BW Legal Defence Thread - WS Stage - Court Date < 2 weeks

JP26

Ok final WS ( New bits I have added in bold, ignore the paragraph formatting) .  I'll leave the lease clause to address in my Skelton argument in more detail, but I'm hoping the judge agrees the external common areas related to the grass area, footpaths and NOT the parking space. It's 15 pages so not sure if there are any other points I can throw in.

On the whole I'm really not sure on what chance I have of winning, I absolutely won't settle with the BW bandits but would just like the whole process to be over now, even if I lose.

Contents of evidence

• Copy of lease with highlighted sections to support JH/001 ( probably don’t need this as BW have provided it)

• Copy of permit confirmation email JH/002

• Pace v Mr N [2016] C6GF14F0 [2016] JH/003

• Beavis Vs ParkingEye 2015 case JH/004

• Pictures of signage from car window - JH/005

• Pictures of permit on drivers seat after the PCN JH/006

• Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA 2012) JH/007

• Site Plan JH/008

• Beavis Sign JH/009

• Tenancy Agreement JH/010

• IPC Signage Guidance JH/11

• CRA schedule 2 JH/012

• Abuse of Process Claim Stuck out UKCPM JH/013

• Abuse of Process Claim Stuck out VCS JH/013

In the County Court

Claim No. XX

Between

XX (Claimant)

-and-

XX (Defendant)

---

Witness Statement

---

1.  I am XX, of [XX], [XX], the Defendant in this matter.

1. I make this witness statement in readiness for the hearing listed on XX at XX.

1.  The facts in this statement come from my personal knowledge. Where they are not within my personal knowledge, they are true to the best of my information and belief.  Attached to this statement is a paginated bundle of documents to which I will reference. 

1. I have not been legally trained and am defending myself through research alone.

1. I am the Registered Keeper of the vehicle in question on the 12th June 2018 and thereafter date.

1. The Particulars refer to the material location as XXX. The Defendant has, since 1st June 2018, held a guest permit for this location under the XX ( JH/-002), which was provided via invitation from the residents residing at this address at the material time. However without any information about a 'contract' or £100 parking charge risk, nor did it say that display was a legal obligation or that signage terms formed part of the permit scheme. It appeared innocuous, just a courtesy permit to show i was not trespassing, and by having it foisted upon me I certainly did NOT agree to chargeable terms or knew about any 'contract' I was supposedly entering into.

1. The permit was attached on the windscreen but during a period of extended lack of use of the Defendant’s’  vehicle, detached from the windscreen where it came to rest on the driver’s seat. (JH/006) During the time that the permit was detached a PCN was issued to the Defendant’s vehicle.

1. After receiving the PCN, the Defendant appealed via the Claimants online portal, providing evidence above (JH/006). The appeal was refused with a standard robo-response seemingly ignoring the appeal and instead repeating that I had breached the terms and conditions of the site. 

1.  The Defendant’s vehicle was parked at Dairycroft during the month of June 2018. Given the extensive time that has passed since the contravention, and the fact that other parties had use of the vehicle during this time, the Defendant cannot recall who was driving at the time the contravention occurred. The Defendant, as the keeper, is under no obligation to disclose the identity of the driver, and the onus is on the Claimant to prove their case. The claimant has offered nothing in the way of evidence as to the identity of the driver and if they wish to pursue the Defendant as driver rather than keeper, then they must produce strict proof instead of an assumption. 

1.  In light of this, the claimant may only pursue the defendant as keeper of the vehicle in strict adherence to the stipulations outlined by Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA 2012) (JH/007)

2. It is averred that the claimant has failed to do this on numerous points

3. Furthermore, the claimant may allege that there is a reasonable presumption that the registered keeper was also the driver, allowing them to circumvent the regulations of POFA 2012. The defendant expressly denies that there is any presumption in law that the keeper is the driver. The defendant denies that the keeper is obliged to name the driver to the private parking firm. POFA 2012 makes no such requirement for a keeper to do this.

1. The claimant may seek to rely on the findings of Elliot V Loake (1982) in alleging that the keeper can be presumed to have been the driver. In this criminal case, forensic evidence was produced to a criminal standard. Therefore, the same logic can absolutely not be applied in this instance.

PRIMACY OF CONTRACT

1. Liability for the alleged debt is disputed in its entirety based on the well-established legal principle of primacy of contract: the agreement (JH//001 – Lease Agreements) that exists between the residents and their landlord extends to the use of the specified parking space and overrides any purported contract conveyed by the claimant’s insufficient, demonstrably illegible signage. The lease agreement makes no assertion that a permit must not be displayed to use the bay, nor that a penalty of £100 must be paid in the event of a failure to do so. Many of the residents residing in the material location are also tennants, and the Tenancy agreement also makes no reference to parking restrictions, and on 4 (4.7) (JH/011) states ‘Where the landlord’s interest is derived from another lease (“The Headlease”) then it is agreed that the tenant will observe the restrictions in the Headlease applicable to the property.” The lease and tennancy agreement’s lack of specificity on any conditions related to parking in the relevant bay can only be construed that none of the restrictions asserted by the claimant apply.

1. The lease agreement states (JH/001) on page XX  “Not to use the External Common Areas for any purposes other than ( where appropriate) recreation and leisure and in accordance with any directions for use made by the lessor or any company firm or person or persons responsible for the time being as Managing Agents in the cultivation and maintenance of the External Common Areas.”

 This clause refers to any directions given by a company/person/persons who are the responsible Managing Agents, and not a third party company in addition to the managing agent. This clause can therefore not be interpreted as justification for the Claimant to impose parking terms at a later date. The external common areas as indicated by the site plan ( JH-008), cover the outside greenery spaces and footpaths of the site and do not extend to the parking area which are therefore not covered by the above clause. 

1. I contend, therefore, that the lease agreement provides an unfettered right to park for themselves and their invited guests. This cannot be superseded, altered, or ignored by a parking management company post hoc. I refer previous cases such as Pace v Mr N [2016] C6GF14F0 [2016] (JH/003), where it was found that the parking company could not override the tenant's right to park by requiring a permit to park.

1.  The Claimant, or Managing Agent, in order to establish a right to impose unilateral terms which vary the terms of the lease, must have such variation approved by at least 75% of the leaseholders, pursuant to s37 of the Landlord & Tenant Act 1987. The tenants are unaware of any such vote having been passed by the residents, and no lease amendments have been available to view from HM Land registry.  

DE MINIMIS PRINCIPAL / UNFAIR TERM 

1. In the alternative, without prejudice to my previous statements, the vehicle was parked in accordance with the Lease agreement with the Landlord and genuinely made every effort to comply with the spirit of parking in accordance with maintaining the control intended by the Landlord. The permit simply slipped off the windscreen due to poor adhesive yet was still visible, therefore this small human error comes under the de minimis principle.

1. In Jolley v Carmel Ltd [2000] 2 –EGLR -154, it was held that a party who makes reasonable endeavours and takes reasonable steps to comply with contractual terms, should not be penalised for breach outside of their control. 

1. It is my view that the display of a valid permit in some circumstances can be synonymous with a parking ticket bought from a machine. Fluttering tickets are routinely accepted as a valid defence to Council Penalty Charge Notices and whilst contractual principles are not applied to such notices, it is indicative of the fact that circumstances out of your control, and where the driver has clearly paid for the parking, are deemed to be a good reason for those notices to be cancelled.

1. I believe that any parking management company with a legitimate interest in protecting the parking rights of a residential space – which is surely their only purpose – would immediately rescind any charges issued to permit holders.

SIGNAGE

1. On this matter, the defendant defers to the ruling of ParkingEye Ltd v Barry Beavis (2015) UKSC 67( JH/-004), insofar as the Court were willing to consider the imposition of a penalty in the context of a site of commercial value and where the signage regarding the penalties imposed for any alleged breach of parking terms were clear – both upon entry to the site and throughout. From the evidence (JH/-005) you can see that the font type is incredibly small and woefully insufficient in conveying the terms of any alleged contract, included the additional debt recovery charges (unlike the Beavis case signage JH-009), and would not be legible from the drivers seat, and is purely aimed at only unauthorised drivers. The signage also fails to satisfy the IPC Code of Practice (which the claimant is a member of) on Part E schedule 1 ( JH-011) on points 6 and 7:

1. Have clear and intelligible wording and be designed such that it is clear to the reasonable driver that he is entering into a contract with the creditor or committing a trespass as the case may be; 

2. Contain text appropriate to the position of the sign and the relative position of the person who it is aimed at.

1.  Even if the sign had the added £60 'debt collection' as a readable figure, it is STILL indisputably double recovery when it comes to parking on private land where the costs are capped and already counted. This is elaborated further on paragraphs 22 and 23.

1.  The residential site that is the subject of these proceedings is not a site where there is a commercial value to be protected. The claimant has not suffered loss or pecuniary disadvantage. The penalty charge is, accordingly, unconscionable in this context.

(cont)

JP26

(WS cont)

ADDITIONAL COSTS: The purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, a disingenuous double recovery attempt, vague and in breach of both the CPRs, and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Schedule 2 'terms that may be unfair'.

1. Alleging that the letters the parking firm sent have caused an additional loss, is simply untrue. The standard wording for parking charge/debt recovery contracts is/was on the Debt Recovery Plus website - ''no recovery/no fee'', thus establishing an argument that the Claimant is breaching the indemnity principle - claiming reimbursement for a cost which has never, in fact, been incurred. This is true, whether or not they used a third party debt collector during the process.

1. The Defendant has the reasonable belief that the Claimant has not incurred an additional £60 in damages or costs to pursue an alleged £100 debt. The arbitrary addition of a fixed sum purporting to cover 'damages/costs' is also potentially open to challenge as an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs, where 44.3 (2) states: ''Where the amount of costs is to be assessed on the standard basis, the court will –

(a) only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred; and

(b) resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount in favour of the paying party.

1.  Whilst quantified costs can be considered on a standard basis, this Claimant's purported added £60 'damages/costs' are wholly disproportionate, are not genuine losses at all and do not stand up to scrutiny. This has finally been recognised in many court areas. Differently from almost any other trader/consumer agreement, when it comes to parking charges on private land, binding case law and two statute laws have the effect that the parking firm's own business/operational costs cannot be added to the 'parking charge' as if they are additional losses.

The Beavis case is against this Claim

1.  Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 ('the Beavis case') is the authority for recovery of the parking charge itself and no more, since that sum (£85 in the Beavis case) was held to already incorporate the costs of an automated private parking business model including recovery letters. There are no losses or damages caused by this business model and the Supreme Court Judges held that a parking firm not in possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. It is indisputable that an alleged 'parking charge' penalty is a sum which the Supreme Court found is already inflated to more than comfortably cover all costs. The case provides a finding of fact by way of precedent, that the £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending upon the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters.

24.1  This charge is unconscionable and devoid of any 'legitimate interest', given the facts. To quote from the decision in the Beavis case at Para [108]: ''But although the terms, like all standard contracts, were presented to motorists on a take it or leave it basis, they could not have been briefer, simpler or more prominently proclaimed. If you park here and stay more than two hours, you will pay £85''. Ad at [199]: ''What matters is that a charge of the order of £85 [...] is an understandable ingredient of a scheme serving legitimate interests.''

24.2 In the Beavis case it was said at para [205]: ''The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer.''

24.3 At para 98. {re ...The desirability of running that parking scheme at no cost, or ideally some profit, to themselves} ''Against this background, it can be seen that the £85 charge had two main objects. One was to manage the efficient use of parking space in the interests of the retail outlets, and of the users of those outlets who wish to find spaces in which to park their cars [...] The other purpose was to provide an income stream to enable ParkingEye to meet the costs of operating the scheme and make a profit from its services...''

24.4. At para 193. ''Judging by ParkingEye’s accounts, and unless the Chelmsford car park was out of the ordinary, the scheme also covered ParkingEye's costs of operation and gave their shareholders a healthy annual profit.'' and at para 198: ''The charge has to be and is set at a level which enables the managers to recover the costs of operating the scheme. It is here also set at a level enabling ParkingEye to make a profit.''

The POFA 2012 and the ATA Code of Practice are against this Claim

1.  The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 (JH/007) ('the POFA') at paras 4(5) and 4(6) makes it clear that the will of Parliament regarding parking on private land is that the only sum potentially able to be recovered is the sum in any compliant 'Notice to Keeper' (further, the ceiling for a 'parking charge', as set by the Trade Bodies and the DVLA, is £100). This also depends upon the Claimant fully complying with the statute, including 'adequate notice' of the parking charge and prescribed documents served in time/with mandatory wording. It is submitted the claimant has failed on all counts and the Claimant is well aware their artificially inflated claim, as pleaded, constitutes double recovery.

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 ('the CRA') is against this claim

1.  Further, the purported added 'costs' are disproportionate, vague and in breach of the CRA 2015 Schedule 2(JH/012) 'terms that may be unfair'. This Claimant has arbitrarily added an extra 60% of the parking charge in a disingenuous double recovery attempt that has already been exposed and routinely disallowed by many Courts in England and Wales. It is atrocious that this has been allowed to continue unabated for so many years, considering the number of victims receiving this Claimant's exaggerated Letter before Claim, or the claim form, who then either pay an inflated amount or suffer a default judgment for a sum that could not otherwise be recovered. It is only those who defend, who draw individual cases to the attention of the courts one by one, but at last in 2019, some areas noticed the pattern and have moved to stop this abuse of process at source.

26.1. In the Caernarfon Court in Case number F2QZ4W28 (Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Davies) on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated: ''Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates [...] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law it is hereby declared [...] the claim is struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.''

26.2. That decision in Wales was contested in a N244 application by VCS, but the added £60 was still disallowed on 30 Oct 2019. District Judge Jones-Evans stated that even in cases parking firms win, he never allows the £60 add on, and despite parking firms continuing to include it in their Particulars, most advocates have now stopped pushing for it at hearings. The Judge said that a contract formed by signage is a deemed contract, which the motorist does not have the opportunity to negotiate. That, and the fact that there is no specified sum on the signage, means that the extra £60 cannot possibly be recoverable. He said that the £60 was clearly a penalty, and an abuse of process. The considered sum in that case was reduced to £100 with a full case hearing to follow, but the £60 would not be awarded under any circumstances, and further, he ordered that the Claimant must now produce a statement of how they pleaded claims prior to Beavis, and subsequently.

(cont)

JP26

(WS cont)

26.3. In Claim numbers F0DP806M and F0DP201T - BRITANNIA PARKING -v- Mr C and another - less than two weeks later - the courts went further in a landmark judgment in November 2019 which followed several parking charge claims being struck out in the area overseen by His Honour Judge Iain Hamilton-Douglas Hughes QC, the Designated Civil Judge for Dorset, Hampshire, Isle of Wight & Wiltshire.

26.3.1. Cases summarily struck out in that circuit included BPA members using BW Legal's robo-claim model and IPC members using Gladstones' robo-claim model, and the Orders from that court were identical in striking out all such claims without a hearing during a prolonged period in 2019, with the Judge stating: ''It is ordered that The claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in the Beavis case. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998...''

26.3.2. BW Legal made an application objecting to two 'test' cases that had been struck out by District Judge Taylor against a parking firm for trying to claim for £160 instead of £100 parking charge. This has been repeated conduct in recent years, on the back of the Beavis case, where parking firms have almost unanimously contrived to add £60, or more, on top of the 'parking charge'. Members of both ATAs who have influence on their self-serving 'Trade Bodies' have even voted to have this imaginary 'damages/debt collection' sum added to their respective two Codes of Practice, to create a veil of legitimacy, no doubt to allow their members to confuse consumers and to enable them to continue to 'get away with it' in several court areas which are still allowing this double recovery.

26.3.3. That N244 application to try to protect the cartel-like position of some of the 'bigger player' parking firms, was placed before the area Circuit Judge and a hearing was held on 11th November 2019, with other parking charge cases in that circuit remaining struck out or stayed, pending the outcome. The Defendants successfully argued on points including a citation of the CRA 2015 and the duty of the court to apply the 'test of fairness' to a consumer notice (a statutory duty that falls upon the courts, whether a consumer raises the issue or not). All three points below were robustly upheld by District Judge Grand, sitting at the Southampton Court, who agreed that:

(a) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was in breach of POFA, due to paras 4(5) and 4(6).

(b) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge (howsoever argued or constructed) was unconscionable, due to the Beavis case paras 98, 193, 198 and 287.

(c) The Claimant knew or should have known, that £160 charge where the additional 'recovery' sum was in small print, hidden, or in the cases before him, not there at all, is void for uncertainty and in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14.

26.3.4. At the hearing, the Judge refused their request to appeal. It was successfully argued that the parking firm's consumer notice stood in breach of the CRA 2015, Schedule 2 (the 'grey list' of terms that may be unfair) paragraphs 6, 10 and 14. Using the statutory duty upon the Courts to consider the test of fairness and properly apply schedule 2 of the CRA 2015 it was irrelevant whether or not the consumers' defences had raised it before, which they had not. The same issues apply to this claim.

26.3.5. A transcript will be publicly available shortly. In his summing up, it was noted that District Judge Grand stated: ''When I come to consider whether the striking out of the whole claim is appropriate, that the inclusion of the £60 charge means that the whole claim is tainted by it, the claimant should well know that it is not entitled to the £60. The very fact that they bring a claim in these circumstances seems to me that it is an abuse of process of the court, and in saying that, I observe that with any claim that can be brought before the court that if a party doesn't put in a defence to the claim, default judgments are entered. So, the Claimant, in bringing the claims is, in other cases, aware that if the defendant doesn’t submit a defence, the Claimant is going to get a judgment of a knowingly inflated amount. So I conclude by saying that I dismiss the application to set aside Judge Taylor’s ruling.''

26.4. Consumer notices - such as car park signs - are not excused by the CRA 'core exemption'. The CMA Official Government Guidance to the CRA says: ''2.43 In addition, terms defining the main subject matter and setting the price can only benefit from the main exemption from the fairness test ('the core exemption') if they are transparent (and prominent) – see part 3 of the guidance.'' and at 3.2 ''The Act includes an exemption from the fairness test in Part 2 for terms that deal with the main subject matter of the contract or the adequacy of the price, provided they are transparent and prominent. (This exemption does not extend to consumer notices but businesses are unlikely to wish to use wording that has no legal force to determine 'core' contractual issues).'' The parking industry is the exception to this rule because they have no consumer 'customers' yet are consumer-facing. Their intention is very clearly in many cases (including this case) for a consumer not to see the onerous terms hidden in their notices and it is averred that no regard is paid to consumer law.

26.5. The definition of a consumer notice is given at 1.19 and the test of fairness is expanded at 1.20: ''A consumer notice is defined broadly in the Act as a notice that relates to rights or obligations between a trader and a consumer, or a notice which appears to exclude or restrict a trader’s liability to a consumer. It includes an announcement or other communication, whether or not in writing, as long as it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to be seen or heard by a consumer. Consumer notices are often used, for instance, in public places such as shops or car parks as well as online and in documentation that is otherwise contractual in nature. [...] Consumer notices are, therefore, subject to control for fairness under the Act even where it could be argued that they do not form part of the contract as a matter of law. Part 2 of the Act covers consumer notices as well as terms, ensuring that, in a broad sense any wording directed by traders to consumers which has an effect comparable to that of a potentially unfair contract term is open to challenge in the same way as such a term. There is no need for technical legal arguments about whether a contract exists and whether, if it does, the wording under consideration forms part of it.''

1.  In December 2019 in a different Court circuit, Deputy District Judge Joseph sitting at Warwick County Court had clearly heard about the decisions affecting the IOW, Hampshire, Dorset and Wiltshire circuit because he summarily struck out multiple parking ticket claims from various firms all due to the adding of the false £60 costs to £100 parking charge, that already indisputably (in law and case law) includes those costs.

27.1. The Judge determined that ''it is an abuse of process for the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover.'' further, in issuing his Orders striking out several £160 parking claims without a hearing (JH/013) , the Judge stated that he had ''considered S71(2) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 for the fairness of the contract terms and determined that the provision of the additional charge breached examples 6, 10 and 14''.

1.  In summary, the Claimant's particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all. The Claimant's vexatious conduct from the outset has been intimidating, misleading, harassing and indeed untrue in terms of the added costs alleged and the statements made.

1. The Defendant is of the view that this Claimant knew or should have known that to claim in excess of £100 for a parking charge on private land is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA 2015, and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

1. If this claim is not summarily struck out for the same reasons as the Judges cited in the multiple Caernarfon, Southampton, IOW and Warwick County Court decisions, then due to this Claimant knowingly proceeding with a claim that amounts to an abuse of process, full costs will be sought by the Defendant at the hearing, such as are allowable pursuant to CPR 27.14.

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Defendant

Signed

Coupon-mad

Beavis Vs ParkingEye 2015 case JH/004

You don't put that in evidence at all (you have already quoted the paras 98, 193 and 198 that matter)

Re the POFA issue, you need to append Excel v Smith - get it from the Parking Prankster's case law pages online.

Are there judgments striking out a UKCPM case for abuse of process?  I thought it was VCS, Britannia, Spring and Excel?

Also, that ending is older than the words used in a couple of defences I've written in the past week that now include the Skipton case as well (another strike out!).

1505grandad

All paras should be sequentially numbered - perhaps a formatting error while c & p?

Just a skim read but checking you are quoting evidence numbers in accordance with the list i .e.:-

PRIMACY OF CONTRACT

Many of the residents residing in the material location are also tennants, and the Tenancy agreement also makes no reference to parking restrictions, and on 4 (4.7) (JH/011) states ‘Where the landlord’s interest is derived from another lease (“The Headlease”) then it is agreed that the tenant will observe the restrictions in the Headlease applicable to the property.”   -   deals with T.A.

but heading states:-

IPC Signage Guidance JH/11

JP26

Thanks @Coupon-mad , the UKCPM case that was struck out for abuse of process was taken from your post on page two here (Manchester Court):

https://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/discussion/6014081/abuse-of-process-district-judge-tells-bwlegal/p2

I'll get rid off the Beavis vs Parking eye evidence, and replace it with Excel V Smith. Is there a partiucular part in the POFA section I should reference this case?

I have also amended the last three paragraphs to more recent wording:

7.   In summary, the Claimant's Particulars disclose no legal basis for the sum claimed and it is the Defendant's position that the poorly pleaded claim discloses no cause of action and no liability in law for any sum at all.  The Defendant is of the view that this Claimant knew or should have known that an exaggerated claim in excess of £100 for a parking charge which cannot have the same costs added again, is disallowed under the CPRs, the Beavis case, the POFA and the CRA.  

18.  Given the fact that this is a disproportionate, unconscionable and exaggerated claim, it is an abuse of process and relief from sanctions should be refused.  Merely disallowing the added 'debt collection/admin fee/damages/indemnity' sum on a case-by-case basis for those relatively few Defendants who see their cases through to a hearing, as has been happening in recent years, is not enough and fails to pay due regard to the interests of consumers.

19.  The Court is invited to summarily strike out the entire claim, as other Court circuits continue to do.  A copy of a judgment or order striking out a similar claim is attached to this defence and the Court is invited to use it as a draft order under the Court's own case management powers and exercise their duty under the CRA 2015, s71(2).

Other than that I think my Witness Statement is as ready as it'll ever be!

JP26

@1505grandad Thanks for spotting that, I'll print the WS off and cross referecne all the evidence numbers to check there are no erros.

Le_Kirk

However without any information about a 'contract' or £100 parking charge risk, nor did it say that display was a legal obligation or that signage terms formed part of the permit scheme. It appeared innocuous, just a courtesy permit to show i was not trespassing, and by having it foisted upon me I certainly did NOT agree to chargeable terms or knew about any 'contract' I was supposedly entering into.

This does not flow, it reads as if you have finished one style and started another, maybe better as: -

However without any information about a 'contract' or £100 parking charge risk, or did it say that display was a legal obligation or that signage terms formed part of the permit scheme, it appeared innocuous, just a courtesy permit to show I was not trespassing and, by having it foisted upon me, I certainly did NOT agree to chargeable terms or know about any 'contract' I was supposedly entering into.

JP26

Thanks @Le_Kirk made some more amendments, I also had a closer look at the lease and it clearly defines the parking area as 'Demised Premises' so it's not covered by the clause BW legal highlighted in their WS.

I'm just hoping that me not being a party to the lease, and instead holding a permit that a friend renting the flat provided to me, makes my whole primacy of contract arugment null.

My WS is annotated and numbered, all 69 pages. I will be delivering to the court tomorrow AM and emailing to BW legal tomorrow before the 4pm deadline, making sure to copy myself on the email as evidence of proof of delivery.

Do I need to serve a copy to the Claimant as well ( Bristol Parking Services) ?

nosferatu1001

Youre hoping it DOESNT make it null! 
You point out your friend has clearly authorised you to park there, and you dont have to be named on the lease to do so. ]69 pages?!?! How much added stuff are you adding? You dont exhibit all of the POFA, for eaxmple, nor all of Beavis, so not sure how youre up to 69 pages!
No. By serving on their sol, you serve on their client.