Funding APP scam reimbursement: 2.9p per Faster Payment proposed

eskbanker

EssexExile wrote: »

I'm just glad they are going to limit the levy to 2.9p. 3p would've been beyond the pale.

You might not have to wait long as it would be subject to annual review:

The level of the fee would be determined by the necessary size of the no blame fund and the volume of qualifying transactions. The fee would be set on a yearly basis by the Fund Administrator, with 4-8 weeks’ notice being provided before changes to the CRM Fee were implemented.

Having said that, the proposal document seems to envisage the 2019 payouts from the interim fund being reimbursed retrospectively from the new fund, so it may be that the level is higher initially than it'll settle down to be.

There's also the impact of Confirmation of Payee, which should generate a significant reduction in the level of APP scams when (if) it's finally implemented next year....

Anyway, apologies for crashing all over your punchline with po-faced serious stuff!

masonic

eskbanker wrote: »

There's also the impact of Confirmation of Payee, which should generate a significant reduction in the level of APP scams when (if) it's finally implemented next year....

A proportion of APP scams (including one or two people here have created threads about) involve the fraudsters gaining access to the account and then phoning the victim and convincing them to read out the authorisation codes for transactions the fraudster is making.

What would be nice to see is a warning at the start of authorisation SMS messages stating 'never give this code to anyone who contacts you and asks for it, even us'. That could be implemented immediately. Similar action could be taken in apps and could be printed on card readers, since I don't believe any bank uses codes generated by any of these to verify customers on the telephone.

londoninvestor

masonic wrote: »

What would be nice to see is a warning at the start of authorisation SMS messages stating 'never give this code to anyone who contacts you and asks for it, even us'. That could be implemented immediately. Similar action could be taken in apps and could be printed on card readers, since I don't believe any bank uses codes generated by any of these to verify customers on the telephone.

Indeed, and some banks are already there. Santander's OTP texts state (immediately before the code itself) "NEVER share this code, not even with Santander staff".

And Nationwide have a warning printed on the card readers.

Santander's payment screen in the web banking also picks up that you're paying a new recipient, and suggests you might want to set the payment date to tomorrow rather than today if you have second thoughts.

However, a good proportion of APP victims who fall for the line "we're your bank and we need you to move this money to a secure account" will probably also believe the scammers when they update their scripts to include "ignore that warning please, you're ok with us as we're a special secret security team"...

eskbanker

masonic wrote: »

A proportion of APP scams (including one or two people here have created threads about) involve the fraudsters gaining access to the account and then phoning the victim and convincing them to read out the authorisation codes for transactions the fraudster is making.

What would be nice to see is a warning at the start of authorisation SMS messages stating 'never give this code to anyone who contacts you and asks for it, even us'. That could be implemented immediately. Similar action could be taken in apps and could be printed on card readers, since I don't believe any bank uses codes generated by any of these to verify customers on the telephone.

Yes, in one of those recent threads I quoted the wording Santander use in their OTP messages, which seems appropriate to me (and will doubtless be considered an Effective Warning for the purposes of the CRM code): "OTP to MAKE A (NEW) PAYMENT of £x to account ending nnnn. Please call us if this wasn't you. NEVER share this code, not even with Santander staff".

masonic

Good to know some banks are doing this.

Edit: just had a quick check back through my own messages and TSB also adopted similar wording around July, but several others are still failing to do so.

System

Thrugelmir wrote: »

Perhaps the issue is that the charging system should be fairer. With say a basic account charge of £3-£5 a month. Rather than those that borrow meeting the costs of those that don't.

In lots of countries e.g US - you can still get free banking but you just have to deposit your salary or maintain a minimum balance.

eskbanker

Seems that this is back in the news again - Which? and UK Finance have ramped up the rhetoric today, pointing out that time is running out to get something agreed before an imminent deadline (sounds familiar!):
https://press.which.co.uk/whichstatements/which-and-britains-biggest-banks-urge-pay-uk-to-back-vital-scams-reimbursement-funding-proposal/

to which Pay UK are getting a bit defensive, pointing out that consultation only completed last week: https://www.wearepay.uk/pay-uk-response-to-which-comments-on-scams-reimbursement/