PCN at Railway Station

pookyal

Having read through the NEWBIE page and various other posts, I wanted to pick your brains about 4 Parking Charge Notices I have received from NCP as a registered Keeper. These allege that the driver has failed to pay parking fees on the relevant days. I received the PCNtK today, although they were all dated 4 November. Payment is required by 18 November, However, the notices relate to incidents dating 31 July, 1 August, 19 September and 9 October 2019. In two cases, it would appear that payment was actually made, albeit 12-15 minutes after arrival.

I have responded with the following (based on the content of the template and another poster with similar issues), but wasn't sure whether it was worth following up separately to reference the payments for two of the PCNs (on a without prejudice basis)? They don't even appear to have an option to update the information through the portal, but have sent general emails that I could respond to. I have since found that the GA Parking website states that you have until 4am the next day to pay for your parking (this is also stated in a press release on their website) so it seems that no breach has actually occurred. Would welcome your thoughts...

Dear Sirs,

I have just received your Parking Charge Notice to Keeper (‘PCNtK’) for vehicle VRM XXXX. As the keeper of the vehicle, I dispute your PCNtK' and deny any liability or contractual agreement.

The Main CP (at XXX station) appears to be not relevant land as defined by paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of The Protection Of Freedoms Act 2012 (‘POFA’), being subject to byelaws. You cannot, therefore, transfer liability for the alleged charge from the driver at the time to me, the keeper. Even if it were not subject to byelaws, you have failed to comply with the requirements of Schedule 4 of POFA namely, but not limited to, failing to notify the keeper within 14 days of the alleged breach (para 9(5) of POFA and para 21.6 of the BPA Code of Conduct). Consequently, you are unable to rely on keeper liability to enforce this charge.

In addition, the BPA Code of Conduct (para 20.5a) states that when issuing a parking charge notice “you may use photographs as evidence that a vehicle was parked in an unauthorised way…A date and time stamp should be included on the photograph. All photographs used for evidence should be clear and legible and must not be retouched or digitally altered”. Whilst you have included photos of the car on the PCNtK, it is not clear that this is the car park you refer to. The photos are not dated or time stamped, rather you have added these details in the letter. The same is true on your website. Consequently, you cannot demonstrate that these dates and times are correct.

As only the driver can be liable for any charges (for the reasons outlined above) and you are unable to confirm their identity, I expect you to immediately cancel the ‘parking charge’ and inform me in writing that you have done so. If, however, you reject this appeal, then in accordance with the BPA Code of Conduct, please ensure that you enclose all the required information (including the necessary ‘POPLA’ code) so that I may immediately refer this matter (and any further issues that I may subsequently raise) for their adjudication.

Yours...

Coupon-mad

the notices relate to incidents dating 31 July, 1 August, 19 September and 9 October 2019.

Good, so your appeal was fine and NCP might even give up, as you have sussed that a keeper can't be held liable.

Wait for any POPLA code, or cancellations as they furiously backpedal.

Umkomaas

I assume you will be appealing each NtK separately? Please don't consolidate them using one appeal. You can use the same appeal wording for each, just differentiate with their discrete NtK reference numbers.

I wouldn't mention anything about the payments made, unlikely to have any affect at this stage - with or without proof of the payment.

pookyal

Hi all,

Perhaps entirely predictably, NCP rejected my appeal. I have now drafted an appeal to POPLA as registered keeper. I would be grateful if someone more experienced than me could cast their eye over this and let me know if you think it does the job before I submit (deadline is on Monday but want to get this off to them on Sunday). I have 4 tickets, two of which appear to have been paid by the driver, hence the text in square brackets. All of them are timed out, although I get the impression from other posts that the key thing here is probably the byelaws and the fact PoFA doesnt apply. I have to admit, I got a bit lost in the various debates on how POPLA would deal with these in light of their note last year so am hoping the text is clear and not contradictory. Either way, I understand that they are not entitled to chase the keeper.

TIA


This appeal is submitted in relation to the ‘Parking Charge Notice to Keeper’ dated XXXX 2019 (ref. XXXXXX) issued by National Car Parking Limited (‘NCP’) for vehicle registration number XXXX (the ‘PCNtK’). A copy of the notice is submitted for your reference. As registered keeper of the above vehicle, I wrote to NCP on XXXX 2019 challenging the PCNtK. NCP responded on XXXX stating that the appeal had been unsuccessful.

For the avoidance of doubt, the driver’s identity has not been provided and this appeal remains purely from myself as the registered keeper.

The appeal is made on the following grounds, full details of which are provided
below:
1. [Payment was made for the relevant period of parking;]
2. Railway land is not ‘Relevant Land’ for the purposes of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (‘PoFA’) and therefore, there is no keeper liability
3. Non-compliance with PoFA;
4. No evidence of landowner authority;
5. Inadequate signage;
6. The ANPR system is neither reliable nor accurate;
7. Appellant not being the individual liable.

Evidence of payment
[Since my appeal to NCP, the driver has confirmed that payment was made for the relevant period. This was recorded by the Greater Anglia Parking App at 07.XXam on 19 September 2019 (Mobon ref. XXXX). I have attached evidence of payment, together with a screen grab from the GA Parking website that confirms payment may be made at any point up to 4am the next day (ie 20 September 2019). This is also referenced in a press release by Greater Anglia when the ANPR cameras were set up: XXXX. Notwithstanding the published payment payment period by Greater Anglia, paragraph XXXX of the BPA Code of Practice (2018) refers to a ‘minimum’ 10 minute grace period, although this is arbitrary and suggests a longer period can be reasonable. In this context, it is considered that payment was made within a reasonable timeframe to cover a full day of parking, and within the timeframe permitted by Greater Anglia. Consequently, there can be no breach and no liability for non-payment for the driver or the registered keeper.]

Railway Land is not ‘Relevant Land’ and there is no keeper liability
The NCP operated car park at Marks Tey station is located upon land belonging to the railway and therefore the car park is not ‘relevant land’ as defined by paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of PoFA, being subject instead to Railway Byelaws. As a result, there can be no transfer of liability from the driver at the time to the registered keeper.

On the basis that Byelaws are assumed to cover this station, it follows that PoFA is not applicable to this case and any claim made for parking charges by NCP against the driver or registered keeper is unfounded. The onus is upon the operator, NCP, to provide evidence to the contrary. If they disagree with this point, I require them to produce documentary proof from the landowner that this land is not covered by the said byelaws.

Notwithstanding that NCP are not entitled to claim under Railway Byelaws, they have not followed correct procedures even if they were entitled to do so. By claiming the charge is liable to them, NCP appear to be attempting to claim this under Railway Byelaws. I reject this and require them to state which Byelaw they claim is broken, and in any case, why this would result in an obligation to pay NCP.

It is also worth noting Freedom of Information Act Request F0013227, whereby the Department for the Secretary of State for Transport has categorically stated that no confirmation or change in laws since the Railways Act 1993 came into force, which empower any person or body other than the courts to impose a penalty for breach of Byelaws 14(1), (2) or (3) made under Section 219 of the Transport Act 2000 (as amended) and made operational on 7 July 2005.

Therefore, any breach of Railway Byelaws is a criminal offence, not a breach of any contract NCP may say the driver entered in to. If the driver is found to have breached byelaws 14 (1-3), the resulting penalty is paid to the government rather than NCP or the railway. Further, Byelaw offences are decided by the court, not by NCP; the parking operator or railway can only allege the breach.

Further, POPLA guidance issued in 2018 with regard to penalty notices issued under Railway Byelaws, states several expectations of a penalty notice that have not been followed in this instance. For example:
• A Penalty Notice (‘PN’) should say it is a penalty notice – in this case, NCP has issued a ‘parking charge notice’.
• A PN should confirm how the byelaws were brought to the motorist’s attention – the PCNtK does not reference byelaws at all.
• A PN should confirm the law under which it has been issued – the PCNtK is silent on this point.
• A PN should not use the words ‘parking charge notice’ – the PCNtK is clearly labelled as a ‘Parking Charge Notice’

POPLA also notes that the timescales of PoFA 2012 should be followed for penalties issued on railway land, ie issued via post in the period of 14 days beginning with the day after the day after that on which the specified period of parking ended. As noted below, this PCNtK was sent outside of this period.

Non-compliance with PoFA
Even if the car park was considered ‘relevant land’ under PoFA, NCP has failed to comply with the requirements of Schedule 4 of that Act, namely, by issuing the NTK too late for keeper liability to apply.

Under schedule 4, paragraph 4 of the PoFA 2012, an operator can only establish the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the registered keeper of a vehicle if certain conditions are met. Specifically, paragraph 6 (1) states:
“6(1)The second condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or on behalf of the creditor)
(a) has given a notice to driver in accordance with paragraph 7, followed by a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 8; or
(b) has given a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 9.

Paragraph 9 is the relevant paragraph here as the PCNtK was sent by post.

Paragraph 9 (2f) states that the Notice to Keeper must warn the keeper that if, after the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice is given—
(i) the amount of the unpaid parking charges specified under paragraph (d) has not been paid in full; and
(ii) the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver,
the creditor will (if all the applicable conditions under this Schedule are met) have the right to recover from the keeper so much of that amount as remains unpaid;

The PCNtK sent to me as registered keeper does not give any such warning, nor state any such right to recover charges from the keeper.

In addition, Paragraph 9(4) of PoFA states that the notice must be given by:
a) handing it to the keeper, or leaving it at a current address for service for the keeper, within the relevant period; or
b) sending it by post to a current address for service for the keeper so that it is delivered to that address within the relevant period.

The relevant section here is b) as the PCNtK was sent by post. Paragraph 9(5) states that the relevant period for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) is the period of 14 days beginning with the day after that on which the specified period of parking ended.

Paragraph 9(5) of PoFA is reinforced by paragraph 21.6 of the BPA Code of Practice. This states that if an operator wants to make use of the keeper liability provisions in Schedule 4 of PoFA, and it has not issued and delivered a parking charge notice to the driver in the car park where the parking event took place, its Notice to Keeper must meet the strict requirements and timetable set out in the Schedule (in particular paragraph 9).

This PCNtK was sent to me as registered keeper [26] days after the alleged event. This is evidenced in the submitted PCNtK which states the date of the incident as [9 October 2019] and the date of sending the notice as 4 November 2019. This is a breach of both PoFA and the BPA Code of Practice and means there can be no keeper liability in this case.


No evidence of landowner authority
As NCP does not have a proprietary interest in the land, I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner. The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details including exemptions, such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights, is key evidence to define what NCP is authorised to do and any circumstances where the landowner/firms on site in fact have a right to cancellation of a charge. It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is also authorised to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement. Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which on the basis of information on Greater Anglia’s own website, would appear to be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP), and basic information such as the land boundary and bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Witness statements would also fail to provide evidence of the various restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge and of course, how much the landowner authorises this agent to charge (which cannot be assumed to be the sum in small print on a sign because template private parking terms and sums have been known not to match the actual landowner agreement).

Section 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements on landowner authority. Specifically, Paragraph 7.1 states that “if you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you the authority to carry out all the aspects of car park management for the site that you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges.”

Further, paragraph 7.2 states that “if the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.”

Paragraph 7.3 goes onto clarify what the written authorisation must set out, namely:
(a) The definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined.
(b) Any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation.
(c) Any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement.
(d) Who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs.
(e) The definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

NCP have no title in this land and therefore have no standing to enforce 'parking charges' or penalties of any description in any court. No evidence has been supplied lawfully showing that NCP are entitled to pursue these charges in their own right (not that a keeper can be liable anyway on non-relevant land and NCP cannot enforce byelaws themselves, only the Train Operating Company or site landowners can, by requiring the driver ONLY, to answer to a real fine at a Magistrates Court).

I require NCP to provide a full unredacted copy of the contemporaneous, signed and dated contract with the landowner. It will not be sufficient for NCP merely to supply a site agreement or witness statement, as these do not show sufficient detail (such as the restrictions, charges and revenue sharing arrangements agreed with a landowner) and may well be signed by a non-landholder such as another agent. In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, a non-landowner private parking company must have a specifically-worded contract with the landowner, not merely an 'agreement' with a non-landholder managing agent - otherwise there is no authority. I put NCP to strict proof of compliance with all of the above requirements.

Inadequate signage - INSERT FIGURES/PHOTOS
For the purposes of this appeal, I have focussed on signage within the ‘rear’ car park to Marks Tey Station off North Lane and adjacent to platform 3. The driver has advised that this is the car park they regularly use and the photos submitted by NCP appear to be consistent with this. There is another car park adjacent to platform 1 and accessed from Station Road, which I have not considered further.

You will be aware that PoFA expressly references the clarity that needs to be provided to make a motorist aware of the parking charge. Specifically, it requires that the driver is given 'adequate notice' of the charge. This is defined as follows:

''(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) 'adequate notice' means notice given by: (a) the display of one or more notices in accordance with any applicable requirements prescribed in regulations under paragraph 12 for, or for purposes including, the purposes of sub-paragraph (2); or (b) where no such requirements apply, the display of one or more notices which: (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and (ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land''.

Further, Section 18 of the BPA CoP clearly sets out the expectations on operators in terms of signage. Even in circumstances where POFA does not apply, I believe this to be a reasonable standard to use when making my own assessment, as appellant, of the signage in place at the location. I have visited the car park to take photos of the signage, which are included below. Having considered the signage in place against the requirements of Section 18 of the BPA CoP, and POFA, I am of the view that the signage at the site is NOT sufficient to bring the parking charge (i.e. the sum itself) to the attention of the motorist. Here, the signs are sporadically placed and unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. In particular, the font size showing the charge is tiny, as demonstrated by the photos, and does not appear at all at the entrance. In any event, the writing is again too small to read at the entrance (XXmm, shown in Figure XX) without stopping the car and getting out. This is not practical given the sign is placed on a T-junction with the main road and the entrance is not wide enough to safely accommodate a parked car. Stopping in this location would clearly be dangerous to other motorists entering the car park, who would be unable to see a parked car around the bend and/or avoid it. There is only one other sign in the relevant car-park, that is raised some XXm from the ground. The writing on this sign is similarly small, at consistently XXmm high (see Figure X). It’s scale and position is not prominent within the car park and easily missed, but even when you approach it, the writing is so high up and small that it is difficult to read. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is also worth pointing out that the signage in place does not meet the expectations of the BPA CoP in terms of disabled parking. Paragraph 18.9 of that document states that “So that disabled motorists can decide whether they want to use the site, there must be at least one sign containing the terms and conditions for parking that can be viewed without needing to leave the vehicle. Ideally this sign must be close to any parking bays set aside for disabled motorists.” As shown in the photo below, there is no such sign adjacent or in close proximity to the accessible bays. As a disabled driver, one would have to get out of the car and walk to the middle of the car park to the sign shown in Figure X. This is fixed at significant height, especially for those using a wheelchair and unable to stand or reposition themselves to read it. As it faces onto parking spaces and perpendicular to the roadway, it would be impossible for a disabled motorist to view the T&Cs without leaving the vehicle, contrary to paragraph 18.9.

The photos demonstrate that the signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself, contrary to the BPA CoP and PoFA. For a contract to be formed, one of the many considerations is that there must be adequate signage on entering the car park. The images show this is not the case. Further, a Notice is not imported into the contract unless brought home so prominently that the party must have known of it and agreed terms. This is not the case here, and so there was no consideration or acceptance and no contract agreed between the parties.

It is important to note that the situation here is entirely distinguishable from the 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case, which is well cited by operators to support their case in appeals which reference inadequate signage. In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for the industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only.

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges. This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Further, under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA CoP, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This case found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to, and cannot have 'breached', an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I ask that NCP prove where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.
[...]

pookyal

[...]

The ANPR System is neither reliable nor accurate
NCP has provided no evidence that the ANPR system is reliable. The operator is obliged to ensure their ANPR equipment is maintained as described in paragraph 21.3 of the BPA CoP. Further, paragraph 20.5a of the BPA CoP states that when issuing a parking charge notice the operator “may use photographs as evidence that a vehicle was parked in an unauthorised way… A date and time stamp should be included on the photograph. All photographs used for evidence should be clear and legible and must not be retouched or digitally altered” (own emphasis added).

Whilst NCP has included photos of the car on the PCNtK, the photos are not dated or time stamped, rather these details are added to the letter. The same is true on the NCP PCN website. This is contrary to paragraph 20.5a of the BPA CoP. The PCNtK also shows no parking time, merely images of a vehicle and a number plate corresponding with that of the vehicle in question. There is no connection demonstrated whatsoever with the car park in question. Whilst times are shown at the bottom of two images on the website, these times do not equate to any single evidenced period of parking. By NCP's own admission on their PCNtK, one of these times is claimed to be the exit time of the vehicle. There is no evidence of a single period of parking and this cannot reasonably be assumed. Since there is no evidence of actual parking times this would fail the requirements of paragraph 9(2)(a) of PoFA (notwithstanding my earlier point on byelaws) which states: “specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates.”

Consequently, NCP cannot demonstrate that these dates and times are correct and relate to the actual recording of the ANPR camera(s). I therefore require NCP to provide records with the location of the cameras used in this instance, together with dates and times of when the equipment was checked, calibrated, maintained and synchronised to ensure the accuracy of the ANPR images. I also ask them to prove that the times quoted in the PCNtK are directly linked to the camera.

This is important because the entirety of the charge is founded on two images purporting to show the vehicle entering and exiting at specific times. It is vital that NCP must produce evidence in response to these points and explain to POPLA how their system differs (if at all) from the flawed ANPR system which was wholly responsible for the court loss by the Operator in Parking Eye v Fox-Jones on 8 Nov 2013. That case was dismissed when the judge said the evidence from the Operator was 'fundamentally flawed' as the synchronisation of the camera pictures with the timer had been called into question and the operator could not rebut the point. NCP has not provided any evidence to show that their system is reliable, accurate or maintained.

Appellant not being the individual liable
NCP has not shown that the individual who it is pursuing is in fact the driver who was liable for the charge. In cases with a keeper appellant, yet no PoFA 'keeper liability' to rely upon, POPLA must first consider whether they are confident that the assessor knows who the driver is, based on the evidence received. No presumption can be made about liability whatsoever. Any person(s), with the consent of the registered keeper, may drive a vehicle as long as the driver is insured. Where a charge is aimed only at a driver then, of course, no other party can be told to pay.

I am appealing this PCNtK as the registered keeper. As there has been no admission regarding who was driving, and no evidence has been produced, it has been held by POPLA on numerous occasions, that a parking charge cannot be enforced against a keeper without a valid Notice to Keeper.

In furthering the understanding of keeper liability, Henry Greenslade (the previous POPLA Lead Adjudicator) confirmed in 2015 that full compliance with PoFA was required to recover unpaid parking charges. He states:
'There appears to be continuing misunderstanding about Schedule 4. Provided certain conditions are strictly complied with, it provides for recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. There is no 'reasonable presumption' in law that the registered keeper of a vehicle is the driver. Operators should never suggest anything of the sort. Further, a failure by the recipient of a notice issued under Schedule 4 to name the driver, does not of itself mean that the recipient has accepted that they were the driver at the material time. Unlike, for example, a Notice of Intended Prosecution where details of the driver of a vehicle must be supplied when requested by the police, pursuant to Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a keeper sent a Schedule 4 notice has no legal obligation to name the driver. [...] If [POFA 2012 Schedule 4 is] not complied with then keeper liability does not generally pass.' (own emphasis added).

As the keeper of the vehicle, it is my right to choose not to name the driver, yet still not be held liable if NCP is not using or complying with Schedule 4 of PoFA. This appeal demonstrates that NCP has not met the requirements of Schedule 4 (notwithstanding that the land in question is not ‘relevant land’ in any case). The burden of proof therefore rests with the Operator to show that (as an individual) I have personally not complied with terms in place on the land and show that I am personally liable for their parking charge. NCP cannot do this.

For the above [7] reasons, I ask as keeper of vehicle NXXXX that my appeal is upheld and PCN XXXXX cancelled.

KeithP

On the basis that Byelaws are assumed to cover this station...

Change that to...

As Byelaws cover this station...

Be positive. Make them prove their case.

Coupon-mad

Very good; that should see a mass cancellation by NCP.

pookyal

Hi everyone. Just wanted to write with some good news to say that NCP didn't contest any of my 4 PCNs at my local train station car park based on the above response. It does mean I have no idea which was the 'killer blow', but I suspect being timed out on all of them played a significant part. In any case, great result. Thanks again to the forum!

Coupon-mad

Haha, as predicted, the NCP typical mass cancellation at POPLA stage happened!

:T