contract, and the quantum.  The contents of this defence represent hours of research by the Defendant, in order to grasp some knowledge of alien concepts of law, codes of practice and procedures relating to the specific area of Parking Charge Notices (‘private PCNs’).   

 

2.        In relation to parking on private land, it is settled law that for any penalty to escape being struck out under the penalty rule, it must be set at a level which already includes recovery of the costs of operating the scheme.  However, this Claimant routinely claims (as in this case) a global sum of £140 per alleged PCN.  This figure is a penalty, far exceeding the charge in the ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case and falling foul of the binding authority in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores [2012] EWCA Civ 1338.  In the 2012 case, the Court of Appeal held that £135 would be an unrecoverable penalty but a claim for the PCN itself would not [ref: para 419].   Thereafter, ParkingEye quietly dropped their ‘PCN plus indemnity costs’ double recovery business model and pursued £85 in the Beavis case, where it was determined by the Supreme Court that a significant justification for that private PCN was that it already included all operational costs [ref: paragraphs 98, 193 and 198].   

 

 

 

 

The part played by the (non-regulatory) two conflicting Accredited Trade Associations 

 

3.       Should this claim continue, the Claimant will no doubt try to mislead the court by pointing to their Trade Association ‘ATA’ Code of Practice (‘CoP’) that now includes a clause 'allowing' added costs/damages.  The CoP is a self-serving document, written in the parking firms’ interests.  Further, the ‘admin fee’ model was reportedly the proud invention of a member of the BPA Board, Gary Osner, owner of ZZPS and whose previous firm, Roxburghe (UK) Limited, folded after being declared ‘unfit’ by the Office of Fair Trading who refused to renew their consumer credit licence due to ‘unfair and misleading’ business practices.   

 

4.       The BPA’s Mr Osner states in an article in the public domain since 2018: 

https://parkmaven.com/news/gary-osner-zzps-interview ''I created the model of ‘admin fees’ for debt recovery because ticket value was so low that nobody would make any money. Parking is business and business is about money, after all.''  The Defendant avers that it is clear that the competing ‘race to the bottom’ ATAs are sanctioning double recovery and both the BPA and the 

IPC/Gladstones (who had shared Directors) have engineered a veil of legitimacy to protect this industry for years.  The ATAs operate more like a cartel, not ‘regulators’ and the conflicting CoPs have failed consumers so badly that the Secretary of State is overseeing a new regulatory Code, following the enactment of the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019.   In contrast to the BPA Board member’s mindset, the will of Parliament as set out in the new 2019 Act is very much consumer-focussed, aiming for:  ''good practice...in the operation or management of private parking facilities as appears to the Secretary of State to be desirable having regard to the interests of persons using such facilities.''    

 

 

Pre-action protocol breach and nonsensical Particulars of Claim 

 

5.        In the alternative, the defence is prejudiced and the court is invited to note that, contrary to the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the Letter Before Claim omitted evidence of any breach and failed to append the wording of the sign or consumer notice.  Further, the stylised Particulars of Claim are embarrassing and incoherent, lacking specificity re the status of the contracting parties and failing to detail any contract, conduct or liability that could give rise to a cause of action.  There is insufficient detail to ascertain the nature, basis and facts of the claim and even the exaggerated quantum has fluctuated, changing with each debt demand and/or letter of claim over the preceding months.  

  

 

The facts - lack of prominently displayed contract and no agreement on the charge 

 

6.       Should this poorly pleaded claim not be summarily struck out for any/all of the reasons stated above, it is the Defendant’s position that no contract was entered into with the Claimant, whether express, implied, or by conduct.  Therefore, as a matter of contract as well as consumer law, the Defendant cannot be held liable to the Claimant for any charge or damages arising from any alleged breach of the purported terms.  Whilst there is a lack of evidence from the Claimant, the Defendant sets out this defence as clearly as possible in the circumstances, insofar as the facts below are known. 

 

 

7.       On the date XXXXX the Defendant was a member of XXXXX located at XXXXXXX and was entitled to free parking in the car park upon entering registration details. The defendant parked there on every occasion the Defendant used the gym (to which the Defendant can supply in photographic evidence), as was the case for all Gym members and customers to the establishment, the Defendant was not required to pay for parking for the total of 2 hours, to which the Defendant did not exceed. The Defendant was allowed the right to park without payment by the Gym membership agreement. Therefore, the Defendant was not in breach of any parking conditions as an express permission to park had been granted to the Defendant by the Terms & Conditions when using the gym. (To which the Defendant can supply).

 

8.       The Claimant’s signs have vague/hidden terms and a mix of small font, such that they would be considered incapable of binding any person reading them under common contract law, and would also be considered void pursuant to Schedule 2 of the CRA.  Consequently, it is the Defendant’s position that no contract to pay an onerous penalty was agreed by the driver. The Defendant complied with the Terms and Conditions of the gym membership that entitled the Defendant to 2 hours maximum free parking providing the defendant entered the Vehicle regitsration into a machine located within the gym. There was no breach of contract. Suggesting a failure of the terminal system.  The Defendant contacted Easy Gym to obtain proof of registration details being entered. An email can be supplied as evidence form Easy Gym that all member information/access history including supplier relationships (parking) was sold to The Gym Group. Tech Systems have been changed twice since the alleged offence. 

 

The ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 case is distinguished

 

9.       Unlike in this case, ParkingEye demonstrated a commercial justification for their £85 private PCN, which included all operational costs, and they were able to overcome the real possibility of the charge being struck out as punitive and unrecoverable.  However, their Lordships were very clear that ‘the penalty rule is plainly engaged’ in such cases.  Their decision was specific to that ‘unique’ set of facts: the legitimate interest argued, the car park location, and the ‘brief and clear’ signs with the parking charge itself in bold and the largest text.  The unintended consequence is that, rather than persuade courts considering other cases that all private PCNs are automatically justified, the Beavis case facts and pleadings (and in particular, the brief and prominent signs) set a high bar that this Claimant has failed to reach.  

 

10.   At the pre-Beavis High Court (endorsed by the Court of Appeal) case of ParkingEye v Somerfield (ref para 419), it was made clear by HHJ Hegarty that adding costs to enhance the parking charge is not recoverable: 

''It seems to me that, in the present case, it would be difficult for ParkingEye to justify, as against any motorist, a claim for payment of the enhanced sum of £135 if the motorist took the point that the additional £60 over and above the original figure of £75 constituted a penalty. It might be possible for ParkingEye to show that the additional administrative costs involved were substantial, though I very much doubt whether they would be able to justify this very large increase on that basis. On the face of it, it seems to me that the predominant contractual function of this additional payment must have been to deter the motorist from breaking his contractual obligation to pay the basic charge of £75 within the time specified, rather than to compensate ParkingEye for late payment. Applying the formula adopted by Colman J. in the Lordsvale case, therefore, the additional £60 would appear to be penal in nature; and it is well established that, in those circumstances, it cannot be recovered, though the other party would have at least a theoretical right to damages for breach of the primary obligation.'' 

 

11.   Without the Beavis case to prop it up, and no alternative calculation of loss/damage, this claim must fail.  Paraphrasing from the Supreme Court, deterrence is likely to be penal if there is a lack of an overriding legitimate interest in performance extending beyond the prospect of compensation flowing directly from the alleged breach.  The intention cannot be to punish a motorist - nor to present them with concealed pitfalls, traps, hidden terms or unfair/unexpected obligations - and nor can the operator claim an unconscionable sum. 

 

12.   Further, in its conduct and signage, this Claimant has failed to comply with the CoP that they are signed up for, such as it is.  Under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations, it is an unfair/misleading business practice to state that a Trader complies with a Code of Practice, but in reality, does not.  This Claimant’s conduct is also significantly different from the Beavis case [para 111.] where even the Supreme Court were wrongly convinced that the CoP was some sort of regulatory framework:   

“And, while the Code of Practice is not a contractual document, it is in practice binding on the operator since its existence and observance is a condition of his ability to obtain details of the registered keeper from the DVLA.  In assessing the fairness of a term, it cannot be right to ignore the regulatory framework which determines how and in what circumstances it may be enforced.’’

 

13.   A more relevant list of binding Court of Appeal authorities which are on all fours with a case involving unclear terms and a lack of ‘adequate notice’ of an onerous parking charge, would include: 

 

(i)                 Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 and 

(ii)               Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd  [1970] EWCA Civ 2,  

both leading examples of the ‘red hand’ rule, that an unseen/hidden clause cannot be incorporated after a contract has been concluded; and 

(iii)             Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest: CA 5 Apr 2000, where the Court of Appeal held that it was unsurprising that the appellant did not see the sign ''in view of the absence of any notice on the wall opposite the southern parking space''.  In other cases where parking firm Claimants and/or their legal teams have cited Vine in their template witness statements, they have misled courts by quoting out of context from Roch LJ, whose words related to the Respondent’s losing case, and not from the decision.  In fact, Miss Vine won because it was held as a fact that she was not afforded a fair opportunity to learn of the terms by which she would be bound. 

 

14.   The Claimant is also put to strict proof, by means of contemporaneous and unredacted evidence of a chain of authority flowing from the Landowner or Lessor of the relevant land to the Claimant.  It is not accepted that the Claimant has adhered to the landholder's definitions, exemptions, grace period, hours of operation, etc. and any instructions to cancel charges due to complaints.  There is no evidence that the freeholder authorises this particular Claimant (Companies House lists their company number as 05645677) to issue private PCNs or what the land enforcement boundary and start/expiry dates are/were, and whether this Claimant has standing to enforce such charges by means of civil litigation in their own name rather than a bare licence to issue PCNs ‘on behalf of’ the landowner on an agency basis.    

 

 

In the matter of costs; if this claim is not struck out, the Defendant seeks:

15.   (a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and (b) that any hearing is not vacated but continues as a costs hearing, in the event of a typical Notice of Discontinuance.  The Defendant seeks a finding of unreasonable behaviour in the pre-and post-action phases, by this Claimant.  Pursuant to CPR 46.5, whilst indemnity costs cannot exceed two thirds of the applicable rate if using legal representation, the Defendant notes that LiP costs are not necessarily capped at £19 ph.  It is noted that a Defendant may ask in their Summary Costs Assessment for the court to award their usual hourly rate for the many hours spent on this case [ref: Spencer & anor v Paul Jones Financial Services Ltd].

 

16.   In summary, the Claimant's Particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and the abuse of process taints this Claim.  The Claimant knew, or should have known, that an exaggerated claim where the alleged ‘debt’ exceeds £100 (ATA Code of Practice ceiling for a private PCN) is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA.  The Defendant invites the court to find that this exaggerated claim is entirely without merit, and to bring an end to the case without a hearing. 

 

 

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this defence are true.  I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. 

 

Defendant’s signature:

XXXXXX

             

Defendant’s name:

XXXXX

 

Date: XXXXXXX

 

Approved Judgment from Southampton Court is appended to show why claims such as this are being summarily struck out

Coupon-mad

£350 per alleged PCN

No, it isn't.  Re-read what the template defence tells you about that sum.  With CEL it's usually £182 (left hand side of claim form).

s1morgan

I changed £350 to £140 in the above draft.
Without any extra charges or interest that are listed on the claim form the PCN is £140.

s1morgan

s1morgan said:

I changed £350 to £140 in the above draft.
Without any extra charges or interest that are listed on the claim form the PCN is £140.

debt and damaged take the sum to £236.00
with added interest the sum is £251.57

which is the correct figure?